


Articles by James A. Caporaso and Alan L.

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Daniel W. Fleitas, William J. Crotty



Sidney Tarrow

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Psychological Sources of Political Belief:
Self-Esteem and Isolationist Attitudes

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ARTICLES

- 341 **The Urban-Rural Cleavage in Political Involvement: The Case of France.** Rural France is often seen as culturally isolated and politically uninvolved. Using a combination of community studies and survey evidence, one can show that the lack of declared interest in politics of rural Frenchmen seems to mean an absence of involvement in the party system rather than a passivity toward public life. Nevertheless rural France produces higher voting turnouts in local and national elections than are found in other sections or population groups.

The weakness of *partisan* involvement, as opposed to *citizen* involvement, seems to bespeak not merely apathy, but actual hostility, toward party politics. This political hostility is widespread among French workers but is politically more important among French peasants. Thus voting choices are less party-oriented precisely where urban-based campaign organizations are least effective. Local non-party notables therefore probably play a greater brokerage role in national election campaigns, and election results are less predictable than in the rural sectors of many other societies. The degree of antipartisanship in rural constituencies also seems to encourage candidates to avoid national party labels in election campaigns.

Three kinds of factors are suggested to account for both the high citizen involvement and the low partisan involvement: First, historically, the extension of the suffrage to the rural periphery long before the French party system was capable of the same kind of penetration may have habituated rural Frenchmen to the exercise of the vote in a non-partisan context. Second, the achievement of stable landholding for most peasants removes visible class conflict as a legitimizing factor for party organization, while an extensive interest group structure increases the tendency to keep informed, to participate, and to run for local office. Third, the political ecology of the French village both encourages high citizen involvement and discourages partisan involvement. While many of these factors are universal among peasant societies, the particular historical, sociological, and ecological configuration of the French village seems to produce a rural resident who is more informed and active than our inherited wisdom would suggest, but less partisan than are urban citizens with similar levels of involvement.

By SIDNEY TARROW, Associate Professor of Political Science, Yale University.

- 358 **Trends in Popular Support for the Wars in Korea and Vietnam.** In an examination of responses to public opinion poll questions designed to assess the degree of generalized support for the wars in Korea and Vietnam, popular support for the two wars was found to follow highly similar patterns. Support was high initially but declined as a logarithmic function of American casualties, a function remarkably similar for both wars. While support for the war in Vietnam did finally drop below those levels found during the Korean War, it did so only after the fighting had gone on considerably longer and only after American casualties had greatly surpassed those of the earlier war. These trends seem to have been fairly impervious to particular events in either of the wars.

It is suggested that the greater vocal opposition to the Vietnam War reflects mainly a shift of opinion within the intellectual left on the wisdom of the two wars. Armed with new techniques of protest learned in its identification with the civil rights movement, the intellectual left has been able effectively to garner great attention for its cause during the Vietnamese War.

Also noted was the presence of a rather large body of opinion inclined to follow the President on war policy, giving him considerable room for maneuver, at least in the short run, and making public opinion in this area highly sensitive to current policy.

A crude comparison with data from World War II suggests that, while the earlier war was unquestionably more "popular" than the wars in Korea and Vietnam, support was less consensual than might be expected. The popularity of the Korean War rose slowly after its conclusion, but this sort of retrospective support for World Wars I and II may have declined as time went by and, at any rate, was quite sensitive to current events.

In repeated instances, differences in question wording were found to alter substantially the response generated to poll questions about the wars.

By JOHN E. MUELLER, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Rochester.

- 376 **Prescription and Description in Political Thought: The Case for Hobbes.** In seeking a basis for political obligation in the "facts" of human nature, Hobbes has created a major problem for students of political theory. Recent scholarly debate has suggested that we understand Hobbes *either* as a descriptive and analytic theorist, *or* as a normative theorist. While this logical distinction has didactic value, it is apt to produce a misunderstanding of the dynamics of political thinking. All discourse does not rest upon logic: we must distinguish political argumentation, which often goes beyond the confines of logic by manipulating our factual perceptions, from disinterested philosophical debate, which aims at clarity.

Hobbes manipulates his readers' perceptions in such a manner as to preclude a number of assumptions underlying traditional moral arguments for political disobedience. While moral argument (at least of a sort) is *possible*, it is not *necessary* to the argument of the *Leviathan*. Hobbes grounds political obligation on one situational and two psychophysiological postulates: man's most fundamental concern is self-preservation; his passions lead him into situations of conflict which give rise to intense feelings of fear; this fear has an "enlightening value," transforming human behavior from the merely reflexive to the contrived. Terror hence provides a strategy of fear-avoidance, a logic of survival to which the individual must conform in order to avoid future encounters with death.

Thus, while Hobbes's answer to the problem of political obligation is nonmoral in the traditional sense, it is more than merely prudential. Hobbes's conception of homeostasis as informed by fear is, like morality, both universal and imperative. The natural law binds not because it is "good" but because its violation is too frequently accompanied by an all-consuming terror which the ordinary man cannot withstand.

By BLAIR CAMPBELL, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of California at Los Angeles.

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- 389 **Issue Salience and Party Choice.** A number of leading studies of voting behavior in recent years have concluded that specific issues are not a salient element in the electoral decision. These studies have indicated not only that voters are unfamiliar with most issues, but also that the electorate is generally unable to detect differences between Republican and Democratic positions on issues. Using the same Survey Research Center interviews upon which these previous findings were based, this article modifies these previous evaluations. This study concentrates on data from the 1964 election—a campaign that was notable *not* for the issues it raised, but rather for the public's strong reactions to the candidates. The findings in this article show that, even in 1964, most people were concerned with a number of specific issues and that these issue concerns had a very measurable effect on voting choice. Furthermore, large proportions of people were able accurately to perceive the differences between the parties on those issues that were salient to them. The major reason these findings are so different from previous results is that new measures and a different approach were used—particularly open-ended interview material that for the first time allowed the researcher to discover the issues that were salient to the voter.

By DAVID E. REPASS, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Connecticut.

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- 401 **Psychological Sources of Political Belief: Self-Esteem and Isolationist Attitudes.** Research has shown that political attitudes spring from diverse sources. This paper focuses on isolationism, a set of beliefs that can stem from social factors (e.g., economic deprivation, poor education, social or geographic isolation) and from psychological factors (e.g., *n.* aggression, inflexibility and low self-esteem). The purpose is not to demonstrate again that there is a connection between personality and political belief. Instead, the authors ask whether or not it matters if a political attitude—in the present case, isolationism—stems from personality influences rather than from some other sources, for example, education, group memberships, or ideology. Isolationists low in self-esteem are shown to differ from those high in self-esteem on a range of values and beliefs: liberalism-conservatism, extreme political values, and specific foreign policy questions. Thus, those who hold common beliefs on one set of issues are likely to differ in the opinions they hold on other political questions depending on whether they owe their convictions to their personality characteristics or to some other influence.

By PAUL M. SNIDERMAN, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Stanford University; and JACK CITRIN, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of California at Berkeley.

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- 418 **Economic and Political Integration in Europe: A Time-Series Quasi-Experimental Analysis.** Changes in political decision-making outputs and trading activities in the European Economic Community are examined around three quasi-experimental events (formation of the EEC in 1958, first agricultural package in 1962, and the agricultural crisis in 1965–66). On the basis of a preliminary analysis, nine variables were selected for inclusion in the study (three political decision variables and six trade indicators); these were then subjected to "interrupted time-series analysis," through which the quasi-experimental effects of the three events were assessed for statistical significance (*t*-tests and autocorrelation measures) and theoretical validity (through the elimination of plausible rival interpretations).

Political integration in the EEC is viewed as (1) positive growth in system indicators, and (2)

increased mutual responsiveness among the major components or subsystems of the EEC. Results of the quasi-experimental analyses suggest that despite high positive growth in the selected variables, mutual responsiveness among system parts remains quite low; therefore, the principal conclusion drawn is that the EEC is a "weakly" integrating system—a collection of structures growing rapidly in many directions, with each structure very imperfectly responsive to the behavior of others.

The paper urges and attempts to demonstrate the methodological usefulness of applying the logic of experimentation to ex-post-facto research. This approach entails the demonstration that non-random variation in independent and dependent variables has occurred, that these variables are related in some way, and that the relationship is nonspurious—that is, that the important confounding variables have been controlled by eliminating plausible rival hypotheses through statistical and analytical procedures.

By JAMES A. CAPORASO, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Northwestern University; and ALAN L. PELOWSKI, Instructor of Political Science, Lancaster University, Lancaster, England.

- 434 **Bandwagon and Underdog Effects in Minimal-Information Elections.** This investigation is based on an experimental study of voting behavior in what the author terms a minimal-information election. This type of election is characterized by a dearth of public information about election issues and partisan considerations, so that the campaign is waged primarily on the basis of the voters' attitudes toward the candidates as personalities. In general, the minimal-information election most often characterizes local nonpartisan contests.

The experiment examined changes in voting that appeared to result from electioneering strategies designed to elicit "bandwagon" or "underdog" responses. These strategies consisted of presenting the "electorate" with the results of pre-election preferential polls, as well as qualitative information explicitly aimed at arousing the emotions of the voters.

The experiment clearly demonstrated that mere poll results are insufficient to impel would-be bandwagon or underdog identifiers to switch their votes. Rather, this type of behavior does not appear until a strong qualitative stimulus sensitizes or cues bandwagon or underdog tendencies among the voters.

By DANIEL W. FLEITAS, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of North Carolina at Charlotte.

- 439 **Party Effort and Its Impact on the Vote.** The effect of party activities on the vote, while a fundamentally important question for any understanding of party operations, has received little research attention. This neglect has come about partly because the analysis is difficult to conceptualize and because the data have to be generated principally by the investigator. In addition, structural variables relevant to the nature of the environment in which the parties compete must be introduced into the analysis, and the canvas must be broad enough to permit comparative assessments within a controlled research design.

The present study sets out to deal with precisely these problems. It analyzes the contribution of the competing parties' efforts to the final vote in elections for five levels of office, from local to national, in 100 North Carolina counties.

Multiple correlation analysis was used to judge the association between the final vote and three sets of independent variables: demographic, institutional (specifically the extent of competition between the contending parties), and political, with emphasis on those associated with campaigning. The variance explained by each is described, as well as the total contribution of all to understanding the outcome of the election.

The variables proved quite successful in explaining the final vote. The strength of the associations increased as one proceeded from the local to the national level, and party output measures proved more impressive contributors to explaining the votes in competitive as against non-competitive areas. Overall, the variables relating to party effort were found to add significantly to the understanding of the election outcomes.

By WILLIAM J. CROTTY, Associate Professor of Political Science, Northwestern University.

- 451 **Statistical Models of Senate Roll Call Voting.** This paper uses statistical analysis to consider what factors influence the way senators vote and how important these influences are. The answers are specific statements about individual senators' decision processes, and quantitative estimates of the weights applied to the different variables in these models. The form of the voting models and the variables in them were developed from hypotheses about individual decision-making and descriptions of the legislative process. Examples of the variables are the preferences of the senator's

constituency, the opinions of his party leader, and the views of the President. Quantitative measures of the variables were obtained from state demographic characteristics and by Guttman-scaling the votes on passage of the amendments to specific bills considered in 1961 and 1962. Linear regression analysis of these Guttman scales was then used to test the hypotheses and estimate the coefficients in each senator's voting model. After the results from these analyses are discussed, the explanatory power of these models on individual bills is evaluated by comparing the vote they estimate with those predicted using two alternative models.

By JOHN E. JACKSON, Assistant Professor of Government, Harvard University.

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- 471 Predicting Voting Patterns in the General Assembly.** This project attempts to relate a large number of potential predictors to voting data generated at the United Nations. Numerous associations were found when the predictors, 77 in all, were related to 13 different kinds of voting scores. Because of considerable redundancy in both sets of data, national attribute and voting, the results were factor analyzed and the original variables were reduced to 14 sets of factor scores representing the national attribute data, and 4 representing the voting data. Several significant associations emerged from the intercorrelation of these two sets of factor scores, with the independent variables "Economic Development," "Democracy," and "U.S. Relations" exhibiting considerable predictive power. When the overall relationships between the two sets of data were assessed by use of the canonical correlation technique, "Economic Development" received the greatest weight on the national attribute side, and "Eastern Voting" on the voting (dependent variable) side. These findings accord well with previous research, in that "Economic Development" seems to predict negativism as revealed by voting. Thus "Economic Development" appears to be fundamentally related to certain schisms at the United Nations, with the representatives from the most developed states appearing the most "negative" as evidenced by questionnaire responses and voting behavior. Such orientations are likely to have a significant impact on the evolution of the organization.

At a theoretical level, the present findings may have considerable relevance for both Social Field theory and Attribute theory.

By JACK E. VINCENT, Associate Professor of Political Science, Florida Atlantic University and University of Hawaii.

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The Urban-Rural Cleavage in Political Involvement: The Case of France*

SIDNEY TARROW

Yale University

Of the many cleavages that score the political landscapes of modern nations, the gap between urban and rural society is perhaps the most intriguing and the least understood. While the industrial worker follows the timeclock, the peasant is apparently imprisoned by the inexorable march of the seasons in a community that time seems to have forgotten. Does this cultural isolation cut him off from the national political community, or create a delay in the reception of political symbols or produce in the peasant simply a qualitatively different citizen than his urban compatriot?

If we look only to the most isolated remnants of traditional peasant society or study rural communities without comparing them to urban ones we may exaggerate the differences between peasants and other people as well as romanticizing the rural world. The consumer revolution, the demographic uprooting of two world wars and a depression, and the virtual stamping out of illiteracy have exposed the peasant to the joys and horrors of the wider universe. It would be peculiar if these changes had not brought with them a pattern of greater involvement in the national political community.

But integration need not imply imitation. Just as the peasant's possession of a television does not mean that he will retain the same information as his urban compatriots,¹ involvement in national politics need not make him an identical participant either. Rural communities sometimes retain many aspects of their traditional political posture but in forms that are compatible with their new position. Thus, as has been argued elsewhere, a traditional rural clientele system, instead of disappearing with the advent of national mass politics, may be integrated unchanged into the national political community through the party system.²

This is only another way of saying that national political communities may be highly integrated without becoming homogeneous—which

is precisely why it is impossible to measure "integration" as a subjective state. What is measurable—and may differ greatly from society to society—is the particular pattern of rural involvement in the national political community. Some classical patterns are: (1) the rural world is apathetic towards national politics, mediating its participation through effective interest group leaders, as in the United States; (2) the farmer participates more actively, through a farmers' or a largely rural party that defends his interests in national politics, as in Scandinavia; (3) the real adaptation takes place in the structures of the national, urban-based political parties as they attempt to penetrate the rural world, as in Southern Italy?³ The peasant may remain isolated culturally and geographically, and in one way or another still be involved in the political community.

In this paper, I want to investigate the urban-rural cleavage in political involvement in France, which, I shall argue, demonstrates a different pattern of rural integration into national politics than the three patterns listed above. My sources here are mainly secondary: historical studies of the peasants' relationship to national politics;⁴ published studies of French rural communities;⁵ and evidence from French

³ See Angus Campbell, et al, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1960); Chapter 14 offers strong support for this view. For Norway, see Henry Valen and Daniel Katz, *Political Parties in Norway* (London: Tavistock Publications, 1964), p. 27. For southern Italy, see Tarrow, *op. cit.*

⁴ The major historical studies are surveyed in Barrington Moore, Jr., *The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967); in Henri Mendras, *La Fin des Paysans: Innovations et Changement dans l'Agriculture Française* (Paris: S.E.D.E.I.S., 1967); and in Gordon Wright, *Rural Revolution in France* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964). These three studies and the following work, Jacques Fauvet and Henri Mendras, *Les Paysans et la Politique dans la France Contemporaine* (Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Cahier #94; Paris: A. Colin, 1958), were especially useful in the preparation of this article.

⁵ The major community studies are Laurence Wylie, et al, *Village in the Vaucluse* 2nd Ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1964); Laurence Wylie, et al., *Chanzéaux: A Village in Anjou* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966); Edgar Morin, *Commune en France: La Métamorphose de Plodémé* (Paris: Fayard, 1967); Lucien Bernot & Bernard Blancard, *Nouvelle* (Paris: Institut d'Ethnologie, 1953); and Julian Pitt-

* I would like to thank Suzanne Berger, Jean Blondel, Fred Greenstein, Mark Kesselman, Juan Linz and Laurence Wylie for comments on a draft of this paper.

¹ Michel Souchon, *La Télévision des Adolescents* (Paris: Les Éditions Ouvrières, 1969.)

² Sidney Tarrow, *Peasant Communism in Southern Italy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), ch. 12.

and comparative sample surveys.⁶ The choice of these very different types of evidence is in part inevitable, but mainly deliberate. By its very nature, the survey instrument flattens cross-sectional differences that historical studies, with their broad sweep, and community studies, with their urge to sniff everybody's stewpot, may exaggerate. In the process, it will be possible to say a good deal about the relative utility of all three types of evidence in studying rural political involvement in France and elsewhere.

I. Dimensions of Political Involvement

(a) **Interest in Politics.** Despite a long tradition of study, little clarity exists about the degree and character of the integration of the rural sector into French national politics. Given the cultural isolation of the peasant, many observers have emphasized how his response to national politics differs from that of his urban compatriots, and have inferred from this that rural France is poorly integrated into the national political community. As Georges Chaffard wrote of the reaction to May, 1968 in the French provinces, "Although the Parisian cauldron seemed like an impassioned moment in French history from the banks of the Seine . . . it did not penetrate at all deeply into the leathery tissue of peasant France."⁷

This view is supported by what we know of the stony individualism of the French peasant, who, according to Henri Mendras, "has the intimate conviction that his field is unique, because he is the only one to know it, to love it, and to own it."⁸ It is also sustained by what we know of the suspicious, anti-outsider subculture of the French village, based on the assumption that "the *ils* outside Peyrane," in Wylie's words, "are dangerous because they are anonymous, intangible and overpowering."⁹ In point of fact, many peasants today (forty-two percent of a national sample interviewed by the IFOP in 1966) own farms that have been in their families for less than a generation and many communities are less isolated than Wylie's perched village in the Vaucluse,¹⁰ but few would deny

the cultural isolation that has hindered the peasant's entry into the modern world.

In apparent harmony with these facts is the lack of interest in politics often expressed by rural Frenchmen. When asked whether they were "interested in politics" a great deal, somewhat, a little or not at all, fully one-half of the residents of towns of less than twenty thousand inhabitants answered "not at all," as opposed to thirty-seven percent in cities of more than one hundred thousand residents.¹¹ Similar questions in other surveys have turned up equal differentials between urbanites and rural dwellers in France.¹² Such survey results are familiar to students of other democratic systems, but show a greater gap in "interest in politics" between urban and rural France, where the statistical mode is usually found in the "least interested" response category. In most other countries, the largest group of respondents in both the urban and rural population is usually found in the intermediate response category. Some comparative survey findings from France, Finland and the United States are presented in Table 1 below.

Should we conclude, on the basis of this evidence, that rural France is very poorly integrated into the French political system? There would be much precedent for this conclusion in writings on peasants in French politics. But several characteristics of rural France should leave us uneasy with this line of reasoning. First, some observers have felt that interest in politics in rural France is very great. Traditional lore on rural France supports this latter view. Henri Mendras, a leading French rural sociologist, has written:

Our villages are almost always divided into two clans: the reds and the whites, the republicans and the reactionaries, the partisans of the school-teacher and those of the priest.¹³

Henry Ehrmann, a leading foreign observer, feels that the more personal quality of politics

Rivers, "Social Class in a French Village," *Anthropological Quarterly*, 33, no. 1 (1960).

⁶ The major source of survey materials on the French peasantry are two issues of *Sondages*; "L'information chez les Agriculteurs," 26, no. 1 (1964); and "Les Agriculteurs Français, Conditions de Vie et Opinions," 28, nos. 3-4 (1966), to be cited below as IFOP (Institut Français d'Opinion Publique), (1964) and IFOP (1966).

⁷ Georges Chaffard, *Les Orages de Mai* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1968), p. 10.

⁸ Mendras, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

⁹ Wylie, *Village in the Vaucluse*, p. 206.

¹⁰ Most of the village studies come from singular vil-

lages in relatively isolated parts of France: Roussillon (Wylie's Peyrane) in the Vaucluse, Plodèmet (*Commune en France*) on the tip of Brittany, Chanzeaux, virtually in the Vendée, and Magnac ("Social Class in a French Village") far off in the Pyrénées. There is no "typical" French village, but life is probably much less isolated to the peasant in the Loire Valley, the North or the East of France.

¹¹ "Le Retentissement des Événements de Mai 1968," *Sondages*, 31, nos. 1-2 (1969), p. 13.

¹² Emeric Deutsch, *et al.*, *Les Familles Politiques dans la France d'Aujourd'hui* (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1966), pp. 104-105. In this survey, only twenty-seven percent of the peasants interviewed declared themselves to have "much" or "some" interest in politics, compared to thirty-five percent of the general population.

¹³ In Fauvet and Mendras, *op. cit.*, p. 232.

Table 1. Degree of "Interest in Politics" for Urban and Rural Respondents, France, Finland and the United States

Degree of "Interest in Politics"	France ¹ (IFOP, 1969)		Finland ² (Pesonen, 1958)		United States ³ (SRC, 1960)		
	Less than 20,000 pop. (%)	More than 100,000 pop. (%)	Korpilahti, (4,276 pop.) (%)	Tampere, (140,000 pop.) (%)	Rural Farm Pop. (%)	Rural Non-farm (%)	Urban (%)
High	13	25	19	29	19	31	42
Medium	36	37	51	51	51	41	34
Low	50	37	30	20	30	28	24
Non-response	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total N	(**)	(**)	(501)	(97)	(121)	(209)	(767)

* Note: The categories "High", "Medium" and "Low" interest in politics are constructed in the following way: France and Finland, "High" = the survey categories "much interest" and "a great deal" of interest; "Medium" = "a little interest"; and "Low" = "no interest." In the United States, the index is drawn directly from the SRC's composite index of (a) interest in the campaign and (b) in its outcome.

** N's not provided by the IFOP in their report.

Sources: 1. *Sondages, Revue Française de l'Opinion Publique*, 31, Nos. 1 and 2 (1969), p. 13.

2. Pertti Pesonen, *An Election in Finland: Party Activities and Voter Reactions*, (New Haven, 1968), pp. 61 and 84.

3. A. Campbell, et al., *The American Voter*, (New York and London, 1960), p. 411.

in rural France endows it with greater interest. He points to

... the greater personal intensity experienced by the rural voter during the campaign and afterwards in his relations with his deputy. During the electoral campaign, the smaller the districts, the more fascinating became the personal confrontations of the candidates, their mutual accusations in the electoral materials, and the equally vehement discussions among their followers.¹⁴

The testimony of such talented observers cannot be sloughed off easily.

(b) Party Identification. A second perspective supports their view. Cross-national survey materials ought to be used judiciously when they touch upon cultural predispositions that few citizens could articulate intellectually, but which can adversely affect the comparability of the findings.¹⁵ The ostensibly bland survey item, "Est-ce que vous vous intéressez à la politique beaucoup, un peu ou pas du tout?" intended in the polls as a neutral measure of a person's interest in the sector of the social system we

call 'politics,' in France seems to tap a more controversial dimension—that of commitment to a political party and involvement in the conflict-strewn world of partisan politics.¹⁶ If "interest in politics" really meant to the voter "commitment to a political party," then we ought to reject it as a neutral measure of rural Frenchmen's involvement in politics, unless we meant by "involvement in politics" only involvement in the party system.

The tense connotation of the term "interest in politics" in France can be illustrated by a comparison of French election surveys over a long period of time. During the doldrums of the Vth Republic, in 1962 and 1966, thirty and thirty-five percent, respectively, of Frenchmen interviewed said they had no interest at all in politics. But during the birth pangs of the DeGaulle republic, in 1958, and during its death agony in the months after May, 1968, forty-three and forty-one percent, respectively, of interviewed Frenchmen denied having any interest in politics.¹⁷ It seems unlikely that the

¹⁴ Henry Ehrmann, *Politics in France* (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1968), p. 100.

¹⁵ For a general discussion of this problem in cross-national attitude research, and for a suggested attempt to solve it through the development of semi-projective interviewing techniques, see Fred I. Greenstein and Sidney Tarrow, "Comparative Political Socialization: Explorations with a Semi-Projective Procedure," *Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics* (Beverly Hills, California: 1971).

¹⁶ The techniques explored in the citation above turned up a great deal of wariness and suspicion even in French pre-adolescents when they were interviewed on political subjects. For a brief description of some of these interviews, see Fred I. Greenstein and Sidney Tarrow, "Children and Politics in Britain, France and the United States: Six Examples," *Youth and Society*, 2, no. 1, (September 1970), pp. 118-121.

¹⁷ The 1958, 1962 and 1969 results are summarized in *Sondages*, 31 (1969), nos. 1 and 2, p. 12. The 1966 figures are from Deutsch, et al., *Les Familles Politiques*, loc. cit., pp. 104-05.

level of political interest, objectively conceived, was falling as the Fifth Republic was being born and threatened. It appears more plausible that Frenchmen were withdrawing from *partisan* involvements as the regime and its political alignments were being transformed.

The logic of this discussion should become plain when we consider, first, that of all western democracies, France has the lowest percentage of party identifiers,¹⁸ and, second, that party identification—understood as psychological involvement in the party system—is clearly weakest in rural France. In survey after survey, the weakness of partisan affiliation in rural France has been underscored. When asked by interviewers of the SOFRES in 1966 to state a broad ideological preference, small town and rural Frenchmen were more likely than any other category to report no preference or to choose “the center” and declare very low political interest.¹⁹ Forty percent of the residents of communes of less than two thousand inhabitants are categorized by the SOFRES in this group,—which they picturesquely label “the marais”—as opposed to thirty-two percent of the sample as a whole.

Although the cross-national survey findings are mixed, in most western democracies strong party identification is generally rarer in the rural sector than in the cities.²⁰ But in France the incidence of “voting for the man rather than the party,” the lack of citizen interest in the national party affiliations of local candidates, and the claim, “Moi, je ne fais pas de politique,” are far more widespread in the villages than in the cities.²¹ If party identification is indeed so weak in rural France, and if Frenchmen interpret “interest in politics” as an affiliation with

political parties, then the low level of “interest in politics” that the surveys find in rural France may mean nothing more than weak party identification, and may tell us little about interest in politics at all, unless we mean by that term *only* partisan involvement in the political system.

c. Electoral Participation. What we have said so far leads to an apparent paradox. If the lack of declared “interest in politics” really means nonpartisanship and not low political involvement, then we still know nothing directly about the political involvement of rural Frenchmen. On the other hand, survey results in the United States and elsewhere show that the non-party identifier is less likely to participate in elections than the identifier. As Robert Lane writes:

... in general, party identifiers tend to vote more than those with no party loyalties at all; and those with strong identifications tend, in each party, to participate more in the election campaign than those with weak identifications.²²

If rural France is full of people whose psychological attachment to the party system is weak, and if partisans are more likely to participate than nonpartisans, we should find that voting turnout (and hence involvement) is dramatically lower in rural, than in urban, France.

Alas, this turns out not to be the case at all. On several more-or-less standard measures of participation, the French peasant scores *higher* than most of his urban compatriots: higher, in some cases, than those with more education. On others, levels of participation are comparable. Some of these measures are performe impressionistic or non-comparable. For example, a 1966 IFOP survey shows that thirty-two percent of the peasants interviewed had participated in demonstrations like the ones that broke out in Brittany in 1961. Similarly, twenty-four percent of the peasants interviewed by the IFOP reported that they were very interested in peasant movements in the rest of France. Although comparisons are difficult, perhaps only the general strike of May, 1968 had so strong a meaning for the French working class as these demonstrations had for the peasants. They showed that behind the mask of apparent organizational incapacity, the peasants have an enormous capacity for participation when the situation does not divide one from another.²³

²² Robert E. Lane, *Political Life: Why and How People Get Involved in Politics* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1959), p. 300, and Stein Rokkan, *Citizens, Elections, Parties* (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1970), p. 355.

²³ IFOP (1966) pp. 64-65; see the account of this also in Mendras, *op. cit.*, p. 275-79.

¹⁸ The standard source on this problem remains Philip Converse and Georges Dupeux, “The Politicization of the Electorate in France and the United States,” *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 26 (1962), p. 9. Partisan identification in France was slightly higher in 1967 than it was in 1958, when Converse and Dupeux’s data were collected, but was still lower than in most other countries. See, for example, Roy Pierce and Samuel H. Barnes, “Public Opinion and Political Preferences in France and Italy,” paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the APSA, Los Angeles, September 8-12, 1970, p. 3.

¹⁹ Deutsch, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 106-07.

²⁰ The relevant American findings can be found in Angus Campbell, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 405; for Germany, see Juan Linz, “The Social Bases of West German Politics” Diss. Columbia University 1959, pp. 787-89; for Finland, see Pertti Pesonen, *An Election in Finland* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 85; and for Norway, see Valen and Katz, *op. cit.*, p. 214.

²¹ For these points, see *Sondages*, 29, no. 3 (1967), p. 28; and Mark Kesselman, *The Ambiguous Consensus* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1967), p. 136; Jean Piret, “L’opinion au début de l’année 1965,” in *Revue Française de Science Politique*, 15, no. 3 (1965), p. 536.

Other measures of participation are more comparable between urban and rural France. The most obvious and important is the level of voting turnout. Electoral statistics show that turnout in local elections in France varies *inversely* with the size of the commune. In a study based upon three French departments, Kesselman showed that voting turnout in rural communes averaged eighty-two and one-half percent. In communes of more than two thousand inhabitants, only seventy-six percent of the eligible voters had voted. In national elections, the same study showed, the rural communes were two percent lower than communes with more than two thousand inhabitants—a difference that hardly suggests non-participation.²⁴

The polls show a much stronger picture of rural turnout and a weaker one of urban voting. An IFOP survey of 1951 reveals a broader pattern of participation on the farm: the abstention rate among farmers was seventeen percent; among people in commerce, industry and the professions, twenty-two percent; among workers twenty-three percent; and among white collar workers twenty-five percent.²⁵ More recent surveys show a similar result. Peasants vote more regularly than all other social groups, except for those at the very highest educational level. On the first ballot of the 1962 national elections, only businessmen (five percent) and managers (six percent) reported a lower abstention rate than peasants (nine percent). With about the same educational level as the peasants, fifteen percent of the workers reported non-voting, according to this survey. In a 1966 IFOP survey, eighty-nine percent of the peasants were "normal voters" (seventy-eight percent always voting and eleven percent voting often).²⁶ In 1969, eighty-one percent in towns of less than 20,000 population intended to vote, the same percentage as the sample as a whole.²⁶

This high rural turnout rate is underscored by the low voting rate among farmers in the United States, where the rate of "turnout variability" is forty-six percent for farmers, forty-three percent for rural non-farm respondents and thirty-nine percent for city-dwellers. In a Finnish election, twenty-three percent in a rural district did not vote, as opposed to twelve per-

cent of those polled in an industrial city. Only in Norway do surveys show higher voting levels among farmers than in the general population.²⁷

The high voting level in rural France is particularly striking when we recall that French elections are held so *often*. Since 1965, for example, Frenchmen have gone to the polls for one local election, one cantonal election, 2 presidential elections, a referendum and two legislative elections—a total of 11 times in five years, remembering the two ballot system used in local, presidential and legislative elections.

A plausible explanation for this high voting participation in rural France is sometimes offered. According to this view, elections in rural France are merely occasions on which social conformity requires one to vote. As Wylie writes of some of Chanzeaux's citizens; "... one of the tokens of their respectability is the fact that they do vote, even if they have nothing to vote for."²⁸

I do not think this explanation is very persuasive. For rural voters seem to have a rate of *objective* interest in elections that goes far beyond voting. In this respect, a careful study by Georges Dupeux shows that participation of various kinds in electoral campaigns is higher among the residents of rural communities than in the rest of French society.²⁹ When Dupeux combined several measures of campaign participation—(1) voting, (2) attendance at campaign meetings, (3) reading election posters and (4) trying to persuade others how to vote—he found that peasants and rural residents ranked higher than almost any other group—and highest of all, if only men are considered. Table 2 reproduces Dupeux's most important findings, but excludes the control for sex.

Thus the high rural voting turnout is probably not a result of social conformity, since it is accompanied by levels of campaign attention greater than would be compatible with that inference. The rural French voter is not apathetic, even if he is not a partisan. What has to be explained, then, is not only the high level of participation in rural France, but its combination with an absence of the partisan identifications we have come to assume as a necessary corollary (and even as a cause) of political involvement. How can the rural Frenchman be politically involved if he lacks the integrating

²⁴ Alain Lancelot, *L'Abstentionisme Électorale en France* (Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Cahiers #162; Paris: A. Colin, 1968), pp. 195-97.

²⁵ Lancelot, *ibid.*, p. 190.

²⁶ IFOP (1966) p. 83; and François Goguel, *Le Référendum d'Octobre et les Elections de Novembre, 1962* (Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Cahiers #142; Paris: 1965), p. 239; *Sondages*, 3, no. 3 (1969), p. 33.

²⁷ Campbell, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 406; Pesonen, *op. cit.*, p. 276; Valen and Katz, *op. cit.*, p. 158; also see Linz, *op. cit.*, p. 787.

²⁸ Wylie, *Chanzeaux*, p. 275.

²⁹ "Citizen Participation in Political Life: France," *International Social Science Journal*, 12, no. 1 (1960), pp. 41-42, for a description of the index used and pp. 45-47 for the data reported here.

Table 2. Participation Index by Place of Residence and by Occupation¹

	Participation Index			
	No.	High	Moderate	Low
<i>Place of Residence</i>				
0-2,000	328	25.0	31.0	44.0
2,000-20,000	267	13.5	41.5	45.0
20,000-100,000	133	15.0	36.0	49.0
Over 100,000	142	15.0	35.0	50.0
<i>Occupation, Head of Family</i>				
Farmers	91	24.0	35.0	41.0
Prof, Executives	59	27.0	35.5	37.5
Artisans, Trade	127	20.5	36.0	43.5
Clerical	162	19.0	41.0	40.0
Workers	257	15.0	37.0	48.0
No Occup. or Retired	173	14.5	29.0	56.5

1. Source: G. Dupeux, "Citizen Participation in Political Life: France," *International Social Science Journal*, 12, no. 1 (1960), pp. 45-47.

psychological involvement in the electoral contest afforded by partisan identification? On the other hand, how can he be politically uninvolved if he participates so fully in both national and local electoral contests? Is there something in the way we conceptualize political involvement that makes these findings appear ambiguous when they should not be?

II. The Dynamics of Political Involvement

This way of posing the problem makes explicit what has grown implicitly out of the discussion thus far: that since rates of electoral participation and levels of partisan identification are less than perfectly matched in rural France, the two dimensions should be separated analytically, even though they seem to be closely related empirically in research settings like the United States. Without bothering too much about nomenclature, we may say that political involvement consists of two major dimensions: a) citizen involvement, and particularly a belief in, and regular exercise of, the vote and; b) partisan involvement, or an approach to the political system that uses partisan identification as a mental economizing device. Expressing these dimensions typologically, we can say that there are four theoretical categories of participants:

Partisan Involvement	Citizen Involvement		
	High	Low	
	High	Partisans	Outsiders
	Low	Nonpartisans	Parochials

Those who vote regularly, using party as an organizing principle, we will call *partisans* (this implies no intensity of involvement); those who vote regularly but lack that partisan perspective on the political community we will call, for the moment, *nonpartisans*; those citizens who neither vote nor have a partisan approach to participation we can call *parochials*; and those who, despite a partisan identification, do not vote, we will call *outsiders*. The total balance among these types in any democratic society will say a great deal about its political dynamics, and probably relate closely to the historical relationship between the expansion of the suffrage and the extension of the party system. It should also differentiate analytically between social and demographic groups within the same society in terms of the ratio between "partisans" and "nonpartisans" within the stable voters of each group. Traditional lore about the peasantry would lead us to suspect that most rural voters in France would be found in the bottom right-hand quadrant, among the "parochials." Looking, first, at citizen involvement, and, second, at partisan involvement, and then at the two variables in combination, we shall see that this is not the case.

There are three potential ways of operationalizing what I have called citizen involvement: first, by the frequency of actual participation; second, by the value placed on the norm of voting; and, third, on the citizen's stated determination to vote in a particular election. Since we are interested in voters' orientations, and not directly in their behavior, the first measure seems less than perfect, and since a voter's expression of the "norm of voting" may be ritualistic, so is the second. The determination to exercise the vote may serve as an adequate indicator of citizen involvement, since it combines intended behavior with personal conviction, but is primarily attitudinal.

In the January, 1967 IFOP survey to be analyzed here,³⁰ a sample of close to two thousand Frenchmen were asked:

- a. Do you intend to vote on Sunday, March 5th, on the first ballot?
- b. (if yes) To what extent are you decided you are going to vote; would you say it is absolutely certain, that there is a good chance you will vote, or that it isn't certain?

Those who answered positively on the first part of the question and then said they were "absolutely certain" they were going to vote on the

³⁰ Survey No. ER 170, provided by courtesy of the Roper Center for Opinion Research.

second were scored "high" on citizen involvement; all those who were less than certain, including those with no intention to vote, were scored low. The results, for the sample as a whole, and for the five basic classes of communes, are as follows:

Table 3. Citizen Involvement, Based Upon the Certainty of Voting, by Demographic Class of Community (IFOP, Jan. 1967)

	0-2,000 pop. (%)	2,000-20,000 pop. (%)	20,000- 100,000 pop. (%)	Over 100,000 pop. (%)	Paris Region (%)	Total (%)
Certain voters	77.2	82.6	78.8	78.5	81.2	79.1
Uncertain and non-voters	22.8	17.4	21.2	21.5	21.5	20.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total N.	708	270	241	381	345	1945

$X^2 = 4.1$ with 4 degrees of freedom.

Not Significant

As the table shows, voters in communes of less than 2000 inhabitants are right near the national average in the percentage who are "absolutely certain" to vote in the legislative elections of March, 1967. Moreover, if we look at communities of between two and twenty thousand inhabitants, a larger than average percentage declare themselves to be certain voters. The statistics for all demographic groups are very close to the national average, and there is no linear relationship between certainty of voting and community size. The interesting question is: "How do these largely invariate relationships interact with partisan involvement in the survey population?"

The search for an adequate operational measure of partisan identification presents problems familiar to many researchers outside the United States. In countries in which parties have appeared, disappeared and changed their nomenclature frequently, the ordinary voter may find it difficult to articulate to survey researchers his "underlying partisan predisposition" even when he has one.³¹ Many partisan voters seem to think in terms of *tendance*, rather than party, and others hesitate to reveal their affiliations. This is particularly the case in France and Italy, where those voters most likely to have a strong attachment to their party—the Communists—may oppose the very regime they live under. Rural voters, as well as claiming the status of "independent" more frequently than others, are also most likely to "not remember" whom they last voted for.

³¹ For a discussion of some of these problems, see Pierce and Barnes, "Public Opinion and Political Preferences in France and Italy," *op. cit.*, pp. 2-3.

This large nonresponse category would be less deterring if we knew that it represented only habitual party identifiers disguising their affiliations. But it also obviously includes a "real" category of casual voters who cannot remember their last voting choice and a certain

number of non-voters unwilling to admit that they did not vote. Almost forty percent of the non-respondents on a question about their probable future vote in a 1965 French survey lived in communes of less than 2,000 inhabitants.³²

Given this problem, it was decided to use as an operational measure of partisanship one that did not tie the respondent to a particular party and did not require him to declare for whom he habitually voted at all, but simply asked (in a survey administered before the election campaign began) whether or not he had *decided* for whom he would vote. Surveys administered in other countries have shown that voters who make up their minds before the campaign begins are more likely to be strong partisans than either weak partisans or independents. This is true in the United States, in Finland and in Great Britain.³³ French studies have shown that those whose partisanship we know to be strong—the Communist identifiers—habitually make a voting choice long before the election.³⁴ This would seem to legitimize the technique of using

³² *Sondages*, 28, no. 2 (1966), p. 14.

³³ See, for this point, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard R. Berelson and Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice*, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948), p. 55; Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld and William N. McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), pp. 128 ff; Campbell, *et al.*, *The American Voter*, *op. cit.*, pp. 78 ff; Pesonen, *An Election in Finland*, *op. cit.*, pp. 82-83; David Butler and Donald Stokes, *Political Change in Britain* (NY: St. Martin's Press, 1970), p. 428.

³⁴ For evidence about Communist identifiers, see *Sondages*, 29 (1967) no. 3, p. 47. In any case, the risk involved in this procedure seems preferable to the risks involved in using declared party identification literally.

Table 4. Partisan Involvement, Based Upon the Time of Voting Choice, by Demographic Class of Community (IFOP, Jan. 1967)

	0-2,000 pop. (%)	2000- 20,000 pop. (%)	20,000- 100,000 pop. (%)	Over 100,000 pop. (%)	Paris Region (%)	Total (%)
Voting choice made before campaign	26.8	35.2	36.5	34.1	43.2	33.5
Voting choice un- decided or unclear	73.2	64.8	63.5	65.9	56.8	66.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total N.	708	270	241	381	345	1945

$\chi^2 = 34.9$ with 4 degrees of freedom.
 $p < .001$.

the variable of the period of voting decision (before or during the campaign) as a "stand-in" for an adequate direct measure of partisan identification.

Proceeding on this basis, we find, in the same January, 1967 survey analyzed above, that three-quarters of the voters in French villages did not yet know for whom they would vote (and this includes some voters who were not certain they would vote at all) in the March legislative election of that year, compared to two-thirds of the voters interviewed in larger towns and cities, and fifty-six percent of the voters interviewed in the Paris region. Thus, while more than forty-percent of the respondents in Paris had already chosen their candidates two months before the election, and about one-third had done so in most other French communities, only one-quarter of those interviewed in the villages had made a pre-campaign choice.

Two comments seem useful before proceeding to an examination of the relationship between the certainty of voting and the early choice of a candidate in urban and rural France. First, the traditional—and probably correct—interpretation of deferred voting choice in America is the voter's uncertainty caused by attitudinal cross-pressures.³⁵ It is certainly not in our armory of inherited wisdom to see the French rural voter in this way. Second, voters who have not made up their minds (and who cannot be written off as abstainers) have a greater tendency to be influenced by the election campaign, and might be expected to be the target of intensive campaign propaganda. But the fact that they are found disproportionately dispersed in villages inhibits the effectiveness of urban-based campaign efforts. If they were disproportionately non-regu-

lar voters, this would reduce the politicians' risks in not seeking to influence their vote. But, as we can see in Table 5, by far the largest group of respondents in communes of less than 2,000 inhabitants are citizens who 1) are certain they will vote and 2) had not made a voting choice at the start of the election campaign.

In Table 5, the two variables analyzed in Tables 3 and 4 have been cross-tabulated in terms of the typology of "citizen and partisan involvement" above. As the table shows, the "nonpartisans" are the modal category in each class of commune except Paris, where the proportions of partisans and nonpartisans are almost equal. In the smallest communes, the percentage of "nonpartisans" is greatest and the partisans are less than twenty-five percent of the surveyed population. There are slightly more "parochials" in the villages than in the other classes of communes, but this group is less than twenty percent of the surveyed population in all cases. There are, as expected, very few "outsiders," but this may result jointly from the nature of the population and the type of operational indicators we have used.

The Table verifies what we have suspected all along: that there are in France numbers of voters involved in the political system as citizens without, for all that, confronting their electoral choices as committed partisans, and that there are more of these "nonpartisan" voters in rural France than elsewhere. Hence the oddity of a population grouping that produces low declarations of political interest (in a partisan sense) but consistently high levels of voting turnout.

The most striking comparison between respondents in the rural communes and the rest of the population is not the composition of the entire group, but the relationship between partisans and nonpartisans in the active voting population. Among those who are "absolutely certain" they are going to vote, the ratio of

³⁵ See Campbell, *et al.*, *The American Voter*, *op. cit.*, p. 83, for an examination of this problem.

Table 5. Citizen and Partisan Involvement, Based Upon the Certainty of Voting and the Time of Voting Decision, by Demographic Class of Commune

Class of Commune N=	Involved Voters*		Uninvolved Voters**		Ratio of Partisans to Nonpartisans	Total (%)
	Partisans (%)	Nonpartisans (%)	Parochials (%)	Outsiders (%)		
0-2,000 (708)	23.3	54.0	19.2	3.5	1/2.31	100.0
2,000-20,000 (270)	34.1	48.5	16.3	1.1	1/1.42	100.0
20,000-100,000 (241)	31.5	47.3	16.2	5.0	1/1.50	100.0
100,000- & above (381)	31.3	47.2	18.6	2.9	1/1.51	100.0
Paris region (345)	40.3	40.9	15.9	2.9	1/1.01	100.0
Total % (N.) (1945)	30.4 (591)	48.7 (948)	17.7 (345)	3.2 (61)	1/1.60	100.0

$X^2 = 40.7$ with 12 degrees of freedom

$p < .001$

* For relationship between "partisans" and "nonpartisans":

$X^2 = 32.1$ with 4 degrees of freedom

$p < .01$

** For relationship between "parochials" and "outsiders":

$X^2 = 4.5$ with 4 degrees of freedom

Not significant

partisans to nonpartisans is 1/2.3 compared to ratios of about 1/1.4 in the rest of the sample. In Paris, there are approximately the same number of partisans as nonpartisans, while in the villages of less than two thousand people there are twice as many nonpartisans as partisans.

Some hypothetical consequences of this higher level of nonpartisanship among the active voters in the villages can be briefly outlined:

(a) since most of those who will vote make their voting decision during the campaign, its timing and rhythms are relatively more important in the villages than in the cities;

(b) but since nonpartisan voters in the villages are, by definition, dispersed throughout the society, they are more difficult to reach by national parties using urban-based campaign organizations;

(c) as a substitute, these parties may improvise village campaign organizations by seeking the support of small-town political leaders (the so-called "notables") who will act as temporary brokers between the parties and the non-partisan voters;

(d) failing this possibility, the small town vote is probably less predictable and more volatile than the urban vote, and less susceptible to influence by campaign strategists operating out of party organizations. As a result, candidates in rural districts may be en-

couraged to run on non-party labels in national political elections.

This last possible consequence of the dynamics of involvement in rural France seems particularly important because of the *character* of nonpartisanship that appears through the cracks in the survey evidence and is starkly evident in the community studies. For the active rural voter who lacks a party identification seems to be far more than non-partisan. In many ways he is *antipartisan*, in the sense that he rejects, not only affiliation to one party or another, but the very notion of the party system as a legitimate way of structuring the vote and determining national priorities.

There is much impressionistic evidence to support this assertion. For instance, in his rich case study of the 1968 elections in a rural circumscription of the Loir-et-Cher, Georges Chaffard quotes one peasant who came to see a candidate, and then left quietly, remarking: "I hope no one saw me come in... I wouldn't want anyone to think I take part in politics."³⁶ Rural Frenchmen are uninterested in a candidate's attitudes toward the regime; fifty-eight percent of the rural respondents in a 1965 survey took this view, as opposed to forty-six percent of the sample as a whole.³⁷ And in a survey of 1967, forty percent of the residents of rural communes and forty-one percent of the peasants

³⁶ Chaffard, *Les Orages*, op. cit., p. 145.

³⁷ Jean Piret, loc. cit.

Table 6. Hostility to Political Leaders, by Level of "Interest in Politics" for Urban Workers and Peasants (IFOP, 1962)

Interest in Politics	N=	Hostility to Political Leaders					
		Workers			Peasants		
		Hostile	Non-hostile		N=	Hostile	Non-hostile
High	(92)	25	75	100	(54)	14	86
Medium	(154)	44	56	100	(84)	52	48
Low	(49)	76	24	100	(50)	74	26

said they regarded their vote for a deputy purely as a vote for a local representative and not as a vote for or against a national government, compared to thirty-three percent of the sample as a whole.³⁸

But the term "antipartisan" implies an active hostility to the party system, and this we have yet to demonstrate. First, it ought to be said that during the Fifth Republic, hostility to the party system, and particularly to its leaders, has been common in all classes of the population. But, secondly, it is particularly widespread among those traditional population groups who have been most deeply hurt by the rapid changes which have occurred in French society since the end of World War Two. According to Guy Michelat, those with the greatest hostility to the party system are (a) Gaullists, right wing voters and chronic abstainers, (b) women more than men, (c) those in the lowest and the highest income ranges, (d) artisans, shopkeepers, white collar workers and managers. Farm owners are found only about halfway up the scale of "antiparlamentarism" that Michelat has devised.³⁹

What interests us here is the relationship between what I have until now called "nonpartisanship" and hostility to the party system, or, differently put, the affective attitude towards the party system of those voters—urban and rural—who both vote regularly and do not use a partisan perspective when they go to the polls. Michelat's scale of "antiparlamentarism" contains many items that largely concern the party leadership (although others do so only inferentially).⁴⁰ When we look at the relationship between "antiparlamentarism" and "interest in politics"—which we already know is closely related to partisan involvement—we can then assess the degree of hostility to the party system of both urban and rural voters whose partisan involvement is weak. Table 6 presents these re-

lationships for urban workers and peasants interviewed during the election campaign of 1962.⁴¹

As Table 6 shows, there is found in both workers and peasants a strong and inverse relationship between "interest in politics" (which we have inferred to be in reality a measure of partisanship) and hostility to party leaders. In other words, both workers and peasants are much more hostile to party leaders when their declared "interest in politics" is weak. Hostility to party leaders decreases rapidly with an increase in political interest, but this decrease is more dramatic among peasants than it is among workers. For both groups, but proportionately more so among peasants, weak partisan involvement is not just an *absence* of partisanship, but is related to an active hostility to the party system, or antipartisanship.

These relationships, statistically similar in workers and peasants, seem to be politically more important in the latter group, and perhaps in rural France as a whole. This is so for two reasons. First, more peasants than workers, according to Michelat, declare themselves to have "no interest in politics" (twenty-six percent as opposed to seventeen percent of the workers in his sample). Second, as Table 7 shows, sixty-six percent of the peasants with "no political interest" actually vote, as opposed to only fifty-six percent of the workers in the same category. In other words, in terms of our initial typological discussion of the problem, peasants are more likely to be "nonpartisans" than "parochials" and their hostility to the party system manifests itself in active voting behavior, which is much less likely to be true of the workers in the same category. Thus, voter hostility to the party system is a more active constraint on the campaign behavior of candidates in rural, than in urban, districts.

The political consequences of antipartisanship are, of course, far more complex than

³⁸ *Sondages*, 29 (1967), no. 3, p. 28.

³⁹ See Guy Michelat, "Attitudes et comportements politiques à l'automne 1962," in Goguel, *op. cit.*, pp. 254-264.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 256 for the items composing this scale.

⁴¹ I am grateful to Guy Michelat for graciously providing me with the unpublished material presented in Tables 6 and 7.

Table 7. Voting Intentions of Workers and Peasants by Level of "Interest in Politics" (in %)*

Interest in Politics	Voting Intention							
	Workers				Peasants			
	N=	Left	Right	Abstain	N=	Left	Right	Abstain
High	(92)	63	29	7 99	(57)	39	51	9 99
Medium	(154)	40	35	22 97	(84)	33	48	19 100
Low	(49)	27	29	43 99	(50)	18	48	32 98

* The rows in this table do not uniformly total 100% because percentages were calculated only up to two decimal points.

those of simple *nonpartisanship* would be.⁴² In this context, I want merely to speculate about its relevance to local political organization and campaign behavior in local elections. For it has long been well known that French local elections in small towns are seldom bouts between party lists, that the French rural mayor—the key small town notable—rarely belongs to a party, and that party organizations have difficulty surviving in the villages as long-term propositions.⁴³

The reasons given for this apolitical nature of the rural elite generally take two forms: first, that French local government is but a pawn in the bureaucratic hierarchy of the prefectural system, and that party politics has little objective reason to survive in the small town; and, second, that the peasant is too parochial to see political life in partisan terms, and substitutes the politics of local unanimity for the politics of party conflict. The "bureaucratic" explanation seems to fail in explaining the apolitical character of local government in France for the simple reason that, in a similar prefectural system—that of Italy—the evidence is abundant that local elections are run along partisan lines and that local party organizations flourish in most regions.⁴⁴ The "parochial" explanation seems to fail too, because, as we have seen, the French rural resident is an active participant in elections and, as we shall see, is also a relatively attentive citizen.

It seems likely, on the other hand, that the largely antipartisan character of small town in-

⁴² This problem will be treated in detail in Sidney Tarrow, *The Grassroots in Italy and France: A Comparative Study of Elections, Parties and Elites* (to be published, 1972).

⁴³ For some evidence on this point, see Kesselman, *op. cit.*; *French Politics*, ed. Martin Harrison (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1969), p. 182; also see J. Gilli, "Les maires dans le département les Alpes-Maritimes," in *Revue Française de Science Politique* 18, no. 3 (June, 1968).

⁴⁴ On the Italian prefectural system, see Robert Fried, *The Italian Prefects: A Study in Administrative Politics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963).

volvement may act as a constraint upon the politicization of local government and the growth of party organizations in rural France. If twice as many active rural voters are antipartisans as partisans, the successful candidate, irrespective of his own partisan affiliations, cannot risk appealing to them with a partisan platform or with party organizational support. If he does, he may risk having it said of him, "Lui, il fait de la politique." For there is, in the French village, a political culture of antipartisanship that no serious candidate for office can ignore.

III. The Origins of Antipartisanship

Before examining the sources of this culture, we ought to face squarely a question which has been glossed over until now: the difference between the peasant and the non-peasant population in the small towns with respect to both participation rates and partisan orientations. For it is possible that non-peasant rural groups have orientations towards the political system that differ radically from those of the peasantry, and if this were true, we should have to analyze the two separately.

As it turns out, even the social class in French small towns which has the least in common sociologically with the peasantry—manual workers in non-agricultural occupations—demonstrates both the high participation rate and the low partisan orientation that is characteristic of the small town as a whole. In Table 8, based on an IFOP survey of 1956, we can see that the voting record of small town workers was higher and their "interest in politics" was lower than that of workers in either larger towns or in cities.⁴⁵ Whatever the sources of the political culture of antipartisanship in the villages, it seems to affect manual workers to an equal degree as other rural classes. Workers vote more regularly and declare themselves to have less "interest in politics" than workers in the rest of France.

⁴⁵ *Sondages*, 18 (1956) no. 2, p. 64.

Table 8. Interest in Politics and Voting in Elections, Working Class Respondents, Demographic Class of Commune* (IFOP, 1956)

Size of Commune	Interested in Politics		Vote in Elections	
	A Lot %	Not at All %	Always %	Never %
less than 2000	6	48	80	7
2-5,000	9	33	75	8
5-20,000	18	31	68	8
20-100,000	14	38	73	10
More than 100,000	11	39	62	13

* Intermediate categories excluded and number of respondents not provided by the IFOP.

If we accept that the rural community is a coherent social unit, then, what seem to be the major sources for the high level of citizen involvement and the low level of partisan involvement—or antipartisanship—that we have observed there? Both have three major types of sources: (a) historical, (b) organizational and (c) ecological.

(a) Historical Origins. No study of political involvement in France can ignore the fundamental fact that France has had an almost unbroken tradition of mass exercise of the franchise since 1848, earlier, and with fewer inequalities, than that of any other European country.⁴⁶ That a phenomenon has origins does not explain its effects, but clearly the long tradition of widespread suffrage in France—even during the relative rigors of the second Napoleonic empire—is the necessary background within which we ought to see the high rate of rural participation in France.

But in many European countries, the extension of the right to vote was received with less enthusiasm in the rural than in the urban areas. Icelandic data cited by Rokkan, for example show that turnout in villages and other rural areas is much lower than turnout in the towns, although the gaps tend to narrow with time. If the French vote is higher in rural, than in urban, France, this is not unrelated to the fact that each of the two important regimes which governed the country between 1852 and 1940—the Second Empire and the Third Republic—worked hard to win the vote of the peasants.

The techniques varied. Louis Bonaparte, ever an improviser, depended mainly on rhetoric and patronage—what Marx called, in his won-

derful phrase, “champagne and sausages.”⁴⁷ But the architects of the Third Republic were convinced that they would fail unless they could somehow turn the peasant from a clerical-monarchist into a republican. The strategy chosen was the establishment of a lay primary school in every village and its staffing with a shock troop of *instituteurs*—republicans to a man—who often doubled in the key role of Secretary of the Commune.⁴⁸ In turn, the parish priest, pinnacle of “authority and obscurantism” fought to bring out the vote of his parishioners so as to vanquish the “standard bearers of the Revolution.”⁴⁹ An increase in the use of the vote followed accordingly.

But history tells another story as well. For unlike many other European countries, the extension of the suffrage did not coincide with the creation of a network of party organizations into the provinces from the capital. This was partly due to the circumstances that most of its first twenty-five years were spent under a semi-dictatorial regime in which elections were held but political associations were banned. In part, however, the French tendency to think in terms of *tendances* instead of parties is linked to a fundamentally anti-associational legal tradition dating back to the Revolution and to the Old Regime.⁵⁰ The politics of the Third Republic, when political association was legitimized, still show political leaders attempting to organize power through the control of the prefectures—that is, as State power—rather than through the creation of party organizations, or as political power.⁵¹ Of course, the exemplar of the weakness of party organization in the provinces was the old Radical Party which could succeed in organizing the vote through networks of clientele relationships, and never needed anything more stable than Electoral Committees in the way of party organizations.⁵²

⁴⁷ Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (New York: International Publishers, 1963), p. 78.

⁴⁸ For a summary of the campaign for the *école laïque*, see W. D. Halls, *Society, Schools and Progress in France* (London: Pergamon Press Ltd., 1967), pp. 21–22, and pp. 75–88.

⁴⁹ Herbert Luethy, *France Against Herself*, 2nd ed., (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1957), p. 34.

⁵⁰ On the legal history of the restraint on association, see Arnold M. Rose, “Voluntary Associations in France,” in Arnold M. Rose (ed), *Theory and Method in the Social Sciences* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1954), pp. 77–98.

⁵¹ I am indebted for this insight to Aristide Zolberg. For an example see Georges Dupeux, *Aspects de l'Histoire Sociale et Politique du Loir-et-Cher, 1848–1914* (Paris and the Hague: Mouton & Co., 1962), Part III.

⁵² See, for example, Daniel Bardonnnet, *Evolution de la Structure du Parti Radical* (Paris: Edition Montchrestien, 1960), chap. 2.

⁴⁶ Rokkan, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

Thus we find in the nineteenth century origins of French electoral politics both an encouragement to the exercise of the franchise and a number of inhibitions on the creation of party organizations. In the nature of things, the weight of both the school teacher-priest encouragement to vote and the notable-clientele electoral organization was more profound in the countryside than in the cities. The spread of citizen involvement to the countryside did not occur simultaneously with the penetration of organized patterns of partisan involvement.

One heritage of the Third Republic's campaign for a schoolhouse in every village is extremely important in explaining why rural Frenchmen vote in such great numbers: the literacy rate in rural France is now over ninety-five percent. Rural literacy in Italy, where universal primary education has still to be achieved, is much lower.⁵³ This high rate of rural literacy narrows considerably the usual gap in newspaper readership between city and countryside, and increases the importance of secondary, as opposed to primary, media of communications in rural France. As many peasants report regular readership of news items as urban groups, and more peasants than the members of any other social group reported in a survey that they get "the greater part of their information on what happens in the world through the newspaper, rather than the radio, conversations or other means."⁵⁴ Table 9 reports the percentage of various occupational groups in a 1955 survey declaring "regular attention" to different types of newspaper articles.

French peasants are relatively well informed also, at least on issues relating to agriculture. Sixty-seven percent of a national sample of peasants in 1964 claimed to have heard of the Brussels EEC agreement on farm products. Fifty-nine percent of the same survey population were able to correctly name the Minister of Agriculture at the time. Surveys of the general population show that fifty to seventy percent of all Frenchmen are unable to express an opinion on any government minister.⁵⁵ On the other hand, peasants generally have a lower information score on issues which do not directly concern them.⁵⁶ Their information levels are lowest, as might be expected from the discussion above, on questions having to do with par-

Table 9. Percentage Reporting "Regular Readership" of Various Newspaper Topics by Occupation

	Peasants %	Workers %	White Collar %	Owners, Tradesmen, Professionals %
Politics	62	60	61	60
Local News	58	65	51	44
Human Interest	22	27	21	16
Sports	27	56	45	40
Columnists	38	45	47	48
Amusements & Books	9	11	33	34

Source: "La Presse, le public et l'opinion," in *Sondages*, 17 (1955) no. 3, p. 54. (Number of respondents not reported.)

tisan alignments and evaluations of party leaders. When asked, in 1955, if they were satisfied or dissatisfied with Mendes-France as Prime Minister, forty-four percent of the peasants in an IFOP sample declared themselves indifferent or did not respond, as compared to thirty-three percent of the workers and twenty-two percent of white collar workers.⁵⁷

The general literacy of the French peasant, his great attention to the press and his relatively high information levels seem to be important in helping to explain his high level of citizen involvement. Thus, he exercises the vote not as a mere tool of the village clientele leader (who, in any case, has disappeared from the scene as a political figure) but as an informed citizen, aware, at least, of the issues that concern him. For reasons that go back at least to the Second Empire, he does not exercise it as a partisan.

(b) Class and Professional Organization. A second group of variables also help to explain both the high citizen involvement and the antipartisanship in much of rural France. Political representation can take either a territorial or a functional form. In the former, existing territorial entities become the natural focus of representation and their internal cleavages are suppressed or diffused. In the latter, usually linked with urbanization and social differentiation, the internal cleavages of a territorial unit form the basis for political representation and competition.⁵⁸ In the rural sectors of some countries such as Italy, class cleavages resulting from the incomplete agrarian revolution in the nineteenth century join territorial cleavages as the bases for political competition. Hence class, and party based upon class, become a legiti-

⁵³ IFOP (1964); on Italy, see *Statistiche sul Mezzogiorno d'Italia, 1861-1961*, (Rome: 1964), p. 797.

⁵⁴ See, for this information, *Sondages* 17 (1955) no. 3, p. 26, pp. 31-32, and p. 54.

⁵⁵ *Sondages*, 25 (1963) no. 3, p. 54; IFOP (1964), p. 58, & p. 66.

⁵⁶ IFOP (1964), p. 65 and *Sondages* 25 (1963), no. 3, p. 80.

⁵⁷ *Sondages* 17 (1955), no. 1, p. 39.

⁵⁸ Rokkan, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

mate symbol around which to organize competing local groups.

But in France, rural party organization seems to suffer from the very totality of the success of the French Revolution in creating a national class of smallholding peasants as the backbone of the rural economy. For the rural community—ever susceptible to appeals based upon the so-called “unity of the rural world”—is even less susceptible to party appeals based upon class models when the majority of the local farmers are landholding small peasants with the same legal status. It is only in the Massif Central and parts of the South of France, where sharecropping was once widespread and where vast differentials could be found in the amount of land each peasant farmed, that a rural politics of class could appear and flourish. In most other areas of France, in order for a party to prosper, it needed to build its appeal on non-class symbols, to stress local, territorial issues rather than class issues, and purposefully fail to build party organizations. Hence the class structure emerging from the French Revolution and the legal reforms which followed it seem to be a definite brake upon the growth of party politics in rural France.

Not so for professional organizations. These syndicates, cooperatives and educative societies have not only improved the peasant's economic condition, but have enabled his class to survive despite the apparent obsolescence of the small peasant property as a commercial operation. Gordon Wright has outlined the role of the State in the encouragement of agricultural association, even during the Third Republic when industrial unions were banned and political associations were discouraged. By 1914, membership in agricultural syndicates was enormous—500,000 according to a conservative estimate and 1,600,000 according to an enthusiastic foreigner.⁵⁹

Most writers have minimized the political importance of agrarian organizations in France, and have stressed that their major role was the economic one of providing cheap seeds, fertilizer and technical information. These organizations have also been dominated nationally by the interests of their larger and more powerful members in the Paris Basin, at the cost of their small peasant members in the South and West.⁶⁰ But since the FNSEA (National Federation of Syndicates of Agricultural Operators), like its predecessors, does provide bread-and-butter benefits for its members, it is

likely to have the same impact upon electoral involvement as associational membership everywhere—to increase the tendency to vote and the informedness of the voter. As Linz concludes in his analysis of the politics of farmers in West Germany, “. . . the high degree of organization of farmers in pressure groups and functional organizations may account for the higher electoral turnout.”⁶¹

This certainly seems to be the case in France, where over 700,000 peasants adhere to the FNSEA. In the 1964 IFOP survey, forty-eight percent of the peasants interviewed reported membership in agricultural syndicates and ten percent more were members of other professional groups. In the 1966 survey, in a question that probably overstates membership (“Are you satisfied or not very satisfied with the action of your syndicate?”) only one-third reported that they were *not* members of any syndical organization. In the same survey, twenty-five percent reported themselves members of a cooperative, and eighteen percent said they were members of a veteran's association.⁶²

These figures are strikingly high, no matter from what angle we view them. Compared either to traditional folklore about French rural individualism, to the organization of other French occupational groups or to farmers in other countries, they lead to the same conclusion: French peasants are exceptionally well organized. Not only syndical groups, but also technical and mutual aid associations are active in the French countryside. Henri Mendras has written of the “social inventiveness” of the peasant in adapting technical change to an agrarian society through such groups as the C.E.T.A. (Committees for Agricultural Technical Studies) and the C.U.M.A. (Cooperatives for the Joint Use of Agricultural Machines). In the past, agricultural improvement committees were animated by local notables or technicians, but “these new institutions, so different from their predecessors, are animated by young farmers and not by local notables or functionaries.”⁶³

It is interesting that syndical membership is highest among farmers engaged in the polyculture typical of traditional French agriculture. This does not mean that the mass of these farmers are backward, for, except in the rich plains of the North, polyculture has an economic rationale—hedging against sudden variations in the market price of any one product by producing several. Since these peasants are

⁵⁹ See Gordon Wright, *op. cit.*, p. 19 and p. 213, n.17; also see Fauvet and Mendras, *op. cit.*, pp. 232–37.

⁶⁰ Wright, *op. cit.*, p. 21 and p. 104, and Fauvet and Mendras, *op. cit.*, pp. 231–52.

⁶¹ Linz, *op. cit.*, p. 790.

⁶² IFOP (1964), p. 27 and IFOP (1966), p. 64.

⁶³ IFOP (1966), p. 65; Mendras, *op. cit.*, p. 270 and Wright, *op. cit.*, pp. 149–150.

more actively engaged in diverse economic relations than others, they need professional information more than the specialized farmer. If this is true, it may provide a partial explanation for the high level of syndicalism in rural France as a whole. For in a country in which sixty percent of the peasants are engaged in polyculture of one sort or another, a high level of associational life is an obvious corollary.⁶⁴

Organized peasants are better informed politically than others. The 1964 IFOP survey shows that fifty-three percent of syndicated peasants were moderately or well informed on a variety of issues, compared to only thirty-six percent of non-organized peasants. Discussion of agricultural problems such as the Brussels Agreements was twice as high—with thirty percent—among the syndicated as among those with no organizational ties—sixteen percent of whom had discussed them. Syndicated peasants also attend more meetings than others; fifty-one percent of the organized peasants in the 1964 IFOP sample said that they attend meetings for farmers at least sometimes; twenty-three percent of the unorganized gave the same answer.⁶⁵

Finally, a background in syndical or cooperative activity appears to be an important support in town council and in mayoral recruitment, and this appears to be true in smaller, just as in larger, communes. In fact, the relative unimportance of political parties in recruitment to local political roles in small French communes leaves the syndicates and cooperatives as the most important associational sources of recruitment. This results not only from the network of acquaintanceships that leaders of these associations build up, but also from their relatively high economic status, their dynamism and their technical modernity. Every technical change, writes Henri Mendras, "takes on a political significance, involving itself in the game of village rivalries." Since associational leaders are often in the forefront of technical change in agriculture, they also find themselves in line for municipal or provincial political positions too.

This has emerged dramatically in the ascendance of a new rural political elite since the nineteen-fifties, mainly drawn from progressive young farmers. Socialized through various Catholic Action affiliates, their first instinct was to reject the political process and to get agricultural modernization mainly through technical means. But it soon appeared that without the cooperation of the rural political elite, the infrastructure necessary for change could not be

constructed. Where this help was not forthcoming, there was no alternative but to agitate politically through syndical groups and eventually to run for office.⁶⁶

Thus, while the class structure of rural France militates against the organization of local political conflict along partisan lines and encourages territorial forms of representation, the great professional organization of French peasants improves rural political information levels, reinforces social integration in the village, and encourages electoral participation and running for office. But these forms of association themselves reinforce the tendency for territorial forms of representation, since their members organize, not against other groups in the same community, but against middlemen and distributors outside the village. Paradoxically, perhaps, the rich associational tradition of the French peasant is a corollary of antipartisanship.

(c) The Ecological Origins. A third, and final, class of variables also add to our understanding of both citizen involvement and antipartisanship in rural France. By the term "ecological," I simply mean the social logistics of village life: the impact of the size, structure and interrelations of the French village upon the political involvement of its residents. While sparsely populated rural areas appear to have a lower voting rate than cities, small but physically cohesive villages seem to have a higher turnout rate because of a) the social visibility of the individual behavior, b) the personal character of local government and c) the high ratio of formal political role holders to the population. As Rokkan writes;

... We have reason to expect a higher level of active participation in the rural areas than in the cities simply because the smaller units of local government will allow a higher proportion of formal political roles than the larger units.⁶⁷

In France, rural turnout is high in part because the average commune is small, compact, and has a high ratio of formal political role holders to voters. France has only 221 inhabitants per square mile, compared to 571 in West Germany and 783 in Belgium. They live in 38,000 communes, more than the rest of the Common Market and Britain combined.⁶⁸ Most of these communes are not made up of widely scattered farms but of village *agglomerations*

⁶⁴ IFOP (1966), p. 44.

⁶⁵ IFOP (1964), p. 64; *Sondages* 25 (1963), no. 2, p. 68; IFOP (1964), p. 60 and p. 68.

⁶⁶ Wright, *op. cit.*, pp. 148-72; Mendras, *op. cit.*, pp. 153-160; Wylie, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 234 and Morin, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

⁶⁷ Rokkan, *op. cit.*, p. 376.

⁶⁸ Ehrmann, *Politics in France*, pp. 21-27.

with all the social pressures and pleasures that this implies. It is mainly in the underpopulated Southwest that the rural population is physically dispersed in the countryside.⁶⁹

Participation is also encouraged because of widespread local office-holding. The 1966 survey shows that in twenty-one percent of the peasant families interviewed, the husband was or had been a member of the municipal council. This astonishingly high figure compares to roughly 1.8 percent of the population as a whole.⁷⁰ Considering that the 35,000 French communes with less than 2,000 inhabitants have an average population of four hundred and fifty, and that each commune has at least nine municipal councillors, it is little wonder that one-fifth of the sample had local elective experience, or that such a rate of participation could not be matched in urban France. Mayors interviewed in small towns in southern France often maintained that one of the criteria in the selection of a candidate for their list was that he have a large family to turn out and vote for him. This conveys at once the personal flavor of the campaign and the statistical factor that the political ecology of the village encourages a large turnout, particularly in local elections.

But the very factors that increase citizen involvement also encourage antipartisanship. In a small village dominated by the corporate interests of a single social class—the small-holding peasantry—open partisanship threatens the community not only with political conflict but with personal strife. Where there is no underlying class division in a territorial unit, personal conflicts are expressed as the petty *brouilles* and *histoires* of village life and not automatically translated into party conflict, except in a sporadic and idiosyncratic way that everyone in the village understands to be conflicts of personality and not of party.

The attempt to systematize and concentrate personal animosities into village-type party conflict can threaten the harmony of family relations, the pleasure of social occasions and the informal work cooperation and sharing of tools that are crucial to the economic survival of each family. The small size of the French rural commune and its physical concentration make this threat ever more real. As Georges Dupeux explains it:

The refusal of the peasants to recognize the interest that they have in politics is doubtless the consequence of their refusal to assume a partisan affiliation. And that can be explained by the socio-

logical conditions where they live. To assume a partisan affiliation can, in the small communities, lead to a rupture of social relations with numerous neighbors with whom one must coexist from day to day, and can provoke a nearly intolerable isolation.⁷¹

As with the historical and the class and professional influences on political involvement, the political ecology of the village seems to contribute to both the high citizen involvement and the low partisan involvement of rural France.

Concluding Remarks

The line of argument in this article seems easy to sum up. I first tried to deal with some puzzling inconsistencies in the survey evidence on French political involvement (and with inconsistencies between the survey evidence and the community studies) by reconceptualizing political involvement into two aspects: (a) citizen involvement and (b) partisan involvement. I then showed that, unlike the United States and perhaps some other countries, the two aspects of involvement are in far less than perfect fit in France, and that the modal form of voter involvement in rural France is a combination of high citizen involvement and low partisan involvement. That the average voter in rural France is not simply "nonpartisan" but actively "antipartisan" was indicated by some impressions gleaned from the community studies and demonstrated by some survey findings.

The electoral consequences of the dominance of village antipartisanship were then suggested to be a greater volatility of the rural vote and a tendency of candidates for office to shy away from partisan affiliations. The origins of antipartisanship were sought in the historical background of modern French politics, in the class and professional structure of the village and in what I choose to call its political ecology. It was suggested, in conclusion, that high citizen involvement and antipartisanship are not only coincidental in the French village but derive from the very same factors.

The primordial fact that universal manhood suffrage appeared in France long before an organized party system may be peculiarly French, but it should alert us to a fundamental problem. We tend to conceptualize the expansion of mass participation in terms of a unilinear model of the "mobilization of the periphery" a concept which we perceive upon examination to be built on the assumption that parties are aggregative institutions expressing the conflicts and coalitions of the social system. But not all elements in the peripheries of their societies

⁶⁹ Lancelot, *op. cit.*, p. 200.

⁷⁰ IFOP (1966), pp. 64-5; also see Ehrmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 81-93.

⁷¹ Written communication to the author.

have been mobilized in a partisan way, because party conflict cannot be perceived as legitimate by local communities lacking the social bases of party conflict. Such communities, I have tried to show, have a virtual culture of antipartisanship, and are widespread in rural France. We ought to inquire also how widespread they are in the rural and urban sectors of other modern societies.

This perspective can be enlightening also because of what it suggests about the nature of party organizations. Are they genuine aggregative institutions in a dynamic sense with respect to all the population groups of a given society, or only with respect to the social groups which originally gave rise to them: elements of an insurgent bourgeoisie, a defensive landed upper class or an industrial proletariat, each transforming its dominant values into the aggregative ideologies of, respectively, classical liberal, conservative and social democratic labor parties?

These doubts about the usefulness of looking at political parties as instruments of aggregation suggest a complementary perspective: that parties are agencies of penetration bringing an

essentially urban model of representation to bear in peripheral communities to which they may be foreign. Hence the party either transforms its appeal in the rural setting, seeks the mediation of rural office holders or associational leaders, or leaves the rural periphery unorganized and subject to violent electoral shifts during and between election campaigns.

The age of the mass party may be ending in Western Europe. But in parts of France it may never have struck organizational roots, and in others—once deeply politicized, so the historians tell us—a de-politicizing process must have occurred. But since political involvement may be great, and even intense, without the intervention of partisan involvement, the phenomenon of antipartisanship in rural France intersects dramatically in the 1970s with antipartisanship from another source: I refer here to the revulsion from traditional partisan allegiances of key sectors of the urban population, particularly young workers and students. Whether these two antipartisanships will bring about, in the post-Gaullist age, the obsolescence of the mass party so long sought by de Gaulle, is difficult to predict.

Trends in Popular Support for the Wars in Korea and Vietnam¹

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During the last twenty years the United States has found itself involved in two lengthy wars on the fringes of Asia. Because of their militarily limited and politically complex nature, these wars are often seen to have put a peculiar strain on the American public: Compared to World War II, the enemy is less obviously "evil," progress in battle is more difficult to measure and comprehend, the American entrance into the war is less easily rationalized, and the end of the war is more likely to prove puzzling and unsatisfying. At the same time popular support influences the conduct of the conflict, since attitudes toward the war at home may be reflected in tactics on the battlefield.

Using poll data, this study will attempt to assess trends in support by the American public for the two wars and to compare the wars with each other and with earlier wars on this dimension.²

A number of hypotheses can be generated about what shape trends in support for a war should take. A most plausible proposition, at least for the wars in Korea and Vietnam, might suggest a continually declining level of support. As the war drags on, perhaps, more and more Americans become disillusioned with the war and their support changes to opposition.

An alternative hypothesis would suggest increasing support for the war. The public, horrified at the start by the thought of war, soon becomes propagandized by the government into supporting its war policy. Furthermore, as costs and casualties mount, opposition to the war becomes more difficult since such a position seems callously to write off the sacrifices of the combat dead. Thus the war might gain a certain "popularity" in order to justify these sacrifices.³

¹ This investigation is part of a project supported by the National Science Foundation. Helpful comments were contributed by Peter Ordeshook.

² The Survey Research Center data used in this report were made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research. Unless otherwise indicated all other data are taken from materials supplied by the Roper Public Opinion Research Center, Williamstown, Massachusetts.

³ This is a possible interpretation of William Gladstone's observation that all English wars gained popular approval within eighteen months of their commencement. See Kenneth N. Waltz, "Electoral Punishment and Foreign Policy Crises," in James N. Rosenau (ed.),

A third hypothesis is that no general trends in war support are likely. Rather the excitable American public swings capriciously from support to opposition and back again depending on the events of the hour. Thus, a military setback will send much of the public into opposition while good news from the battlefield or negotiating table causes support to blossom.⁴

As the results of this study will show, none of these three hypotheses is entirely adequate.

I. Measuring War Support: the "Mistake" Question

For the purposes of this analysis, it was necessary to find a poll question that tapped a sort of generalized support for the war and that was asked repeatedly in both wars. Only one question fit these requirements really well: Gallup's query during the Korean War, "Do you think the United States made a mistake in going into the war in Korea, or not?" and his Vietnamese War version: "In view of the developments since we entered the fighting in Vietnam, do you think the U.S. made a mistake sending troops to fight in Vietnam?"

There were several variations on this theme, especially during the Korean War. Sometimes the question was put in positive form: "Did we do the right thing?" rather than "did we make a mistake?" Sometimes added phrases helped to boost the percentage expressing support while at other times a variant seemed to lower support. Rather than obfuscating the patterns of support, these question variants, used with care, can help to broaden the trend analysis.

Whatever the variation, however, the question always asks for the respondent's general opinion on the wisdom of the war venture itself and thus it seems to be a sound measure of general support for the war. At the same time it says little about policy preferences at any given moment: Should the war be escalated or de-escalated? Nor does it give much indication of

Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press, 1967), p. 272.

⁴ Such fluctuations have been stressed by Gabriel Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1950). Clausewitz once observed that "Public opinion is won through great victories." Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr., *Rebellion and Authority* (Chicago: Markham, 1970), pp. 15-16.

how the respondent feels the incumbent President is handling the war at the moment. For various reasons, questions like these are far less satisfactory than the "mistake" question for the purpose of this study. They receive separate examination in Section VII.

II. Elements of Support for the Korean War

The responses for the support question and its variants for the Korean War period are given in rather elaborate form in Table 1.⁵ The basic question asked by Gallup (American Institute of Public Opinion—AIPO) is given in Column A. Included with it is the Survey Research Center (SRC) question asked in 1950 and 1952, "Do you think we did the right thing in getting into the fighting in Korea last summer (two years ago) or should we have stayed out?" The positive-negative "right thing"—"mistake" comparison seems to make little difference, as can be seen in a comparison of responses to polls conducted at approximately the same time. The Minnesota Poll asked a support question quite similar to the AIPO-SRC version and, despite the limited sampling area, generated similar responses (as displayed in column D).

In the first years of the war, the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) included an additional element in its formulation of the question: The respondent was asked if he felt the United States was right to send troops "to stop the Communist invasion of South Korea" (see Column B). Clearly, the added reference to the "Communist invasion" was an important cue to the respondents, for the NORC question generally found a 15 to 20 percentage point increase in "support" over that indicated by the AIPO-SRC version and a noticeable drop in the percentage without opinion.

The words "Communist invasion" seem to have sounded more of a clarion call than did the words "defend South Korea." When the AIPO question was first asked, it included these latter words (the items with the b superscript in

Column A) but with no apparent impact on war support—compare especially the Column A entries for December 1950 and February 1951. This can also be seen in the responses to a question asked in Minnesota early in the war and documented in Table 2. *A desire to defend the Koreans was not a major motivating force in opinion on the war*, despite the leading tone of the question.

These data suggest somewhat conflicting observations. On the one hand, support for the war was clearly tied to the anti-Communist spirit in America at the time. To generate a sort of war fever, one merely had to toss the words, "Communist invasion" into the discussion. On the other hand, the antagonism toward Communism was not entirely built into the response to the war, because Americans had to be reminded of it before their anti-Communism was fully activated. To an extent these notions conform at the international level to the survey findings of Samuel Stouffer from the domestic level: While Americans were devotedly and il-liberally anti-Communist in the early 1950s, there was in no sense a national anxiety over the issue.⁶ There was concern, but not hysteria.

Another formulation of the question was asked by NORC in the last years of the war (and into the postwar period, a concern of Section X). In the NORC reformulation, the mention of the Communists was eliminated, as well as the reference in the AIPO-SRC version to the idea that the United States or "we" somehow "made a mistake" or "did wrong." The respondent was simply asked if he thought the war "worth fighting." This elegantly bland formulation (Column C) seems to have lowered "support" for the war substantially below that tapped by the other queries.

These findings suggest another manipulable element in measured war support: a loyalty to governmental policy, a reluctance to admit that "we" might have erred. Again, however, this element produces more response impact when it is explicitly included in the stimulus. It is clear that *support for the war comes not simply from those who find war a congenial way of solving problems, but also from those who support it because, right or wrong, it is "ours."* This theme, an important one, is developed at greater length in Section VII.

In summary, these considerations suggest that *it is clearly nonsense to designate the amount of "support" for the war by a single number.* The question, "How many people support the

⁵ The data in Table 1 came from the following surveys. In column A: AIPO 460, 469, 471, 473, 474; SRC S-101; AIPO 476, 478, 487; SRC 1952 Election Study; AIPO 506, 507, 510. In Column B: NORC 287, 288, 295, 298, 300, 302, 307, 312, 314, 315, 320, 327, 348. In Column C: NORC 332, 333, 334, 339, 341, 347, 349, 365, 393. In Column D: Minn. 89, 92, 94, 95, 97, 99, 104, 111, 116, poll in *Polls*, Spring 1966, p. 76. For other analyses of some of these data, see William A. Scott and Stephen B. Withey, *The United States and the United Nations* (New York: Manhattan, 1958), pp. 77-81; Joel T. Campbell and Leila S. Cain, "Public Opinion and the Outbreak of War," 9 *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 318-29 (September 1965); Waltz, *op. cit.*; and Hazel Erskine, "The Polls: Is War a Mistake?" 34 *Public Opinion Quarterly* 134-50 (Spring 1970).

⁶ Samuel A. Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955), ch. 3.

Table 1. Support and Opposition in the Korean War

- A: "Do you think the United States made a mistake in going into the war in Korea, or not?" (AIPO)
 B: "Do you think the United States was right or wrong in sending American troops to stop the Communist invasion of South Korea?" (NORC)
 C: "As things stand now, do you feel that the war in Korea has been (was) worth fighting, or not?" (NORC)
 D: "Looking back over the Korean War since it started last June (in June last year, last year, two years ago, in June of 1950) would you say *now* that you feel the United States (we) did the right thing in sending American forces to Korea?" (Minn.)

For each question the numbers represent, in order, the percentages in support of the war (Pro), in opposition (Con), and with no opinion (DK).

	A			B			C			D		
	Pro	Con	DK	Pro	Con	DK	Pro	Con	DK	Pro	Con	DK
July 1950				75 ^a	21	4						
August 1950	66 ^b	19	15									
Inchon												
September 1950				81	13	6						
China enters												
December 1950	39 ^b	49	12	55	36	9				47 ^d	42	11
February 1951	41	49	10	57	32	11						
March 1951	43	44	13	60	30	10				46 ^d	38	16
MacArthur recalled												
April 1951	45	37	18	63	27	10						
May 1951				59	30	11						
Early June 1951	42 ^c	41	17							39 ^d	46	15
Mid June 1951	39	43	18									
Peace talks begin												
July 1951										46 ^d	43	11
Early August 1951	47	42	11									
Late August 1951				60	30	10						
September 1951										52	35	13
Early December 1951				54	36	9				45	39	16
Early January 1952				54	34	9						
March 1952	37	50	13	50	40	10						
June 1952				55	38	7				41	43	16
September 1952	39 ^c	41	20									
Early October 1952	36	46	18									
Late October 1952	37	42	20				31	56	12			
Eisenhower elected												
November 1952							34	58	8	48	38	14
Ike visit to Korea												
January 1953	50	36	14				39	53	9			
April 1953							36	55	9			
Late April 1953										52	36	12
Late June 1953							32	58	9			
Talks resume, truce signed												
August 1953							27	62	11			
Prisoner repatriation												
September 1953				64 ^e	28	8						
November 1953							38	50	11			
November 1954							39	51	10			
September 1956							46	41	13			
March 1965										67 ^f	16	17

^a "Do you approve or disapprove of the decision to send American troops to stop the Communist invasion of South Korea?" (NORC)

^b "In view of the developments since we entered the fighting in Korea, do you think the United States made a mistake in deciding to defend Korea (South Korea), or not?" (AIPO)

^c "Do you think we did the right thing in getting into the fighting in Korea last summer (two years ago) or should we have stayed out?" (SRC)

^d "... that you feel it was the right thing or the wrong thing to send American ..." (Minn.)

^e "As you look back on the Korean war, do you think the United States did the right thing in sending troops to stop the Communist invasion, or should we have stayed out of it entirely?" (NORC)

^f "Do you think the United States did or did not do the right thing by entering the Korean War in 1950?" (Minn.)

war?" has no simple answer. For popular "support" for the Korean War was noticeably raised whenever the respondent to oppose the war was required a) to admit the United States had made a mistake, or b) to oppose the halting of the Communists. Both a desire to support the country and its leadership, and a penchant for anti-Communism seem to have been important in determining support for the war. At any given point in time, support should be considered a chord, rather than a note.

III. Trends in Support for the Korean War

The support percentages for the questions in Columns A, B, and C of Table 1 are plotted in Figure 1. As can be seen, the chords progress in parallel fifths, making for consistently patterned, if inelegant, harmony.

Support for President Truman's reaction to the North Korean invasion was overwhelmingly favorable at the beginning of the war. In early July Gallup found 77 percent approving his "decision to send U.S. military aid to South Korea" despite the fact that 43 percent in the same poll felt this action would "lead to another world war."⁷ Support remained high through the summer and into the fall of 1950 as the North Korean thrust was stopped at Pusan and reversed at Inchon. This high level of support was maintained probably because the public was convinced the war would be a short one. In July, only 14 percent expected the war to last more than a year.⁸

It was the entry of China into the war that apparently altered such perceptions and, with them, the basic support for the war. As the Chinese swarmed across the Yalu River, blunting and then turning the Allied "home by Christmas" offensive, the war took on a new and far more painful appearance.⁹ By the time the "mistake" questions were again posed in the last days of 1950, support for the war had dropped some 25 percentage points.

More striking than the drop in support caused by the Chinese entry is the near-absence of further decline for the remaining two-and-a-half years of war. From early 1951 until the end of the war in summer, 1953, basic support

⁷ AIPO 458. See also Elmo Roper, *You and Your Leaders* (New York: Morrow, 1957), pp. 144-45 and the Minnesota data in Table 2.

⁸ AIPO release, July 29, 1950.

⁹ Most Americans, however, were probably not surprised by the Chinese entry into the war. In September 1950, Gallup asked, "The 38th parallel is the border between North and South Korea. Do you think Russia and Communist China will enter the fighting in Korea if the U.S. and her allies continue the fight north of this line?" Fully 64 percent replied affirmatively; 22 percent negatively. (AIPO 461.)

Table 2. Reactions to Truman's Korean Decision

On the whole do you approve or disapprove of President Truman's action in sending American military forces to help the people of South Korea? Why? (Minn. 84, August 1950, N=965)

Approve 75% Disapprove 19% DK 7%

Reasons given for approval

Must stop Russia, the Reds, only thing to do, have to sooner or later	53%
Serving our own interests, keep them from coming over here	17
Help oppressed people, they needed help	10
Bound to help because of UN ties, UN action, etc.	7
Approve, but other nations should help too	2
We should have fought the Reds even sooner	1
Other reasons	8
Don't know why, no reason given	3

Reasons given for disapproval

Not our business, let them fight their own battles	31%
Other nations should help too	13
We weren't prepared, not ready, not equipped	12
Don't like war, don't want war	5
Other reasons	34
Don't know why not, no reason given	6

for the war, seen not only in the A and B figures, but also in those from Minnesota in Column D of Table 1, remained largely constant. This despite the continually mounting casualties and despite a number of important events: the recall of General MacArthur; the beginning, breaking off, and then intermittent restarting of peace talks; the launching of offensives and counter-offensives; the 1952 campaign and election.

Thus, although there seems to have been an important shift of opinion on the war after one major event, events thereafter had comparatively little impact on support for the Korean War. The Chinese intervention seemed to shake from the support ranks the tenuous and those who felt they could support only a short war. The war was then left with a relatively hard core of support that remained generally constant for the duration, despite changes of fortune and climbing casualty figures. Notions about the shifting moods of the American public do not seem to fit these findings at all well.¹⁰

This is not to say, however, that events after the Chinese entry had no impact whatever on war support, merely that changes were small.

¹⁰ See also William R. Caspary, "The 'Mood Theory': A Study of Public Opinion and Foreign Policy," 64 *American Political Science Review* (June 1970), 534-547. But see also the discussion in Section VII below.




Figure 1. Support for the Korean War. (Letters refer to questions in Cols. A, B & C of Table 1.)

Support for the war rose somewhat and opposition declined in the A, B, and D figures in the first half of 1951 after the initial depression over the Chinese entry began to wear off and as the Chinese drive was itself blunted. By June, this marginal increase of enthusiasm showed signs of waning when the opening of peace talks, viewed by some with cautious optimism,¹¹ seems to have caused a rise of support (but a much smaller decline in opposition), evident in the A and D figures. And the election of General Eisenhower in 1952, together with his post-election trip to Korea may have generated some temporary enthusiasm, judging from the behavior of the data in the A, C, and D columns.¹²

¹¹ In July 1951 Gallup found 38 percent expecting the peace talks to be successful while 42 percent expected the fighting to start up again (AIPO 477).

¹² After the election and before the Korean trip, Gallup found the public held the view, by a 48 to 39 percent margin, that the trip "would bring and earlier end to the war." (AIPO 508). In January, 1953, the public

IV. Trends in Support for the Vietnamese War

Survey trend data on war support are less rich in the Vietnamese War period than in the Korean War period, despite the increased popularity of polling in the decade separating the wars. Gallup was still there and asking the right questions for present purposes, but NORC had gone into more specialized polling, and the new Harris polling organization never really asked over any length of time an appropriate war support question.¹³

Table 3 displays the results of the relevant

was about evenly divided on whether Eisenhower would "find some way to end the Korean War within, say, the next year." (AIPO 511). See also Roper, *op. cit.*, p. 260.

¹³ From time to time between 1966 and 1968 the Harris Poll reported a "war support index." Although it was not always clear from the news releases, however, the questions on which this index was based varied somewhat from time to time and usually tapped policy preferences (discussed in Section VII) rather than the sort of general war support elicited in the Gallup question.

Table 3. Support and Opposition in the Vietnamese War

- A: "In view of the developments since we entered the fighting in Vietnam, do you think the U.S. made a mistake sending troops to fight in Vietnam?" (AIPO)
 B: "Some people think we should not have become involved with our military forces in Southeast Asia, while others think we should have. What is your opinion?" (AIPO)
 C: "Do you think we did the right thing in getting into the fighting in Vietnam or should we have stayed out?" In 1964 and 1966 asked only of those who said they had been paying attention to what was going on in Vietnam (80% of the sample in 1964, 93% in 1966). (SRC)

For each question the numbers represent, in order, the percentages in support of the war (Pro), in opposition (Con), and with no opinion (DK).

	A			B			C		
	Pro	Con	DK	Pro	Con	DK	Pro	Con	DK
November 1964							47	30	23
January 1965				50	28	22			
May 1965				52	26	22			
August 1965	61	24	15						
November 1965				64	21	15			
March 1966	59	25	16						
May 1966	49	36	15						
Bombing of oil dumps									
September 1966	48	35	17						
November 1966	51	31	18				47	31	22
Early February 1967	52	32	16						
May 1967	50	37	13						
July 1967	48	41	11						
October 1967	44	46	10						
Bunker, Westmoreland visit									
December 1967	46	45	9						
Tet offensive									
Early February 1968	42	46	12						
March 1968	41	49	10						
April 1968	40	48	12						
GOP Convention									
August 1968	35	53	12						
Democratic Convention									
Early October 1968	37	54	9				30	52	18
Nixon elected									
February 1969	39	52	9						
September 1969	32	58	10						
January 1970	33	57	10						
March 1970	32	58	10						
April 1970	34	51	15						
May 1970	36	56	8						

questions from the Vietnamese period. The three questions listed are all quite similar in basic format to the AIPO-SRC questions from the Korean period listed in Column A of Table 1: All ask whether "we" or "the U.S." did the right thing; none added anything about stopping Communism. The AIPO question in Column B of Table 3 is separated out only because there is room. The SRC question in Column C, however, must be kept separate because it usually was asked only of those respondents who said they had been paying attention to what was going on in Vietnam. The support scores

from Columns A and B are combined and plotted in Figure 2.¹⁴

Unlike the Korean War, the war in Vietnam had no clearcut beginning. From the standpoint of American public opinion Vietnam only became really significant in 1965 when it became in considerable measure an American operation with the massive influx of U.S. troops and with the beginning of sustained bombing by American planes. Before that, Americans were strik-

¹⁴ The Gallup data come from *Gallup Opinion Index*, Nos. 6, 52, 56, 59, and 61.




Figure 2. Support for the Vietnam War.

ingly ignorant of the war: In spring, 1964, Gallup determined that 63 percent of the public was giving little or no attention to developments in South Vietnam;¹⁵ in June, SRC found fully 25 percent of its respondents willing to admit they had heard nothing about the fighting in Vietnam;¹⁶ and, as noted in Table 3, SRC in its 1964 election study, after months of campaign debate over the war, escalation, and the incidents in the Bay of Tonkin, found that 20 percent still were paying no attention to what was going on in Vietnam.

Judging from the data in Table 3 and from the plot in Figure 2, support for the war in Vietnam rose very considerably as American troops joined the fighting during the last half of 1965. There seems therefore to have been at the time a fairly considerable "rally-round-the-flag" effect (a phenomenon of interest also in Section VII). At the same time, the percentage with no opinion dropped, suggesting that as the war began to gather more popular attention, people were led to form an opinion on it, rather

than subjected to confusion and doubt through cross-pressures or value conflicts. It is also notable that, as the Vietnam war debate broadened over the next years, the "no opinion" percentage tended to decline somewhat further.

General approval for the war remained at its high level into 1966. Comparable support in Korea is found only in the early months of the conflict. By mid-1966, however, support had dropped to levels more familiar from the Korean case, though still on the high side. The Buddhist crisis and the frustrating South Vietnamese political instability of the time—Americans advocated summary withdrawal by a 54–28 margin if the internal fighting increased¹⁷—undoubtedly affected this change. In addition, the increasing disaffection of prominent American politicians and intellectuals, voiced in the Fulbright hearings of February and March, 1966, probably helped to make dissent respectable.

Also important was the fact that, as in Korea at the end of 1950, the war was increasingly expected to become a long, bloody affair, not one that American troops could bring to a

¹⁵ AIPO release May 27, 1964.

¹⁶ A. T. Steele, *The American People and China* (New York: McGraw-Hill 1966), p. 294.

¹⁷ *Gallup Opinion Index*, No. 12, May 1966, p. 8.

hasty end. The percentage expecting a long war rose from 54 to 72 between the end of 1965 and mid-1966.¹⁸ At the same time, U.S. casualties soon attained an order of magnitude comparable to Korea: Some 4,000 Americans had been killed in Vietnam by September 1966 and another 1,000 had died by the end of the year.

In the years after the middle of 1966, support for the war suffered a slow and somewhat ambiguous decline, while opposition grew at a slightly faster rate. Support dropped by 1969 to levels as low as any attained in Korea. And at the end of the year support for the first time finally reached levels clearly lower than those found in the earlier war. By that time, however, the war had been going on for more than a year longer than the Korean conflict, and American losses in Vietnam had well surpassed those suffered in Korea—casualties passed Korean War totals in early 1968 and combat deaths did so a year later.

As in the Korean case, events do not seem to have set up major perturbations in these trends. It is particularly notable how little the support for the war changed between the fall of 1967 and the spring of 1968, despite a series of presumably momentous events: the Tet offensive, the replacement of General Westmoreland, President Johnson's decision not to run again and his partial bombing halt, the opening of preliminary peace talks, miscellaneous offensives in the South, and the emergence of explicit challenges to the Johnson policy by prominent Democratic presidential candidates. Of course, the support question was not asked frequently enough to permit sorting out the various effects of each of these incidents, but the combined impact of all of them seems limited at most.¹⁹

It seems, then, that public support for and opposition to the war in Vietnam hardened somewhat as in Korea, to the point where

events were less likely to make much of an impression. This is not to say that Americans became unaware of events in the war: The number believing the allies were "losing ground" in Vietnam rose 15 percentage points after the Tet offensive in 1968, and those who believed that the war would be over in less than two years dropped 13 percentage points.²⁰ But support or opposition as a matter of general policy seems to have changed only gradually.

V. A Comparison of the Wars: The Beginning

It is somewhat surprising that the wars in Korea and Vietnam generated about the same amount of support at the beginning—where the "beginning" of the Vietnam War is taken to be mid-1965. The Korean War, it would seem, was begun under far more dramatic circumstances with a rather clearcut Communist attack and an American decision made within a few days to come to the aid of the attacked under United Nations auspices. In Vietnam the greatly increased American involvement in 1965 was accomplished over several months and in piecemeal fashion, with the administration consciously trying to downplay its significance.

The comparability of war support at this point suggests that the principal motivating element in the public response to the Korean decision was similar to that in Vietnam—a desire to support the country's leadership in time of trouble, the "rally-round-the-flag" phenomenon. This reinforces the observation in Section II above that helping the besieged South Koreans was not a major factor.

It also suggests that as long as the President has the power to commit troops, proposals that suggest wars would be avoided if the public (or Congress) were required to vote on their desirability are naive. After the commitment, there is a strong tendency to support the leadership. Even votes taken before the commitment is made are likely to be heavily influenced by the position of the leadership.²¹

VI. A Comparison of the Wars: Trends in Support

As seen in Sections III and IV, support in both wars declined from initial high levels. The transitions were similar in the sense that

²⁰ Gallup report, *New York Times*, March 10, 1968, p. 4.

¹⁸ Harris Poll, *Newsweek*, July 10, 1967, p. 22.
¹⁹ It is tantalizing to suggest that perhaps an event that did noticeably decrease support for the war was the 1968 Republican convention, for a new low support score for the war was registered in August 1968 after the Republican convention but before the Democratic one. Perhaps the televised display of that respectable, conservative body denouncing the war, albeit in highly unspecific terms, served to convert to war opposition some conservatives who had been utterly unaffected by the anti-war agitation from the left. It should be acknowledged, however, that the trend was downward throughout the spring, and possibly this depth of support would have been reached by August anyway. In a report on some unpublished research based on a series of daily polls conducted during the last half of 1968, Richard Maisel notes that "public response to the Republican convention was greater than to the Democratic convention particularly for non-college graduates," 33 *Public Opinion Quarterly* 456 (Fall 1969).

²¹ See also the discussion in Section VII. One might speculate that the impact of the Pearl Harbor attack was not as vital to public attitudes toward World War II as might be supposed. President Roosevelt might have been able to carry much of the public with him had he simply led the country directly into war without benefit of this dramatic stimulus. Popular attitudes toward World War II are discussed briefly in Section XI.

Table 4. Regression Results: War Support as a Function of the Logarithm of American Casualties

	Dependent variable			
	Percent support		Percent opposed	
	Korea	Vietnam	Korea	Vietnam
Mean	51.4	44.2	36.2	43.4
Standard Deviation	12.1	9.5	9.4	11.6
Intercept	114.46	121.68	-16.12	-52.05
Independent variables				
Log ₁₀ casualties	-14.89 (2.38)	-15.76 (1.15)	12.02 (2.60)	19.43 (1.39)
NORC dummy	15.49 (2.10)		-9.45 (2.30)	
Standard error of estimate	5.21	3.00	5.68	3.65
R ²	.83	.90	.67	.91

The regression equations are displayed vertically. The number of items in the Korean case is 25: all items in Columns A and B of Table 1 except for that of September 1953 (which was taken after the war had ended). The number of items in the Vietnam case is 22: all items in Columns A and B of Table 3 after mid-1965 (which is when the war is taken to have begun for the American public). The NORC dummy variable in the Korean case takes on a value of 1 if the item in question comes from Column B of Table 1 and is zero otherwise. It reflects therefore the general added boost given to measured war support by the wording of that question. The figures in parentheses are the standard errors for the respective regression coefficients. To be regarded statistically significant a regression coefficient should be, conventionally, at least twice its standard error. All equations are significant (F test) at well beyond the .01 level.

events, particularly in later stages of the wars, seem to have had relatively little impact on the overall trend. But the pace of the transitions differed considerably: Support for the Korean War dropped precipitously after the Chinese entered the war, while support for Vietnam declined much more gradually.

But of course the wars also differed in the pace at which American casualties were suffered. As noted, Korea became an intense war in a few months while casualties in Vietnam mounted much more slowly. Support for the wars thus appears to be related to these casualty patterns, except that in the later stages of the wars the decline of support slowed despite continuously mounting casualties.

These observations can be formalized by viewing popular support as a function of the *logarithm* of the total number of American casualties that had been suffered at the time of the poll. As can be seen in Table 4, the regression equations so generated are strikingly similar for the two wars: *In each war, support is projected to have started at much the same level and then every time American casualties increased by a factor of 10 (i.e., from 100 to 1,000 or from 10,000 to 100,000) support for the war dropped by about 15 percentage points.* Results are not so neat when the dependent variable is the percentage opposing the war, but the patterns remain largely similar: Opposition to Vietnam is

taken to have begun at a somewhat lower level than in Korea and then to have increased at a somewhat faster rate. Part of this difference is due to the generally lower frequencies of "no opinion" responses during the Vietnamese period.²²

When one takes support or opposition for the wars in Korea or Vietnam and correlates either of them with 1) the casualties suffered at the time the poll was conducted or 2) the duration of the war at the time of the poll (the plots in Figures 1 and 2), one gets at least a reasonably good fit; indeed, this would be the case if one correlated support or opposition with *any* variable that increased (or decreased) continually during the wars. But in all cases, correlating the *logarithm* of the number of casualties suffered at the time of the poll gives the best fit—the difference is especially noticeable in the Korean case. Furthermore, and most important, because of the differing patterns under which casualties were suffered in the two wars, the equations relating support or opposition to the logarithm of the casualties are much more

²² The similarities between the equations for the wars increase when one removes the NORC cases and the NORC dummy variable from the Korean consideration, thus comparing only questions almost identical for the two wars. The Korean equations then generate intercepts of 117.44 and -22.74 and regression coefficients of -15.51 and 13.40 for the approval and disapproval scores, respectively.

similar for the two wars than are the equations generated when the logarithm of the casualties is replaced as the independent variable by the simple casualty figures or by the duration figures. The plots in Figures 1 and 2, relating support to duration, do not look greatly similar; if the percentage support were plotted against the logarithm of casualties, however, the lines would be highly similar for the two wars.

What this suggests, then, is that *Americans, in the aggregate, reacted in similar ways to the two wars.* While they did weary of the wars, they generally seem to have become hardened to the wars' costs: They are sensitive to relatively small losses in the early stages, but only to large losses in later stages. Another way of looking at the trends is to see subgroups of the population dropping off sequentially from the war's support as casualties mount. In the early stages the support of those with considerable misgivings is easily alienated; in later stages the only advocates left are the relatively hardened supporters whose conversion to opposition proves to be more difficult.

VII. Other Possible Measures of War Support

Thus far this analysis has rested on an examination of the response to one sort of poll question about the wars. On this measure levels of support seem quite similar for the two wars. But it might be argued that these measures are insufficiently sensitive to intensity. Perhaps, of those who classify the war a "mistake," more are intense about their opposition in Vietnam than in Korea. These and other differences might appear if one were to look at other sorts of poll queries.

Unfortunately, while many other questions were posed by the polling agencies during the Korean and Vietnamese wars, none was asked with anything approaching the constancy and persistency of the "mistake" questions. Therefore when one tries to use these questions to compare wars, or even to analyse trends within a single war, one can draw only very limited conclusions. Both the conclusions and the difficulties will be discussed, belabored perhaps, in this section.

Two sorts of questions seem worth special examination in this respect: those that ask about policy preferences (Should the war be escalated or deescalated?), and those that ask the respondent how he feels the war is being handled by the administration.

1. *Questions about policy options.*²³ The importance of question wording has already been

²³ Questions about policy options by no means probe the same responses as the "mistake" questions. It is

Table 5. Responses to Two Questions on the Chinese Entry into the Korean War

AIPO 468 Early December 1950: If the Chinese Communists continue to send hundreds of thousands of troops into Korea, far outnumbering our forces there, what do you think we should do?	
28%	Withdraw
27	Use atomic bomb
25	Intensify against Red China
4	Strategic retreat
2	Negotiate
1	Miscellaneous
12	No opinion
99	
AIPO 469 Early January 1951: Now that Communist China has entered the fighting in Korea with forces far outnumbering the United Nations troops there, which one of these courses would you, yourself, prefer that we follow—	
66%	A. Pull our troops out of Korea as fast as possible
25	B. Keep our troops there to fight these larger forces
9	No opinion
100	

noted in Section II which contained a discussion of the responses to various forms of the "mistake" question during the Korean War. The wording of questions about policy options also varied during both wars, but with a caprice that all but frustrates careful analysis. *In fact, the only really firm conclusion one can reach is that question wording usually helps to determine in a major way the response generated.*

Consider, for example, the responses to the questions in Table 5, posed by Gallup about a month apart during the Korean War. To begin with, the questions are framed in such a tendentious manner that the only safe inference is that the Gallup organization itself favored U.S. withdrawal from Korea at the end of 1950.²⁴ Beyond this, the change from an open-ended format to a strict two-way choice between withdrawal and American slaughter alters radically the proportion who are presumed to favor withdrawal—probably because it

entirely possible, for example, to find the war a mistake but still prefer escalation as a strategy, or to favor withdrawal as a present strategy while finding the war not to have been a mistake. See Philip E. Converse and Howard Schuman, "Silent Majorities" and the Vietnam War," *Scientific American*, June 1970, pp. 17-25.

²⁴ Nevertheless, the questions are taken to have meaning for some analysts. See "Public Opinion and the Korean War," *Gallup Opinion Index* No. 3, August 1965, p. 26; S. M. Lipset, "The President, the Polls, and Vietnam," *Trans-action*, Sept./Oct. 1966, p. 24.

forces would be escalators to choose between what are for them second-best alternatives. Of course the problems of question wording need not be this gross. It seems likely that the American public will respond in quite different ways to these three comparatively similar options: "withdraw immediately," "withdraw as fast as possible," and "begin to withdraw." Therefore if one wants to demonstrate the popularity or unpopularity of withdrawal, escalation, or any other policy or strategy, considerable power is in the hands of the author of the question.²⁵

This is not to say that *all* questions are capable of extensive manipulation. Where opinion is intense and commitment is strong on an issue, wording changes are unlikely to make much difference. In a 1941 study, for example, it was found that even the most loaded questions about Hitler could not alter American opinion about him one way or the other; on other subjects, however, attitude was found to be highly sensitive even to minor wording changes.²⁶ The very sensitivity of opinion to changes in the wording of the stimulus question therefore can be taken as an index of uncertainty and indecision of public opinion on issues of war policy and strategy.

Some of the problems of question wording are minimized for present purposes if the same question was asked repeatedly in both wars: At least the biases and peculiarities of any given question would remain constant, as was the case with the "mistake" question. There is another problem, however. Questions about war policy are usually much more related than the "mistake" question to current happenings and policy changes in the war because events can substantially change their meaning to a given respondent. Those who favor escalation, for example, will support the present strategy when the war is being escalated, but will oppose it when the war is not being escalated.

Most important in this connection is the large

²⁵ The problems of varying question wording are also discussed for the Vietnamese case in Converse and Schuman, *op. cit.*, and in Milton J. Rosenberg, Sidney Verba and Philip E. Converse, *Vietnam and the Silent Majority* (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), ch. 2.

²⁶ See Hadley Cantril and associates, *Gauging Public Opinion* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1944), pp. 45-46 and *passim*. It is worth noting that even party identification is quite susceptible to wording change. In the early 1950s, NORC asked its party identification question this way: "In politics today do you consider yourself a Democrat, or a Republican, or do you favor some other party?" Gallup used this question: "In politics, as of today, do you consider yourself a Democrat, Republican, or Independent?" The Gallup query rather uniformly garnered an eight percentage point higher estimate of "Independent" voters. Therefore proclamations about the percentage of the population belonging to various partisan groups should not be taken as entirely definitive.

number of citizens who are inclined to support the country's leadership no matter what it does. If the administration is using force, these people will respond like hawks; if it is seeking peace, they respond like doves. In the responses to the "mistake" question, therefore, these people are likely to wind up in the support column, although, as noted in Section II, the acquiescence of many of them sometimes can only be activated when the question specifically identifies the war with U.S. or "our" policy (Column A compared to Column C in Table 1).²⁷

Demographically, these administration supporters for the two wars tend to be found disproportionately among the affluent, the better educated, and—contrary to the usual wisdom—the young. When the attitudes of people with these characteristics are assessed on issues of war policy, they are usually found to be at least somewhat more favorable to whatever happens to be the presidential policy than are the poor, the ill-educated, and the old. They are particularly likely to reject proposals for immediate withdrawal or for major escalation, such as the use of nuclear weapons in the Vietnamese War or the invasion of China during the Korean War. The attitude of these people probably stems in large part from their closer identification with the country and its leadership and from a susceptibility to social and political influences. But they are also more likely to know at any given point what the Presidential policy is, while the poor, the ill-educated, and the old are more likely to respond randomly to the survey stimulus as well as to select the "no opinion" response more frequently.²⁸

The existence of the leadership-supporting group means that the administration, particu-

²⁷ See also the discussion of the "mainstream" model in William A. Gamson and Andre Modigliani, "Knowledge and Foreign Policy Opinions: Some Models for Consideration," 30 *Public Opinion Quarterly* 187-99 (Summer 1966).

²⁸ For a more extensive analysis of the relationships discussed in this paragraph, see John E. Mueller, *War, Presidents and Public Opinion* (New York: Wiley, forthcoming). On the Vietnamese case, see also Converse and Schuman, *op. cit.*, Rosenberg, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, ch. 3, and Erskine, *op. cit.*

A technical note is in order in this connection. Samples drawn by Gallup in the Vietnamese War period are more representative of the lower classes than those drawn during the Korean period. Major changes in sampling procedure seem to have been made in the polling for the 1952 election. Since upper status people have tended to support the wars more than lower status ones, the data in this paper may overestimate the popularity of the Korean War in comparison to the conflict in Vietnam. The bias, however, is likely to be a very small one. See Norval D. Glenn, "Problems of Comparability in Trend Studies with Opinion Poll Data," 34 *Public Opinion Quarterly* 82-91 (Spring 1970), Converse and Schuman, *op. cit.*, and Rosenberg, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, ch. 2.

larly in the short run, has more flexibility in war policy than might at first appear—a proposition rarely noted by journalists or politicians but often by public opinion analysts.²⁹ The group tends to reject proposals for escalation and de-escalation in the abstract since they imply an alteration of “our” present course, but once the President has adopted the new policy many in the group will follow his lead.

Thus one finds major shifts in public opinion on questions of policy after policy changes. Table 6 illustrates this finding with an example from the Vietnamese period. The Harris poll reports that support for bombing the Hanoi-Haiphong area increased substantially after the bombing of military targets there was begun in 1966. Lest one conclude that administration-supporters are simply latent hawks, Table 7 illustrates a dovish shift after the partial bombing halt of 1968. Question H was asked after the bombing halt but before the North Vietnamese had responded by agreeing to preliminary talks. As can be seen, the shift in opinion is striking if the response is compared to the pre-halt response generated by question G, which is worded in a manner rather favorable to a bombing halt; and the shift is spectacular if any of the other early questions are used as the base of comparison.

After all these caveats and excursions, it should be clear that little of a firm nature can be said about how the wars compare on popular views on issues of policy and strategy. Nevertheless, opinion is not infinitely manipulable and a few rough regularities do seem to appear.

In general, it seems that the conclusions reached in Section VI about the similarity of support for the wars in Korea and Vietnam still hold when these other questions are examined. Most of the time, some 20 or 30 percent of the American public usually has supported a withdrawal from each of the wars, depending, of course, very much on circumstances and question wording. By 1969 or 1970, however, when a sort of withdrawal from Vietnam had become official policy, support for this option increased greatly. Sentiment for escalation is more difficult to assess, as the discussion of the bombing issue in Vietnam already suggests. Nevertheless, it would be difficult to make a case that the wars differed greatly on this slippery dimension.³⁰

²⁹ See Lipset, *op. cit.*, Waltz, *op. cit.*, and Sidney Verba, Richard A. Brody, Edwin B. Parker, Norman H. Nie, Nelson W. Polsby, Paul Ekman, and Gordon S. Black, “Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam,” 56 *American Political Science Review* 317–33 (June 1967).

³⁰ For data from Korea, see Scott and Withey, *op. cit.*, pp. 81 ff. Examples from Vietnam can be seen in items in the following reports of the *Gallup Opinion Index*: 2, 10, 13, 29; and in Philip E. Converse, Warren E.

Table 6. Responses to Questions about the Bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong, 1965–66

	% of those with opinion	
	Favor bombing	Oppose bombing
Do you think the administration is more right or more wrong in not bombing Hanoi or Haiphong?		
September 1965	30	70
February 1966	42	58
May 1966	50	50
———— Bombing begun ————		
Do you think the administration is more right or wrong in bombing Hanoi and Haiphong?		
July 1966	85	15

Source: Harris Poll, *Los Angeles Times*, June 13, 1966, July 11, 1966.

There does seem to be one area of escalation in which public opinion differs between the wars. The American public apparently may have been more willing to recommend the use of atomic weapons in the Korean War than in Vietnam. This readiness may be taken to indicate a greater frustration in the earlier war, but it probably better reflects a certain casualness toward the weapons in the early years of the atomic age, a casualness which diminished with the acquisition of the hydrogen bomb in enormous stockpiles and with the development of the missile.

2. *Questions about war leadership.* Besides the “mistake” question, one poll query posed repeatedly during the two wars might be expected in some degree to reflect support for the wars. This was the “presidential popularity” question: Do you approve or disapprove the way (the incumbent) is handling his job as President?”

If the responses to this question are taken to be stimulated in large measure by attitudes toward the war, one would conclude that, if anything, the war in Korea was somewhat more unpopular than the one in Vietnam. The popularity ratings of Presidents Truman and Johnson were in clear and rather steady decline during the terms in which the wars occurred, but President Truman managed to descend to a

Miller, Jerrold G. Rusk, and Arthur C. Wolfe, “Continuity and Change in American Politics: Parties and Issues in the 1968 Election,” 63 *American Political Science Review* 1086 (December 1969).

Table 7. Responses to Questions about the Halting of Bombing, 1967-68

		Favor bombing	Oppose bombing	No opinion	
A.	Should the bombing of North Vietnam be halted "to see if the Communists will come to the negotiating table?"				
	September 1967	48	37	15	
B.	Same as A.	October 1967	53	29	18
C.	"Continue to bomb selected targets in North Vietnam as at present and keep military pressures on until we get word from North Vietnam that they will reduce their military efforts and agree to talk about a solution to the war. Do you favor or oppose this plan?"				
	October 1967	55	35	10	
D.	"Some people say that a halt in bombing will improve our chances in Vietnam for meaningful peace talks. Others say that our chances are better if the bombing is continued. With which group are you more inclined to agree?"				
	October 1967	63	26	11	
E.	Same as A.	December 1967	63	24	13
	—— Tet offensive ——				
F.	Same as D.	February 1968	70	16	11
G.	"The North Vietnamese have said that if we agree to stop the bombing of North Vietnam, they will agree to peace negotiations. How do you feel—should we stop the bombing or not?"				
	March 1968	51	40	9	
	—— Partial bombing halt ——				
H.	"Do you approve or disapprove of President Johnson's decision to stop the bombing of North Vietnam?"				
	April 1968	26	64	10	
	—— North Vietnamese agree to preliminary peace talks ——				
I.	"Do you approve or disapprove of the President's decision to halt bombings of North Vietnam to get the Communists to start peace negotiations?"				
	April 1968	24	57	19	

Sources: A, B, E: *Washington Post*, December 23, 1967, full text of question not given; C: *Gallup Opinion Index*, No. 29; D, F: *Ibid.*, No. 33; G: *Ibid.*, No. 34; H: *Ibid.*, No. 35; I: *Washington Post*, April 8, 1968.

popularity rating a full 10 percentage points lower than that attained by President Johnson.

It is doubtful, however, whether the wars can be connected to presidential popularity in any simple way. Indeed, one study finds the Korean War had a substantial negative independent impact on President Truman's popularity, while Vietnam had no independent impact on President Johnson's popularity at all after other effects, including a general overall downward trend in popularity, had been taken into account.³¹

A related potential indicator of war support might be the question posed repeatedly during the Vietnamese war by the Gallup and Harris organizations: "Do you approve or disapprove of the way President Johnson is handling the situation in Vietnam?" The responses to this

question closely parallel those generated by the presidential popularity question. This may suggest that the question does not adequately discriminate war support from presidential popularity: It may be that the "approve . . . President" part of the question activates most of the response, not the "handling . . . Vietnam" part. This impression is strengthened by some data from the Korean War. During that period NORC repeatedly asked their respondents whether they approved or disapproved "of the way the officials in Washington are handling our foreign affairs"—a large part of which presumably included the war in Korea. The responses fell into a pattern that closely paralleled the trend on the "mistake" question—a substantial decline of approval after the Chinese entry into the war and then something of a leveling off—not the continual decline of the Truman popularity trend line. Thus questions asking about the President and the war in the

³¹ John E. Mueller, "Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson," 64 *American Political Science Review* 18-34 (March 1970).

same breath may stimulate reactions to the President more than to the war.

VIII. The Similarity of Support for the Wars: An Explanation

In summary, then, popular support for the wars in Korea and Vietnam appears highly similar. As noted in Section V, both began with about the same amount of support as judged by responses to the "mistake" question. It was seen in Section VI that this support declined as a logarithmic function of American casualties, a function that was remarkably similar for both wars. While support for the war in Vietnam finally dropped below those levels found during Korea, it did so only after the war had gone on considerably longer and only after American casualties had far surpassed those of the earlier war. Furthermore, as found in Section VII, the conclusion that public response to the wars was quite similar is not weakened when other sorts of poll questions are examined.

This similarity of support might seem surprising, for grand proclamations about the extreme unpopularity of the war in Vietnam are common. James Reston once called it "the most unpopular American war of this century"; a study group for the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence has declared that it "commands less popular support than any previous American international war"; and journalist David Wise has disclosed that in the Vietnam War, the nation entered "the most unpopular war in its history."³² The poll evidence suggests that Vietnam has at least one rival for these unhappy distinctions.³³

³² *New York Times*, June 21, 1968; *ibid.*, June 6, 1969, p. 23; "The Twilight of a President," *New York Times Magazine*, November 3, 1968, p. 27. All three statements were made before Vietnam support fell below that of Korea.

³³ On the other hand one possible indicator, the morale of American troops, would suggest that the earlier war was the more unpopular. Social commentators during the Korean War were fond of attributing the low morale they discerned to miscellaneous notions about the crusading spirit of the American people who were unable to support a war unless there were some Great Ideal at stake. Vietnam is surely no more a crusade than Korea, yet morale apparently has been comparatively high. One seeks, therefore, more prosaic explanations for the supposed low morale in Korea: the men thrown into the Korean War, especially in its early stages, were very disproportionately World War II veterans extracted from peacetime preoccupations just when they were getting used to them. Bitterness under these circumstances is hardly surprising. The army desertion rate, incidentally, appears to have been considerably higher in Korea than in Vietnam. And it was much higher yet during World War II, when massive mobilization brought in less "select" recruits. See *New York Times*, February 14, 1968, p. 4.

The Vietnamese War is seen by some to be more unpopular than the Korean War probably because *vocal* opposition as judged by demonstrations, petitions, and organized political campaigns was far greater during the later war. Of course all the anti-Vietnam demonstrators, petition-signers, and campaign workers together represent only a very small percent of the American adult population, and thus cannot be expected, by themselves, to exert a measurable effect in a cross-sectional poll. But one might expect their existence to be symptomatic of a much larger discontent. The data suggest, however, that *while the opposition to the war in Vietnam may have been more vocal than that in Korea, it was not more extensive*.³⁴

How then, can one account for the increase in *vocal* opposition to the Vietnamese War?

1. *The intellectual left*. Most of the vocal opposition to the war in Vietnam seems to have come from the intellectual, non-union left, a group that has been called the journalistic-academic complex. It seems likely that, unlike the general population, this small group did view the two wars differently. Korea may have seemed to them an unpleasant but necessary episode in the cold war against Stalinist Russia. By the mid-1960s however, the Russian cold war threat had abated considerably while China was increasingly preoccupied with internal difficulties. Thus, for many in the intellectual left, the wisdom of an anti-Communist war in Vietnam was difficult to grasp.³⁵

Some in the intellectual left may have been willing in 1965 to grant the Johnson administration's position that China posed a significant threat to Southeast Asia, a threat that must be opposed by American power. Within a year,

³⁴ For indicators of this extreme difference in vocal expression, see James N. Rosenau, "The Attentive Public and Foreign Policy: A Theory of Growth and Some New Evidence," Research Monograph No. 31, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, March 1968, p. 17. That demonstrators have not been representative of the general public in their attitudes toward the Vietnamese War can be seen in the evidence presented in Sidney Verba and Richard Brody, "Participation, Policy Preferences, and the War in Vietnam," 34 *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 325-32 (Fall 1970).

³⁵ Hans J. Morgenthau is probably reasonably representative. At the time of Korea, he says, "Communism was monolithic. Since we were committed to the containment of the Soviet Union, we were also committed to the containment of Communism throughout the world—Communism being a mere extension of Russian power. I have been frequently criticized by supporters of our Vietnam policy because of this alleged inconsistency. I supported the Korean intervention, but I was from the very beginning opposed to the Vietnam intervention. The Vietnam intervention is of an entirely different character in its foreign policy from what it was twenty years ago." *The University of Chicago Magazine*, Sept.-Dec. 1969, pp. 17-18.

however, this point was considerably weakened with the reversed trend of events in Indonesia and with the beginning of the highly diverting Red Guard movement within China. For these individuals, the justifications for the Vietnam venture were no longer valid, and they could turn to opposition.³⁶

In the poll data, it is difficult to measure this shift among intellectual liberals because no questions were consistently posed that would permit sorting them out from the rest of the population. The best one can do is to look at the responses of Jews as a sort of imperfect surrogate for the liberal position on the issue. A notable shift is evident: Jews strongly supported the Korean War but tended from the beginning to oppose the war in Vietnam.³⁷ In fact, Jews seem to be about the only subgroup of all those usually sorted by demographic questions in surveys whose position on the two wars differs. It is therefore not surprising to find the Vietnamese protest centered in places where intellectual liberals and Jews are found in striking disproportion—the better universities.³⁸

The years between the Korean and Vietnamese wars had seen the gradual emergence of the intellectual left as a force with political, though not necessarily electoral, impact. This seems to have grown out of the opposition to Joseph McCarthy and then developed in the late 1950s with movements urging arms control measures such as atomic test bans, unilateral disarmament initiatives, and alliance readjustments. In the early 1960s it had as a major inspiration opposition to President Kennedy's fallout shelter program.³⁹

Around 1963, the intellectual left moved from a preoccupation with international cold war issues to an alignment with the fast emerging civil rights forces. In part this shift was due to the attractive dynamism of the civil rights issue and of its aggressive and inspired leadership. And in part it was due, after the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, to the notable thaw in the

cold war. That seemed to make international threats and issues less pressing. The near-evaporation of the arms control movement at that point is paradoxical, for the improved diplomatic atmosphere made it likely that pressure for arms control measures would finally prove effective.⁴⁰

In its association with the civil rights movement, the intellectual left picked up and helped develop effective new techniques for political expression including passive disobedience, peaceful mass protest, the use of the media, and obstructionism. But as important legislative and judicial victories were won in the civil rights struggle; as the issue became more technical and cloudy; as Negroes showed themselves capable of handling their own movement and, in some quarters, became rather resentful of (even friendly) white interference; and as the movement developed into the destructive, but possibly cathartic and vital, riot stage—as these developments occurred, the civil rights issue became less attractive to the intellectual left.

Vietnam became at first a competitive cause, then a dominating one, until by 1968 it became virtually the sole preoccupation of the intellectual left. The new techniques of political expression, refashioned and redeveloped to fit the new cause, were put into action. The efficacy of the movement generated a certain attractive momentum, swelling the ranks.

Thus *the "new left" of the late 1960s seems, in this analysis, to be the old left with new methods of expression, a new vocalism. It was not made up primarily of "young people" brought up in the shadow either of the bomb or of John Dewey. Young people are the most conspicuous element of any political movement presumably because of their physical energy and their lack of occupational and familial obligations. Thus, in 1964, it may be recalled, journalistic pundits professed to see an attraction of young people to the Goldwater movement.*⁴¹ In another area, the college campus, the new methods of protest were applied to perennial issues of student complaint and concern: student discipline, college management,

³⁶ For a discussion of the concern over a potential China-Indonesia anti-American axis in 1965, see C. L. Sulzberger, "Foreign Affairs: The Nutcracker Suite," *New York Times*, April 10, 1966, p. 8E.

³⁷ For some data, see Richard F. Hamilton, "A Research Note on the Mass Support for 'Tough' Military Initiatives," 33 *American Sociological Review* 439-45 (June 1968).

³⁸ For a further discussion of this point, see Mueller, *War, Presidents and Public Opinion*. A survey conducted for the President's Commission on Campus Unrest found that campus disturbances occurred most often at large, eastern, liberal arts colleges with high admissions standards. *New York Times*, November 5, 1970.

³⁹ See Robert A. Levine, *The Arms Debate* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963).

⁴⁰ Indicative of the change was the collapse of the *Journal of Arms Control* after a few issues in 1963. It proved to be the wrong journal at the wrong time on the wrong subject.

⁴¹ In fact, as noted in Section VII, young people were more inclined to support both wars than their elders were, a point also noted for Vietnam by Erskine, *op. cit.*, pp. 134-35; Converse and Schuman, *op. cit.*, and Rosenberg, *et al.*, *op. cit.* For an able dissection of the "generation gap" punditry, see Joseph Adelson, "What Generation Gap?" *New York Times Magazine*, January 18, 1970.

and college relations with the community.

As the Vietnamese issue itself faded in 1970 with declining American combat activity and with continuing withdrawals of U.S. forces from Vietnam, the intellectual left—except for a spurt of activity in connection with the Cambodian invasion in the spring of 1970—moved on to new arenas, most notably the environmental one.

In part, it seems the intellectual left is rather fickle about its causes. But in addition, the group seems to be a sort of vanguard, limited in size and energy. Thus it does not seem able effectively to fight full force on two fronts at the same time but must instead choose its priorities: So, in the late 1960s one commonly heard that the race issue could never be solved until the Vietnamese War was brought to an end. Nor does this analysis deny the political impact of the intellectual left's agitation on important elite groups, including those that finance political campaigns.⁴² The message here is simply to warn against the assumption that intellectual agitation is the same thing as a mass movement.

2. *McCarthyism and the Korean War.* If there were any on the left who opposed the Korean War, their expression of dissent may have been smothered by the pall of McCarthyism.⁴³ In the early 1950s, a war opponent risked the danger of being labeled a Communist. In the 1960s the climate had changed enough so that such labeling was less likely to occur and, more importantly, less likely to be effective if applied.⁴⁴

For academicians, an important element in

⁴² See also John P. Robinson, "Public Reaction to Political Protest: Chicago 1968," 34 *Public Opinion Quarterly* 9 (Spring 1970). It is noted in this study and also in Converse, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, that the anti-Vietnamese war protesters had an extraordinarily negative public image, even among doves. This phenomenon may have hurt the anti-war cause by associating the issue with an unpopular reference group. It is conceivable, therefore, that the war would have had somewhat less support in the general population if there had been no vocal opposition.

⁴³ It has been suggested that the politicians' fear of McCarthy was somewhat unrealistic. See Nelson W. Polsby, "Toward an Explanation of McCarthyism," 8 *Political Studies* 250-71 (October 1960).

⁴⁴ In this connection, one limited but suggestive finding might be mentioned. It has been noted that in the Korean War period the insertion in the war support question of the phrase "to stop the Communist invasion" boosted support strikingly. In February, 1967, Gallup asked his question about support for the Vietnamese War in a somewhat similar manner. The mention of "Communist expansion" increased support not at all. Thus, anti-Communism may have become less viscerally related to public response to foreign policy than it was in the early 1950s. Unfortunately, the questions are not entirely comparable because Gallup added

the intellectual left, economic considerations in the 1950s may have reinforced these pressures, thus discouraging any inclined to oppose the Korean War from loudly voicing their point of view. The academic marketplace of the early 1950s was an extreme buyers' market: The generation born in pre-depression days, joined by somewhat older people whose graduate education had been postponed by World War II, entered the academic profession to find only the depression generation to teach. Thus job insecurity may have made political protest economically unwise and may have made the academic profession peculiarly susceptible to McCarthyite intimidation.

By the mid-1960s, however, the situation was reversed. The post-World War II babies were going to college while depression babies were entering the academic profession which then became a sellers' market. Thus academicians could protest, threaten to resign, speak freely and impertinently, always aware that jobs were open somewhere. In part, therefore, academic courage may have an economic base.

3. *The attentive public.* It may be the case, as James Rosenau has suggested, that the size of the attentive public has been increasing in response to advances in education, technology, and communication. These increases would not be enough to register markedly in public opinion polls, but they might show up in the increased scope of organized political protest.⁴⁵

IX. TV

Many see Vietnam as a "television war" and argue that the vivid and largely uncensored day-by-day television coverage of the war and its brutalities has had a profound impression on

in his Vietnam version a negative formulation of the proposition. The question was, "Some people feel that the U.S. did the right thing in sending troops to Vietnam to try to prevent Communist expansion. Others feel that the U.S. should not become involved in the internal affairs of other nations. With which group do you agree?" *Gallup Opinion Index*, Report No. 21, March 1967, p. 6.

None of this is to suggest that Americans have suddenly become ardent civil libertarians. In 1966 only 35 percent agreed with the right "to demonstrate against the war." See Lipset, *op. cit.*, p. 24. This area seems to be one of the many in which opinions are quite sensitive to question wording, however. The Harris Poll seems to find considerably more tolerance for the right to undertake "peaceful demonstrations" (*Washington Post*, December 18, 1967). One study found that 46 percent of the American public thought the United States should "forbid" public speeches against democracy while fully 62 percent felt the government should "not allow" such speeches. Donald Rugg, "Experiments in Wording Questions: II," 5 *Public Opinion Quarterly* 92 (1941). See also Converse, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 1087-88. 1105n, and Robinson, *op. cit.*

public attitudes. The poll data clearly show, however, that whatever impact television had, it was not enough to reduce support for the war below the levels attained by the Korean War, when television was in its infancy, until casualty levels had far surpassed those of the earlier war.⁴⁶

X. Support for the Korean War after the Truce

Popular support for the Korean War seems to have behaved rather curiously at the war's end in mid-1953. The initial reaction to the truce, according to the NORC index in Column C of Table 1, was that noticeably fewer people found the war "worth fighting" during the truce than when the killing was still going on.

This phenomenon does not seem to be due to a specific resentment of the truce itself. Although some politicians and journalists at the time denounced the settlement as a sell-out, the public was found by NORC to prefer the armistice to continued fighting by a 75 to 15 percent margin.⁴⁷ The popular discontent may have derived from the widely held opinion that the armistice would not be successful and that the war would soon erupt again. A substantial majority held this view at the time of the truce and the view prevailed for several months thereafter.⁴⁸ The public had learned to be skeptical.

At any rate, by the last months of 1953, support for the war, as measured by NORC's questions in Columns B and C of Table 1, had risen to as high a level as any observed since China entered the war. Doubt over the wisdom of the war apparently had begun to be replaced by a need to rationalize the loss.

When the question represented in Column C

⁴⁶ Rosenau, "The Attentive Public . . ."

⁴⁷ For an excellent discussion, see Michael J. Arlen, *Living-room War* (New York: Viking, 1969). The Harris Poll once reported, "For most Americans, television helps simplify the enormous complexities of the war and the net effect is that when they switch off their sets, 73 percent feel more hawkish than they did before they turned them on." (*Newsweek*, July 10, 1967, p. 22). The question on which this observation is based, however, was: "Has the television coverage of the war made you feel more like you ought to back up the boys fighting in Vietnam or not?" (Letter from Louis Harris Political Data Center, University of North Carolina, September 10, 1969).

⁴⁸ NORC 348.

⁴⁹ "Do you think the fighting in Korea is really over, or will the war there start up again in the near future?" (NORC 347, 348, 349, 351).

	Really over	Will start again	Don't know
August 1953	24%	58	14
September 1953	21%	62	16
November 1953	20%	59	20
January 1954	35%	46	19

was again posed a year later, in November 1954, however, it was found that support for the war had not risen at all. Only in 1956, substantially after the peak of the McCarthy period, when this question was last asked of the public did a majority of those Americans with opinions find the war "worth fighting." At that point opposition to the war on the toughest of the war support questions had dropped to a new low. Finally, years later in March 1965, when the Minnesota Poll asked if the United States had done the right thing by entering the Korean War, it was found that 67 percent thought it had while only 16 percent thought it had not.

Thus, as the population slowly became convinced that the Korean War was really over, the popularity of the war rose. But, although the anguish and uncertainty associated with the war did finally dissipate, this change took years.

XI. Korea, Vietnam, and World War II

To put the numbers from Korea and Vietnam in somewhat broader perspective it may be useful to look at poll data from World War II, presumably the most "popular" war in American history. In early 1944 Gallup posed a question comparable to the one under consideration here, namely, "Do you think you, yourself, will feel [in years to come] it was a mistake for us to have entered this war?" Only 14 percent answered affirmatively with 77 percent in the negative, a support rating far more favorable than those attained by the two later wars.⁴⁹

Still, the full picture is not quite so clearcut. In 1967 Gallup posed an updated version of a question that had been asked frequently during World War II: "Do you feel you have a clear idea of what the Vietnam war is all about—that is, what we are fighting for?" Not surprisingly, great confusion was found—only 48 percent felt they knew.⁵⁰ The comparable question during World War II elicited a more confident judgment—but not as much greater as might be expected. In fact, in June 1942—six months after Pearl Harbor—only 53 percent of the public felt it had a clear idea of what the war was about. This proportion later increased but it approached 80 percent only in 1945, and at one point—in the spring of 1944—it dipped below 60 percent.⁵¹

⁴⁹ Hadley Cantril and Mildred Strunk, *Public Opinion 1935-1946* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), p. 978.

⁵⁰ *Gallup Opinion Index*, Report No. 25, July 1967, p. 8.

⁵¹ Cantril and Strunk, *op. cit.*, pp. 1077-78. Hadley Cantril, *The Human Dimension* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1967), p. 48.

Sentiment for withdrawal from the Korean and Vietnamese Wars may be very crudely compared to an affirmative reply to the following query posed frequently during the Second World War: "If Hitler offered peace now to all countries on the basis of not going further but of leaving matters as they now are, would you favor or oppose such a peace?" Few supported the proposition in the early years of the war, but in early 1944—while Hitler still held France—it was endorsed by over 20 percent of the population and by about 15 percent thereafter.⁵²

Thus World War II, although unquestionably much more highly supported by the public than the Korean and Vietnamese Wars, seems to have been rather less consensual than might be supposed. This may be partly because the truth about Hitler's death camps did not reach the American public until 1945. In mid-1943 only half the population thought that the death camp "rumors" were true. At the end of 1944 this proportion had risen to 76 percent, but few of these anticipated that the death toll would be greater than "thousands."⁵³ Therefore a major reason for supporting the war was largely unappreciated while it was going on.

In the post-World War II period Gallup twice asked, "Do you think it was a mistake for the United States to enter World War II?" In April 1946 only 15 percent answered affirmatively, about the same support rating as had been generated in 1944. However, a year and a

half later, in September 1947, 24 percent thought the war a mistake.⁵⁴ This shift may reflect a certain disillusionment with the war as East Europe came under Soviet control and the cold war began with all its ferocity.⁵⁵ The Pearl Harbor hearings may also have had an impact.

XII. World War I?

If we allow this sort of "retrospective popularity" to count, it would seem that World War I was the most unpopular war of the century. In 1937 the American people were asked whether they felt it had been a mistake for the United States to enter World War I. Only 28 percent answered in the negative—a support score lower than any attained by comparable measures for the wars in Korea and Vietnam.

However the popularity of World War I seems to have been highly sensitive to events taking place at the time of the survey: Its popularity rose after the German invasion of France and soared at the time of Pearl Harbor.⁵⁶

This finding should lead us to be cautious in predicting the final public evaluation of a major event such as the war in Vietnam. Events of the next ten years will not change the facts about Vietnam, but they may change how we recall and evaluate what happened there.⁵⁷

⁵⁴ Erskine, *op. cit.*, p. 137.

⁵⁵ For parallel trends in American willingness to trust the Russians, see William R. Caspary, "United States Public Opinion During the Onset of the Cold War," 9 *Peace Research Society (International) Papers* 25-46 (1968).

⁵⁶ Erskine, *op. cit.*, p. 136.

⁵⁷ It is possible that the events in Vietnam have harmed the retrospective popularity of the Korean War. Polls of students in international politics classes at the University of Rochester in 1966 and 1969 showed parallel drops in support for the two wars: 34 percentage points for the Korean War and 35 percentage points for the war in Vietnam.

⁵² *Loc. cit.*

⁵³ Cantril and Strunk, *op. cit.*, pp. 383, 1070-71. The discovery of the death camps, however, seems to have had no immediate effect on American anti-Semitism. See *Opinion News*, March 1, 1948, p. 7. In the two decades since that time, however, anti-Semitism has diminished markedly. See Charles H. Stember and others, *Jews in the Mind of America* (New York: Basic Books, 1966).

Prescription and Description in Political Thought The Case for Hobbes*

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I

In seeking a basis for political obligation in the "facts" of human nature, Hobbes has created a problem for students of political theory comparable to the mind-body dilemma that has plagued the field of psychology. Hobbes bases his theory of obligation on natural laws, and he appears at times to vest these laws with the aura of sanctity usually reserved for moral commandments. Modern students have read Hume; they know that it is impossible to effect a logical connection between descriptive and prescriptive argumentation.¹ Therefore, we must understand Hobbes *either* as a descriptive and analytic writer *or* as a normative theorist; he cannot be both.²

The debate on this issue has taken a dialectical course. Until the late thirties, the prevalent view was that Hobbes is to be understood as a descriptive and analytic theorist. His laws of nature are, according to this interpretation, maxims of prudence; they advise rather than prescribe.³ In 1938, A. E. Taylor provided the

* I am very grateful to Victor Wolfenstein, Duane Smith, Wayne Swanke, and the anonymous referees of the *American Political Science Review* for their invaluable assistance in the final preparation of this paper.

¹ Although there have been some contemporary attempts to challenge this axiom, such as John R. Searle's "How to Derive 'Ought' from 'Is,'" *Philosophical Review*, LXXIII, No. 1 (Jan., 1964), 43ff., they appear to have met with little success among most ethical philosophers. See James and Judith Thomson's "How Not to Derive 'Ought' from 'Is,'" *ibid.*, No. 4 (October, 1964), 512ff.

² Another obvious alternative—that this radical distinction between fact and value is simply inapplicable to Hobbes—is often rejected as irrelevant. Stuart M. Brown, Jr. states:

"Even if Hobbes himself did not in fact distinguish clearly between questions in moral philosophy and questions in empirical psychology, we now distinguish between these questions and must determine whether Hobbes could in principle have done so without damage to his theory."

("The Taylor Thesis: Introductory Note," *Hobbes Studies*, ed. Keith C. Brown [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965], p. 34).

³ Leslie Stephen's *Hobbes* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1961), presents this view, as does Michael Oakeshott's "Introduction" to the *Leviathan* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1960), although the latter argument allows for an element of morality. D. D. Raphael's "Obligations and Rights in Hobbes," *Philosophy*, XXXVII (1962), 345ff., restates and defends the traditional view.

antithetical interpretation, describing Hobbes as a proto-Kantian moralist.⁴ Finally, Howard Warrender has synthesized the two conflicting interpretations.⁵ The debate, according to Warrender, arises from a failure to distinguish two aspects of moral obligation: the grounds and the validating conditions. Once we make this distinction we can then discover two parallel arguments in Hobbes. There is, on the one hand, the moralistic natural law theme in which Hobbes delineates (at least implicitly) the grounds for political obligation. Secondly, there is the analytic and descriptive theme, in which he depicts the psychological motives as part of the validating conditions for such obligation.⁶ Hobbes's theory of obligation is therefore quite distinct from his descriptive psychology. Although both have the same behavioral implications (the psyche of Hobbesian man is so constituted as to motivate him to behave as the natural law would have him behave), this parallelism is only coincidental. Hobbes's psychology has no logical connection with his theory of obligation.

While this debate possesses a certain amount of didactic value—clarifying as it does the logical relations between moral and political obligation—it has also had its harmful consequences for our understanding of Hobbes and even, perhaps, for our broader understanding of political thinking.

First, in emphasizing the distinction between

⁴ Taylor's article, "The Ethical Doctrine of Hobbes," is included in *Hobbes Studies*, p. 35ff. It originally appeared in *Philosophy*, XIII (1938), 406ff.

⁵ *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: His Theory of Obligation* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1957). Warrender has summarized major segments of his argument in "Obligations and Rights in Hobbes," *Philosophy*, XXXIV (1962), 352ff.; "The Place of God in Hobbes's Philosophy," *Political Studies*, VIII, No. 1 (February 1960), 48ff., and "A Reply to Mr. Plamenatz," *Hobbes Studies*, p. 90ff. Although Warrender was quite tentative in grounding Hobbesian natural law in God, he has, nonetheless, inspired several theistic interpretations of Hobbes. See Francis Campbell Hood's *The Divine Politics of Thomas Hobbes: An Interpretation* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1964), Frederick A. Olafson's "Thomas Hobbes and the Modern Theory of Natural Law," *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, IV, No. 1 (January 1966), 15ff., and Willis B. Glover's "Human Nature and the State in Hobbes," *ibid.*, Vol. IV, No. 4 (October, 1966), 293ff.

⁶ *Political Philosophy of Hobbes*, p. 93ff.

description and prescription, the Warrender debate has had the effect, however, unintended, of suggesting that factuality is irrelevant to moral persuasion, that descriptive or analytic thinking can have no significance for prescription. Thus if Hobbes engages in both types of thinking, he is functioning in two unrelated (or at best "parallel") capacities; he cannot use his factual analysis for prescriptive ends.

This view is vulnerable to one of two criticisms: either it is false or it is true but distortingly irrelevant to political thinking. "Is," at least insofar as it suggests factual necessity, is obviously related to "ought" in one crucial sense: it is *inversely* related; the two are mutually exclusive. Where brute factuality reigns, morality cannot thrive. We do not ask whether we *ought* to breathe, to eat, to sleep; we say simply that we *do* perform these functions, that we must. Morality requires the contingent, the probable; only in those situations in which it is genuinely possible for us to act in alternative ways is it meaningful to speak of moral choice.

Admittedly, this relation does not affect the logical distinctiveness of "is" and "ought," and it is from the logical point of view that the debate concerning Hobbesian morality is conducted. But such a perspective, however relevant to other varieties of discourse, is applicable to political thinking only in a limited and problematic manner, for logic is but one element in the blend of political argumentation and varies greatly in importance from thinker to thinker. Indeed, its significance appears to vary from theme to theme within a single political argument. To reduce such an argument to the requirements of logic may have a certain heuristic value, but it may also distort our understanding of political thought. In placing political arguments upon such a Procrustean bed, we may be committing an interpretive error, a fallacy of misplaced logicity.

Second, in asking whether or not a moral code exists in the *Leviathan*, Warrender and his opponents overlook the prior—and perhaps more significant—question concerning the *importance* Hobbes ascribes to morality. We cannot assume from the mere presence of a moral theme in the *Leviathan* that morality is vital, or even significant, to the argument; such assumption requires that we ignore the obvious possibility that Hobbes's uniqueness consists not in his offering (or failing to offer) a moral argument for political obligation, but rather in his relegating the political role of morality to virtual insignificance. We must remember that content is only one of *two* significant moral variables: prescriptive codes differ as much in

their scope as in their content. At one extreme an ethical system can be construed so broadly that the injunction "Thou ought" broods over all life's activities, however trivial these activities may seem to an objective observer. The preparation of food, the cut of one's garment, even the interest rate on financial transactions—nothing escapes moral scrutiny. At the other extreme, one can so delimit the realm of morality with a skein of factual necessity that genuine ethical decision is virtually insignificant for living.⁷ Insofar as moral choice requires the problematic or indeterminate, it is thus possible to expand or confine its scope—and therefore to exercise complete control over its existential significance—by means of factual description.⁸ If I am by my very nature incapable of sustaining myself—those aspects of my identity which I most treasure—outside the law, then the question "Ought I to obey the law?" is as absurdly irrelevant as "Ought I to digest the food I have eaten?" I will attempt to show that Hobbes did succeed in depriving morality of one of its most crucial political functions. Human personality, as Hobbes describes it, is totally dependent on political law. First, however, it is necessary to underscore certain fundamental differences existing between political and philosophical argumentation.

II

Terms such as "argue," "reason," "discourse," "philosophize," and even "think" are deceptive insofar as they suggest that intellectual activity is, at least in some sense, all of a piece, that all arguments are to be understood in the same manner. Human argumentation serves a variety of functions; each must be understood in terms of the tasks it seeks to accomplish. Thus, if we are to comprehend an argument of any thinker—whether political, scientific, or religious—we must first decide what he seeks to achieve by means of his argument. To what facet of *psyche* is he addressing himself, and for what purpose? Failure to make such a determination can produce a cheap victory over the argument, but it can never result

⁷ The French *philosophes*, particularly La Mettrie, d'Holbach and Helvetius, inclined toward this extreme. See Diderot's *Jacques le Fataliste* for an uneasy parody of this position. While Diderot could satirize this posture, he was unable to offer a "scientific" refutation of it.

⁸ Oakshott has also observed this relation: "What we ought to do is unavoidably connected with what in fact we are; and what we are is (in this connection) what we believe ourselves to be." (*Rationalism in Politics* [New York: Basic Books, 1962], p. 248). However, he apparently views this mutual influence merely as constituting a limitation within which a thinker must function, rather than as a manipulative weapon.

in understanding. The scientist and the religious fundamentalist, for instance, can argue endlessly without achieving the slightest measure of communication, for each reduces the other's argument to his own forensic requirements.

There are certain arguments, such as the mathematical or scientific, which we can legitimately seek to understand by asking "Is it true?" Our criteria for answering these questions are *a priori*. They are objective and (at least we presume to suppose) fairly stable through time: does the argument conform to our logical canons or, if it claims empirical validity, does it adhere to scientific procedure? Here the argument is addressed to that part of the *psyche* which is strictly *rational*, which, that is to say, is unemotional and stable; reason does not change with the moods and desires of its possessor.⁹ Insofar as the hearer of the argument is rational, he is always the same, always prepared to register assent or dissent in accordance with the same standards.¹⁰ Because the task of understanding these arguments is so straightforward and tidy, we tend to reduce all discourse to their requirements.

There is a variety of argument, however, which cannot be understood in such fashion, for it does not cast its appeal to the objective and constant aspects of *psyche*. A good rhetorician, for instance, seeks first to alter *psyche*, to manipulate the factual perceptions and the feelings of his audience until he has instilled within each listener a prerational empathy,¹¹ a predisposition to agree with his arguments; indeed to find them quite rational. It is this stage of the rhetorician's presentation that is most important to his success, for if he succeeds in predisposing his reader to agree with his argument, he need expend little effort in presenting his case: the actual crux of the argument is anticli-

mactic. And we should note that this crucial phase of his presentation is, in a sense, both descriptive and prescriptive (or, perhaps more accurately, "pre-descriptive" and "pre-prescriptive"). Its essential function is to create a predisposition both to perceive in a certain manner—to perceive new "facts" or old facts from a different perspective—and to attach predetermined evaluations to these perceptions. To ask whether such an argument is true is as irrelevant for our understanding of its intellectual force as is the question: "Is it art?" We can attempt to determine whether it is cogent or persuasive; that is to say, we can seek to understand it in terms of its own dynamics. But to reduce it to the interpretive requirements of arguments which claim objective truth-value is to distort it.

The existence of this second style (or perhaps second pole) of argumentation should serve to prevent students of political thinking from engaging uncritically in facile logical analyses. Such an approach, of course, is not entirely irrelevant in all cases, but the point is that the question of the applicability of logical analysis is problematic; it is a question which must be raised and answered before meaningful interpretation can begin.

There is much to suggest that political thinking partakes more of the manipulative than the purely philosophic form of argumentation. Philosophic and political discourse betray fundamental differences both in their objectives and in their methods. Philosophic argument aims at achieving disinterested logical clarity. And while its conclusions are logically implicit in its premises, they are not foregone; from the point of view of the inquirer, they are genuinely problematic. Since it addresses itself to the logical intellect, it must rely primarily on logic for its persuasive force; other forms of argumentation are excluded as irrelevant. It would, of course, be virtually impossible to discover an argument that could measure up to this description, yet it is nonetheless true that philosophers evaluate each other according to the ideal expressed in these standards. A putative philosopher is branded as a dogmatist, poet, ideologist, or demagogue if he wanders from it.

Political arguments on the contrary seek not so much to clarify as to justify: to explain both the necessity for and the worth of a course of political action.¹² Such arguments rarely admit

⁹ Even the most radical of relativists must assume some degree of psychic fixity. Hans Kelsen, an advocate of relativism, observes that such a position must assume both equality and mutual conformity among knowing subjects (*What is Justice? Justice, Law and Politics in the Mirror of Science* [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1957], p. 200).

¹⁰ Paul Schrecker makes this point in his admirable "Revolution as a Problem in the Philosophy of History": "Every true scientific proposition is, at the same time that it figures as a link in an objective system of knowledge, a norm which must be followed by our thought, a model to which the mind must conform, if it desires to reach the truth." (*Revolution [Nomos, VIII]*, ed. Carl J. Friedrich [New York: Atherton Press, 1969], p. 40).

¹¹ Or "just the right frame of mind," as Aristotle described it. Aristotle, indeed, defines the emotions in terms of their ability to influence cognition: "All those feelings that so change men as to affect their judgments. . . ." (*Rhetoric*, Book II, ed. and with an Introduction by Richard McKeon [New York: Random House, 1941]).

¹² J. G. A. Pocock draws a parallel distinction between philosophic and ideological thinking in "The History of Political Thought: A Methodological Inquiry," contained in *Philosophy, Politics and Society* (2nd Series), eds. Peter Laslett and W. G. Runciman (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1962), p. 186ff.

of debate concerning their conclusions; they have been answered in advance. If a philosophic argument begins with the question "I wonder . . . ?" its political equivalent usually begins with the tacit assertion "I know!": "I know a method by which a prince can seize and maintain a state," "I know how to achieve political order and stability."

The fact that many political thinkers write in order to justify answers rather than to adduce questions requires that they extend their appeal beyond the confines of logic. Such a writer must address himself not merely to the disinterested intellect but rather to the whole man. He must therefore be flexible, his argument protean. He must use the vocabulary of logic when he thinks it appropriate, but he must also speak the language of the heart and emotions; he requires sympathy as much as rational assent. Unlike his philosophic cousin, he must be (by the very nature of his task) part rhetorician, part poet. Plato—who provided both Western philosophy and political thought with their prototypes—did not hesitate to employ myth where logic failed him; and Hobbes, who bitterly denounced non-rational forms of persuasion, nonetheless admits that the ultimate appeal of his argument is subjective:

. . . when I shall have set down my own reading orderly, and perspicuously, the pains left another, will be only to consider, if he also find not the same in himself. For this kind of doctrine admitteth no other demonstration.¹³

There is yet another powerful nonrational element that enters into political argumentation: an effective writer must play the mesmerist as well as the poet. Like the rhetorician, he must cast a sort of hypnotic spell over his reader, reconstituting his perception of political "reality." Political abstractions exert a powerful force on human affairs; they acquire a mundane reality that has no philosophic counterpart. There have been few philosophic martyrs; no wars or revolutions have ever been conducted in the name of Apollo. Political ideas, on the contrary, probably have been responsible for a greater amount of turmoil than any other human force, with the exception of religion. Abstractions such as "justice," "liberty," "equality," and "order" are usually perceived by the political activist not as mere ideas but rather as real facts or forces: forces to be institutionalized, maintained, or removed. An effective political writer must, therefore, mediate between the reader and the reader's perception of these "realities." He must destroy the reader's grasp of the "facts," insofar as these facts are

inimical to his own vision, both by active assault and subtle erosion. And he must provide his reader with a new set of prisms, a novel structuring of political and human realities.

This power of perceptual manipulation is perhaps the most potent weapon in the political thinker's arsenal; it is the sword with which he severs the Gordian knot of logic, the enchanted arrow he plunges into the heart of the emotionally recalcitrant. It is the first, and perhaps the most crucial, weapon Plato employs in his construction of the *Republic*. Without it, his utopian enterprise would have floundered upon the Sophists' criticisms. Although the Sophists disagreed among themselves concerning the nature of justice, they did agree that the individual's relation to the state was one of essential tension. Virtually all their political discussions are based on the assumption that the exigencies of politics are fundamentally inimical to the desires and requirements of the individual. Plato responds to them with a "procedural" suggestion. Let us envision the state—let us picture the "facts"—in a new way: let us view the *polis* as *psyche* writ large. To submit to such an analogy is, of course, to surrender the assumption of tension; the state cannot be an extension of *psyche* and, at the same time, an entity which is in fundamental conflict with *psyche*. Thus the Sophists lost their argument even before Plato began his rebuttal. In deferring to Plato's structure of the "facts" they had surrendered their conception of politics-as-conflict, and had already opted for Plato's view of politics-as-harmony.

Rousseau is, of course, the most obvious of political thinkers in setting aside the facts and recasting reality. But while Hobbes is less flamboyant than Rousseau, he is more thorough. He devotes the first nine chapters of the *Leviathan* to the task of redefining factuality and "true" knowledge. Thus, unlike Rousseau, he begins by superseding, rather than by merely denying. Notions such as "life" and "man" are not so simple and distinct as we have suspected, Hobbes's reader learns. Life is only a variety of motion, not different in kind from mechanical dynamics:

Why may we not say, that all *automata* (engines that move themselves by springs and wheels as doth a watch) have an artificial life? For what is the *heart*, but a spring; and the *nerves*, but so many *strings*; and the *joints*, but so many *wheels*, giving motion to the whole body. . . .¹⁴

In effecting such a reduction, Hobbes was participating in a scientific tradition which remains quite respectable even today.¹⁵ But we

¹³ *Leviathan: Or the Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil*, p. 6.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

¹⁵ Norbert Weiner, one of the major pioneers of the

cannot understand this reduction as mere scientific indulgence; his mechanistic approach also serves for him the same function as did Plato's psychic analogy. Timely, sophisticated, and therefore cogent, it provided him with a factual solvent.¹⁶ Hobbes is saying in effect: "If we but look at the facts intelligently—that is to say *scientifically*—we will see . . ." Thus if the reader is to improve his level of scientific knowledgeability, he must relinquish his perception of the facts; he must view the world as Hobbes presents it.¹⁷

III

An apologist for political order must be ambivalent in his attitude toward political moralism. Moral justification ensures legitimacy for the state and its laws and is therefore beneficial; government has its source in something more fundamental, more real, than the commonplace facts of everyday life. But morality serves another function less salubrious for political stability. One's obligation to the state is always conditional, insofar as it is morally inspired. One obeys the law because (and only to the extent that) it is good, virtuous, conscionable to do so. Thus, while a moral code can strengthen the force of political obligation, it also subordinates one's political duty to a more categorical scheme of prescription. It sets the specifying conditions under which the moral subject must and, implicitly, must *not*, obey the law. A doctrine which confers moral justification on the state is therefore a two-sided coin; morally obliging obedience is meaningful only if there are possible situations in which it ceases to be operative, circumstances under which one is morally disobliged to obey.¹⁸

"cybernation revolution," has modernized the scientist's beloved machine-man with a network of electronic circuits. See his *The Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society* (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1954). See also W. Sluckin's *Minds and Machines* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1954).

¹⁶ This does not mean that Hobbes's interest in science was solely as an ideological tool, any more than was Plato's psychic preoccupation, although Leo Strauss's *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and its Genesis* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1963), suggests such an interpretation. Both J. W. N. Watkins' *Hobbes's System of Ideas: A Study in the Political Significance of Philosophical Theories* (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1965), and M. M. Goldsmith's *Hobbes' Science of Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), take issue with Strauss, attempting to unify Hobbes's scientific and political doctrines.

¹⁷ Hobbes devotes a separate section of the *Leviathan* to those who conceived of intellectual sophistication in terms of religion rather than science.

¹⁸ A doctrine which suggests that we are always obliged to the state is not a moral doctrine. It supercedes morality with politics. It reduces itself to the

Again we can see this dualistic aspect of political morality unfolding at the outset of our tradition of political thinking, in the works of Plato. He wrote the *Crito* before he had discovered his moral basis for the state; that is, before he wrote the *Republic*. Although he was extremely hostile to the Athenian democracy of his day, he describes Socrates' account of political obligation, in the *Crito*, without the slightest hint of disapproval. Socrates submits to the laws of Athens not because they were morally justified in condemning him, but simply because he was their creation. He sees himself (at least in the *Crito*) exclusively as a political entity; therefore, the state is justified in demanding total submission from him. It is only after Plato had formulated his moral code—after he had written the *Republic*—that he could reverse Socrates' doctrine of categorical political obligation. In the *Laws* he describes political disobedience as a moral duty under certain circumstances:

. . . a man's whole energies throughout life should be devoted to the acquisition of the virtue proper to a man . . . anything which may be an impediment, the good man ought to show that he utterly disregards. And if at last necessity plainly compels him to be an outlaw from his native land, rather than bow his neck to the yoke of slavery and be ruled by inferiors, and he has to fly, an exile he must be and endure such trials, rather than accept another form of government which is likely to make men worse.¹⁹

Because of its two-pronged nature, moral justification is ultimately more of a bane than a boon to political stability. And such justification is by no means necessary. A theorist can dispense with morality even in his account of political obligation, as did Socrates in the *Crito*:²⁰

slogan "right or wrong, my country." A moralist, on the contrary, must be prepared to say "Politically or not, my principles."

¹⁹ *The Dialogues of Plato*, ed. Benjamin Jowett (New York: Random House, 1937), II, 531.

²⁰ To say that a person is politically obliged is to say only that he ought to obey the commands of the state. If this obligation is to be *morally* binding, the "ought" must be followed by the explanation "because it is good or moral to do so." Socrates never offers this explanation; indeed he takes it for granted that the legal command that has inspired the discussion of the *Crito*—his condemnation—is not good or moral. For an opposing interpretation of Socrates' submission see Hanna Pitkin's "Obligation and Consent—II," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. LX, No. 1 (1966), pp. 40–42. Her argument is "that Socrates' focus on his past acceptance of the laws and his gratitude to them is in fact an evaluation of the Athenian government (or the expression of such an evaluation)." (p. 42). If this were the case, we could legitimately expect Socrates to explicate the standard according to which he was making such an

he can replace morality with some form of necessity. And once he resorts to superfluous moral argument, he threatens his state with the possibility of moral rejection. The champion of political stability would therefore be remiss in his efforts if he did not make some attempt to remove this dangerous possibility.

Hobbes is quite successful in eliminating this moralistic threat. Within the Hobbesian world it is virtually impossible to deny one's obligation to the state on moral grounds. And he does not accomplish this task by repudiating political moralism. Rather he precludes—by means of definition and “description” (that is, by re-constituting human and political realities)—certain assumptions necessary for an assertion of moral disobligation. Thus Hobbes's importance does not depend on whether his account of political obligation conforms to a rigid moral formula. It consists rather in his radical constricting of the scope and the consequence of personal decision in political affairs. Previous political thinkers had responded with “yea” or “nay” to the question “Ought I to obey the law?” Hobbes's highly original answer to this question is: “It makes little difference whether you ought; you will, at least if you are psychologically normal.”

IV

Western experience affords the disobedient citizen much scope in his quest for moral justification. He has at his disposal a broad spectrum of alternative ends to which, he may claim, all life's activities are subordinate: goals which range bathetically from such grandiose extremes as wisdom or beatitude to physical happiness or property ownership. This flexibility exists only at the level of ends, however, for the moral quest is rigidly confined within a structure of factual assumptions. While western ethical thought has varied considerably in its successive formulations of the good life, it has adhered unquestioningly to certain factual presuppositions about human nature. Indeed, these beliefs are so deeply enmeshed in western spec-

evaluation; yet he does not offer a standard. Indeed, his biographical emphasis makes it quite clear that he owes his very identity to his beloved Laws, and that there could be no circumstances under which he would be morally obliged to disobey them (Miss Pitkin herself concedes that “Socrates may never have been in doubt as to what he would do . . .” [p. 40]). He does remind his judges, in the *Apology*, that he has disobeyed political edicts in the past, but his disobedience was motivated by a deep sense of commitment to political legality, not to transpolitical morality. He emphasized that he had “law and justice” with him on the relevant issues, that he disobeyed the “criminal” edicts because of their “illegality.” (*The Dialogues of Plato*, I, 415).

ulation that one cannot deny them without also denying existential, and pre-eminently *political*, force to morality.

In order to argue that there exist situations in which man is morally obliged to political disobedience, one must assume that human nature possesses some measure of integrity or identity that is non-political, that there dwells within man some dimension of constancy—either of purpose, aspiration, or need—that the state can neither extinguish nor manipulate. Without this inviolable inner sanctum—whether we call it “soul,” “reason,” “will,” “inner light,” or simply “moi”—man has no perspective from which he can evaluate and criticize the state; no basis for political nay-saying.

First, this non-political psychic dimension must provide the individual with the capacity for discovering truth. Moral man must be able to reason or think independently of the state: Big Brother must not preside over the court of reason. Unless the citizen possesses some means for arriving at truth and value that is impervious to political onslaught, he is incapable of using his reason to deny legitimacy to the state.

Second, the moral man must believe that the truths and values discovered by his reason are objectively valid: that there exists some nonpolitical realm which provides his reason with standards of justice, virtue, dignity, honor and worth. It is only by means of such standards that he can distinguish the good from the evil government.

These assumptions were widely shared in seventeenth century thought; indeed they were enmeshed in the deepest convictions of the period. Whether we turn to religion or science, we encounter a conception of selfhood that is powerful, isolated, ineffable, and pre-eminently nonpolitical. In announcing that “the word of God is plain in the self,” John Knox, in the previous century, had already adduced psyche as the final arbiter of religious truth,²¹ and Descartes had entrenched the self no less deeply in scientific metaphysics:

I noticed that whilst I thus wished to think all things false, it was absolutely essential that the ‘I’ who thought this should be somewhat, and remarking that this truth ‘I think, therefore I am’ was so certain and so assured that all the most extravagant suppositions brought forward by the sceptics were incapable of shaking it, I came to the conclusion that I could receive it without scruple as the first principle of the Philosophy for which I was seeking.²²

²¹ J. W. Allen, *A History of Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century* (London: Methuen [n.d.]), p. 115.

²² *Discourse on Method, Philosophical Works of Descartes*, trans. Elizabeth S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross

Thus all intellectual forces seemed to conspire against political order in asserting this isolated self as a solvent for institutional loyalties.

But there² exists a new science, Hobbes informs his reader; a method for the study of politics, sophisticated, closely attuned to the latest developments in scientific speculation. And this new science requires that man examine himself anew. Descartes—overawed perhaps by the Church's persecution of Galileo—had been insufficiently scientific.²³ Had he dared examine himself more carefully, he would have discovered that this "moi" which he had posited as his first principle was no more than a disguised residue of Christian spiritualism, quite incompatible with the new spirit of inquiry. The "true" self—self as discovered by Hobbesian science—is a far different creature. Certain themes in the *Leviathan* must strike us as superfluous, even strangely obtrusive, unless we understand them as attempts to reconstitute human nature in such a manner as to preclude any measure of nonpolitical autonomy. Man does not possess the capacity for reasoning independently of the state, nor does there exist a nonpolitical realm of reality which he can invoke against immoral acts of the state.

Hobbes begins and ends his great work on politics with lengthy discussions of the nature of reason, science or philosophy. He devotes half the chapters of the first part, "Of Man," exclusively to the question of knowledge. This is curious, particularly on the part of a man so well disciplined as Hobbes. Of course, a systematic thinker of the seventeenth century began any intellectual enterprise with a statement of method, and this frequently included an epistemology. But the emphasis Hobbes places on knowledge is rather inordinate. He was usually a tidy, logical thinker, with a strong sense of relevance. There is no nonsensical digression in his works, such as we find in a Montaigne or a Rousseau; no topic appears to him worthy of inclusion simply because it happens to be charming or curious. Therefore it seems justifiable to assume that he discusses knowledge at

such great length because he thinks it is of direct political significance.

His epistemology does in fact serve a political function: it renders the assumption of a non-political reason absurd. Rational thinking presupposes the existence of the *Leviathan* for Hobbes, just as it presupposes the individual for Descartes. The question "Why should I obey the law?" is an expression of a rational doubt and a demand for a rational explanation. Even in the act of doubting your obligation to the state, you betray your dependence upon it, Hobbes states in effect; for insofar as you are rational, you are a political being.

Throughout his epistemological discussions in the *Leviathan*, Hobbes maintains a sharp distinction between reason and the individual's private ratiocination. The latter, which Descartes had mistakenly postulated as the source or first principle of reason, is merely an ineffetual soliloquy, a form of "mental discourse."²⁴ It does not signal the existence of an autonomous rational "faculty" lodged within the private regions of the soul; it is rather an epiphenomenon, a function subordinate to more dynamic processes. Indeed, this private activity, when unaffected by other psychic events, is little more than passive phantasmagoria: "the thoughts are said to wander and seem impertinent one to another, as in a dream."²⁵

It is only through the agency of the passions that the individual's mental discourse acquires coherence, for it is the desires that govern and direct thought, providing the mind its steadiness and quickness.²⁶ But this coherence is still far removed from genuine reason. Private thoughts, however, purposive, remain solipsistic. They are still devoid of standards of truth and falsity, and thus cannot serve as a basis for rational communication; nor can mental discourse function as an adequate instrument for power. If man is to be consistently effective in satisfying his passions, he must learn to function conceptually. He requires words or concepts to facilitate the acquisition of power by imposing generality and regularity on his experience,²⁷ and conceptual knowledge presupposes the existence of society. As an isolated individual, he is incapable of devising the elaborate repertoire of concepts necessary for his pursuit of power; only the collectivity can provide him with adequate intellectual tools.

Thus true reason—cognition effective for acquiring power—is essentially public. It is not the product of private experiences, but rather

(2 vols.) (Cambridge: Dover Publications, Inc., 1955), I, 100. See also A. J. Kraisheimer's *Studies in Self-Interest: From Descartes to La Bruyere* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), Ch. 2.

²³ Descartes had been frightened into intellectualizing on behalf of the doctrine of transubstantiation. Hobbes deplored this as cowardly, despite his own views about the power of fear. See Helen Hervey's "Hobbes and Descartes in the Light of Some Unpublished Letters of the Correspondence between Sir Charles Cavendish and Dr. John Pell," *Osiris*, X (1952), 83ff. For a more complete account of the intellectual relationships between Hobbes and Descartes, see Frithjof Brandt's *Thomas Hobbes's Mechanical Conception of Nature* (Copenhagen: Levin and Munksgaard, 1928), Ch. 4.

²⁴ *Leviathan*, p. 13.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 46.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

of "general names agreed upon."²⁸ Reason, of course, has its source in the same desires to which the private thoughts are handmaidens, but it is in no way reducible to the solipsistic mental discourse. Reason, Hobbes repeatedly insists, is an unnatural activity; it is not given to us at birth, nor does it unfold in us spontaneously with adulthood. Rather it emerges from a deliberate process of socialization; it must be "acquired and increased by study and industry."²⁹ And as a result of this socialization, man acquires consciousness, a true rational faculty. "Con-scious," literally rendered, means joint awareness, or collective knowing: "When two or more men, know of one and the same fact, they are said to be conscious of it to one another, which is as much as to know it together."³⁰ Only by the most perverse use of metaphor has consciousness come to signify "secret facts and secret thoughts."³¹

Failure to maintain this distinction between reason and the private "conscience" is not merely to commit an innocuous error; it is rather to perpetuate a "disease,"³² both personal and social. Personally, the individual who confuses the two will suffer the most grievous handicap extant among men, the affliction of impotence, for he will be unable to vie with those who have mastered the art of conceptual thinking. And socially, such confusion is no less pathological, for it inevitably produces anarchy:

And when men that think themselves wiser than all others, clamour and demand right reason for judge, yet seek no more, but that things should be determined, by no other men's reason but their own, it is as intolerable in the society of men, as it is in play after trump is turned, to use for trump on every occasion, that suite whereof they have most in their hand. For they do nothing else, that will have every of their passions, as it comes to bear sway in them, to be taken for right reason, and that in their own controversies: betraying their want of right reason, by the claim they lay to it.³³

Therefore, if man is to function rationally—if he is to compete effectively for power—he must perforce undergo a metamorphosis; for the acquisition of reason, like any other socializing process, requires a high degree of psychic taming. The private thoughts must be placed upon the Procrustean bed of language; they must be divested of uniqueness in order to be cast in the mold of names agreed upon. Hobbes

draws the contrast between the amoral gambling of mental discourse and the sober, discreet functioning of reason in the starkest of terms:

"The secrete thoughts of a man run over all things, holy, profane, clean, obscene, grave and light, without shame, or blame; which verbal discourse cannot do, farther than the judgment shall approve of the time, place, and persons."³⁴

Moreover, it is society that provides reason with its standard of certainty. To know something with certainty is not merely to perceive it clearly and distinctly with the mind's eye; it is to be able to communicate it to others, to "teach the same, that is to say, demonstrate the truth thereof perspicuously to another."³⁵ And since reason has both its source and its justification in consensus, the knowing process must be explained ultimately in terms of the manner in which consensus is created. Because voluntary or spontaneous agreement is impossible in a society such as Hobbes's, consensus must be imposed by means of arbitration:

. . . and therefore, as when there is a controversy in an account, the parties must by their own accord, set up, for right reason, the reason of some arbitrator or judge, to whose sentence they will both stand, or their controversy must either come to blows or be decided, for want of any right reason constituted by nature.³⁶

And the final arbiter in any situation is, of course, the *Leviathan*; it is through the agency of political law that the "public conscience" (that is to say, the only valid conscience) is created.³⁷

Thus insofar as man reasons effectively—insofar as his reason serves as an efficient instrument of his passions—he functions as a political creature;³⁸ both reason and its psychic locus, consciousness, are creations of society and the state. Rational political disobedience is therefore unthinkable, a contradiction in terms.

Hobbes's work is not accomplished, however. His case for the social nature of reason is, after all, only an argument from expediency. It

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 211.

³⁸ Sheldon Wolin also emphasizes this point in his *Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1960), p. 257ff. This conception of truth appears to be confined to Hobbes's political writings, however. Concerning scientific truth, he appears to have accepted Descartes' self-evidence theory. See Richard Peters' *Hobbes* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1956), p. 57. Oakeshott argues for an individualist interpretation of reason, even in Hobbes's political writings. See his Introduction, p. IV. Comparisons with Kant obtrude themselves into discussions of Hobbes's epistemological,

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

³¹ *Loc. cit.*

³² *Ibid.*, p. 211.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

is persuasive only if one believes, with Hobbes, that rational truth has no objective referent, that it stands or falls upon its efficacy as an instrument for power. It is still possible to believe that there exists a "real" or "true" reason which, though subdued by circumstances, nonetheless retains its validity as a means for criticizing, and even rejecting, the state (a reason that retains an *in foro interno* reality).³⁹ Even Socrates, who, in the *Crito*, went every bit as far as Hobbes in politicizing reason—was he not prone to invoke his private *daemon* against rational protocol whenever he thought that Truth or Justice required it? Therefore, if Hobbes is to secure his triumph, he cannot rest his case for reason on the intrinsic merits of expediency. He must preclude the very possibility of an objective, or transpolitical, realm of truth and value. And he is quite thorough in this enterprise; he systematically removes all the traditional sources of truth and value, the objective standards according to which men have passed moral judgments on the state.

In denying legitimacy to the state the moralist usually resorts to one (or more) of three loci of value, generic sources which constitute for him a realm more real or fundamental than the state. He may find such values, first of all, inherent in the cosmos. The universe, he may feel, evinces a rational and moral design; it is governed in accordance with a *logos* or a natural law that has its source in a benevolent, omniscient spirit or God. Government, accordingly, must conform to the dictates of this cosmological scheme in order to be morally obliging.

Although it is this transcendent source for morality that political dissenters have most frequently employed in justifying their conduct, there exist two alternatives, less ethereal but no less insistent in the demands they pose for conscience. Society in its various aspects provides one alternative. The moralist can agree with the political apologist that the true foundation of values and morality is to be found in our relations with other persons, but for the former, the most essential element is nonpolitical. For example, he may discover his morality in his belongingness to a specific sub-group, as did Antigone when she refused to obey a law that conflicted with her familial code. The chivalric

creeds of the medieval feudal orders represent another instance of sub-group morality. Or the moralist may find his source of value in some facet of history. Custom, as embodied in English common law, and the ancient constitution discovered by the Huguenots seemingly acquire moral significance from their historicity.

Finally, the moralist can discover fundamental truth and value in his own nature or identity. He may find it to consist, for instance, in his uniqueness or individuality, as have the most ardent of our libertarian proponents such as Mill and Thoreau. This individuality specifies certain requirements for thought and action, circumscribing the sphere within which the state can legitimately make demands on the individual. Alternatively the political dissenter may seek recourse in his humanity. Here it is his status as a participant in mankind that provides him with attributes which the state categorically must respect. Plato's *Republic*, for example, is the best state because it conforms to human nature; similarly, Rousseau rejects the political institutions of his day because they violate human nature: one cannot be both man and citizen.

These three value sources—a divine or rational universe, society, and human nature—are fairly exhaustive of the forms human ingenuity has taken in expressing moral discontent with politics.⁴⁰ And within Hobbes's world, these sources are nonexistent. The *Leviathan* steals the march on the moralist: God and his universe, society, and human nature all become politicized. Reason can only comprehend God as first cause, Hobbes informs us; it can only discover *that*, not *what*, he is.⁴¹ And while the causal argument has its intellectual charms, it offers virtually no consolation for religion or morality. The god that it adduces is strictly a rational *deus ex machina*, providing the mind with a causal terminus.⁴² And since the mind

³⁹ Numerous additional *mystical* conceptions of value and truth, of course, have been and are still being suggested. For instance, it would be difficult to place into either category the psychedelic truths which urge our Yippies to "drop out." However, the above do constitute an exhaustive list of alternatives that have been asserted as being rational. Men have maintained both that they are discoverable by intellect and demonstrable; this without benefit of drugs or grace.

⁴⁰ *Leviathan*, p. 68.

⁴¹ With the exception of the Warrender school, most scholars see Hobbes's theistic notions as being irrelevant to his political argument. Leo Strauss, for instance, remarks: "Recognition of teleology here and there . . . is, if it is sincere, to be explained only as a residue of tradition which contradicts the whole of Hobbes's philosophy." (*Hobbes*, p. 123, n. 3.) Plamenatz also insists that God plays no part in Hobbes's political views. ("Mr. Warrender's Hobbes," *Hobbes Studies*, p. 74ff). And even Keith C. Brown, who

as well as his ethical doctrines. S. Morris Engel, for instance, views Hobbes as proto-Kantian in his conception of knowledge. See his "Analogy and Equivocation in Hobbes," *Philosophy*, XXXVII (1962), 326ff.

³⁹ Herbert Marcuse's *One Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966) provides us with a modern instance of such belief. See Ch. 1, especially p. 13ff.

can know God only in His role as first cause, He is of virtually no rational significance to men: "They cannot have any idea of him in their mind answerable to his nature."⁴³ To state anything about God other than that he is the ultimate cause of everything that exists is merely to deify one's own hopes and fears, to indulge in superstition and idolatry:

. . . opinion of Ghosts, ignorance of second causes, devotion towards what men fear, and taking of things causal for prognostics, consisteth the natural seed of religion; which by reason of the different fancies, judgments, and passions of several men, hath grown up into ceremonies so different, that those which are used by one man, are for the most part ridiculous to another.⁴⁴

But to explain religion away is not to gainsay it; men will continue to deify their fancies and passions. And since their passions are different from, and inimical to, each other, their penchant for ascribing qualities to God provides men but another avenue to destructive conflict. Therefore they have need of an arbitrator to decide on the attributes of God, just as they require one in order to settle the significance of words. This arbitrator is again the *Leviathan*:

And because words, and consequently the attributes of God, have their signification by agreement and constitution of men, those attributes are to be held significative of honour, that men intended shall so be; and whatsoever may be done by the wills of particular men, where there is no law but reason, may be done by the will of the commonwealth, by laws civil. And because a commonwealth hath no will, nor makes no laws, but those that are made by the will of him, or them that have the sovereign power; it followeth that those attributes which the sovereign ordaineth, in the worship of God, for signs of honour, ought to be taken and used for such, by private men in their public worship.⁴⁵

Having politicized God—the most inveterate of conscience-inspirers—Hobbes can dispatch other sources of morality almost in passing. The purpose of his chapter, "Of Systems Subject Political and Private,"⁴⁶ is to delineate the scope, functions, and powers of the various sub-groups that constitute society. Here he makes it quite clear that such groups are by no means valid alternatives to the *Leviathan*.

Rather they exist at the sufferance of the state, for society is unthinkable apart from politics within the Hobbesian world. Before the inception of the state, there is only a brief convocation of the people; there is no society. Hobbes appears to have had no conception whatever of spontaneous sociability, or association motivated by no aim other than the sheer pleasure of human company. Any form of human association presupposes the existence of political power: "Men have no pleasure, but on the contrary a great deal of grief, in keeping company, where there is no power able to over-awe them all."⁴⁷ Nor are custom or precedent binding in any way of conduct, for they are but patchworks of ignorance. Since men disagree as to the nature of custom, it becomes a source of conflict rather than of order.⁴⁸ A judge, Hobbes informs us, is not bound by precedent—even his own—in reaching his decisions.⁴⁹

Finally, the suggestion that humanity is itself a repository of moral value would be dismissed as utterly chimerical within Hobbes's world. The individual personality, a congeries of desires and aversions in continual mutation,⁵⁰ is too amoral, protean, and vapid to contain any element of grandeur; and humanity, as Hobbes conceives it, is less an identity or commonality of nature than a network of mutual dependencies and antipathies. Because man is devoid of psychic constancy, his private experiences are of no more real significance to morality than they are to reason.⁵¹ "Good" and "evil" are merely pompous terms with which he attributes grandeur to his whims:

Good, and evil, are names that signify our appetites, and aversions; which in different tempers, customs, and doctrines of men, are different: and divers men, differ not only in their judgment, on the sense of what is pleasant, and unpleasant to the taste, smell, hearing, touch, and sight; but also of what is comfortable, or disagreeable to reason, in the actions of common life. Nay, the same man, in divers times differs from himself; and one time praiseth, that is, calleth good, what another time he dispraiseth, and calleth evil.⁵²

Without intrinsic identity, he can have no intrinsic worth; virtue, dignity, and honor are

⁴³ *Leviathan*, p. 68.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 72.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 240.

⁴⁶ Ch. 22.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 81. Cf. *De Cive or The Citizen*, ed. with an Introduction by Sterling P. Lamprecht (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1949), p. 22n., pp. 22–23.

⁴⁸ *Leviathan*, p. 67.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 181.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 190.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 104.

believes that the argument from design should be allowed "its proper place in Hobbes's system," nevertheless concedes (at least implicitly) that it is redundant ("Hobbes's Grounds for Belief in a Deity," *Philosophy*, XXXVII [1962], p. 336ff). Finally, Quentin Skinner's "Hobbes on Sovereignty: An Unknown Discussion," *Political Studies*, XIII, No. 2 (June 1966), 213ff., brings new evidence to bear against a theistic interpretation of Hobbes's political views.

merely comparative terms, modes of expressing his "price" in vanity's marketplace.⁵³

As we might expect, man's penchant for attaching moral valuations to his conduct provides still another justification for the state. Moral disagreement produces "disputes, controversies, and at last war;"⁵⁴ an arbiter is again required. Once more the *Leviathan* steps in, transforming virulent phantoms into wholesome realities. It is he who defines moral virtue, who confers honor and dignity; he who creates a "public conscience" from moral chaos.⁵⁵

V

Hobbes was unique among political thinkers in attempting to deny political force to morality; he was quite conventional, however, in his tactic of manipulating the moral sphere by means of factual description. He sought to reverse the moralizing trend set by Plato, yet he employed a technique which Plato himself had established, and which had subsequently become a standard weapon among political thinkers. It is Hobbes's descriptive account of human nature that performs the task of vitiating political morality, just as it was Plato's psychology that had moralized politics.

It is still possible, of course, to refer to Hobbesian "morality," to impose the vocabulary of a previous tradition upon Hobbes's conception of political obligation *provided*, first, that we ask the proper question of Hobbes; and second, that we are aware that the application of this venerable label tends to obscure a significant element of uniqueness. The question whether there is a moral case for obligation to be found in *Leviathan* too often confuses separate lines of inquiry, for it raises two issues of differing significance. We can ask whether moral argument is *possible* within the *Leviathan*: whether such an argument can be interpolated compatible with Hobbes's major doctrines;⁵⁶ alternatively, we can ask whether moral argument is *necessary* to the *Leviathan*. Only in response to the first (and certainly the more trivial) question can we make a case for moral obligation. And here, our answer affords us no insight into Hobbes's argument, for our question is more concerned with our own definitional standards than with the *Leviathan*; its answer, depending on what minimal conditions we are willing to accept as sufficient for moral obligation, has nothing to do with Hobbes's case.

If we demand no other condition than that the

obliged behavior be considered "good" in some sense, then we can make a moral case for the *Leviathan*; it is good because it is the indispensable condition of all the refinements that make civilized life worth living. But to accept such a bare definition is to overlook fundamental differences in various prescriptive codes, both in their behavioral impact and their underlying psychological assumptions; it is to confuse the moral man with the "good" child who obeys, without question or exception, rules he cannot understand. In his study of the nascence of moral judgment, Jean Piaget describes a process of development from a puerile "moral realism" which closely parallels Hobbesian man's attitude toward the law.⁵⁷ Although there is considerable disagreement as to the meaning of "morality," no one would deny that it presupposes an agent who is both rational and autonomous (capable of arriving at, and acting upon, correct moral judgments without the supervision of an authority). Yet "good" conduct, for Hobbes, no less than for Piaget's moral ingenu, is categorical and enforced obedience; it assumes that man cannot sustain either his reason or his good intentions without external inducement.⁵⁸

Leviathan, like Yahweh of the *Old Testament*, is good in the sense that he is the condition of civil (and hence ethical) life. Just as Yahweh guaranteed the various rules according to which the Hebrew defined his ethical conduct, so does Hobbes's sovereign. But also like Yahweh, he is himself above the rules; "beyond good and evil." And because the obedience he exacts is unquestioning, he can suspend the rules of civilized existence upon his whim; his claims override those of all humanly responsible morality. We can, of course, still apply the term "moral" to both sorts of demand; we can understand the duty which an Old Testament character such as Abraham owed to Yahweh as well as his paternal duty both as instances of moral obligation. But we will thereby miss the different significances of these two sorts of obligation upon the subject's life. Abraham's obligation as a parent, presupposing a morally responsible agent, was abruptly suspended. Abraham the "good" parent succumbed to Abraham the "good" child of Yahweh; he placed his son upon the sacrificial altar without question or hesitation. And similarly, it is the morality of

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 42, p. 57.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 104.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 211.

⁵⁶ See n. 1, above, for an instance of this rendition of the question.

⁵⁷ "The tendency which the child has to regard duty and the value attaching to it as imposing itself regardless of the circumstances in which the individual may find himself." (*The Moral Judgment of the Child*, trans. Marjorie Gabain [New York: Free Press, 1965], p. 111.)

⁵⁸ "The will of all" is formed, not by moral decision, but rather by "terror." (*Leviathan*, p. 112).

the "good" child, rather than that of the responsible adult, that Hobbes demands of his citizens.

The more interesting question—whether morality is necessary to the argument of *Leviathan*—must be answered in the negative. Hobbes presents his case for obligation in the only manner consonant with his psychology and epistemology: he describes the nature of the political bond, which is psychological. If the ultimate unit of political analysis, the individual, is a creature of passion—if his thoughts, volitions, and valuations, even the very quality of his awareness, are products of his appetites—then we must found the political order, not on an objective moral realm (which must perforce be outside the individual's psychic and intellectual ken), but rather in the passions themselves. If we are to demonstrate that a rule of conduct obliges the individual, we must show that it is psychologically imperative; since "good" and "evil" are meaningful only as psychophysiological terms, labels for our tropisms of desire and aversion,⁵⁹ we must demonstrate that the rules emanate from the homeostatic mechanism of these tropisms.

Homeostasis—reduced to fundamentals, rendered as the stark, ineluctable impulse to preserve one's being—is not merely a "motive" (as opposed to a "ground") of conduct for Hobbes. It is a *psychological* ground, the only sense in which "ground" can have any meaning within Hobbesian philosophy; it is the ultimate rationale, the fundamental justification for all motives. Beyond this point, rational demonstration cannot go; men shun death "by a certain impulsion of nature, no less than that whereby a stone moves downward."⁶⁰ Since the laws of nature are laws of reason, they must have their source and justification in the impulse to maintain one's being. It is not passive beatitude or the gentle wisdom of an older natural law tradition that informs them, but rather the reflexive quest for survival in a perilous world. The laws of nature are thus essentially homeostatic, rather than moralistic imperatives; steps in a strategy of endurance: "A law of nature, *lex naturalis*, is a precept or general rule, found out by reason by which a man is forbidden to do that, which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same; and to omit that, by which he thinketh it may best be preserved."⁶¹

⁵⁹ "names that signify our appetites and aversions . . ." (*ibid.*, p. 104).

⁶⁰ *De Cive*, p. 26. Cf. *The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic*, ed. with a preface and critical notes by Ferdinand Tönnies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1928), p. 54.

⁶¹ *Leviathan*, p. 84.

The psychophysiological urge to survive, however, would seem to provide a foundation far too crude and frail to support the imposing structure of law, for biological impulses require neither prescriptions nor governments. How move from description to prescription, from bestial nature to civility; or even more paradoxically, how it is possible for the laws of nature to be grounded in human biology, and, at the same time, "contrary to our natural passions?"⁶² But Hobbes does not rest his case here; he claimed to have deduced his system from two "maxims of nature." He requires a second psychological penchant, a "concupiscent part" in tension with that "which teaches every man to fly a contranatural dissolution as the greatest mischief that can arrive to nature. . . ."⁶³ Primitive homeostasis is, after all, static and, at least for humans, a stultifying process. The impulse to survive would have no significance whatever for change in the human plight if consistently obeyed. Far from being an elaborate strategy, it would constitute no more than the simple principle of self-sustainment that governs all organismic behavior. Thus, the entire drama that culminates in the creation of the *Leviathan* would never unfold if man always acted upon this impulse. Only when conflict emerges as a result of frustration of the homeostatic urge does development ensue. Without such conflict, Hobbes cannot move from the descriptive to the prescriptive, and man cannot develop from the natural to the political, from the organismic to the human.

Man's second fundamental impulse insures that such conflict will occur; because vanity "desires to appropriate to itself the use of those things in which all others have a joint interest,"⁶⁴ it inevitably leads men into situations which threaten their survival, thereby insuring that they will experience a new emotion, fear. And with the intrusion of fear, psyche loses its monolithic simplicity. Fear of the possibility of death is not merely emotional recoil, according to Hobbes; not just the transitory state of being frightened. It rather has an enlightening value for man, adding a new dimension of awareness, a prevision of a life-style he must assume in order to avoid future encounters with death:

It is objected: it is so improbable that men should grow into civil societies out of fear, that if they had been afraid, they would not have endured each other's looks. They presume, I believe, that to fear is nothing else than to be affrighted. I comprehend in this word fear, a certain foresight of future evil; neither do I conceive flight

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 109.

⁶³ *De Cive*, p. 5.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

the sole property of fear, but to distrust, suspect, take heed, provide so that they may not fear, is also incident to the fearful.⁶⁵

Man discovers that he is possessed of conflicting, even destructive, passions; therefore, the pristine homeostatic mechanism is untrustworthy. The reflexive survival impulse, reactive only to present circumstances, is inadequate. A concern with futurity is necessitated; man flees present danger by instinct, but artifice and force are required if he is to "take care."⁶⁶

Once man is made aware of his psychic conflict, his view of himself as a self-indulgent, nonpolitical creature ceases to be applicable. The self must be harnessed, disciplined, and indeed coerced, if man is to live without fear; his behavior must be circumscribed by rules. Moreover, he requires sanctions if his vanity is to be kept within peaceful bounds; and since he is in a state of constant psychic flux, he cannot rely on his own self-admonitions. Therefore, these sanctions must be given external force, they must be politicized.

Thus, reduced to essentials, Hobbes's argument for political obligation rests on three postulates: two psychophysiological and one situational. First, he assumes that man's most fundamental concern is with preserving his being, or correlatively, that he avoids "most of all that terrible enemy of nature, death. . . ."⁶⁷ Second, man's vanity inevitably leads him into a situation of intolerable self-conflict, which expresses itself in fear. Third, Hobbes assumes that fear changes man's homeostatic behavior from the merely reflexive to the contrived; it provides a strategy of fear-avoidance, a logic of survival to which he must conform in order to avoid future encounters with death.⁶⁸

While Hobbes's answer to the problem of political obligation is non-moral—at least in the traditional sense—it is not merely prudential. Like morality, self-preservation provides a norm for conduct, a governing principle which

serves as a guide for personal, as well as social, behavior. Fear serves to mediate between conflicting desires no less than moral laws "inscribed on the heart": fear, too, cries "NO!" to wayward desires; and it, too, demands behavior contrary to some of the natural passions;⁶⁹ and it, too, requires that we take the needs of others into account (at least within limits), even at the expense of our own.⁷⁰

Most important of all, Hobbes's conception of homeostasis as informed by fear is, like morality, both universal and imperative: it is as compelling and as exhaustive of humanity as was Aristotle's notion of political participation, for it also excludes only Gods and beasts. The natural law (and hence the political) binds not because it is "good" in some disinterested sense, but because its violation is too frequently accompanied by an existential horror, an all-consuming terror which the ordinary man cannot withstand. Only those so noble as to scorn, and those so stupid as to fail to anticipate, fear are exempt from the claims of the *Leviathan*.

And it is as a reminder, a *memento mori*, to ordinary mortals, that the *Leviathan* was addressed. Although Hobbes expressed the hope that his argument would fall into the hands of a sympathetic sovereign, its main impact is upon the citizen. It is less a blueprint for legislation than an attempt to persuade political man that his moral quandaries, his doubts concerning his obligation to the law, are of virtually no significance. They are products of a dangerous game of self-aggrandizement the citizen plays with himself; a form of what Pascal called "*divertissement*." Just as men frolic carelessly on the brink of the precipice after they have concealed its awesome prospect with hedges, so does the citizen indulge himself with doubts concerning the value of the state after it has provided him with indispensable security. But seriously to challenge the authority of the state is to remove the hedges. And the game halts abruptly, for he then beholds the terrible abyss. Fear demands that he replace the hedges; he has no choice.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 24n.

⁶⁶ Hobbes is neither unique nor antiquated in viewing psychic conflict as the source of a quality of awareness. Indeed, he again harks back to Plato, for Plato used an example of such conflict against the Sophists to demonstrate the existence of a rational faculty. See his example of the thirsty man in the *Republic*, trans. Francis M. Cornford (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 136. Of course Marx and Freud put conflict to similar use, and Piaget remarks that consciousness of a rule (even a motor rule) can only occur as a result of frustration and ensuing conflict (*Moral Judgment of the Child*, p. 87).

⁶⁷ *Elements*, p. 54.

⁶⁸ We could easily impose Freudian terminology on this process and say that Hobbes replaces moral persuasion with a description of the development of a political ego; one which emerges from conflict with the external environment, as all good egos must.

⁶⁹ John Plamenatz has stressed the importance of an "internal censor" for morality, and denies that Hobbes acknowledges such a governor. He fails to explain how Hobbes can formulate prescriptive rules which are against the passions (*Man and Society* [New York: McGraw Hill, 1963], I, 128).

⁷⁰ In his *Elements of Law*, Hobbes even offers a golden-rule resolution of the natural law: "That a man imagine himself in the place of the party with whom he hath to do, and reciprocally him in his . . ." (p. 71). Cf. *Leviathan*, p. 103, Thomas Nagel's "Hobbes's Concept of Obligation," *The Philosophical Review*, LXVIII, No. 1 (January, 1959), 68ff., argues that it is a "concern for others," as opposed to self-interest, that is lacking in Hobbes. Hobbes's argument, however, appears to be that it is precisely because of our self-interest that we must effect a concern for others.

Issue Salience and Party Choice*

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In recent years, leading studies of voting behavior have often concluded that specific issues are not a salient element in the electoral decision. It has been found that by and large the electorate is unfamiliar with most issues, and/or is unable to recognize differences between Republican and Democratic positions on the issues. These studies suggest that the electoral decision is based primarily on party identification, on attitudes toward candidates, and on public response to very broad issues such as war or peace, prosperity, corruption, and the like. The purpose of this study is to present new data that in some respects modify these evaluations of the electoral decision.

Previous Findings on the Importance of Issues

First, let us review briefly the leading research in voting behavior in the United States in order to examine the nature of the findings regarding issues, and to establish the context within which the present study was made. *The American Voter*, in a chapter on "Public Policy and Political Preference," indicated that voters' familiarity with issues was generally rather low, and that even when people held an opinion on a particular issue, many were unable to identify correctly the relevant policy stands of the two parties.¹ On each of the sixteen issues examined by the authors, only from 18 to 36 percent of the public (depending on the issue) expressed an opinion, perceived what the government was doing, and detected differences in policy between the parties.

Follow-up studies revealed that many of the people who had expressed an opinion in response to these issue questions were probably guessing. Using the 1956-1958-1960 panel, Philip Converse performed a reliability test and found an unusual amount of turnover in the re-

spondents' positions on these issues.² On the question of leaving "things like electric power and housing" to private business, for example, Converse calculated that about 50 percent of the sample had been responding randomly. (An additional 30 percent had not expressed an opinion on the question at all.)

Other researchers have attempted to compare the direction of opinion (pro and con) on these issues with the voter's party preference. Their findings disclose that party identifiers do tend to hold the expected positions on certain issues, particularly on matters having to do with social legislation and government intervention in the economy.³ When it comes to making an electoral choice, however, party identifiers

Table 1. Relation Between Issue Position and Party Preference: Selected Issues (from Converse and Dupeux, "Politicization of the Electorate in France and the United States")⁴

Issue	Non-South	
	Party Identifiers	Independents
Federal aid to education	.21	.16
Federal guarantees of employment	.19	.03
Government vs. private enterprise in power and housing	.18	.21
Federal school integration	.07	-.06
Federal FEPC	.06	.01
Deployment of U.S. forces abroad	.05	-.02
General isolation-internationalism	.03	.04
Foreign aid	.02	-.05

(correlation coefficients are tau_b's)

¹ Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics" in David E. Apter, editor, *Ideology and Discontent* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1964), pp. 238-245, and Philip E. Converse, "Attitudes and Non-Attitudes: Continuation of a Dialogue" (Survey Research Center, The University of Michigan, February, 1963), 27 pp. (Mimeographed.)

² V. O. Key, Jr., *Public Opinion and American Democracy* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), p. 445; Frank J. Sorauf, *Party Politics in America* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1968), pp. 163-165.

³ Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *Elections and the Political Order* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966), p. 287.

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¹ Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960), Chapter 8.

have not exhibited a strong inclination to vote on the basis of these issue positions. The data presented in Table 1 (taken from a study by Converse) indicate that on only three issues—federal aid to education, federal guarantee of employment, and government involvement in power and housing—is there even a modest correlation between the issue position of the party identifiers and their choice of party. As for Independents, Table 1 reveals that almost no relationship exists between the opinions they hold on most issues and the party preference they express in the voting booth.

When we review these kinds of findings, we can only surmise that the electoral decision is not rich with specific issue content. As the authors of *The American Voter* conclude, there seems to be "widespread ignorance and indifference over many matters of policy."⁵

Importance of Candidates Relative to Issues. In one of the leading analyses in the area of electoral change, Donald Stokes concluded that change stemming from attitudes toward parties was "moderate by comparison with change induced by succeeding pairs of candidates."⁶ In his study, Stokes compared the overall importance of four party-related components and two candidate-image components in the 1952, 1956, 1960 and 1964 elections. He found some indications that certain pervasive issues (such as, for example, the Korean War and the corruption in government charge in the 1952 cam-

paign) did have a measurable effect on the outcome of elections, but even when such issues commanded widespread public attention, attitudes toward the presidential candidates had a far greater effect on net electoral change.

The Independent Voter and Issues Awareness. The Independent voter has been of special interest to many students of electoral change. Independents have been characterized as the "least admirable" voters—those who shift with the popular tide and seem "devoid of policy interests or concerns."⁷ The authors of *The American Voter* describe them as follows:

Far from being more attentive, interested, and informed, Independents tend as a group to be somewhat less involved in politics. They have somewhat poorer knowledge of the issues, their image of the candidates is fainter, their interest in the campaign is less, their concern over the outcome is relatively slight, and their choice between competing candidates, although it is made later in the campaign, seems much less to spring from discoverable evaluations of the elements of national politics.⁸

Thus, when we consider that much of the change in electoral outcome is a result of the shifting preferences of Independents, we have even less reason to believe that the outcome of an election is dependent upon a responsible consideration of substantive issues.

Measuring Issue Salience

The findings cited in the above studies were based on data gathered by the Survey Research Center. As is true with most scientific inquiry, newly refined measures and different approaches often modify the findings of previous research. This study utilizes a new set of interview questions from the same Survey Research Center sample. By analyzing this alternate data set, it reveals new evidence concerning the role of specific issues in voting decisions.

The Survey Research Center interview questions that have been used in the past to measure the issue positions of the public have been of the closed-ended type.⁹ In this format, the

⁵ Campbell *et al.*, *The American Voter*, p. 186.

⁶ Donald E. Stokes, "Some Dynamic Elements of Contests for the Presidency," *American Political Science Review*, 60 (March, 1966), p. 27. It should be pointed out that the graphs in Stokes' article do not indicate the relative importance of each component for individual voting choice; rather the graphs represent the net effect of each component on the overall outcome of each election. Stokes multiplies the beta weights—that is, the importance of each component in predicting individual voting choice—by the distance that the average attitude of the entire electorate is displaced from the neutral position on the attitudinal component. His formula is:

$$b_i(\bar{X}_i - X_i^0)$$

Thus, the relative importance of issues and candidates in individual voting decisions cannot be discerned directly from Stokes' data since his findings are a function of both b_i and $\bar{X}_i$.

In his original component analysis, published in 1958, Stokes did present data showing the relative importance of each component for individual voting choice; bar graphs indicated the relative strengths of the beta weights in the 1952 and 1956 presidential elections. Donald E. Stokes *et al.*, "Components of Electoral Decision," *American Political Science Review*, 52 (June, 1958), p. 381. However, these individual weights have not been included in the subsequent presentations of the component analysis published in *The American Voter* and in the 1966 article cited above.

⁷ V. O. Key, Jr., *Public Opinion and American Democracy*, p. 465.

⁸ Campbell *et al.*, *The American Voter*, p. 143.

⁹ There are some exceptions; a few studies have used open-ended questions to analyze issues. In an effort to measure the impact of the Goldwater campaign, Kessel examined several sets of Survey Research Center open-ended questions: those which measure attitudes toward the parties and the presidential candidates as well as the "most important problems" (which provides the basis for this present study). Kessel shows the distribution of responses to these questions for interviews taken during different stages of the campaign. See John H. Kessel, *The Goldwater Coalition* (Indianapolis and New York:

interviewer reads a preformulated statement and then asks the respondent whether he agrees or disagrees. When a respondent can reply only with a simple "agree" or "disagree," it is difficult to tell whether the interview question has elicited merely a fleeting reaction to an issue that is of little or no concern to the respondent, or whether the respondent views it as being truly salient.¹⁰ The random turnover in responses to this type of question (see the reliability study of Converse cited in note 2 above) indicates that in many cases no real attitude has been measured. If we wish to know how issues affect behavior, we must first find out which issues are salient to individual voters. When we rely on the closed-ended type of question, there is no way to separate voters for whom the issue is salient from those voters who have no particular concern about the issue.

We might also observe that, in presenting a battery of issue questions, the interviewer confronts the respondent with a series of statements that have been pre-selected and preworded by a political analyst. Some respondents may not recognize the issue when it is presented to them in this manner—they themselves may view the issue in entirely different terms. Even more important, many respondents may be concerned with other issues besides those that are included in the interview schedule. These neglected issues may have a strong influence on the individual's voting behavior, and yet voters' attitudes toward them will be unavailable for analysis.

In 1960, the Survey Research Center added a new set of questions to its interview schedule

—open-ended questions which sought information about the voter's issue concerns and his party preference on those issues. These questions allowed the voter to define his own issue space by naming the issues that were salient to him.

This study is based largely on these new measures. The issues that were salient to the public in 1960 and 1964 will be examined first, followed by an intensive analysis of the relative importance of issues in the 1964 election.

The Pattern of Issue Concerns, 1960 and 1964

The issues in 1960 and 1964, as the public saw them, are presented in Table 2. The table is an attempt to reduce a vast set of coded items to manageable proportions by combining similar issues and by collapsing code categories.¹¹ Even then, more than twenty-five issues were mentioned with some frequency each year. Many of these issues would escape detection by the standard battery of issue statement questions and, as pointed out earlier, this statement type of questioning would not be able to detect which issues were of real concern to the public.

In addition to noting the great variety of issues mentioned by the public, we should observe in Table 2 that no single issue attracted a very large following; in other words, each issue was mentioned by relatively small segments of the public. (These segments might be called "issue publics.")¹²

Another important phenomenon noticeable in Table 2 is the considerable change that occurred in issue concerns between 1960 and 1964. The preoccupation with foreign affairs in 1960 had dramatically shifted to domestic concerns by 1964,¹³ especially with respect to racial problems and civil rights.

¹¹ The Survey Research Center changed some code categories in 1964 from those used in 1960. Thus, these data are not exactly comparable. This is particularly true of the foreign aid and Supreme Court issues. Foreign aid responses were not distinguished from other foreign policy responses in 1960, but they were in 1964. Thus, foreign aid appears to be a new issue in 1964; it was not.

The 1964 interview question specifically asked about the Supreme Court; it had not been mentioned in the 1960 question. Thus, responses concerning the Supreme Court in 1964 may be a function of question wording rather than a sudden interest in the Court's activities. All other issues which appear for the first time in 1964 are a result of spontaneous responses, not question wording or coding.

¹² The concept of "issue public" was originally used by Converse in "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," *op. cit.*

¹³ The opposite finding regarding the importance of foreign affairs in 1964 is reported in Stokes, "Some Dynamic Elements of Contests for the Presidency," *op. cit.*, p. 21. His finding, however, is based on quite a different set of questions.

The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1968), pp. 271-280. As we have seen, Stokes based his component analysis on the open-ended questions measuring likes and dislikes for the parties and the candidates. However, in his analysis, the impact of *specific* issues cannot be directly determined since all foreign policy items were placed in a single category, and all domestic issue responses were lumped together into three broad categories (parties as managers of government, domestic issues, and group-related attitudes). Stokes, "Some Dynamic Elements of Contests for the Presidency," *op. cit.*

¹⁰ A "salient" issue may range in centrality from a readily verbalized phrase that is "on top" of the respondent's mind to an attitude which is well developed and of deep concern. When asked an open-ended question, the respondent must have some awareness of an issue and be able to verbalize this cognition. The problem with the Likert type scale is that it measures only the affective component of an attitude, if indeed it measures an attitude at all. Open-ended questions measure both affect and cognition. In using these questions, the researcher comes much closer to measuring an attitude which is on the respondent's mind (salient) at the time of the interview—an attitude which presumably was salient before the interview and will remain so afterwards.

Table 2. Most Important Problems: 1960 and 1964 Responses Compared*

	1960	1964		1960	1964
<i>Domestic Issues:</i>			<i>Foreign Affairs and Defense:</i>		
Racial problems (integration, civil rights)	6.0%	21.3%	Cuba	3.3	2.7
Unemployment	7.0	3.9	Vietnam	—	11.9
Poverty program	—	3.0	Other trouble spots	1.5	1.8
Aged (social security, aid)	2.3	2.7	Foreign aid	—	6.2
Medicare (for aged)	1.5	3.8	Missile, space program	1.0	.6
Schools, aid to education	1.5	1.9	Other (A-bomb, disarmament, U.N.)	3.7	1.5
Other social welfare (health, housing, etc.)	2.3	2.1			
Farm problems	5.9	2.5	Relations with Communist countries	12.9	2.9
Unions, labor relations	2.2	1.0	Maintain U.S. strength vis-a-vis Communists	15.5	4.1
Taxes	3.0	2.1	Relations with allies, more involvement	5.0	1.0
Inflation, fiscal policy	2.7	2.3	Isolationist position (bring boys back home)	2.3	1.9
States' rights	.2	2.2	Aggressive policy (threaten war)	1.9	.1
Government control of business	—	1.2	Vague mention of war-peace, foreign problems	14.3	4.9
Public disorder, crime in the streets	—	2.1	<i>Total foreign affairs and defense</i>	<u>61.5</u>	<u>39.6</u>
Other domestic issues	3.7	3.5			
Supreme Court (prayer decisions, too powerful)	—	4.8	Number of responses	1707*	1981*
<i>Total domestic issues</i>	<u>38.5</u>	<u>60.4</u>			

Note: In 1960, 10% of the sample were unable to think of any problem; in 1964, 14% of the sample failed to mention any problem.

* Percents are based on the total number of first most important problems mentioned (not on the number of respondents). In 1964 the question was rephrased so that respondents could indicate which problems they felt the government should do something about and which problems the government should stay out of. Thus, there are more responses in 1964.

Possible Effects of Events and Campaign Themes on Issue Salience. The data on specific issues in Table 2 may be evaluated in several ways. In one respect, we might view the voters' sparse responses to foreign policy issues in 1964 as being incongruent with crisis developments in the international sphere. With a war building up in Vietnam,¹⁴ and with confrontations over Cuba and Berlin having occurred since the last election, we might expect more, rather than less, attention to foreign problems. The voters' comparative lack of interest in foreign policy matters in 1964 is more understandable if we remember that the concerns of ordinary citizens are usually focused on relatively current happenings. If past "crises" (such as Cuba and Berlin) are no longer in the news or have been resolved in some way, public attention will center upon other matters.

How much the shift in issue salience reflects the themes of presidential campaigns is difficult to say. Kennedy's desire to "get the country

¹⁴It should be noted that in 1964 a relatively large cluster of people did begin to voice concern about Vietnam.

moving again" does not seem to show up in the domestic issue area in 1960, but his expression of concern about American prestige abroad apparently was hitting a responsive chord. It is doubtful that Kennedy's speeches alone created this interest in foreign affairs; but a long series of events—the Russian sputniks, the U-2 incident, anti-American rioting abroad, and similar developments—were probably real enough to the public to cause general apprehension about the Cold War. It should be noted, however, that discussion by the candidates about particular trouble spots—Cuba by Kennedy, and the Quemoy and Matsu incidents in the Kennedy-Nixon debates—did not attract much attention. They were seldom mentioned as important problems by the public.

The shift to domestic concerns in 1964 may be partly a reflection of a campaign in which issues that had divided the parties during the New Deal surfaced once again in the contest between Johnson and Goldwater. Respondents made some remarks about states' rights and government control of business, and the mention of Medicare and social security increased.

Little else of that campaign, however, can be clearly identified in the data.¹⁵

The largest cluster of responses in 1964 is centered on racial problems. As we shall see, many of the respondents were favorable toward civil rights, possibly reflecting a positive reaction to the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It should also be noted that Medicare (which was enacted soon after the election) and the poverty program were salient issues during the 1964 campaign.¹⁶ Apparently presidential support for specific legislation does not go unnoticed.

In summary, it is probably not possible to predict what issues will be salient in a particular election, but the public does seem to respond most to current and recurring news and events. A president's active support for a legislative program also appears to be of consequence to segments of the public. Although the effect of campaign issues and slogans is difficult to measure with these data, we might infer that parties have only a limited influence over what issues become real to the public.

A Comparison with Stokes' Analysis—A Methodological Observation. While the simple presentation of issue response frequencies in Table 2 cannot be directly compared with Stokes' multivariate component analysis, it is interesting that the data presented in this article indicate much more change in issue-related attitudes between 1960 and 1964 than Stokes observed.¹⁷ Perhaps one of the reasons for this difference is that Stokes based his analysis on responses to attitudinal questions which measured like and dislike for the two political parties. Hence, "parties" rather than "issues" were the objects of reference for the respondent. Many of the responses to these party questions undoubtedly expressed long-term cognitive elements of party identification rather than short-term issue concerns. Indeed, Stokes points out that during the entire period of the 1950's and early 1960's, constant references were made to the Democratic Party as being the party of the "common man." Also, "image" issues, which associated parties with good or bad times were conspicu-

ous throughout the period. These long-term cognitions probably reduce the variation that might have been observed if current salient issues had been measured and used in the analysis.

Perception of Issues in 1964

The Nature of the 1964 Data. The 1964 data will be used for further analysis because the basic interview question in 1964 was extended to probe additional dimensions of issue concerns. The issue questions were reworded so that respondents could indicate which problems they felt the government should do something about and which problems they felt the government should refrain from handling. In addition, the Survey Research Center introduced follow-up questions which were specifically designed to measure the degree of salience of each issue.¹⁸ Both of these dimensions proved to be valuable for analytical purposes.¹⁹

The nature of the 1964 presidential campaign, in itself, makes this an interesting

¹⁵ The exact wording of the 1964 interview questions was:

"As you well know, there are many serious problems in this country and in other parts of the world. The question is: *What should be done about them and who should do it?*"

"We want to ask you about problems you think the government in Washington *should do something about* and any problems it *should stay out of*. First, what would you personally feel are the most important problems the government should try to take care of when the new President and Congress take office in January?" (Up to three responses were coded.)

"Now, are there any problems at home or abroad that the government in Washington has gotten into that you think it *should stay out of*? This would include problems the President, the Congress, or the Supreme Court have tried to handle that you think they should have stayed out of." (Up to three responses were coded.)

After each response, people were asked:

"Just how strongly would you say you feel about this: are you extremely worried about it, fairly worried, or just quite interested in it?"

"Is this problem on your mind a lot, or do you think about it mainly when you come across news about it?"

"Who do you think would be most likely to do what you want on this, the Democrats, the Republicans, or wouldn't there be any difference?"

¹⁹ The data presented in Figure 1 and in the remainder of this analysis are based on issues that the respondents felt were of high salience. That is, responses were not included unless the respondent said he was extremely worried about the issue and/or the problem was on his mind a lot. When this measure of degree of salience is not used, perception of party differences is less sharply defined. There is an increase in "no difference" and "don't know" answers or a tendency to match the inappropriate party with the issue. This mismatching or lack of knowledge is to be expected since those respondents who have not thought about an issue or who are not very worried about it will be unlikely to seek out, or pay attention to, cues indicating party positions on the issue.

¹⁵ See Kessel, *The Goldwater Coalition*, Chapter 9, for a more thorough analysis of the impact of the 1964 campaign.

¹⁶ A study using 1958 data reported low salience of specific items of Congressional legislation. Perhaps this was in part a result of the lack of legislative activity under Eisenhower, and in part a result of incomplete questioning of respondents. See Donald E. Stokes and Warren E. Miller, "Party Government and the Saliency of Congress" in Campbell *et al.*, *Elections and the Political Order*, pp. 198-199.

¹⁷ Stokes, "Some Dynamic Elements of Contests for the Presidency," *op cit.*, Figures 1 and 2.

election in which to assess the relative importance of issues. Studies by Stokes and Kessel indicate that the personalities of the candidates were an unusually strong factor in that election.²⁰ Also, Ellsworth demonstrates that, although broad ideological themes were present, specific issues were not prominent in the campaign oratory.²¹ Thus, we would not expect 1964 to be a very promising year for measuring the importance of specific issues in the electoral decision. If anything, we would anticipate attitudes toward candidates to be the highly dominant factor in that election.

Perception of Party Differences on Issues. In Figure 1, the party differences perceived on each issue in 1964 are arranged roughly in order from the most Democratic issue on the top to the most Republican issue on the bottom. These data indicate that, to a remarkable extent, *the public does perceive party differences on those issues that are salient to them.* On most issues, more than 60 per cent of the respondents perceived party differences. Only six of the issues listed in Figure 1 fall below this high level of party relevance.²²

6

²⁰ In analyzing the Survey Research Center's open-ended questions about parties and candidates in 1964, Kessel found that attitudes about candidates were "far more salient than the attitudes about parties . . . questions about candidates engendered half again as many comments as the questions about parties." See John H. Kessel, *The Goldwater Coalition*, p. 258. Also, Stokes found the candidate component to be an unusually strong factor in 1964. See "Some Dynamic Elements of Contests for the Presidency," *op. cit.*

²¹ Ellsworth performed a content analysis on a sample of campaign speeches in 1964, and concluded that "the ideological spread between Johnson and Goldwater did little or nothing to produce an increase in emphasis upon issues by the candidates themselves in their [speeches]." John W. Ellsworth, "Policy and Ideology in the Campaigns of 1960 and 1964" (unpublished paper), p. 8. Polsby and Wildavsky make a similar observation about the 1964 campaign. They state that "in a campaign in which the parties were further apart on issues than they have been in our time . . . there was relatively little discussion of issues. Certainly, the existence of wide and deep policy differences did not, as has sometimes been thought, lead directly to a campaign focusing on specific issues." Nelson W. Polsby and Aaron B. Wildavsky, *Presidential Elections*, second edition (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968), p. 205.

²² The issues on which less than 60 percent perceived party differences were: 1) war-peace, 2) corruption in government, 3) farm problems, 4) labor relations, 5) isolation, and 6) the Supreme Court. Mentions of "war" or "peace" as well as "corruption" in 1964 had little in the way of specific referents; such comments were often unaccompanied by any further substantive remarks. These vague problems were probably mentioned by respondents who were hard pressed to say something, and it is thus not

The Democratic party was clearly preferred as the party best able to handle certain issues such as Medicare, social security, and aid for the poor. The Republicans were singled out as the party best able to handle the Communist threat and as the party most likely to take appropriate stands on foreign aid and fiscal policy. The newly revived issues of states' rights and government control of business were also strongly Republican. A pronounced party differentiation was found on the civil rights-integration issue. Apparently the Johnson-Goldwater division on this issue was quite clearly perceived.²³

Other issues, however, were not generally associated with one political party or the other. On these issues, some respondents felt that the Democratic party would serve their interests better, while about equal numbers of respondents felt that the Republican party would handle the problem more appropriately. This was especially true of defense and foreign policy issues such as the test-ban treaty, disarmament, relations with allies, and intervention in Vietnam and other trouble spots, but the domestic issues of public disorder and crime in the streets also brought forth mixed party evaluations. On some of these issues—especially in the foreign policy area—these different perceptions about the parties may have been due to ambiguous party policies or actions. It may be, too, that the lack of clearly differentiated party positions on some of these issues results from indistinct coding procedures rather than public confusion or party ambiguity.²⁴

surprising that these people were unable to recognize party differences. However, it is difficult to understand why only 52 percent of those who were concerned with farm problems and only 58 percent of those who mentioned labor relations perceived party differences on these questions. The parties have taken clear stands in these matters over the years. As for the isolationists, they have not been able to find a party which would do what they want since the late 1940's. The Supreme Court, as would be expected, was not considered in partisan political terms, at least not in 1964.

²³ When asked during the 1964 interview whether they had heard if "Congress did anything this year in the way of civil rights," 77 percent mentioned the Civil Rights Bill. Of these, 95 percent were aware that Johnson favored it and 84 percent correctly perceived Goldwater as being against it.

²⁴ On some items, the SRC codes do not indicate whether the respondent favored the issue or was against it. When both pro and con respondents are lumped into the same category, it is not surprising that both parties are mentioned as best able to handle the issue. Where provision was made for coding issue position, clearer party differences emerged. A good example of this is the strong differences perceived by those who were favorable to civil rights or integration and those who were anti-civil rights.

A Note on Spatial Models. The information presented in Figure 1 emphasizes that the public sees a diffuse and variegated picture of party activity. Some people focus on one problem, others on quite another problem. No linear, uni-dimensional model of political space could possibly fit the data we have presented here.²⁵ The wide scattering of salient issues—both position issues and valence issues—resists simple ideological structuring or ordering.

In his search for a manageable dimension upon which to locate party differences, the political analyst might find the “do something about”—“stay out of” component (suggested by the data presented in Figure 1) to be useful. This dimension is readily understood by the public and is quite appropriate, given the traditional postures of the two parties on most issues, especially in domestic affairs.

Distortion in Issue Perception due to Party Identification. A number of political behavior studies have recognized that the individual's perception of political objects is often distorted by pre-existing partisan attitudes. In order to maintain cognitive balance, party identifiers will either selectively attend or alter information pertaining to candidates, parties, or other political phenomena. Presumably, this kind of psychological distortion might underly much of the party differentials found in Figure 1. In order to test for this bias, the author examined the data used in Figure 1 more thoroughly, controlling for party identification.

The data were first analyzed to discover what kinds of issues were salient to Democrats and to Republicans; that is, which issues did these party identifiers mention most frequently? The author found a tendency for Democrats to mention pro-Democratic issues and for Republicans to select issues on which their party has been favorably evaluated. This partisan bias may be due to selective attention or to other cognitive balancing processes; or it may result from the fact that Democrats come from different life situations than Republicans do, and may therefore be concerned with quite a different set of issues. Even so, this tendency was not as strong as might be supposed. For example, more than 40 percent of those who expressed support for civil rights, for aid to education, and for poverty programs were Republicans and Independents. On the other side, half of those who were anti-civil rights were Demo-

crats. Furthermore, Democrats and Independents constituted more than a majority of those who mentioned issues on which the Republicans were favorably perceived in 1964 (inflation, Communist threat, states' rights, etc.).

This raises another question: To what extent do party identifiers tend to feel that their own party will do what they want on an issue? The well-known psychological tendency for people to believe that their party is performing in consonance with their personal viewpoints was substantiated in these data on salient issues, but a strong strain toward a correct perception of party positions was also evident. This strain toward political reality was especially apparent in policy areas where the parties have taken opposing stands over a long period of time or on issues on which the candidates have taken clearly opposing positions. For example, of those Republicans who were concerned with Medicare, social security, aid to education, unemployment, or poverty, no more than a third believed that their party would perform better in regard to these matters. On the other hand, virtually no Democrat who mentioned the issues of states' rights or government control of business thought that the Democratic party would act with restraint in these matters.²⁶ On the issue of civil rights—an issue that had become highly salient in 1964, compared with previous years—even less psychological distortion of party position was evident. Only about 19 percent of the Republicans who favored civil rights activities thought that their party would aid in this cause, and only 20 percent of the Democrats who opposed civil rights felt that their party would inhibit advances in Negro rights. As has been noted earlier, the position of the two candidates on this issue was quite widely known, and this fact undoubtedly made avoidance of political reality more difficult.

Thus, although there is distortion in the way party identifiers perceive issues, an analysis of issues that are salient to voters indicates that this distortion is less than previous research would lead us to expect. On several issues, especially those on which the parties or candidates have taken clear stands, there is a fairly accurate recognition of party positions.

²⁶ Further analysis of these data indicate that one of the ways in which party identifiers seem to resolve the psychological conflict created by being concerned about an issue on which the opposite party has the more appropriate position is to claim that there is no difference between the parties on that issue. These respondents might “know” the correct party positions on these issues, but prefer not to undergo the discomfort of saying the opposition party is better in this area.

²⁵ See Stokes' critique of Downs entitled “Spatial Models of Party Competition” for further elaboration of this point. This article is found in Campbell *et al.*, *Elections and the Political Order*, pp. 161–179.





Figure 1. Perceived Party Differences on Salient Issues, 1964

Figure 1 (continued)



The total number of people who mentioned each issue and felt it was highly salient is given in the left-hand column of the figure. The bars in the figure are based on the percent of these total mentions on each issue. (Those who responded "don't know" to the party difference question are not shown in Figure 1, but they were included in calculating the percentages.)

The Role of Issues in Individual Voting Choice

The foregoing analysis of the 1960 and 1964 data has delineated the salient issues as perceived by the public. In order to determine the effect of these issues on individual voting behavior we turn now to an analysis of issue cognitions among individual voters. How many issues did the individual perceive? If he was concerned about more than one issue, was he able to sort out party differences on them in a meaningful way? What effect did issue concerns have on voting choice?

Extent of Issue Awareness. It has already been noted (Table 2) that 14 percent of the respondents in 1964 were unable to think of any problem facing their government.²⁷ On the other hand, 23 percent were aware of four or more issues. The average number of issues perceived by the electorate was 2.5.²⁸

Table 3 shows the distribution of issue awareness by party identification. Here we find new and interesting information about the Independent voter: the table shows that Independents have a relatively high degree of issue concerns. To be sure, strong Republicans are heavily armed with issues when they go to the polls, but Independents are next in order of issue cognizance, with Democrats—weak and strong identifiers alike—looking like indifferent citizens by comparison.²⁹ This relative ranking of party identifiers on issue cognitions remains the

²⁷ The author found that there is a strong tendency for those with no concept of issues to remain home on election day.

²⁸ Respondents were not encouraged by interviewers to mention more than 3 issues. Had all issues salient to the respondents been recorded, the average would have been higher.

²⁹ This is not to say that Independents are "good citizens" in all respects; the author confirmed previous findings which show that Independents are indeed less involved and participate less regularly. But

Table 3. Relation of Party Identification to Number of Issues Mentioned

Number of Issues Mentioned	Party Identification				
	Strong Dem.	Weak Dem.	Ind.	Weak Rep.	Strong Rep.
Low 0 or 1	33%	35%	26%	28%	13%
2 or 3	52	47	44	46	42
High 4 to 6	15	18	30	26	45
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Index	-18	-17	+4	-2	+32
(% High-Low)					
N	394	363	314	194	156

Table 4. Relation of Party Identification to Number of Issues Mentioned with Education Controlled

	Party Identification				
	Strong Dem.	Weak Dem.	Ind.	Weak Rep.	Strong Rep.
<i>Less than High School Education</i>					
Number of Issues					
0 or 1	43%	49%	42%	47%	32%
2 or 3	48	41	46	39	46
4 to 6	9	10	12	14	22
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Index	-34	-39	-30	-33	-10
N	208	168	105	57	41
<i>High School Graduates</i>					
Number of Issues					
0 or 1	25%	29%	26%	26%	9%
2 or 3	56	51	45	48	49
4 to 6	19	20	29	26	42
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Index	-6	-9	+3	0	+33
N	118	123	124	81	55
<i>Some College or College Graduate</i>					
Number of Issues					
0 or 1	15%	11%	7%	10%	3%
2 or 3	60	56	39	52	32
4 to 6	25	33	54	38	65
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Index	+10	+21	+47	+28	+62
N	67	71	83	52	60

same regardless of level of education. (See Table 4.)

This finding is quite different from the conclusions in *The American Voter* (cited earlier) because it is based on different data. Conclusions about the Independent voter in *The American Voter* were based upon responses to the open-ended questions that measured attitudes toward parties and candidates, not toward issues. The Independent is placed at a disadvantage in answering these questions—especially the questions about parties. As we have seen, responses to these questions frequently reflect long-term cognitive elements of party

their concern over substantive issues of the day is none-the-less relatively strong.

identification. Since most Independents have received few cues about parties in their socialization process, it is understandable that their references to parties would be deficient.³⁰

The author also examined the 1964 data on attitudes toward candidates, and he found that many *strong* party identifiers did indeed have more to say about the candidates than did Independents and weak identifiers. This is also to be expected, since strong party identifiers have a powerful motivation to seek information about their candidate.

Issues and Individual Voting Change. Now that we have discussed the general level of issue awareness in the public, what can we say about the effect of these issues in initiating change in voting behavior?

First of all, when a respondent is concerned about several different issues, he has a very strong tendency to name just one party as being the best party to handle *all* of these problems. This was true of Independents as well as party identifiers. (Only 106 out of 1016 respondents

³⁰ When I analyzed the Survey Research Center questions which measured likes and dislikes for the two parties in 1964, my findings agreed with the conclusion in *The American Voter* that Independents have fewer attitudes toward parties than do party identifiers.

Table 5. Relation of Party Identification to Strength of Issue Partisanship					
Strength of Issue Partisanship	Party Identification				
	Strong Dem.	Weak Dem.	Ind.	Weak Rep.	Strong Rep.
High Dem	19%	8%	4%	2%	0%
Med Dem	25	17	14	6	3
Low Dem	34	28	21	18	4
No Perceived Party Difference	14	26	26	27	11
Low Rep	4	11	17	24	14
Med Rep	2	6	7	10	19
High Rep	2	4	11	13	49
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	332	308	272	175	150

"Strength of Issue Partisanship" is based on the number of issues mentioned by each respondent and his perception of a party difference on each issue. If no party difference was perceived on an issue, that issue did not contribute to the score. Salience of the issue was also considered in the scoring.

Respondents who perceived one party as better for handling some issues and the opposite party as better on other issues are included. (Their net partisan position was computed.)

Table 6. Direction of Vote by Strength of Issue Partisanship Controlling for Party Identification

Strength of Issue Partisanship	Party Identification				
	Strong Dem.	Weak Dem.	Ind.	Weak Rep.	Strong Rep.
High Dem	2% (55)	4% (22)	9% (11)	0% (3)	—
Med Dem	1% (77)	2% (41)	4% (28)	20% (10)	40% (5)
Low Dem	0% (83)	11% (63)	8% (40)	18% (28)	33% (6)
No Difference	10% (37)	21% (57)	22% (45)	56% (39)	94% (16)
Low Rep	20% (10)	45% (20)	58% (33)	77% (31)	83% (17)
Med Rep	33% (3)	62% (13)	81% (16)	93% (14)	96% (27)
High Rep	100% (5)	89% (9)	93% (27)	90% (20)	99% (71)

The entry in each cell is the percent of the voters in the cell who voted Republican.

who mentioned more than one issue saw different parties as best able to handle the problems.)³¹ Whatever the cause, there is a strong tendency among voters toward "issue alignment," which apparently lends order and meaning to the political world for most of them.

Party identifiers do not always perceive their party as being best able to handle issues. It is among these identifiers whose current evaluations of political objects contradict their traditional party loyalties, that we can look for voting change. In Table 5, we can observe the pull of issues on party identifiers and Independents in 1964. In the deviant (lower left and upper right) cells of Table 5, we see that one-fourth of the weak Democrats and a similar proportion of weak Republicans perceived the opposite party as being best able to handle the issue or issues of concern to them. Even 7 percent of the strong identifiers in each party defected on issues. The Independents divided their party preferences about evenly between the parties.³²

Table 6 shows the powerful influence of is-

³¹ Only 32 of these 106—about 8 more than would be expected by chance—were Independents.

³² It might be noted in Table 5 that about one fourth of the Independents did not perceive party differences on any issue; however, an equal proportion of weak Democrats and weak Republicans also failed to do so.

sure partisanship (or issue alignment) on voting choice. When issue partisanship conflicted with party identification, the issues often overcame the long-term party loyalties; the stronger the issue partisanship, the greater its electoral effect.³³ The bottom and top rows of Table 6 are especially worthy of note; if several salient issues intervened, party identification had virtually no influence on voting choice.

The Relative Importance of Issues. The overall relationship between Strength of Issue Partisanship and vote for president was found to be .57 (τ_{ab}). Contrary to what has been found in the past, there is indeed considerable party-relatedness of vote based on specific issues.³⁴ The relationship between net attitude toward candidates³⁵ and vote was only slightly higher—.60 (τ_{ab})—and this was in an election year noted for a strong candidate component.

A multiple regression analysis performed with these data indicates that issue partisanship (as measured here) was not as powerful in producing voting change as attitude toward candidate. The standardized regression coefficient (beta weight) for the candidate variable (controlling for issues) was .48, while the coefficient for the issue variable (controlling for candidate) was .33. We should be aware, however, that party identification is a primary underlying factor contributing to the weights of both of these predictors of voting choice. If we wish to

³³ Where conflict occurred between traditional party ties and evaluation of which party would handle the issues best, the conflict did not cause lower turnout. Apparently, the strong force of issue concerns led a high percentage of these people to the polls—many of them to vote for the opposite party.

³⁴ Of course, this correlation is based on a measure which includes all issues an individual had in mind and is thus not directly comparable to previous studies which have used agree-disagree answers to single issue statements.

³⁵ The attitude toward candidate measure was based on open-ended questions which asked what the respondent liked and disliked about each candidate. The net attitude was determined by the algebraic sum of comments for and against the respective candidates.

control or partial out the effect of party identification, we can simply add this variable to the multiple regression equation. When this was done, the weights attached to issue partisanship and attitude toward candidate were both reduced, as expected. The new weights were .39 for candidate image (controlling for issues and party identification), .23 for issue partisanship (controlling for candidate image and party identification) and .27 for party identification (controlling for the two other factors). As expected, candidate image emerges as the most important factor in individual voting choice in 1964, but issues had a strong independent effect as well. The remarkable thing that emerges from this analysis is that *salient issues had almost as much weight as party identification in predicting voting choice.*

Conclusion

What is important to observe from this study is that by and large the voting public has at least a few substantive issues in mind at the time of an election, and the voters seem to be acting more responsibly than had previously been thought.³⁶ To be sure, images of the presidential candidates are still the most important factor in the electoral decision; at least this was true in 1964. But this personal feeling about a candidate is not the only basis for choice—there are substantive concerns as well. Furthermore, when we allow voters to define their own issue space, they are able to sort out the differences between parties with a fair degree of accuracy. It would probably be going too far to say that the public has contextual knowledge upon which to base its decision. But we have shown that the public is in large measure concerned about specific issues, and that these cognitions have a considerable impact on electoral choice.

³⁶ A similar conclusion was reached by V. O. Key, Jr., in *The Responsible Electorate* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966). However, his data and methods were completely different from those employed in this study.

Psychological Sources of Political Belief: Self-Esteem and Isolationist Attitudes

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Research has shown that isolationist attitudes spring from diverse sources. Among the general public, isolationism appeals particularly to the poorly educated and economically deprived, to individuals isolated socially and geographically, and to the ill-informed and politically indifferent.¹ Among the politically articulate and active stratum, conservative ideology and Republican party affiliation are strongly related to isolationism.² But the isolationist impulse can also arise from purely psychological sources such as anxiety, need aggression, inflexibility, and low self-esteem.³ Our purpose is not to demonstrate again that there is a connection between personality and political belief.⁴ Instead, we shall

¹ On this, see Herbert McClosky, "Personality and Attitude Correlates of Foreign Policy Orientations," in James N. Rosenau, ed., *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy* (New York: The Free Press, 1967); and Hadley Cantril and Lloyd Free, *Political Beliefs Among Americans* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1967).

² *Ibid.*

³ See Herbert McClosky, "Personality and Attitude Correlates," in Rosenau, ed., *op cit.*; Bernard Fensterwald, Jr., "The Anatomy of American Isolationism and Expansionism, Part I," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 2 (June, 1958), 111-139; Bernard Fensterwald, Jr., "The Anatomy of American Isolationism and Expansionism, Part II," vol. 2 (Dec., 1958), 280-309.

⁴ The literature on this is voluminous. Fred I. Greenstein, *Personality and Politics* (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1969) provides a comprehensive discussion of key theoretical and methodological issues, as well as a guide to the relevant research literature. Among the major contributions are Theodor Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswick, Daniel Levinson, and Nevitt Sanford, *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York: Harper Bros., 1950); M. Brewster Smith, Jerome S. Bruner, and Robert W. White, *Opinions and Personality* (New York: Wiley, 1956); B. Christiansen, *Attitudes Towards Foreign Affairs as a Function of Personality* (Oslo: University of Oslo Press, 1959); Robert Lane, *Political Ideology* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1962); Herbert McClosky, "Conservatism and Personality," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 52 (March, 1958), 27-45; Herbert McClosky, "Personality and Attitude Correlates," in Rosenau, ed., *op. cit.*; Herbert Kelman, ed., *International Behavior* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1965); Richard Christie and Marie Jahoda, eds., *Studies in the Scope and Method of the Authoritarian Personality* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1954); Milton Rokeach, *The Open and Closed Mind*, New York: Basic Books,

ask whether it matters if a political attitude—in the present case isolationism—stems from personality influences rather than from some other sources, for example, education, group memberships, or ideology. It is our contention that those who hold common beliefs on one set of issues differ in the opinions they hold on other political questions depending on whether they owe their convictions to their personality characteristics or to some other influence.

This study compares the political attitudes of isolationists with different levels of self-esteem, a basic personality trait. We show that the positions on liberalism-conservatism, extreme political values, and specific foreign policy issues depend on the role self-esteem has played in their adopting an isolationist stance.

Theory, Concepts, and Measures

We understand personality traits to refer to certain consistencies in how a person behaves, to a patterning of his perceptual, emotional, and motor responses.⁵ A basic personality characteristic governs an individual's responses to a wide range of stimuli and situations; anxiety, for example, signifies a tendency to be chronically apprehensive, uneasy, and fearful. By contrast, attitudes are dispositions organized about a more restricted and clearly defined class of objects, while an opinion is even more specific in its referent. Personality traits, most psychologists agree, are acquired earlier in the developmental process than attitudes and opinions; psychological processes at the level of personality are more deep-seated and also more

1960); and Gabriel Almond, *The Appeals of Communism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954).

⁵ Evidence establishing the consistency of psychological dispositions is not as conclusive as one might wish—or as most assume. Personality traits are hypothetical constructs, inferred to account for consistencies in behavior, which are commonly thought to be highly enduring and widely generalized, although as yet the limits of their consistency either over time or across situations cannot be fixed. For a comprehensive although critical review of the recent literature, see Walter Mischel, *Personality and Assessment* (New York: Wiley, 1968).

resistant to change.⁶ If this is the nature of personality, then the influence of basic traits such as anxiety, hostility, or low self-esteem on an individual's beliefs should be both pervasive and distinctive, exerting a consistent and unifying pressure upon a wide range of responses. Consequently, we hypothesize that those whose isolationist convictions derive from their psychological makeup will differ in many of their beliefs from those whose isolationism stems primarily from some source other than personality.

Why should personality characteristics have this pervasive effect, shaping men's views on a variety of issues? Several processes are worth identifying. In a most general way, personality affects basic processes of perception, judgment, and learning inherent in the formation of any attitude.⁷ Thus, by influencing an individual's cognitive processes, psychological dispositions such as anxiety or low self-esteem partially determine his level of political awareness, his capacity to perceive and interpret political stimuli accurately, and the way he organizes and interrelates his ideas.

In addition, basic personality traits can provide the foundations for broad orientations which in turn influence opinions on many specific questions. As Smith, Bruner, and White;⁸ Katz;⁹ and others have indicated, political attitudes often reflect a range of personal motives and inner needs, as well as expressing economic self-interest or reference group identifications. For example, psychological characteristics influence one's view of human nature (whether one sees others as fundamentally trustworthy, generous, and intelligent or as selfish, devious, and mean) and the general attitude one adopts on this basic question is likely to influence opinions on such specific policies as increasing government assistance to the indigent and ill. The impact of strong personality needs can also serve to structure opinions by giving them a distinctive tenor and expressive style as well as by providing a consistent direction. Thus, acute anxiety might lead one to refer repeatedly to unrealistic threats from those around him, to perceive political conspiracies at home and abroad, or to view proposals for social change

as fraught with peril and probable deprivation.¹⁰

Some important attributes of political questions in general and foreign policy questions in particular reinforce these connections between personality and political beliefs. The basic ingredients of politics—the issues of the day and the acts of men in public life—are often spectacular and dramatic, laden with symbolic meaning and charged with affect. Thus, foreign policy questions evoke images of and references to national honor and prestige, the safety and well-being of fellow-citizens, life and death. The evocation of such symbols and values engages basic sentiments—nationalism, xenophobia, ethnocentrism, for example—and provides opportunities for the ventilation of emotions and impulses, such as hostility, whose open expression society otherwise discourages. Matters of national security are not alone in tapping deep-seated psychological characteristics. Domestic economic crises, social conflicts, and turmoil abroad can engage the same set of needs and fears and elicit consistent responses from individuals sharing these psychological characteristics.¹¹

Although political issues often arouse powerful emotions, they are usually complex and often ambiguous and remote to most citizens. These characteristics of political stimuli, combined with the absence or weakness of logical, ideological, and social constraints on responses to them, enlarge the role of personality in the formation of idea systems. The relatively low levels of political information and interest among mass publics encourage variation and distortion in the perception of public events. The mass public's characteristic indifference to and ignorance of political issues suggests further that most opinions are not formed in response to group pressure and the demands of social conformity. More often than not, the impact of primary and secondary groups on an individual's beliefs is weak. In addition, ideological constraints on political attitudes rarely are strong.¹² Thus, the role of personality characteristics on the formation and organization of political beliefs is enlarged because there are, often, no consensual standards of right and

⁶ On these points, see Nevitt Sanford, *Self and Society* (New York: Atherton Press, 1966), pp. 90–91.

⁷ For a discussion of this and some evidence see Giuseppe Di Palma and Herbert McClosky, "Personality and Conformity: The Learning of Political Attitudes," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 64 (Dec., 1970), 1054–1073.

⁸ Smith, Bruner, and White, *op. cit.*

⁹ Daniel Katz, "The Functional Approach to the Study of Attitudes," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 24 (Summer, 1960), 163–204.

¹⁰ These are only some of the political consequences of acute anxiety. Similar examples can be given for other personality traits.

¹¹ See the example of anxiety above.

¹² For evidence on this see Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller and Donald Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: Wiley, 1960); and Philip Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in David Apter, ed., *Ideology and Discontent* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1964); and V. O. Key, Jr., *Public Opinion and American Democracy* (New York: Knopf, 1960).

wrong on which to base political judgments, no obvious reference point to serve as a guide for the evaluation of parties, candidates, and issues. Moreover, even when an individual accepts a well-defined and clearly organized system of ideas because it reflects certain ideological values or the interests of his reference groups, he may still differentially embellish or emphasize elements of this idea system, thereby imprinting his own temperament and psychological makeup on his views. Thus, psychological forces have ample scope for shaping men's political beliefs.

Personality influences are among those that can lead men to adopt an isolationist foreign policy orientation. We will refer to those whose isolationist convictions do derive in large part from their psychological characteristics as "personality-type" isolationists. For convenience, we will call those whose isolationism stems from some source other than personality "non-personality type" isolationists. Since the personality characteristics that foster isolationism also affect responses on other political questions, the views of personality-type and non-personality-type isolationists should differ. We do not, of course, expect them to differ in their responses to all political issues. Although personality traits are highly generalized response dispositions, they are not triggered indiscriminately. Political and social issues serve as stimuli, but not all provide cues that engage the inner needs of the personality isolationist. Our understanding of the nature of these inner needs, therefore, should enable us to identify those issues on which personality and non-personality isolationists will diverge. To illustrate the differential capacity of political issues to elicit divergent responses from personality-type and non-personality-type isolationists, we will employ a variety of measures of opinions and attitudes drawn from three separate domains of political belief—liberalism-conservatism, extreme political values, and specific foreign policy issues. We will also ask whether personality characteristics exert a similar measure of influence on the beliefs of isolationists among the politically active as among the general population or whether participation in leadership roles curtails the impact of personality.¹³

An isolationist orientation can be fostered by a number of psychological needs and dispositions. We selected one personality trait, low

self-esteem, to serve as a summary indicator of the aversive dispositions which McClosky has shown to underly isolationism.¹⁴ To test whether personality and non-personality type isolationists differ in political outlook, we will compare those with low and high self-esteem. Operationally, personality-type isolationists include all respondents in our samples whose foreign policy orientation is linked to a negative self-image. Non-personality isolationists are those whose foreign policy stance is unrelated to low self-esteem. This procedure prevents us from counting as personality-type isolationists respondents whose position on foreign policy is dictated by a personality trait other than low self-esteem. Our definition, therefore, misclassifies isolationists who are, for example, anxious and hostile but not low in self-esteem. But because these aversive traits are strongly intercorrelated, the likelihood of such misclassification is slight.

The data we analyze were collected by McClosky in the late nineteen-fifties in two surveys—a representative cross-section of adult Americans ($n = 1484$) and a special sample of delegates to the Democratic and Republican national conventions in 1956 ($n = 3020$). An omnibus questionnaire contained a large assortment of self-administered attitude and personality scales and inquiries about political activity and opinions, together with questions covering the customary "face-sheet" factors. The diversity and range of measures available permit an extensive examination of the idea systems of isolationists.¹⁵

¹⁴ Self-esteem is especially useful for this purpose because its influence has been demonstrated in previous research on such diverse phenomena as psychological maladjustment, attitude change, creativity, conformity, and social interaction, as well as on political behavior. The literature on self-esteem (and equivalent psychological constructs) is exceptionally large and varied; the citations which follow, therefore, are illustrative and not exhaustive; Stanley Coopersmith, *The Antecedents of Self-Esteem* (London: W. W. Freeman, 1967); Morris Rosenberg, *Society and the Adolescent Self-Image* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965); Ruth C. Wylie, *The Self-Concept: A Critical Survey of Pertinent Research Literature* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1961); Carl I. Hovland and Irving L. Janis, eds., *Personality and Persuasibility* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959); Lester W. Milbrath, *Political Participation* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), see chapter 3; James D. Barber, *The Lawmakers* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1965); Carl Rogers, *Client-Centered Therapy* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1951).

¹⁵ These data were collected by Herbert McClosky in his Political Affiliations and Belief (PAB) research project. The sample, questionnaire, personality and attitude measures are described by McClosky and his colleagues in a number of publications. McClosky, "Personality and Attitude Correlates," in Rosenau, ed.,

¹³ Whether personality plays a more important role in shaping the political beliefs and behavior of political leaders than of average citizens is a question of continuing interest to political scientists, although in this paper we touch on it only peripherally. For a general discussion, see Greenstein, *op. cit.*

We define isolationism as a foreign policy posture that emphasizes the need to hold aloof and disengage from foreign involvements.¹⁶ Most scholars agree that a desire to check American participation in world affairs is central to the isolationist persuasion, but some doubt the utility of defining isolationism simply as a generalized aversion to American involvement with foreign nations. The Vietnamese war has, of course, led both politicians and academics to question the nature and extent of American commitments abroad and increasingly writers have sought to discriminate "types" of isolationists and internationalists.¹⁷

But the ease with which such "types" can be imagined does not invalidate a definition of isolationism as a general orientation to foreign policy. Since isolationism has long-standing roots in American history¹⁸ and has proven a controversial and affect-laden issue, we have based our definition and measurement on its traditional usage and customary meaning.¹⁹ This is not to claim that the manifestations of isolationism will be uniform or invariant, regardless of time and circumstance. Nor do we assert that isolationism and internationalism lie

at opposite poles of a single unidimensional continuum of foreign policy attitudes.²⁰

The operational measure of isolationism we employ is the nine-item scale developed by McClosky.²¹ After extensive examination of speeches, writings, descriptions and analyses by and of isolationists, a large number of items, each expressing isolationist sentiments, were written. After screening out dubious items (those ambiguously worded, for example), the remaining 35 statements, scattered within a much larger pool of items, were administered to a representative sample of Minnesota adults. After again eliminating unsatisfactory items (for example, statements which almost all respondents either rejected or accepted or those which a substantial number failed to answer), the surviving items were submitted on a number of occasions to a panel of judges composed of faculty and graduate students in the social sciences. The judges' task was to decide which items best reflected the isolationist persuasion. The nine-item scale which resulted has been subjected to modified Guttman reproducibility checks and to a continuing construct validity evaluation cross-checking theoretical expectations with actual findings on samples drawn from three separate populations.²² Table I lists the nine isolationist items and their item difficulties for the national leader and general population samples. Our operational definition of an isolationist is one who scores six or above on this scale.²³ We refer to those who scored two or below as non-isolationists.

Self-esteem, as we have defined the construct, refers to a set of attitudes an individual forms about himself, indicating how favorably or unfavorably he looks upon himself. Self-evaluative attitudes are held by all and occupy a central place in the personality system.²⁴ The

op. cit.; McClosky, "Conservatism and Personality," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 52 (March, 1958), 27-45; McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 58 (June, 1964) 361-382; McClosky, Paul Hoffman, and Rosemary O'Hara, "Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders and Followers," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 54 (June, 1960), 406-427; Harrison G. Gough, Herbert McClosky, and Paul Meehl, "A Personality Scale for Dominance," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, vol. 46 (July, 1951), 360-366 and "A Personality Scale for Social Responsibility," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, vol. 47 (January, 1952), 73-80; McClosky and John Schaar, "Psychological Dimensions of Anomy," *American Sociological Review*, vol. 30 (February, 1965), 14-40.

¹⁶ This definition and much of the discussion of the meaning of isolationism follow closely McClosky, "Personality and Attitude Correlates," in Rosenau, ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 56-59.

¹⁷ Walter Lippmann has led the pundits in discussing the new isolationism. See the discussions of Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "The New Isolationism," *Atlantic Monthly* (May, 1952), 34-38; Norman A. Graebner, *The New Isolationism: A Study in Politics and Foreign Policy Since 1950* (New York: Ronald Press, 1956); and Leroy Rieselbach, "The Ideology of Foreign Policy: A Preliminary Analysis," unpublished paper delivered at 1968 Midwestern Political Science Association meeting.

¹⁸ For a discussion of the historical sources of American isolationism, see Graebner, *op. cit.*; and Paul Seabury, "The Irreconcilables," unpublished manuscript.

¹⁹ This strategy was also followed in the definition and measurement of the other attitude variables in the PAB study, for example, classical conservatism.

²⁰ Rieselbach correctly points out that this must be determined by empirical research on the clustering of foreign policy attitudes and opinions. See his unpublished manuscript, *op. cit.*

²¹ The following discussion closely parallels that of McClosky, "Personality and Attitude Correlates," in Rosenau, ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 61-62.

²² The pattern of relations uncovered was remarkably similar for the Minnesota sample, the national general population sample, and the party leader sample.

²³ See McClosky, "Personality and Attitude Correlates," in Rosenau, ed., *op. cit.*, p. 62. It is worthwhile at this juncture to make some general comments on the procedures employed to construct and validate measures of the many personality and attitude variables we will discuss below. All these measures were built from agree-disagree items similar to those in the isolationism scale. The items were written and carefully screened by a team of researchers. The personality variables were conceptualized following an examination of available inventories and the work of

exact content of self-esteem, however, is open to controversy.²⁵ After reviewing numerous theoretical and empirical studies, therefore, we defined self-esteem in terms of three dimensions. One focuses on feelings of *personal unworthiness*. Persons lacking self-esteem in this sense are acutely aware of their imperfections in character, believing they have violated important moral standards and, in extreme cases, judging themselves unforgivably flawed. A second dimension of self-esteem refers to feelings of *social competence*—an individual's confidence about his capacity to deal with persons and other objects in his environment. Feelings of ineffectiveness and vulnerability are among the signs of this form of low self-esteem. Finally, self-esteem as we have defined it taps feelings of *social inferiority*, which often find expression in embarrassment about one's manners, social background, or poor schooling.

To construct measures of these three dimensions of self-esteem, we began by factor analyzing the 47 personality and attitude scales con-

relevant theorists, including Gordon Allport, Henry Murray and Raymond Cattell. The "attitude" items were intended to follow closely the statements made by typical representatives of a point of view. So, for example, right-wing items were based on an examination of the speeches and writings of leading right-wing politicians and journalists. For these attitude scales, judges' ratings of face validity constituted the main validating procedure. Validation of the personality measures was more elaborate. While it is impossible to discuss the construction and validation of every scale here, the discussion of the dominance, social responsibility, and anomy scales provides information on the diverse set of procedures employed. See Gough, McClosky, and Meehl, *op. cit.*, and McClosky and Schaar, *op. cit.* General discussions of scale construction abound. A recent commentary that cites McClosky's conservatism scale as a model to follow is Arthur L. Kalleberg, "Concept Formation in Normative and Empirical Studies: Toward Reconciliation in Political Theory," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 63 (March, 1969), 26-39.

²¹ See Rosenberg, *Society and the Adolescent Self-Image*, part I.

²² An extensive literature has grown up on this topic. See, for example, Coopersmith, *The Antecedents of Self-Esteem*; Stanley Coopersmith, "A Method for Determining Self-esteem," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, vol. 59 (July, 1959), 87-94; Douglas P. Crowne, Mark W. Stephens, and Richard Kelly, "The Validity of Equivalence Tests of Self-acceptance," *Journal of Psychology*, vol. 51, (January, 1961), 101-112; Douglas P. Crowne and Mark W. Stephens, "Self-acceptance and Self-evaluative Behavior: A Critique of Methodology," *Psychological Bulletin*, vol. 58 (March, 1961), 104-121; James C. Diggory, *Self Evaluation: Concepts and Studies* (New York: Wiley, 1966); Charles W. Perkins and Donald T. Shannon, "Three Techniques for Obtaining Self-perceptions in Pre-adolescent Boys," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, vol. 2 (Sept., 1965), 443-447; Rosenberg, *op. cit.*; and especially Wylie, *The Self-Concept*.

Table I. The Isolationism Scale—Items

Percent Agreement Among Leaders and General Population		
% Agree Political Leader Sample N=3020	% Agree Gen. Pop. Sample N=1484	Items
67	51	The best market for American goods is right here at home.
66	56	We almost have to restrict the amount of goods we let into this country because labor is so cheap in most other nations.
61	54	Most of the countries which have gotten economic help from America end up resenting what we have done for them.
37	49	These foreign wars America has been in are just part of the old quarrels Europeans have been having among themselves for centuries.
37	82	The federal government should be prevented from giving away any more of our wealth to foreign governments.
24	69	In spite of all the claims to the contrary, America can defend herself, as she has always done, without the aid of our so-called allies.
23	75	George Washington's advice to stay out of agreements with foreign powers is just as wise now as it was when he was alive.
17	55	By belonging to the UN we are running the danger of losing our constitutional right to control our own affairs.
17	30	Anytime American boys are found fighting on foreign shores, it is doubtful that the war is one that the United States should really be in.

structed by McClosky and his colleagues.²⁶ This analysis generated one, and only one, factor whose manifest content referred to self-esteem. The eight scales with a factor loading of

²⁶ The factor analysis was run by Alan Wilson's FA 80 program on the IBM 7094 of the University of California, Berkeley, Computer Center. This program provided a principal components solution and a varimax rotation.

Table II. Items Used in Index of Self-Esteem and Percent Agreement Among Leaders and the General Population

% Agree Leader Sample N = 3020	% Agree Gen. Pop. N = 1484	Personal Unworthiness
30	48	I do many things which I regret afterwards (I regret things more or more often than others seem to).
53	62	There is no such a thing as being "too strict" where conscience and morals are concerned.
50	68	A large number of people are guilty of bad sexual conduct.
48	44	I think that in some ways I am really an unworthy person.
38	63	People today have forgotten how to feel properly ashamed of themselves.
16	13	I never try to do more than I know I can, for fear of failure.
23	26	When I look back on it, I guess I really haven't gotten as much out of life as I had once hoped.
20	77	I often have the feeling I have done something wrong or evil.
Social Inferiority		
49	57	I have often had to take orders from someone who did not know as much as I did.
30	18	I must admit that rich, successful people are generally more pleasant to be with than poor people.
29	49	I would like to wear more expensive clothes than I do.
47	68	It bothers me that I do not have more education.
6	14	I sometimes run into people who make me feel ashamed of my background.
44	63	I prefer to be with people of wealth and good breeding.
15	23	I often wish I could have been born into a high position in life.
Social Competence		
32	57	I often wish I could act free and easy with the people who count.
38	52	I wish I could be as carefree about my actions as others are.

Table II—Continued

% Agree Leader Sample N = 3020	% Agree Gen. Pop. N = 1484	Social Competence
34	61	I hate to have to tell other people what to do.
23	53	I would rather not have very much responsibility for other people.
59	60	When I disagree with people it turns out later that I was in the right.
18	25	I dislike to have to talk in front of a group of people.
19	85	I doubt whether I would make a good leader.

at least .40 on this factor provided the initial pool of self-esteem items. The 75 items from these scales were then submitted for rating to nine judges, all expert psychologists. Their task was to decide whether an item assessed feelings of personal worth, a sense of social competence, feelings of social inferiority, any other dimension of self-esteem, some trait other than self-esteem, or whether it was unclassifiable.

The agreement of at least six of the nine judges was required to place an item in the provisional versions of the three self-esteem sub-indices. Multiple regression analyses, regressing the items in each sub-index on the total sub-index score, measured the direct and indirect effects of each item on the sub-index score, enabling us to eliminate items which had no significant *direct effect*. To the purified versions of the three sub-indices, we added items from the original pool of 75 that met two criteria: 1) a significant point—biserial correlation with one but only one of the three sub-indices, and 2) at least five of the judges agreed on which aspect of self-esteem the item tapped. This procedure yielded the final versions of the personal unworthiness, social competence, and social inferiority sub-indices. Correlations between each of these sub-indices and an extensive range of measures of clinical, social-psychological, and attitudinal variables were computed. Since the correlation matrices confirmed that the three dimensions of self-esteem were embedded in very similar networks of relationships, we combined them to form a single, overall measure of self-esteem. Scores on this overall index were obtained by simply summing a respondent's trichotomized scores on the three sub-indices.

Table II lists the 22 self-esteem items and the

proportion of persons agreeing with each for both the general population and party leader samples. Figure 1 shows the frequency distributions of the self-esteem index scores for both samples. Persons who scored four or above were considered to have low self-esteem, while those scoring two or below were classified as having high self-esteem.

Persons with low self-esteem characteristically feel insecure and ineffective, and accordingly are much more likely than those with high self-esteem to display both physiological and emotional symptoms of chronic anxiety.²⁷ Their failure to sustain a sense of security heightens their reluctance to interact with others. Reduced social contact further accentuates feelings of loneliness and helplessness while at the same time intensifying a need to maintain psychological distance from those around in order to overcome a pervasive sense of vulnerability.

Moreover, low self-esteem not only can depress the overall level of social involvement but can also shape the nature of social interaction. Doubts about his value and competence, and the constraints on social interaction these doubts impose, render a person who is low in self-regard markedly less participatory and self-assertive than someone with high self-esteem.²⁸ Studies of children have found, for example, that those with low self-esteem are more likely than those with high self-esteem to hold lower expectations of success and to participate less vigorously in situations, such as group discussions, which require direct and active involvement or entail clear standards of achievement. They seek success and recognition less often, and, by inference at least, are motivated as much by the desire to avoid disapproval as by the drive to win favor.²⁹ Stated more generally, a lack of self-regard reinforces tendencies to avoid or to limit involvement, to play a passive role, rather than tendencies to approach others, to participate, to dominate.

A lack of self-regard and a chronic sense of vulnerability should be closely connected, if

our interpretation of low self-esteem is sound. The impressions that persons with low self-esteem form of their external environment is one manifestation of this connection. Their characteristic anxieties should lead them to see themselves as threatened and isolated in a chaotic, hostile world.

Table III presents the relationships in our sample between self-esteem and measures of these sentiments of marginality and alienation. Persons with low self-esteem are much more likely than those with high self-esteem to feel cut off from and rejected by those around them. Those with low self-esteem are markedly more likely to score high on the alienation scale,³⁰ which measures feelings of estrangement from one's peers. The strong relationship between low self-esteem and a need for inviolacy³¹ confirms that persons with low self-regard are more likely to feel threatened by close contact with others. Finally, on two measures that assess attitudes toward the external world, the anomie scale and the cruel world index,³² those with low self-esteem are much more likely than those high in self-esteem to score high. They tend, it seems, to view the world as bewildering, lacking lasting values, unaccommodating and even dangerous. These findings, confirming our theoretical expectations and corroborating previous research, furnish strong support for the construct validity of our self-esteem index. They also provide a clue to the connection between isolationism and low self-regard.

As we have already noted, McClosky has shown that isolationism is strongly related to a number of personality characteristics. Compared to non-isolationists, isolationists are more hostile, anxious, suspicious, and inflexible and are lower in ego strength. These personality traits are aversive in character; that is, they signify a tendency "to avoid, deny, deflect, shut out or incapacitate other persons or related stimulus objects rather than to reach out, to

²⁷ The alienation scale includes nine items, all scored in the agree (alienated) direction.

²⁸ Need for inviolacy is a concept developed by Murray. (See Henry Murray, *Explorations in Personality* [New York: Oxford University Press, 1938].) It refers to an individual's desire to maintain his status and to protect himself from the intrusions of others. The scale included six items all scored in the agree (high need inviolacy) direction.

²⁹ The anomie scale is discussed in McClosky and Schaar, *op. cit.* It includes nine items all scored in the agree (anomic) direction. The cruel world index is comprised of statements that describe the world as an unhappy, threatening place in which true values cannot be preserved. A sample item: "Whatever people say about it, the world is actually a pretty selfish dog-eat-dog affair." Eight of the nine items are scored in the agree (the world is cruel) direction.

²⁷ For a detailed consideration of the relation between self-esteem and anxiety, see Rosenberg, *op. cit.*, Chapter 8.

²⁸ See, for example, Rosenberg, *op. cit.*, Chapter 10; Coopersmith, *Antecedents of Self-esteem*; Paul H. Mussen and Lyman W. Porter, "Personal Motivation and Self-Conceptions Associated with Effectiveness and Ineffectiveness in Emergent Groups," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, vol. 59 (July, 1959), 23-27.

²⁹ Virginia C. Crandall, "Personality Characteristics and Social Achievement Behavior Associated with Children's Social Desirability Response Tendencies," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, vol. 4 (Nov., 1966), 477-486.

Table III. Self-Esteem and Feelings of Marginality Among Leaders and Followers
(Percentages Down)

Scales		Self-Esteem Index					
		National Leader Sample (n = 3020)			General Population Sample (n = 1484)		
		Low (726)	Middle (1274)	High (1020)	Low (743)	Middle (513)	High (228)
Alienation Scale	High	37	14	5	53	19	5
	Middle	45	39	22	37	40	27
	* Low	17	47	73	* 11	41	68
Anomie Scale	High	22	5	1	57	17	5
	Middle	52	35	15	36	48	27
	* Low	26	61	83	* 7	35	68
Need Inviolacy Scale	High	37	16	7	50	19	10
	Middle	24	24	15	28	28	14
	* Low	39	60	78	* 22	53	77
Cruel World Index	High	22	8	2	37	12	4
	Middle	50	41	23	47	42	24
	* Low	28	51	74	* 16	46	72

* In these tables $p < .001$.

** In these tables $p < .01$.

*** In these tables $p < .05$.

embrace, accept, or involve them."⁸⁸ Aversive dispositions, as we have seen, are characteristic of persons with low self-esteem, and it is apparent that isolationism, a doctrine which expresses fear of contact with foreign countries, would appeal to them.

Table IV shows that isolationism and low self-esteem are indeed strongly associated. Among the general population, 52 percent of those with low self-esteem scored high on the isolationism scale and only 8 percent scored low, while among those with high self-esteem the corresponding figures are 46 percent and 15 percent. Differences of similar magnitude ap-

pear among the political leader sample. Only 11 percent of the leaders with high self-esteem score high on the isolationism scale, compared with 36 percent of those with low self-esteem. Thus, isolationism provides persons with low self-esteem an opportunity to express their fears, suspicions, hostility, and self-dislike. And the strength of the relationship between isolationism and self-esteem makes plausible our assumption that persons with low self-esteem adopted their isolationist positions at least in part because of their personality characteristics.

Our general expectation is that isolationists with low self-esteem will be disproportionately more likely than those with high self-esteem to adopt political positions that express or offer re-

⁸⁸ McClosky, "Personality and Attitude Correlates," in Rosenau, ed., *op. cit.*, p. 68.

Table IV. Self-Esteem and Isolationism

	National Leader Sample (n = 3020)			General Population Sample (n = 1484)		
	Self-Esteem Index			Self-Esteem Index		
	Low (n = 726)	Middle (1274)	High (1020)	Low (743)	Middle (513)	High (228)
Isolationism						
Low	22	38	58	8.9	26	46
Middle	42	41	31	39	47	39
High	36	21	11	52	27	15

lief from feelings of helplessness and unworthiness. We expect the influence of low self-esteem to be extensive, governing the stands men take on a variety of questions and organizing their views into psychologically coherent idea systems.

II. Findings

Isolationism and political conservatism are positively correlated, at least among the more articulate citizens and party activists.³⁴ Our present aim is to explore the ways in which self-esteem affects the likelihood that isolationists will be conservative.

Liberalism and conservatism are complex orientations, incorporating several distinguishable dimensions. Beliefs about order and the nature of man, civil rights and civil liberties, the problems of change and stability are all facets of the two ideological orientations. Only certain of these dimensions, however, engage the needs which afflict the person with low self-esteem. Evaluations of the free enterprise system, for example, provide little immediate opportunity to discharge feelings of loneliness and

marginality. Other conservative tenets, say, an emphasis on the dangers of social change, tap directly a sense of personal ineffectiveness and, therefore, will attract those with low self-esteem. In general, we expect that persons with low self-regard will disproportionately favor a stance—whether liberal or conservative—which serves to assuage feelings of anxiety and personal weakness. When neither of these ideological postures provides those with low self-esteem a ready opportunity to overcome a sense of personal inadequacy (for example, by picturing man as flawed and vulnerable), we do not expect the responses from isolationists with low and high self-esteem to be divergent.

Table V presents the scores of the personality and non-personality isolationists on various measures of liberalism-conservatism. Self-esteem, clearly, has a close relation with conservatism on two dimensions. Among the general population, for example, 71 percent of the isolationists with low self-esteem score high on the classical conservatism scale³⁵ compared to only

³⁵ See a full description of the classical conservatism scale in McClosky, "Conservatism and Personality." On the complexity of liberalism-conservatism, see Key, *Public Opinion and American Democracy*.

Table V. Self-Esteem and Liberal-Conservative Attitudes Among Isolationists Only
(Percentages Down)

Scales		Self-Esteem					
		National Leader Sample (n = 643)			General Population Sample (n = 557)		
		Low (263)	Middle (270)	High (110)	Low (385)	Middle (138)	High (34)
Classical Conservatism	High	57	28	20	* 71	45	24
	* Middle	28	40	42	20	34	44
	Low	15	33	38	9	21	32
Elitism Index	* High	47	37	23	* 57	46	35
	Middle	40	38	45	33	38	30
	Low	13	24	33	10	16	35
Independence	** High	65	75	79	** 21	48	59
	Middle	26	20	16	49	28	27
	Low	9	5	6	30	25	15
Economic Conservatism	*** High	33	29	24	15	30	21
	Middle	48	49	48	44	39	35
	Low	19	22	28	42	31	44
Business Ideology	High	79	82	77	50	55	50
	Middle	14	10	16	31	21	29
	Low	7	8	6	20	24	21

* In these tables $p < .001$.

** In these tables $p < .01$.

*** In these tables $p < .05$.

24 percent of the isolationists with high self-regard. Isolationists with unfavorable self-evaluations are also more likely to score high on the egalitarianism-elitism index³⁶ which assesses a disposition to derogate man's intelligence and political capacity and a willingness to see some men as intrinsically superior, of a "finer breed," than others.

The connection between low self-esteem and these forms of conservatism is straightforward. The classical conservatism scale summarizes a set of beliefs about the dangers of social change. It is composed of statements which warn against experimental or intellectual orientations and stress the virtues of practical, "tried and true" methods. Convinced that men live in an unmanageable environment, the Burkean conservative calls on tradition and social order to protect society from the vagaries of fate, nature, and character.³⁷

Classical conservatism, then, holds great appeal for individuals who have little confidence in their capacity to cope with their own inner needs or with the demands of the external environment. For its part, an elitist ideology provides the person who has low self-esteem with an opportunity to attribute weakness and incompetence to others, thereby relieving his own sense of unworthiness.

Personality and non-personality isolationists, however, do not differ in their responses on two other measures of conservatism. For neither sample do variations in self-approval significantly affect scores on the business ideology and economic conservatism indices,³⁸ which assess attitudes toward the free enterprise system and the government's role in managing the economy. The statements in these measures express broad evaluations of general economic policy, the capitalist system, businessmen, and trade unions. These attitudes, on their face, neither express a negative image of human nature nor promise to diminish the characteristic anxieties of the person with low self-esteem. We did not, therefore, expect responses to these measures

of liberalism-conservatism to be related to self-esteem.

The relationship between self-regard and the independence of government index³⁹ deserves further comment. This index assesses attitudes toward the role of government in aiding persons facing hardship. A high score indicates a disposition to celebrate the virtues of self-reliance, while a low score indicates a tendency to welcome government assistance and support. On this measure, isolationists who lack self-esteem are more likely to score *low*, that is, to adopt the liberal position, than are those with high self-esteem. It is not surprising that persons afflicted by feelings of helplessness and isolation should find unpalatable a commitment to rugged individualism.

This pattern of selective connections between measures of liberalism-conservatism and self-esteem is most important, for it indicates that the manifest content of the stimulus-object plays a decisive role in determining whether a personality trait like low self-esteem will be engaged. Low self-esteem encourages the adoption of attitudes that bolster or protect the self; liberal as well as conservative positions can serve this function. These findings, then, underline the complexity of the connections between personality and intricate ideological orientations like liberalism and conservatism.

B. Extreme Belief. Isolationism, at least as we have defined and measured it, is one member of a family of extreme views.⁴⁰ Nonetheless, we expect variations in self-esteem to markedly affect isolationists' susceptibility to deviant political values.

Persons with low self-esteem, we have argued, are likely to see their external environment as confused and threatening. Extreme ideologies supply confirmatory descriptions, simple explanations, and attractive solutions for the unhappy state of the world. For this reason, they are likely to appeal to those with low self-esteem. The desire to comprehend the world, to find it orderly, intelligible and purposive, is not, of course, peculiar to persons with low self-esteem, but they are handicapped in fulfilling this desire. The barriers that low self-esteem raises to social participation diminish the incentives,

³⁶ This index includes statements asserting that the average man is incapable of exercising sound political judgement and that "some breeds of people are better than others." Six of the nine items are scored in the elitist direction.

³⁷ See the discussion of this in McClosky, "Conservatism and Personality."

³⁸ The business attitudes index is comprised of statements opposing government intervention in the economy and praising the initiative of private business. Five of the seven items are worded in the agree (pro-business) direction. The economic conservatism index expresses support for the free enterprise system and opposition to proposals for changing the character of the American economy. Six of the eight items are worded in the agree (conservative) direction.

³⁹ A typical statement in this index is: "Even if I fail, I would rather stand on my own feet than accept any help from the government." Five of the nine items in this index are scored in the agree or pro-self-reliance direction.

⁴⁰ For some corroborating evidence, see McClosky, "Personality and Attitude Correlates." For more general discussions of extreme beliefs, see Rokeach, *Open and Closed Mind*; and Daniel Bell, ed., *The Radical Right* (New York: Doubleday, 1964).

opportunities, and capacities for social learning, constricting the ability to obtain information and test ideas against reality. The concomitants of low self-esteem, therefore, reinforce the tendency of those with low self-esteem to perceive the world as bewildering and threatening.

Moreover, one characteristic correlate of low self-esteem is a defensive withdrawal from others. The stress that persons low in self-esteem experience in social interaction impedes their ability to develop a broad network of satisfying primary group relations. Low self-esteem thus strips an individual of external as well as internal sources of support, thereby reinforcing his susceptibility to feelings of helplessness and unworthiness. For people thus afflicted, extremist creeds offer several benefits. Condemnations of pervasive conspiracies provide an opportunity for persons with low self-esteem to counter feelings of personal worthlessness, to cite only one mechanism of defense, by projecting blame for their lack of well-being onto some handy external source—Jews, Negroes, intellectuals, politicians, foreigners, Communists.⁴¹

⁴¹ See Adorno, *et al.*, *Authoritarian Personality*; and for a review of scapegoat theories of prejudice

As Table VI shows, both among the representative sample of average citizens and the special sample of party activists, isolationists with low self-esteem are much more likely than those high in self-esteem to endorse extreme values. For example, among the general population 62 percent of those with low self-esteem scored high on a measure of extreme left-wing values,⁴² compared to only 12 percent of those high in self-esteem; conversely, one-half of this group scored low on this measure compared to only 9 percent of the isolationists with low self-esteem. This pattern reappears when we compare the scores of low and high self-esteem isolationists on other measures of extreme attitude: populism, faith in direct action, right wing belief, and totalitarianism indices.⁴³

and group conflict, Leonard Berkowitz, *Aggression* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962).

⁴² This scale is composed of statements praising socialist economic principles, attacking American society as controlled by the wealthy, and denying the existence in America of true freedom. It is a 14-item index, all items worded in the agree (left-wing) direction.

⁴³ The Populism index is comprised of items that express the critical aspects of the Populist creed. These

Table VI. Self-Esteem and Extreme Belief Among Isolationists Only
(Percentages Down)

Indices		Self-Esteem Index					
		National Leader Sample (n=643)			General Population Sample (n=557)		
		Low (263)	Middle (270)	High (110)	Low (385)	Middle (138)	High (34)
Right Wing Index	High	63	45	40	71	51	29
	Middle	34	47	51	27	41	56
	* Low	3	8	9	* 2	7	15
Left Wing Index	High	21	10	6	62	31	12
	Middle	41	27	16	29	41	38
	* Low	38	63	78	* 9	28	50
Populism Index	High	38	21	12	73	47	47
	Middle	54	56	58	24	47	32
	* Low	8	23	30	* 3	6	21
Totalitarianism Index	High	35	19	9	65	41	27
	Middle	44	44	38	30	36	47
	* Low	22	37	53	* 6	23	27
Direct Action Index	* High	64	45	32	*** 69	59	50
	Middle	25	25	29	19	23	21
	Low	11	28	39	12	19	29

* In these tables $p < .001$.

** In these tables $p < .01$.

*** In these tables $p < .05$.

Party leaders are consistently less likely to endorse extreme values than are ordinary citizens, as Table VI shows. For the political elite, personality traits like low self-esteem appear to play a more critical role in promoting adherence to extremism. Among leaders, relatively few isolationists with high self-esteem endorse extreme beliefs. In this sample, with the single exception of the Right-wing values index,⁴⁴ low self-regard is almost a necessary precondition of extremism. This difference between the two samples is not difficult to understand. The average citizen's minimal and casual involvement in politics is well known,⁴⁵ and his frequent failure to learn the values of the political culture can, and often does, stem from many sources other than psychological maladjustment. Political activists, on the other hand, are as a group more knowledgeable and firmly committed to the modal values of the political culture.⁴⁶ For them to endorse extreme beliefs, therefore, more often requires the pressure of powerful inner needs. Finally, the data in Table VI indi-

statements were drawn from speeches and writings of participants in and students of the Populist movement. It is a nine-item scale, all items worded in the agree (populist) direction. The Direct Action index expressed support for a quick solution to political problems, regardless of whether the proposed course of action would violate established procedures. It is a six-item index, all worded in the agree (pro-direct action) direction. The Right-wing values index includes 12 items, all worded in the agree (right-wing) direction. These items bemoan the influence of liberals, "do-gooders," and left-wingers in American government and express fear for the survival of the "American way of life" and of freedom and initiative. It should be clear that to deny these assertions is not necessarily to subscribe to left-wing beliefs. Hence, we include both a Right-wing and a Left-wing index. The Totalitarianism index is comprised of 13 statements worded in the agree (pro-totalitarianism) direction. These items express disregard for minorities, support for social change even if it requires ruthlessness, and intolerance of dissent.

"The probable reason for this single discrepancy is the especially high correlation between right-wing beliefs and isolationism among the politically articulate. Nevertheless, even this exception is more apparent than real: isolationist leaders low in self-esteem are much more likely to score high on right-wing values.

⁴⁴For summaries of the literature on political participation and knowledge, see Robert Lane, *Political Life* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959); Milbrath, *Political Participation*; Fred I. Greenstein, *The American Party System and the American People* (Englewood, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963); Key, *Public Opinion*.

⁴⁵McClosky and Schaar, "Psychological Dimensions of Anomy"; Campbell et al., *American Voter*; Samuel Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties* (New York: Doubleday, 1955); Key, *Public Opinion*; McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics"; James W. Prothro and Charles W. Grigg, "Fundamental Principles of American Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement," *Journal of Politics*, vol. 22 (May, 1960), 276-294.

cate that isolationists low in self-esteem are much more likely to espouse a variety of deviant values containing diverse and sometimes contradictory assertions. Thus, low self-esteem can promote the acceptance of both extreme left-wing and extreme right-wing values simultaneously. It would be misleading to interpret this simply as a manifestation of inconsistency, since left- and right-wing views may mirror a common psychological state; these beliefs may be psychologically consonant, therefore, although logically inconsistent. Thus, low self-esteem can induce a generalized disposition to extremism.⁴⁷

C. Foreign Policy Issues. In comparing the responses of isolationists with low and high self-esteem to specific foreign policy questions, we are interested in the impact of personality on the level of opinion-holding as well as on the direction of the opinions adopted. Isolationists with high self-esteem should be more likely than isolationists who have low self-esteem to hold definite opinions on specific foreign policy questions. The feelings of bewilderment and uncertainty, of social isolation and of psychological stress and disorganization that characteristically accompany unfavorable self-evaluations impair cognitive skills and capacities for social learning.⁴⁸ Persons with low self-esteem, compared to those high in self-regard, are less likely to perceive accurately their external environment, to be aware of what others value and believe or to take an interest in matters which, like politics, are remote from their immediate concerns.⁴⁹ Thus we expect low self-esteem to depress levels of opinion-holding, but only among the general population. The exceptional level of political involvement among party leaders works against the disorienting effects of low self-regard. Their greater exposure to, interest in, and information about politics virtually assures that party leaders, whatever their level of self-regard, will hold some position on important foreign policy questions.

The data in Table VII confirm these expectations. In the general population sample, isolationists with low self-esteem are significantly more likely to reply "don't know" on all six

⁴⁷Rokeach, *Open and Closed Mind*; and Roger Brown, *Social Psychology* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1965), ch. 10.

⁴⁸See Di Palma and McClosky, "Personality and Conformity."

⁴⁹*Ibid.* For an interesting explanation of this see Betty Jo League and Douglas N. Jackson, "Conformity, Veridicality, and Self-Esteem," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, vol. 68 (Jan., 1964), 113-115.

Table VII. Self-Esteem and Specific Foreign Policy Issues Among Isolationists Only
(Percentages Down)

Issues†		Self-Esteem Index					
		National Leader Sample (n = 643)			General Population Sample (n = 557)		
		Low (263)	Middle (270)	High (110)	Low (385)	Middle (138)	High (34)
Reliance on the UN	Increase	19	18	10	22	20	15*
	Decrease	54	56	65	21	37	56
	Same as	24	24	24	44	37	29
	Don't Know	3	2	2	13	7	0
Foreign Aid	Increase	1	1	0	5	2	0*
	Decrease	91	89	88	70	80	88
	Same as	6	9	9	17	12	9
	Don't Know	3	2	3	8	5	3
US Participation in International Military Alliances	Increase	16	11	7	27	24	15*
	Decrease	53	54	46	21	34	38
	Same as	29	32	45	41	36	44
	Don't Know	2	3	2	12	6	3
Immigration	Increase	9	6	7	4	3	6
	Decrease	53	54	46	62	71	68
	Same as	36	39	45	24	25	24
	Don't Know	3	1	2	10	1	3
Tariff Levels	Increase	32	27	32	20	19	21
	Decrease	18	17	18	22	13	18
	Same as	42	51	45	42	59	59
	Don't Know	8	5	6	17	9	3
Defense Spending	Increase	11	13	8	36	41	35**
	Decrease	52	55	55	22	23	35
	Same as	32	28	34	31	31	26
	Don't Know	5	4	4	10	6	3

† The issue questions were asked in the following manner: "Here is a list of issues about which people often disagree. Please check how you personally feel about all of them." The issue was named (e.g. American participation in international military alliances like NATO) and in each case the respondent could check one of three alternatives—"should be increased," "should be decreased," "should remain as is."

* In these tables, the relationships were significant at the .05 level (one-tailed Chi Square test).

** For this relationship, $.05 < p < .10$ (one-tailed Chi Square test).

foreign policy issues. Among the party leaders, no such differences appear on any of the specific issues.

The direction of the opinions personality-motivated isolationists do adopt on specific foreign policy questions should reflect their need to combat feelings of weakness and vulnerability. The chronic feelings of helplessness and anxiety that afflict persons with low self-esteem often lead them to exaggerate the threats posed by the external environment and to underestimate their ability to protect themselves. As a result, isolationists with low self-esteem should be more likely than those who have high self-

esteem to feel greatly alarmed and threatened by the problems which confront the United States. These fears should find expression in the greater willingness of isolationists with low self-esteem to support whatever policies claim to bolster American security even if these policies entail an increase in America's international obligations.

The data in Table VII confirm this prediction, again among the general population only. Thus, isolationists who lack self-esteem are more likely to favor increased American participation in international military alliances, such as NATO. 27 percent of those low in self-esteem

but only 15 percent of the isolationists with high self-regard favor a strengthened commitment; conversely, 38 percent of the isolationists with high self-esteem, compared to 21 percent of those with low self-esteem, favor scaling down America's overseas military commitments. By roughly similar margins, those with low self-esteem are more likely than their fellow isolationists to support placing more reliance on the United Nations and to oppose cutting foreign aid. In short, low self-esteem makes an isolationist somewhat more willing to adopt what are, in effect, internationalist positions on these foreign policy issues. Personality and non-personality isolationists do not, however, diverge in their attitudes toward tariff and immigration policies.

Why should personality and non-personality isolationists diverge on some issues but not on others? Low self-esteem does, in general, impair cognitive capacities, but we cannot explain the overall pattern of responses as merely the result of many personality isolationists unwittingly and erroneously adopting stands on specific issues that conflict with their general foreign policy orientation. A more persuasive explanation is that low self-esteem shapes the issue preferences of personality-type isolationists by linking their evaluation of policy to a particular view of the world. For persons with low self-esteem, as we have observed, the world is unaccommodating and threatening. The sense of helplessness they experience may encourage them to welcome all efforts to ward off danger. Those policies which evoke differences among isolationists in the general population—support for foreign aid, military alliances, and the United Nations—have customarily been advertised as necessary to safeguard American security. Boosting tariffs and slashing immigration quotas still are popular with isolationists as compared to non-isolationists,⁵⁰ but it is doubtful that these policies provide a sense of protection from the threats America now faces. Therefore, these policies should not and in fact do not find more support among personality than among non-personality isolationists. Finally, among both the political leaders and the general population, personality-type isolationists are significantly more likely than non-personality isolationists to agree to these statements: "Let's face it, the only way to bring peace and order back to the world is to make America the most powerful nation on earth," and "A nation faced with a bunch of really dangerous enemies might be better off to 'shoot first

and ask questions afterwards.' " Isolationists with low self-esteem, it appears, are more often prepared to modify a strategy of general withdrawal from world affairs in favor of jingoistic intervention. In sum, among isolationists, low self-esteem can induce a willingness to support a range of specific policies that promise to bolster American security, including policies that entail increasing American involvement with foreign nations.

III: Summary and Conclusions

The data we have presented confirm that it matters whether a person's isolationist orientation stems from his personality rather than from some other source. Low and high self-esteem isolationists differ in the pattern of their responses to several dimensions of liberalism-conservatism, to measures of extreme political values, and to specific foreign policy issues dealing with national security. In addition, although we do not present the data here, personality and non-personality isolationists differ consistently on measures of such basic attitudes as chauvinism, ethnocentrism, democratic commitment, and political cynicism.⁵¹

We must consider, however, the possibility that these findings are an artifact of acquiescence response set rather than the result of genuine differences in self-esteem. There is always a danger, of course, that measures of personality traits and attitudes comprised mainly of items worded in one direction—as are the self-esteem index and the attitude measures we employ—merely assess the readiness of respondents to agree (or to disagree) with a statement, whatever its content. However, we doubt that the relationships we have presented could result from the influence of acquiescence. For both the general population and the party leaders, the correlations between self-esteem and our measures of conservatism and of extreme belief among isolationists, as well as the correlations between self-esteem and measures of alienation and marginality in the entire sample, remain significant (although somewhat diminished in magnitude) even after we eliminate the effects of acquiescence response set.⁵² In addition, ev-

⁵¹ The measures of these attitudes were constructed in the same way as those described above. The differences between high and low self-esteem isolationists were consistently large, statistically significant at the .001 level.

⁵² The general problems raised by acquiescence response sets are too complex for detailed discussion here. See Jack Block, *The Challenge of Response Sets* (New York: Appleton Century Crofts, 1965); Dean Peabody, "Attitude Content and Agreement Set in Scales of Authoritarianism, Dogmatism, Anti-Semitism,

⁵⁰ See McClosky, "Personality and Attitude Correlates," p. 91.

ery measure of liberalism-conservatism, with the exception of the classical conservatism scale, included at least two items scored in the "disagree direction." Moreover, if acquiescence response set were the controlling factor, low self-esteem isolationists would be more likely than those with high self-esteem to score at the high (conservative) pole of each measure of liberalism-conservatism, since an agree response was typically the conservative response. We have shown, however, that this was not the case in three of five instances. We observed a similar selective pattern of responses to the specific foreign policy questions. Furthermore, these questions were very different in format from standard agree-disagree items. Isolationists with low self-esteem were not indiscriminately or uniformly willing to agree with any statement, regardless of its content. To the contrary, our data suggest that whether or not low self-esteem is engaged depends in large measure on the manifest content of the beliefs. Thus we discount the possibility that the findings reported are the result of acquiescence.

Our results enable us to comment on several issues of interest to political scientists. One question we raised at the outset was whether leadership roles would check the influence of personality on belief. In most instances the same basic relationships between low self-esteem and political attitudes among isolationists appeared in both the political leader and general population samples. The major difference between the two samples was that variations in self-esteem did not influence the opinions on specific foreign policy issues of the isolationist leaders. Whether this curtailing of the effect of personality among the political leaders is due to the specificity of these issues, to the close connection of the issues to traditional tenets of isolationism, or to other factors we cannot say. In general, however, our findings indicate that low self-esteem plays a similar role among political leaders and ordinary citizens.

The way low self-esteem influences the issue preferences of isolationists is relevant to understanding the linkage of public opinion and public policy. Psychological traits, it appears, can

be one of the sources of discrepancy between broad policy orientations and opinions on issues. In the present instance, low self-esteem reduces the opposition to internationalist policies among isolationists in the mass public. Variations in self-esteem, therefore, create a cleavage among isolationists, leading them to disagree about important aspects of foreign policy. Should personality exercise a similar effect among persons who share some other broad doctrine or approach to policies (say, internationalists), it may serve simultaneously as a source of cleavage within and consensus across groups.

Our findings also indicate that personality can play a critical role in the formation of idea systems. By reducing an individual's information about and interest in politics, for example, or by diminishing his capacity for social learning, personality characteristics like low self-esteem do undermine the logical coherence of his belief system. We have seen, for example, that low self-esteem leads isolationists to hold conservative views on some issues and liberal views on others, to espouse the values of the extreme right and also of the extreme left, and while embracing an isolationist posture in general to take a more internationalist stance on a number of specific foreign policy questions. Although perhaps logically inconsistent, these views of isolationists who have low self-esteem reflect a common underlying psychological disposition and in this sense do form an internally coherent system of ideas. Personality, then, can bind beliefs together to form a network of political values whose coherence, in large measure, stems from the psychological impulse it expresses. Attitudes about many different subjects—foreign policy, extreme political values, political and religious tolerance, social change, and human nature—may operate in the service of a common psychological motive; consequently, what appear to be differences or inconsistencies at one level disappear at another level.

Explaining "what goes with what, and why" often appears a hopeless task for the student of public opinion. The average citizen appears lamentably ill-informed about politics, unacquainted with the most basic and simple ideological distinctions, unwilling or unable to organize his ideas in a logical and coherent fashion, and, in many cases, apt to alter his positions on important political issues on a random basis.⁵³ Our findings lead us to suggest that the opinions of mass publics, in some instances, are

and Economic Conservatism," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, vol. 63 (July, 1961), 1-11; Douglas N. Jackson and Samuel Messick, "Response Styles on the MMPI: Comparison of Clinical and Normal Samples," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, vol. 65 (Nov., 1962), 285-299; Leonard G. Rorer, "The Great Response Style Myth," *Psychological Bulletin*, vol. 65 (March, 1965), 129-156; Donald T. Campbell, Carole R. Siegman and Matilda B. Rees, "Direction-of-wording Effects in the Relationship Between Scales," *Psychological Bulletin*, vol. 68, (Nov., 1967), 293-303.

⁵³ See Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics"; and Key, *Public Opinion and American Democracy*.

bound together by psychological rather than logical forces. Future research should aim, therefore, at specifying the ways in which psychological characteristics like self-esteem structure and stabilize idea systems among mass publics.

In this paper, we have analyzed the impact of low self-esteem on the beliefs of isolationists only. Should we expect non-isolationists with low self-esteem to differ from those with high self-esteem in the same ways that we have shown personality-type and non-personality-type isolationists to differ? If they do, are the relationships we have reported merely the effect of differing levels of self-esteem and not, as we believed, the consequence of adopting an isolationist position for one reason rather than another? To answer these questions, it is necessary to return to the arguments underlying our main contention.

Our central hypothesis was that persons who adopt a particular viewpoint because of their psychological makeup differ in outlook from others who have come to the same position for different reasons. A corollary of this hypothesis is that persons with the same personality traits will show certain similarities in their beliefs although they may differ in other respects, such as in their social background. Basic to our argument, then, is the proposition that personality characteristics such as low self-esteem give rise to *characteristic* tendencies to hold certain beliefs, although other factors can sometimes override the influence of these psychological tendencies or alter the expression they take. Nevertheless, low self-esteem has sufficient strength to introduce a certain measure of consistency in the actions, thoughts, and feelings of persons who have this personality characteristic. Therefore, when different groups in the population share a basic personality characteristic, we would expect strong similarities in their idea systems.

This expectation cannot be put to an exact test in the present paper. The difficulty is a practical problem, not a conceptual or theoretical one. The groups we would wish to compare are isolationists and internationalists. The measure of isolationism we employ, however, consists of nine statements *all* worded in the isolationist direction. Operationally, a non-isolationist is someone who consistently rejects these statements. In short, we have defined non-isolationists by what they do not believe. We cannot be certain that non-isolationists are committed to an internationalist stance although we do know that they are united in an aversion to isolationism. And without knowing what a

person's commitments are, we are obviously unable to determine whether they stem from personality or from some other source.

For this reason we have presented data on isolationists only. But a brief comparison of the effects of low self-esteem among isolationists and non-isolationists helps place our findings in a broader context. In general, as our major hypothesis would suggest, non-isolationists with low self-esteem diverge in political outlook from those with high self-esteem in much the same ways that personality-type isolationists and non-personality-type isolationists differ. But our comparison of these groups also suggested that the particular effects of a personality trait such as low self-esteem—the direction and the magnitude of its influence—depend in some measure on a person's other personality characteristics, his attitudes and political beliefs, and his social circumstances. We find clear evidence of this for isolationists and non-isolationists in two areas especially: extreme belief and opinions on specific foreign policy issues.

First, while low self-esteem predisposes both isolationists and non-isolationists to hold extreme views, its influence is much more powerful among isolationists. This is the result of an interaction between low self-esteem, an aversive personality characteristic, and isolationism, an orientation that McClosky has shown to be intemperate in spirit. Secondly, while among isolationists low self-esteem is related to a more internationalist stance on several specific foreign policy questions, among non-isolationists low self-esteem has exactly the opposite effect: non-isolationists with low self-esteem are significantly more likely than those with high self-esteem to take isolationist positions on these same issues.⁶⁴ This is further evidence of the *characteristic* tendency of persons with low self-esteem to assume an isolationist posture, a tendency which is reversed only among isolationists themselves. There is no need to underscore further the point these findings make: the effects of personality factors can vary with the particular context of person and environment. The appropriate strategy, therefore, is to analyze personality in context, not in the abstract.

A final issue is whether replication of this research on a contemporary sample would yield the same results. One might question the continuing relevance of the notion of isolationism in its traditional usage. It is conceivable that there are now several different kinds of isola-

⁶⁴ The reader should keep in mind, however, that isolationists with high self-esteem are still more likely to take an isolationist stand on specific foreign policy issues than non-isolationists with low self-esteem.

tionists and internationalists (those, for example, who combine support for foreign aid with opposition to military commitments abroad). Certainly, the connections between a broad policy orientation like isolationism and opinions on such specific foreign policy issues as the Vietnam War are complex. It is unlikely, however, that the average citizen draws the fine distinctions of current commentators and analysts of international affairs. Isolationism has proven a persistent force in American politics and it is not unreasonable to believe that many citizens continue to resist the idea of American involvement abroad under most, though not necessarily all, circumstances. In any event, the question that concerns us in the present paper is whether individual differences in basic personality characteristics would still evoke variations in political outlook among those who share the same general foreign policy posture. Obviously, the specific relations we reported (for example, between low self-esteem and support for the United Nations) and the magnitude of the differences we observed are partially a function of time and circumstances. But insofar as personality represents a basic and constant source of personal opinions, we expect the relationships we have reported to prove the rule, not the exception. Thus, we would expect isolationists today to differ in their political outlook depending on whether they owe their views on foreign policy to personality or to some other influence.

We have found personality and non-personality isolationists to diverge sharply in their

views on a range of political questions. The implications of this finding extend beyond the study of isolationism. In research on classical conservatism and political alienation we have observed comparable patterns of differences between those who have adopted these attitudes because of their personality characteristics and those who have done so for some other reason. The question we asked at the outset was whether it matters if personality is the source of a political belief. The conclusion we have come to is that it does, for our results suggest that the extent to which adherents of a political doctrine share a common set of values will depend on the proportion who acquired their convictions because of the influence of their personality.

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"Economic and Political Integration in Europe: A Time-Series Quasi-Experimental Analysis"*

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"T. H. Huxley once said that the tragedies of science are the slayings of beautiful hypotheses by ugly facts. Against this tragedy . . . the artist seems to be immune." Koestler, *The Act of Creation*.

Introduction

By and large, political scientists have made little use of experimental logic in the analysis of the behavior of large-scale social systems. This is partly because we feel that the neat procedures applicable to the isolated laboratory are not appropriate for the messy, ex-post-facto research problems that confront us. This rejection of experimental approaches may also stem, however, from confusing the *logic* of experimentation with its procedures and techniques.

In our view, this logic includes three components: (1) the production of variation in the independent variable 'X'; (2) observing covariation with a dependent variable 'Y'; and (3) ruling out or controlling for any possible competing explanations to the hypothesized one(s). The experimenter has some powerful tools at his disposal to implement these three goals. He can create variation in the independent variable physically, for example, by pushing a button to give the subject a slight shock. He may have relatively precise equipment to measure covariance between the administered stimulus and the observed effects (response time clocks, for example.) Finally, and most importantly, the experimenter can render inoperative a great many variables by randomly assigning subjects to treatment groups and the application of the experimental variable itself. This controls not only some known confounding variables, such as SES variables, but also eliminates the effects of some that are unknown.

We believe that the logic of ex-post-facto research also requires the demonstration that non-random variation in independent and dependent variables has occurred, some evidence that these variables are significantly related in

some way, and the provision of some justification for the interpretation that 'X' and 'Y' are non-spuriously related by controlling for the important confounding variables. However, the procedures are somewhat different. One must search the socially given distributions of variables to discover significant variation or discontinuities in these variables. Then, after finding patterns of data which provide interpretable variation, one must show that this variation is non-spuriously associated with variation in other variables. But since ex-post-facto researchers are not able to assign subjects randomly to treatment groups, they attempt to eliminate the operation of confounding variables through imaginative research designs (for example, Weber, in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, selected countries outside Western Europe on the principle that they should be as similar to the European countries as possible except on the hypothesized independent variable),¹ and/or through data analysis procedures (for example, partial correlation).

We are particularly aided in this "translation" problem by the literature on quasi-experimental design and analysis techniques developed by D.T. Campbell and others.² Generally, the particular form of quasi-experimental technique we use is one among many alternative time-series designs.

Substantive and Rival Hypotheses

The language of science consists of a set of more or less deductively related "if . . . then" statements where the "if" stands for an independent (experimental) variable and the "then" represents the dependent (experimental

¹ For a discussion and elaboration of this point, see Neil Smelser's "The Methodology of Comparative Analysis of Economic Activity" in Smelser, *Essays on Sociological Explanation* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), pp. 62-75.

² D. T. Campbell and Julian C. Stanley, *Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research* (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1963). D. T. Campbell and H. Lawrence Ross, "The Connecticut Crackdown on Speeding: Time Series Data in Quasi-Experimental Analysis," *Law and Society Review*, 3, 1968, pp. 33-53. D. T. Campbell, "Reforms as Experiments," *American Psychologist*, 24, no. 4, 1969, pp. 409-429.

* The authors wish to thank Donald T. Campbell for providing stimulating intellectual support and highly useful criticism. Our thanks also to the staff of the Simulated International Processes Project for their provision of on-line, interactive computing facilities.

effect) variable. In one sense, politics as a practical concern is one big quasi-experimental laboratory;³ behind all legislation, every reform, each political stratagem, lies a guess (hypothesis) concerning the impact each will have. Politics, whether defined as the authoritative allocations of values or as attempts to change the existing value distributions, implicitly introduces the notion that altering X (or a series of X's) will change Y (or another series of Y's).

This paper aspires to make the implicit methodology of the practitioner more explicit. Thus, if we argue that it is the business of science to make "if . . . then" knowledge claims, we also must argue that we will have confidence that X caused Y to the extent that we can develop evidence to show that X is associated with a non-random change in Y, and that all other plausible rival explanations have been eliminated.

The emergence and proliferation of a great many regional organizations since the end of World War II⁴ have stimulated a good deal of research into the processes of international integration. The language of this research has tended, for the most part, to be descriptive (in the sense of commenting on the distribution or occurrence of a variable) rather than theoretical (which would assert relations of interdependence between variables or sets of variables).⁵ There are some good reasons for this, the first being that there is not yet agreement on what has occurred within variables. Before this is established, it may not be fruitful to talk about relationships. The best example of this centers on the controversy of whether Europe is less integrated today than it was in 1958, when the EEC came into existence. Though establishing the relative values or strengths of integrative behaviors for a succession of time-points would seem to be a relatively trivial matter—a straightforward measurement question, so to speak—the problem in fact invokes important questions of philosophical assumptions, measurement strategies, and theory all in one. Thus we have witnessed the tendency for issues of technical details to become quickly embroiled in theoretical controversy and, since theoretical advance depends upon settling some of these measurement problems, the circle has become a vicious one. This raises some serious problems for a strategy of inductive empiricism which places its faith in sense observations inductively

justifying theory. The view here suggests that the processes of measurement and observation are in themselves not theoretically neutral and, as a result, presuppose theories rather than lead to them. For example, the use of the "RA" (relative acceptance) index by Karl Deutsch⁶ and his associates is not a technical decision but is tied to theoretical assumptions about the scarcity nature of the integrative process, that is, the view that there is a certain amount of integration waiting to be distributed.⁷

Further, we agree with D.T. Campbell⁸ that social scientists too hastily ask the question of "What caused Y to change?" before a non-random change has been demonstrated. Deutsch's argument is that what change has occurred could be accounted for by a null model.⁹ Other scholars simply argue that "significant change" has occurred in some direction or other.¹⁰ In all these examples, the language of cause and effect is present; it is assumed that changes in integrative patterns of behavior have occurred—and then it follows that one wants to be able to explain these changes.

In addition to problems concerning the presumption of change, yet other problems hinder the goal of explaining variations in integrative behavior. Lindberg¹¹ has outlined some of the frustrations flowing from the fact that different theorists of integrative processes start off with different assumptions, entities, definitions, and concepts concerning integration. Thus it is not so much that they come up with divergent results as results that are fundamentally incommensurable: ". . . the theories hardly ever confront or complement each other or even appear in any clear relationship to each other."¹²

Joseph Nye has pointed out another problem for us—the dimensional or generic nature of the integration process.¹³ Lindberg's solution

⁶Richard Savage and Karl Deutsch, "A Statistical Model of the Gross Analysis of Transaction Flows," *Econometrica*, 28, no. 3, 1960, pp. 551–572.

⁷James Caporaso, "Theory and Method in the Study of International Integration," *International Organization* (forthcoming).

⁸D. T. Campbell, "From Description to Experimentation: Interpreting Trends as Quasi-Experiments," in *Problems in Measuring Change*, ed. Chester Harris (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1963), pp. 212–245.

⁹Karl Deutsch and Lewis Edinger et al., *France, Germany, and the Western Alliance* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967).

¹⁰Leon Lindberg, "The European Community as a Political System: Notes Toward the Construction of a Model," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 1967, pp. 344–387.

¹¹Lindberg, "The European Community," 1967.

¹²Lindberg, "The European Community," 1967, p. 345.

¹³Joseph S. Nye, "Comparative Regional Integration: Concept and Measurement," *International Organization*, 22, no. 4, 1968, pp. 855–880.

³See the relevant discussion by D. T. Campbell, "Reforms as Experiments," 1969.

⁴Paul Smoker, "Preliminary Analysis of an International Integrative Subsystem," *International Associations*, 11, 1965, pp. 638–646.

⁵Hans L. Zetterberg, *On Theory and Verification in Sociology*, 3rd ed. (Totowa, N.J.: Bedminster Press, 1966), pp. 64–65.

calls for the construction of an "... overarching macro-analytical framework,"¹⁴ while Nye urges us to "disaggregate" the concept of integration. Both approaches are compatible (Nye's components becoming the elements in Lindberg's system) and offer hope of pulling the study of integration out of the descriptive stage.

In line with the above considerations, we choose to make our epistemology explicit. The view taken here is that no problem of substantive theory is likely to be solved until the following preliminary conditions are met: (1) a determination as to whether a non-random change has occurred; (2) the theoretical language of independent-dependent variables is given some methodological teeth by constructing separate measures of each; (3) knowledge claims are made in such a way as to throw into bold relief the nature of the assertion and the logical implications among the key terms; and (4) a systematic attempt is made to eliminate plausible rival explanations.

The first condition is included to prevent us from the confusion of trying to explain a change in terms of substantive theory where a statistical model would be more appropriate. The second criterion, by explicitly dealing with separate measures of independent and dependent variables, hopes to eliminate the *ad hoc* nature of inferences made from one measured variable to another which is not measured. The third criterion represents an attempt to make clear what data sets will falsify a hypothesis, and also to place some limits to the variation we may get in answer to the question, "What empirical outcomes are compatible with my theory?" Finally, condition four is included so that we are reminded that we should not stop with a positive confirmation of X's relationship to Y, but should repeatedly attempt to confirm this relationship by refuting other variables and relationships as plausible explanations.

In relation to all of these substantive, technical, and epistemological problems, as well as in relation to the design, selection, and testing procedures (below), we have decided to state our theoretical argument in two sets of hypotheses: Substantive (integration) and Plausible Rival (potentially confounding).

Substantive Hypotheses

1. Change patterns and causal links among variables *within* subsystems (political decision-making and economic performances) will be stronger than change patterns and causal links *across* subsystems.

2. In a positive growth system, we expect quasi-experiments occurring earlier in the system's life

to have stronger impact than later ones. (A growth system would involve the process of increasing complexity—old institutions would differentiate, new ones would be added—thereby producing a "multi-stability" due to the operation of its many components and thus become less sensitive to the influence of any one component or occurrence.)

3. The more functionally and/or geographically "specific" a variable, the less the likelihood of significant change around quasi-experiments.

Plausible Rivals

4. Change patterns found in quasi-experiments are due to random (non-systematic) instabilities in the variables.

5. Change patterns found around quasi-experimental occurrences are part of either or both short-term or long-term systematic trends that have no causal relationships to those quasi-experiments.

6. Changes in quasi-experimental effects over time are due to changes in measurement and/or scoring procedures that are irrelevant to the occurrence of quasi-experiments.

7. Changes in system performance "explained" by the occurrence of quasi-experiments can be equally well explained by the occurrence of other variables/events not included in the system description.

8. The response of a variable to a quasi-experiment is irrelevant or idiosyncratic in the sense that other plausible operational indicators of the variable do not so respond.

9. The response of a variable to a quasi-experiment is irrelevant or idiosyncratic in the sense that other quasi-experiments of a similar type fail to elicit similar responses.

10. The response of a variable to a quasi-experiment is irrelevant or idiosyncratic in the sense that other quasi-experimental *settings* fail to bring out similar responses to similar experiments (or in fact do bring out responses to dissimilar quasi-experiments.)

Design


In general, studies can be called "quasi-experimental" if random assignment to treatment groups is not possible, and/or if the independent variable (or "event") is "socially given," (that is, not under experimental control). Campbell and his associates¹⁵ have assembled a considerable number of such designs, each attempting in a variety of ways to counteract the lack of control. Here, we employ one such design which may be called the "interrupted time series." This particular design involves (1) periodic measurements on some variable(s) obtained at equally spaced points in time, (2) the "introduction of" a quasi-experimental variable somewhere into the series, and (3) the assumption

¹⁴ Adapted from Campbell and Stanley, *op. cit.*; and Campbell, "Reforms as Experiments," 1969.

¹⁵ Campbell and Stanley, *op. cit.*; D. T. Campbell, "From Description to Experimentation," 1963, pp. 212-245.

¹⁴ Lindberg, "The European Community," 1967, p. 345.

tion that the introduced variable occurs “exactly” between two selected measurement points. For our substantive problem and data set, this design can be diagrammed as follows:



Where ‘X’ is any indicator, and where time is specified by 1, 2, . . . n+k, and where experiments ‘a’ and ‘b’ are two different experiments. The first pre-test series has ‘m’ data points, the second ‘n’, etc.

A full discussion of the strengths and limitations of the interrupted time series design is beyond the scope of this paper; however, it should be noted at the outset that testing quasi-experimental effects with this design is limited to “discontinuities” (abrupt changes limited in time), as opposed to the smoother inter-variable connections which are more appropriately examined by other methods (lagged cross-correlational analysis and serial or auto-covariance methods). Even within this limitation there exist alternative and in some respects more adequate methods and designs for measuring discontinuities in variables.¹⁷ Some of these will be discussed in relation to rival plausible hypotheses.

Quasi-Experiments and Variables

Three quasi-experiments were selected¹⁸ for study: (1) The “formation” or coming into effect of the EEC in January, 1958; (2) The adoption of the first agricultural “package” decision in January, 1962; (3) The Common Market agricultural crisis which began in June 1965 and ended in January 1966. Our working hypothesis was that each of these “events” would provide us with a socially given behavior

¹⁷ Gene V. Glass, “Analysis of Data on the Connecticut Speeding Crackdown as Time-Series Quasi-Experiment,” *Law and Society Review*, 1968.

¹⁸ Three criteria were developed for selecting among the “candidate” socially given events that highlight Common Market development. First, we asked whether the event could have general significance for system-wide performances (trade flows, political decision-making). Second, we wanted to get maximum spacing in time between any two quasi-experiments. We hypothesized that increasing the interval between experiments would increase the probability that each experiment could be interpreted in “relative isolation” from others—realizing of course that even “ideal” spacing would not permit inferences from “closed systems.” Third, we selected events with the potential for relatively short-term, “discontinuous” effects. This criterion meant that sudden, immediately applied quasi-experiments would be selected for study before smoother, generally anticipated events.

that could be interpreted in the quasi-experimental terms of our design.

Two criteria were developed and applied in the selection of system variables. The first of these was based on our general interest in integrative processes at the international level, and is thus primarily theoretical.¹⁹ The second was developed with the “discontinuity” requirement in mind, and is based on a preliminary statistical analysis.²⁰

We choose to view integration in terms of the building of new structures and functions at a new system level, which is more comprehensive (either geographically or functionally) than previously. Thus, one way of assessing whether Europe is becoming more integrated would be to ask to what extent structures exist at the Community level and how well developed they are. As Lindberg and Scheingold have argued:

“ . . . the sure sign of political integration is a system which can make authoritative decisions for the entire Community, regardless of whether these are military, economic, or social welfare decisions.”²¹

Thus, one of the tests of integration is provided by the extent to which we can meaningfully talk about the creation of new functional environments where new structures have emerged, overlaying but not necessarily supplanting the older national ones. The other basic component of integration is that of system linkages. If the behavior of a given political structure is indifferent to other political struc-

¹⁹ We began with a matrix of over 40 variables and between 35 and 47 quarterly time-points. This was first reduced by eliminating covariant nation-specific trade indicators (on the basis of a dimensional analysis). James A. Caporaso, “Functionalism and International Integration,” Diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1968.

²⁰ The reduction accomplished by dimensional and theoretical analyses was considerable—leaving us with a matrix of 25 variables rather than the original 40. Of this remaining set we then asked “Does each variable have the statistical potential to respond at all to the occurrence of quasi-experiments of a discontinuous sort?” To answer this question we employed extensive variable-by-variable “sensitivity analysis” involving auto-correlational and trend removal techniques. This analysis was aimed at determining the relative intra-variable predictability over time; the greater the intra-variable predictability in a variable the less likely that the variable would “respond significantly” to the occurrence of the selected quasi-experiments. Techniques employed were adopted from Paul Smoker, “A Time Series Analysis of Sino-Indian Relations,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 13, no. 2, 1969, pp. 172-191. The end result was a set of nine variables—each meeting our *a priori* theoretical and statistical tests.

²¹ Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, *Europe's Would-Be Polity* (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1970).

tures or to economic structures, then we may speak of that "system" as poorly integrated. Integration in this second sense involves the gradual appearance of social coordination within the system and predictability among its components. We emphasize that these two components, growth and system linkages, are interdependent in that it would be meaningless to talk about linkages before structures had emerged and developed, at least minimally. On the other hand, the relationship between these two components is far from linear. Etzioni has suggested a temporal sequence for their development in which system performance precedes system control.²² The political indicators we have chosen are intended to reflect the emerging decisional capabilities of the EEC.

Variables²³

1. European Commission Regulations—Regulations have general scope, are binding in all respects, and are directly applicable in all member states. Professor Sidjanski argues that Regulations are distinct in terms of the generality of their scope and the immediacy of their application; i.e., they are directly applicable and do not have to pass through the administrative apparatus of member states.²⁴

2. European Commission Decisions—Decisions are also binding but do not possess the general scope of Regulations. They become "individual" in the sense that they designate a destination.²⁵

3. Council of Ministers Regulations—These have the same legal status as Commission Regulations. However, in terms of the substantive area that these Regulations cover, they apply to more general, political concerns than Commission Regulations, which are usually reserved for "... those technical areas in which the principles and the general policy have been defined in the Treaty."²⁶

4. Germany's exports to EEC (summed over all members)—This is measured in U.S. dollars

and represents Germany's total exports to all other EEC members.

5. Germany's food, beverage, and tobacco exports to all other member states.

6. Germany's total exports to the EEC divided by Germany's total exports to all other nations. This variable has the same numerator as #4 above, with the denominator being a control term representing total export activity outside its boundaries.

7. Germany's food, beverage, and tobacco exports to EEC members divided by Germany's total export activity with all other states. The numerator is the same as #5.

8. French exports to all other EEC members.

9. German imports from other EEC member states.

These nine variables form the data base for our subsequent quasi-experimental analysis. Insofar as this form of analysis is relatively uncommon in the political sciences,²⁷ we outline in some detail the techniques and assumptions that underlie it.

Measuring Discontinuity

Our research aim has been stated in terms of finding causal relationships between selected quasi-experiments and variables describing Common Market performance over time. We carried out three further analyses in this determination: (1) an additional estimate of "trend," employing sample segments equal in length to the pre-experimental and post-experimental series lengths; (2) linear regression estimates of pre- and post-experimental slopes—each slope being the relative change in the level of trend with respect to time; and (3) a standardized estimate of the difference between pre-experiment and post-experiment regression "Y" intercepts—referring to the "Y" axis occurring at the point of the quasi-experiment. Each of these measures will be discussed briefly in turn.

"Trend" may be defined as the general rise or fall in the mean level of a variable. As such it is of general interest in our interpretation of the effects of the introduction of quasi-experimental events. If the value on a variable at time $t = n + k$ can be predicted with some accuracy from knowledge of the values on the variable in the interval $t = 1, 2, \dots, n$, then "trend" is said to exist in some degree. (In this analysis we assume that the required "knowledge of previous values" can be obtained from linear

²² Amitai Etzioni, "The Epigenesis of Political Communities at the International Level," *American Journal of Sociology*, 68, 1963, pp. 407-421.

²³ All trade indicators were collected from *Commodity Trade Statistics, United Nations Statistical Papers*, Series D., New York; the data on decisions and regulations were collected from the *Bulletin of the EEC*, Commission of the Common Market, Luxembourg.

²⁴ Dusan Sidjanski, *L'Originalité des Communautés Européennes et la Répartition de Leurs Pouvoirs* (Paris: Éditions A. Pedone, 1961), p. 25.

²⁵ For an excellent discussion of the entire decision-making process, from the role of the Commission and Council of Ministers to the part played by the Committee of Permanent Representatives and pressure groups, see *La Décision dans les Communautés Européennes*, under the direction of Pierre Gerber and Daniel Pepy (Bruxelles, Belgique: Presses Universitaires de Bruxelles, 1969).

²⁶ Leon N. Lindberg, *The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1963), p. 35.

²⁷ An early application has been provided by Campbell, "The Connecticut Crackdown," 1968, along with Glass, "Connecticut Speeding Crackdown," 1968. A later effort has been that by Alan L. Pelowski, "A Research Note on the Use of a Quasi-Experimental Design in the Study of International Organization and War," 1969(a), mimeo.

regression estimates). Just how high this intra-variable predictability can be measured by what are called autocorrelations. If one can estimate trend by autocorrelations, one can also "remove" it to some degree (as in the moving averages technique), leaving in the variable the residue *error variance*, which can then be analyzed and related to causal interpretations of change.


Before illustrating how autocorrelated error variance can affect the interpretation of change in a variable, it will be necessary to introduce our measures of discontinuity. As indicated above, our data consists of nine variables for up to 47 time-points (or eleven years and nine months). Somewhere along each series the quasi-experiment occurs, constituting the "introduction of" an experimental variable or event. *The point is that this introduction is the event to be assessed; there is nothing else "in" the event other than the interruption point.* The problem of interest then becomes one of determining the degree of discontinuity around the interruption, which, temporally, "corresponds to" the "real" event of substantive interest.²⁸

Two estimates of the effects of each of the interruptions have been calculated.²⁹ The simpler of the two is called the "single-Mood test." The other is the "double-Mood test."³⁰ Each of these analyses provides us with an estimate of series' slopes, 'Y' intercepts, and the standard error and autocorrelated error associated with the estimates.


The word "single" in single-Mood indicates that this test is based on a single series (usually the pre-test series leading up to the interruption) slope and 'Y' estimate. It is a simple line-fitting technique based on the least squared criterion, where the slope of the line is used to "predict" the first value occurring after the quasi-experiment. This prediction, or estimate of 'Y' at the first time period after the interruption, is then compared to the "real" first value

as read from the data. As such, the single-Mood test is appropriate for tests of hypotheses concerning the *immediate* post-experiment effects of the introduction of the independent variable. Consider, as examples, the following hypothetical cases for which this test is appropriate.

Post-experimental Increase




Post-experimental Decrease




The double-Mood test involves *both* a pre-test linear fit as well as a post-test linear fit, the comparison being between the two 'Y' estimates of the (hypothetical) data point lying "between" the two time points in which the interruption occurs. This, in other words, is a comparison between two "intermediate" estimates of 'Y'. The double-Mood calculation is at least plausibly appropriate for series comparisons like the following.


Change in Mean Level



Change in Mean Level and in Slope



Delayed Response



²⁸ By which we mean our experimental decision-points: Formation, Agricultural Package, and Crisis.

²⁹ Calculations were performed on time-sharing computers with programs originally developed by Sween and Campbell. (Joyce Sween and D. T. Campbell, "A Study of the Effects of Proximally Autocorrelated Error on Tests of Significance for the Interrupted Time Series Quasi-Experimental Design," mimeo, Northwestern University, 1965; and Joyce Sween and D. T. Campbell, "The Interrupted Time Series as Quasi-Experiment: Three Tests of Significance," 1965, Northwestern University, mimeo, pp. 1-39.), and converted to time-sharing by the authors, (Alan L. Pelowski, "PINTR: A Version of Timex for On-Line Use," 1969(b)).

³⁰ After A. M. Mood, *Introduction to the Theory of Statistics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1950); Sween and Campbell, "Study of Effects of Proximally Autocorrelated Error," 1965.

For the single-Mood test, the standard error is based on pre-test variance only; for the double-Mood the entire series variance is used. For each, the explicit comparison is calculated by means of the *t*-test, where

$$t = \frac{Y_1 - Y_2}{\text{S.D.}}$$

We can now turn to the question of autocorrelation and the interpretation of '*t*' computed by the above methods. Probability models on which these tests are based make the minimal assumptions that errors have equal variances and expected (mean) values of zero. In addition, for most cross-sectional analyses it is assumed that errors are independent (uncorrelated). While, for example, even in cross-sectional studies this latter assumption may be confounded by cross-entity diffusion,³¹ for longitudinal studies employing time as a variable the observed values will rarely if ever exhibit independence (zero autocorrelation). It is likely, furthermore, that measures taken closer in time will be more dependent than measurements farther apart. In any case, when such dependence exists, the underlying probability assumptions of the models are not fully met. Although this circumstance complicates the use of regression techniques in time-series analysis, there exist some additional techniques for controlling serial dependence partially (i.e., for estimating the effects of degrees of autocorrelation in a variable). One method has been developed which works directly on the interpretation of '*t*'. Sween and Campbell³² have investigated by means of Montecarlo simulation³³ the effects of proximally autocorrelated error variance on the significance levels of the *t*-test. Generating some 1000 time series of differently autocorrelated values, they were able to show, in the case of the double-Mood test, that if autocorrelated error exists, use of the test with the standard *t*-tables³⁴ will produce significant results solely on the basis of chance more than 1 percent (or 5 percent) of the time. The degree to which the usual significance levels were exceeded depended upon the magnitude of auto-

Table I. Effect of Autocorrelated Error on T-Value Interpretation

	Critical values yielding One and Five percent significance levels for the double-Mood test			
	One-percent		Five-percent	
Degrees of freedom for <i>t</i>	16	36	16	36
Tabled critical values for <i>t</i>	2.92	2.70	2.12	2.03
Independent (random) error	3.03	2.90	2.14	2.04
Correlated error at Lag-1	3.52	3.36	2.56	2.49
Correlated error at Lag-2	4.64	4.46	3.24	3.16
Correlated error at Lag-3	5.14	4.98	3.75	3.57

correlation and, more important, the persistence of autocorrelation beyond lags of one or two.

While this result places constraints on our ability to interpret double-Mood measured discontinuities, for the single-Mood no important adjustments are needed.³⁵ Part of these findings have been reported in tabular form, and are reproduced below both to summarize the effects of autocorrelated variance on *t*-value significance and to provide a reference table for our ensuing analysis.³⁶

Quasi-Experimental Results

Formation of EEC. On January 1, 1958, the EEC—composed of France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg—came into effect. These six countries joined together to pursue common policies in a wide variety of substantive areas, among which were the lowering of internal (within EEC) tariffs, the merging of external tariffs to provide and maintain a common tariff wall with respect to third countries, and the pursuit of common policies in several functional areas, (for example, agriculture and transport).

The goals and expectations of the member nations were fairly clear. They wanted to take advantage of a large market size which a united Europe could provide, the economies of scale, and the benefits that would accrue from the expected international division of labor. In addition, one other reason for the formation of the EEC was the expected trade diversion from all third countries to intra-EEC trade.

³⁵ Sween and Campbell, "Interrupted Time Series as Quasi-Experiment," 1965, p. 13.

³⁶ Sween and Campbell, "Interrupted Time Series as Quasi-Experiment," 1965, p. 26.

³¹ Raoul Narroll, "Two Solutions to Galton's Problem, in *Readings in Cross Cultural Methodology*, ed. F. W. Moore (New Haven: HRAF Press, 1961), pp. 221-248.

³² Sween and Campbell, "Interrupted Time Series as Quasi-Experiment," 1965.

³³ The Monte-Carlo simulation method employs pseudo-random variates to obtain estimates of solutions that (supposedly) cannot be obtained by analytical procedures (such as the areas of complex volumes).

³⁴ H. Arkin and Colton, *Tables for Statisticians* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1963), p. 121.

Table II. Experiment: Formation of EEC

Variable Name	Pre-N	Post-N	Slope Change	t-values		Significance Level			Lag-1 Autocorrelated Error
				Single Mood	Double Mood	Single Mood	Double Mood	Adjusted Double	
German exports total (internal)/world exports total	12	35	+	0.09	1.60				.29
German foodstuffs exports (internal)/world exports	12	35	-	.24	.98				.11

^a Pre-N refers to the pre-experimental series length, post-N to the post-experimental series length. Total series length is always the sum of these two numbers (i.e., 47).

^b Adjusted double-Mood significance refers of course to the effects on the t-value interpretation due to autocorrelated error-variance.

^c Autocorrelated error is here reported for the separate pre-test and post-test "trend out" series; that is, for two-segment trend (slope plus intercept) removal. Lag 1 refers to the spacing between the overlapping values of the residue error variance.

Among the quasi-experiments selected for this study, that of the formation presented us with the greatest difficulty—namely, lack of pre-test series for EEC-wide variables (commission and council Decisions). This left us with only two variables with which to work (both trade variables). Nevertheless, for the purposes of our later comparison of changes in these two variables, we report the results of the formation quasi-experiment.

The following plot gives one a picture of the development of Germany's exports to the EEC as a proportion of its world exports.

There is a small increase immediately after




Figure 1. Formation: Germany's Exports with EEC/Total Exports.



Figure 2.

the formation, followed by a decrease and then an average rise in trade figures for the rest of the time points.

Did the formation have an effect on trade patterns? It is best to answer this question in terms of our plausible rival hypotheses. The plausible rival hypothesis of instability invalidates the interpretation that the small upswing immediately following formation was a result of the EEC's coming into existence. The single-Mood test is 0.09, indicating that this first post-test value could easily have occurred by chance. In other words, the random variability of this distribution is great enough to account for the occurrence of this upswing.

The double-Mood test provides us with an estimate of whether the entire distribution of post experimental values could have occurred by chance. Our double-Mood value of 1.60 (43 degrees of freedom) is not significant but comes very close to being so at the .10 level. We can see, nevertheless, that there is a slope change after the formation of the Common Market. Figure 2 gives you an impression of

this change, which went from 0.099 for pre-test slope to 0.338 for post-test slope.

We mentioned earlier that before one searches for substantive explanations of change, one should firmly determine whether a non-random change occurred. Our tests of significance told us that the changes that occurred could have happened fairly often by chance. If this is actually the case, we need not explore the matter any further. For illustrative purposes, however, let us accept the double-Mood as significant at the .15 level and attempt to evaluate that significance.

Probably the greatest threat to the hypothesis that the formation caused the observed change is the rival hypothesis that the change is part of a long-term system trend which has no causal relationship to formation. It is the case that if one cuts into the post-formation distribution at almost any point, the points subsequent to that will be higher values. But in a positive growth system, that is, a system in which everything is going up, there is the danger that increases subsequent to the quasi-experiment will be inter-




Figure 3

puted as dependent upon that experiment. There are techniques of trend adjustment available to render implausible the effect of seasonal trend and larger-term trend operative within our series length. There remains, however the plausible hypothesis that the effects we are interpreting are part of a still longer-term trend of which our observations are a fragment. The following figure illustrates this:

The "hypothetical data" indicate that perhaps our 47 time points are all part of a longer-term trend in world trade. We may only be picking up the portion of this overall trend line which includes the upswing. We have no way of eliminating this plausible hypothesis.

In addition to the plausible hypothesis of trend, there are other substantive variables that may have accounted for the post-formation changes in trade patterns. Rarely do we find social situations where only one event or distribution unequivocally accounts for a change. Among the plausible rivals we must consider here are changes in internal productivity (a country that shows a sharp increase in production is expected to trade more), possible tariff cuts, a price change in EEC countries or outside countries, such as the United States, making intra-EEC trade more attractive. It should be mentioned that part of the reason for the low trade values immediately following formation is that the system already appeared to be undergoing a decline after a rather sustained period of economic progress from 1952-1957. This was part of a general recession and flattening of economic growth in Europe around 1957-1958.³⁷ If it had not been for this, it is possible that the formation of the EEC would have had more of a positive impact on trade than it did.

Agricultural Decisions

On January 14, 1962 the Council of Ministers, on a proposal by the Commission, adopted a series of Regulations laying the basis for the common agricultural policy. These Regulations provided for the basic mechanism of the common markets during the transitional period, the variable levy, which was to be equal to the difference between the price of a Community product and its price on the world market.³⁸ EEC officials felt a watershed had been

reached. Krause describes the effect of these decisions:

"The goal of policy was the establishment of a single unified market for the entire community. In such a market, prices for identical goods would differ only by transportation costs. To accomplish this, all national policies affecting prices, such as trading restrictions, local usage regulations, and subsidies would have to be replaced by regulations for the community as a whole."³⁹

The importance of this policy can readily be seen. Agriculture ceased to be a purely domestic concern. As one author put it "... if New Year, 1958 was the birthday of the Common Market in law, New Year 1962 was its birthday in fact; and, as Common Market personnel put it, the Common Market had passed the 'point of no return' on the road toward federal Europe."⁴⁰

What is the evidence for the impact of these decisions? The table on the following page summarizes the results for our nine dependent variables. First, we should note that in every case, the post-test slope changed in a positive direction. In other words, the line representing the rate of growth for each of the nine variables was steeper after the adoption of the agricultural package than before it. The single-Mood test was significant only for Commission Decisions and German exports to the EEC/world (total) at .01 and .05 respectively. The double-Mood was significant at .01 for Commission Decisions, German exports and French exports. The double-Mood, adjusted for autocorrelation, was significant for these same three variables at .01, .01, and .05 respectively. To gain some insight into the meaning of these figures, we have plotted Commission Decisions (significant) and Commission Regulations (not significant).

The visual picture certainly gives one a strong feeling that something "intervened" in the system somewhere around the beginning of 1962. The first sixteen time points are all zero entries. After the adoption of the agricultural policy these figures jumped to 29, 15, 53, 38, 32, 55 etc. for Commission Decision and to 0, 2, 35, 41, 27, 18 etc. for Commission Regulations. Clearly something happened between

³⁹ Krause, *European Economic Integration*, 1968.

⁴⁰ We should note that the Regulations adopted in January 1962 did not bring into existence a common agricultural policy immediately but rather provided the framework for the gradual establishment of agricultural policies from 1962 to 1970, the end of the transition period. In addition, no common price policy existed as yet and governments could intervene in a variety of ways to distort competition and affect trade. (See Lindberg and Scheingold, *Europe's Would-Be Polity*, 1970, for a discussion of the fragmentary nature of these Regulations.)

³⁷ Alexander Lamfalussy, "Europe's Progress: Due to Common Market?" in Krause (ed.), *The Common Market: Progress and Controversy* ed. L. B. Krause, (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1964), pp. 90-108.

³⁸ See Lawrence B. Krause, *European Economic Integration and the United States* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1968), for a more extensive treatment of the agricultural policy, as well as Lindberg and Scheingold, *Europe's Would-Be Polity*, 1970.




Figure 4. Agricultural Decisions.

Table III. Experiment: First Agricultural Package

Variable Name	Pre-N	Post-N	Slope Change	t-values		Significance Level			Lag-1 Autocorrelated Error
				Single Mood	Double Mood	Single Mood	Double Mood	Adjusted Double	
Commission Regulations	16	24	+	.73	.49				.65
Council Regulations	16	24	+	.30	.68				-.08
Commission Decisions	16	24	+	17.48	4.04	.01	.01	.01	-.10
German Exports to EEC (total internal)	16	23	+	1.13	.33				.19
German Exports to EEC (food internal)	16	19	+	.22	1.68				-.16
German Exports to EEC/World total	28	19	+	1.96	4.41	.05	.01	.01	.56
German Exports to EEC/World (food)	28	19	+	1.00	1.28				.10
French Exports	16	24	+	1.20	2.78		.01	.05	.25
German Exports	16	19	+	1.04	.21				.25

1958–1961 and the beginning of 1962. The interpretation here is that the agricultural package served as a kind of political “take-off” impetus for the EEC political system.⁴¹

Let us briefly confront this interpretation with our plausible rival hypotheses. Although there is a great deal of instability in our data, in the case of the Commission Decisions at least, we obtain a post-test result not explainable by chance at the .01 level. The puzzling thing from our “eyeball” test of the plots is that the Mood tests for Commission Regulations do not yield significant results. However, if we remember that the double-Mood compares pre- and post-test intercepts, we can see why this is the case. The least-squares line for pre- and post-test look roughly like this:




Figure 5

The intercept for the post-test is lower than that for the pre-test. Yet the slope on the post-test line (4.619) is much higher than the pre-test slope (0.040). We did however, test an F ratio for difference between slopes, and this was significant at the .01 level.

The hypothesis that the post-test distribution is part of either a seasonal trend or longer-term trend (within our series length) is not plausible given the fact that our pre-test observations do not exhibit such trend. It is clearly not the case that we can simply extrapolate pre-test values to obtain the results we did. The post-1962 behavior of the political decision variables appears to be part of a different system—that is, sensitive to different forces than the pre-test values of these variables.

It seems evident that we have isolated a change which is non-random and non-serially dependent. The question arises as to whether history provides us with any other substantive variables to explain the change. There is the plausible hypothesis that Great Britain's first request in July, 1961 to join the EEC stimulated

a great deal of confidence and political activity within the Community. This appears less plausible if we recognize that we have sustained growth in selected indicators even after the British bid was vetoed in January, 1963. A more plausible rival hypothesis is that the beginning of 1962 was the start of the second stage of the transition period. By the end of December, 1961, tariffs had to be partially cut and the six had to start movement toward forging a common external tariff. Tariffs were to be cut by 30 percent but in fact the members decided to accelerate and cut tariffs by 50 percent in many sectors. On the same date, December 31, 1961, quotas for industrial products were to be removed. This showed a great deal of good will among the Members and a desire to go ahead as quickly as possible.⁴²

In addition, even though the decision to lower tariffs took place before the adoption of the common agriculture policy, these two events can't be seen in any strict causal relationship since agreement in agriculture was explicitly linked by the French to movement into the second transitional stage.⁴³ One way to check this out more thoroughly would be to look to cases where additional tariffs had been cut but where common policies did not come into existence, and to corresponding cases where common policies came into existence but tariffs had not been cut. December 15, 1964 provides us with a good example of the adoption of another agricultural package policy, the important Mansholt Plan which was to align cereal prices in one jump.⁴⁴ The last previous tariff cut (10 percent) occurred in July, 1963, and a 30 percent movement toward the common external tariff occurred on the same date.⁴⁵ If we examine the plot we find a rather high peak in both of the variables around December, 1964. This reported measure of a variable very similar to the first agriculture package strengthens our interpretation.

The Agricultural Crisis

On June 30, 1965, the French representative in the Council of Ministers, Couve de Murville, and other representatives of Community bodies where member states are directly represented, walked out and did not return until the end of January, 1966. This six to seven month period

⁴¹ Compare these results with the data and interpretation provided by William E. Fisher, “An Analysis of the Deutsch Sociocausal Paradigm of Political Integration,” *International Organization*, 23, 2 (Spring, 1969), especially pp. 271–273. Fisher's data are not strictly comparable for a variety of reasons, among which are that he includes in his measure of output performance Community acts not examined here (e.g., recommendations and directives) and that he weights his indicators.

⁴² Guy DeCarmoy, *The Foreign Policies of France* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 372.

⁴³ DeCarmoy, *Foreign Policies of France*, 1970, p. 373.

⁴⁴ John Newhouse, *Collision in Brussels: The Common Market Crisis of 30 June 1965* (London: Faber and Faber, 1967).

⁴⁵ Krause, *European Economic Integration*, 1968, p. 58.

—referred to as the “Community crisis” or “agricultural crisis”—ostensibly began over some rather technical issues relating to the financing of the common agricultural policy.⁴⁶ However, subsequent developments demonstrated that the crux of the crisis was related to more fundamental notions about how the Community should be constituted, such as the role of the Commission, whether the practice of majority voting should come into operation, and whether the Community should have its own financial resources.⁴⁷ Many observers feel that the crisis was the most serious test of the Community’s integrative accomplishments, a crisis so severe as to threaten the “very existence of the Community,”⁴⁸ at worst, or to bring it to a standstill at best. Let us examine the extent to

⁴⁶*Le Marché Commun et L’Agriculture*, Livre Blanc des Organisations Professionnelles Agricoles (Oct., 1965), pp. 21–25.

⁴⁷For a detailed analysis of the crisis see John Lambert, “The Constitutional Crisis: 1965–66,” *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 4, no. 3 1966, pp. 195–228.

⁴⁸Gordon Weil, “The European Community: What Lies Beyond the Point of No Return?” *The Review of Politics*, 29, no. 2, 1967, p. 166.

which this crisis was felt in other parts of the system.

The following table presents the results for the onset of the crisis, June 30, 1965. Commission Regulations and Council Regulations produce double-Mood values which are significant at the .01 and .10 levels respectively. The single-Mood value for German exports to the EEC is significant at the .05 level. Let us take a closer look at these three variables to see how they stand up to other (in addition to instability) rival interpretations.

The following plot illustrates the path of Commission and Council Regulations before and after the crisis. The plots are remarkably similar for both variables. They both rise slightly immediately after the crisis, then drop off considerably, then rise again. If we look at the distribution as a whole, there are ups and downs at other points also. Could this drop simply be part of that same trend pattern? If we adjust for trend we find that the double-Mood values are now significant at .05 and .10 instead of .01 and .10. Thus at least in the case of Commission Regulations, trend is a plausible




Figure 6. Agricultural Crisis.

Table IV. Experiment: Agricultural Crisis

Variable Name	Pre-N	Post-N	Slope Change	t-values		Significance Level			Lag-1 Autocorrelated Error
				Single Mood	Double Mood	Single Mood	Double Mood	Adjusted Double	
Commission Regulations	30	10	+	.23	2.82		.01	.05	.43
Council Regulations	30	10	+	.25	1.98		.10	.10	-.36
Commission Decisions	30	10	-	1.51	.88				.08
German Exports to EEC (Total internal)	30	10	+	2.10	.35	.05			.20
German Exports to EEC (Food internal)	30	5	+	.86	.96				.34
German Exports to EEC/World total	42	5	+	1.07	.87				.77

rival that we can eliminate only by moving to a new p-level.

We indicated that irrelevant responsiveness of measures becomes important when an indicator responds to a stimulus but the indicator is a fallible and imperfect representation of the concept it measures. To rule out the plausible argument that a change is irrelevant or idiosyncratic we must utilize multiple measures of the same concepts and obtain response consistency for a set of indicators. It could be argued that the political decision-making variables are indeed sensitive to the crisis simply because they are so "close" to it. That is, the crisis involved the French boycott of Community institution meetings. Thus, one would expect the output of Community institutions to fall off during the boycott. In one sense it is difficult to assess whether the drop-off in Council and Commission Regulations was *the crisis itself* or its effect. Perhaps we should be introducing still another plausible rival hypothesis—that the observed effects occurred because they were logically entailed by the stimulus. This interpretation is rendered impotent to the extent that we can marshal additional, independent indicators that are sensitive to the crisis. Trade indicators present one kind of indicator which is clearly not logically entailed by the crisis. Out of three trade indicators only one of them is significant, German exports to the EEC. Yet it may be important to note that there is an immediate drop-off for all three indicators at the time point following crisis onset. This drop-off is not sustained, however, and trade picks up strongly even before the crisis is resolved and continues to increase. We can safely say that the crisis has not done irreparable damage to the EEC, either in terms of our economic or political indicators.

A final plausible hypothesis to explain the significant observed effects is that other empiri-

cal variables were at work to produce a depression in our indicators. Some authors see the Community crisis as the result of diplomatic breakdown involving France, Germany, and the United States. Miriam Camps argues that "... the French decision in 1965 to seek to loosen the structure of the Community and thus to regain 'independence' was from a Gaullist standpoint, the logical consequence of the French failure to shake the Germans on the defense issue during the summer and autumn of 1965."⁴⁹

For this argument to carry weight one must show not only that diplomatic factors caused the crisis but that they also independently caused the decreases in our indicators. More explicitly, if diplomatic factors led to the crisis and the crisis caused a drop in our indicators, our original interpretation is not weakened.

Evaluation of Hypotheses

We return now to the three substantive hypotheses which we earlier stated. The first hypothesis had to do with the development of system linkages within the EEC.

1. Change patterns and causal links among variables *within* subsystems (political decision-making and economic performance) will be stronger than change patterns and causal links across subsystems (e.g., economic to political).

In terms of our quasi-experiments, this means that if the stimulus is political in nature, observed effects should be stronger among political indicators than among economic indicators. The adoption of the agricultural package in 1962 was a political act in the truest sense. However, Table III shows that two out of three variables that respond are trade variables. The opposite pattern, however, emerges from an ex-

⁴⁹ Miriam Camps, *European Unification in the Sixties* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1966), p. 16.

amination of the crisis where two out of three of the responsive measures are political. One easy interpretation is that in the case of the agricultural package we have twice as many economic as political indicators. But clearly no strong conclusion can be drawn with respect to the first hypothesis until we introduce additional indicators.

2. In a positive growth system, we expect quasi-experiments occurring earlier in the system's life to have stronger impact than later ones.

We state this hypothesis not because we believe that system linkages will become weaker with the passage of time, although this is certainly a possibility. Instead, we suspect that as time passes a system grows, not only in terms of scale increases but also in terms of complexity. New components are added, old components differentiate and elaborate so that the emerging system is composed of a much broader range of structures than it earlier possessed. The upshot of this is that, even if system linkages are stronger, the behavior of any one particular variable will not be able to produce sharp discontinuities in the system. In a multiply determined system, any particular variable counts less than it would in a more limited system of variables. Thus we expect the effects of complexity to be a general smoothing out of system performance.

If we examine the three tables which summarize the three quasi-experiments, we can see that there is no clear cut evidence for this hypothesis. One out of two of the variables was significant for the formation, three out of nine for the adoption of agricultural policy, and three out of nine for the agricultural crisis. However, the impediment to a clear interpretation of this hypothesis is that we have no way of knowing if the experiments are of roughly equal stimulus strength. In fact, it seems reasonable to argue that the events we have chosen become stronger with the passage of time—that the crisis was the most powerful stimulus, the adoption of agricultural decisions next, and the formation the least powerful. However, in the absence of more information on this, we must view this hypothesis as unconfirmed.

3. The more functionally and/or geographically "specific" a variable, the less likelihood of significant change around quasi-experiments.

Our basic argument is simple: The more specific a variable, either in terms of the number of functional contexts in which it operates or the geographic area to which it applies, the more autonomous the behavior of that variable and the more insensitive it will be to the behav-

ior of other variables either within the same subsystem or across subsystems. Thus, for example, a trade variable expressed in terms of foodstuffs should be less sensitive than a total trade measure. This is in fact the case. In no instance was either of the indicators of trade in foodstuffs sensitive, while over-all trade figures were significant on five different occasions. This lends some evidence in support of our third hypothesis. However, it is clear that a great deal more research must be presented before any firm conclusions can be drawn, especially since the implications of our findings are *not* consistent with a body of literature on integration which stresses that spillover occurs best when it proceeds from functionally specific sectors.⁵⁰

Conclusion

The primary conclusion we draw is that at present the EEC is a weakly integrating social system. First, there is as yet limited responsiveness among the major components or subsystems of the EEC (political and economic subsystems). One minimal empirical requirement of a system is that there be some predictability in the relationships among its parts so that change in one part of the system implies change in another part. We selected some of the potentially strongest of these changes and searched for their effects. With the significant noted exceptions, we found few.

Second, there is another way to view integration—in terms of the growth and development of structures and functions at a new level.⁵¹ In these terms, the EEC (as a positive growth system) is rapidly integrating. Almost without exception, all the variables we dealt with are and have been rapidly increasing. Germany's exports to EEC members have tripled since 1958, and the growth in the number of political decisions and regulations adopted is even greater. If we leave this growth (trend) component in each variable, we find high correlations among behaviors of system parts, correlations mostly due to trend.⁵² What we have been primarily interested in here, however, are discontinuities around trend lines and whether such discontinuities produce discernible changes in other system components.

⁵⁰ In general, this may be referred to as the "Functionalist School" of international integration theory of which David Mitrany is sometimes considered the founding intellectual father.

⁵¹ Lindberg, "The European Community," 1967; Werner Feld, *The European Common Market and the World*, (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1967); Etzioni, "Epigenesis of Political Communities," 1963.

⁵² A cross-lag panel correlation analysis of up to 8 quarterly lags produced uniformly high cross-variable predictability with little if any attenuation for higher lags.

An astute European observer once remarked that Europe, even the Europe of the Six, was not one creature but rather a loose collection of different power centers which somehow hung together in a very decentralized and poorly coordinated existence.⁵³ Spinelli's observation, made from the perspective of the European activist, is corroborated by Etzioni's theoretical insight that new communities tend to develop capabilities for performance first and mechanisms for control and coordination later. This appears to be the state in which European integration finds itself today—a collection of structures rapidly growing in many directions and each very imperfectly responsive to the behavior of the others.

Finally, we feel compelled to go beyond our analysis to urge the exploration of a particular methodological and philosophical position, a

⁵³ Altiero Spinelli, *The Eurocrats* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966).

quasi-experimental methodology which emphasizes the successive elimination of plausible rival hypotheses. We urge a philosophy of science which stresses the ways in which hypotheses can be refuted, and we advocate the position that we creatively attempt to expose our hypotheses to all plausible competing interpretations. Sometimes these competing interpretations may be substantive, sometimes statistical, and sometimes they may be concerned with measurement and scoring procedures. Any of these may confound the hypothesized interpretation. We agree with Popper's suggestion to shift the critical question from "How can we find confirming instances?" to "How can we detect and eliminate error?"⁵⁴ In short, we hope to make a methodological virtue out of Huxley's tragedies.

⁵⁴ Karl Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963).

Bandwagon and Underdog Effects in Minimal-Information Elections*

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I. Introduction

The influence of pre-election polls on voting behavior has been the focus of considerable research in recent years.¹ This interest—and concern—has been heightened by the advent of computer-processed predictions which have attained a remarkable degree of accuracy in forecasting the outcomes of numerous elections at the national, state, and local levels.

The concern usually expressed over the publication or dissemination of preferential polls is that such information might constitute an independent effect on election results. The argument is made that any information that predicts which candidate will emerge victorious might lead to a *bandwagon* effect.² An alternative hypothesis, less often proposed, assumes that some persons may be predisposed to identify or sympathize with the candidate who seems to be at a disadvantage. Among such individuals, information that appears to be discouraging for a candidate might trigger an *underdog* effect.³

* The research on which this paper is based is from the author's dissertation, "The Underdog Effect: An Experimental Study of Voting Behavior in a Minimal Information Election" (unpublished Doctoral thesis, Florida State University, 1970). I wish to thank Charles N. Brownstein, James W. Clarke, and James W. Dyson for helpful critiques of an earlier version of this paper.

¹ See, for example, Archibald M. Crossley and Helen M. Crossley, "Polling in 1968," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XXXIII (Spring, 1969), 1-16; George Gallup, "Polls and the Political Process—Past, Present, and Future," *Public Opinion Quarterly* XXIX (Winter, 1965-1966), 544-549; Louis Harris, "Polls and Politics in the United States," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XXVII (Spring, 1963), 3-8; Kurt Lang and Gladys Engel Lang, *Voting and Nonvoting* (Waltham, Mass.: Blaisdell Publishing Co., 1968); Norman C. Meier and Harold W. Saunders, eds., *The Polls and Public Opinion* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1949); and Harold Mendelsohn and Irving Crespi, *Polls, Television, and the New Politics* (Scranton, Pa.: Chandler Publishing Co., 1970).

² Bernard C. Hennessy notes that the bandwagon effect must be distinguished from the mere inclination of partisans, in conventions or in primaries, to rally to the support of a candidate who appears to have the ability to win. As he explains, "The bandwagon effect is supposed to induce the voter, regardless of party or other factors, to support a candidate simply because he appears to be a winner." See Bernard C. Hennessy, *Public Opinion* (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., Inc., 1965), p. 141.

³ A more concise and mathematical delineation of the bandwagon and underdog phenomena is offered

Clearly, the same information that stimulates a bandwagon movement among some voters may induce others to attempt to rescue the underdog.

What both the bandwagon and underdog phenomena have in common is the ability to persuade voters to respond to candidates on the basis of very little information. And because so many election campaigns, especially those at the local level, are characterized by a dearth of information as to the candidates and their positions on issues, voters may be highly susceptible to influence or manipulation by any informational stimuli that they receive.

These circumstances are particularly characteristic of the type of contest which this paper describes as a minimal-information election. Such an election is defined by a general absence of awareness of the issues on the part of the voters, lack of partisan identification on the part of the candidates, and by a relative or total lack of relevant information with which the voters can evaluate the candidates. In the main, the minimal-information election evokes little ego-involvement, interest, and turnout.

The conditions characterizing a minimal-information election are frequently found in local elections of the nonpartisan type. In a study of nonpartisan elections, Charles R. Adrian has noted that these contests tend to promote candidate-oriented campaigns and lack of debate on the issues:

In fact, fence-straddling [in nonpartisan elections] is much more tempting than under the conventional election system, since in the latter, the presence of party label suggests some sort of "position" to the electorate. And since under nonpartisanship the voter seldom can associate a candidate with a position, he comes, as a last resort in his confusion, to choose "name" candidates.⁴

In effect, the process of assessing candidates under minimal-information conditions requires voters to rely on their own values and predispositions to form complete impressions of the

by Herbert A. Simon, "Bandwagon and Underdog Effects and the Possibility of Election Predictions," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XVIII (Fall, 1954), 245-253.

⁴ "Some General Characteristics of Nonpartisan Elections," *American Political Science Review*, XLVI (September, 1952), 773.

candidates on the basis of very meager and vague cues.⁵ Almost any information, including poll results, might have an exaggerated and decisive impact in such campaigns.

The study reported here was an attempt, under experimental conditions, to determine how ballot preferences formed early in a minimal-information campaign were subsequently influenced by electioneering strategies designed to elicit bandwagon and underdog effects. The investigation also explored the effect of these phenomena when the candidates' party affiliations were revealed.

II. Method

In order to ascertain how bandwagon and underdog effects might operate in a minimal-information election, a "before-after" experimental design was utilized. The design consisted of a series of four presentations of information, with each presentation followed by a ballot. In two instances, the information was in the form of poll results, and in the other two the information was of a qualitative nature (see Figure 1).

The voters in the experimental election included 625 students at Florida State University who were enrolled in the basic American government course during the fall of 1969 and the winter of 1970. They were told that they would play the role of voters in a mayoralty election, and that they would be asked to indicate their choice for mayor on four successive ballots, each ballot following the receipt of some information about the candidates or the progress of the election. Prior to each of the last three ballots, the voters would be informed about the results of the preceding ballot. Unknown to the

voters, however, they were to be given bogus results so as to make it possible to study the effect of different poll margins on their voting behavior.

Initially, all voters were introduced to the two candidates, "Mr. Jones" and "Mr. Roberts," via a printed bulletin that provided some brief background commentary about the two men as well as short platform statements. At the conclusion of the first ballot, the voters were informed that the frontrunner was ahead by a percentage margin of 52-48. With only this poll result as new information, a second ballot was requested.

After the second ballot, the frontrunner supposedly had increased his lead to 71-29. This new result was made credible to the voters by explaining that approximately half the electorate had been furnished some "secret" information about the candidates just prior to the second ballot. In fact, no one had received any additional information about Mr. Jones or Mr. Roberts.

At this point, the electorate was divided into different treatment groups so that experimental controls could be incorporated into the design. Treatment Group I (N = 222) was allowed to react only to the 71-29 poll. But Treatment Group II (N = 158) and Treatment Group III (N = 245) received new qualitative information, in which the previously announced frontrunner was described as having numerous advantages such as strong financial backing, a prestigious family background (his father was a former governor), and the support of the capable, outgoing mayor. The underdog⁶ was portrayed as not too well known although ac-

⁶ Although the discussion in this paper uses such terms as *underdog*, *frontrunner*, and *bandwagon*, these words were carefully avoided by the experimenter in his instructions and announcements to the voters.

Figure 1. Research Design

Treatment Group	Stimulus Block 1	Stimulus Block 2	Stimulus Block 3	Stimulus Block 4
I (N = 222)	Introduction	52-48 Poll Result	71-29 Poll Result	69-31 Poll Result: Bandwagon-Underdog Message
II (N = 158)	Introduction	52-48 Poll Result	71-29 Poll Result: Bandwagon-Underdog Message	69-31 Poll Result
III (N = 245)	Introduction	52-48 Poll Result	71-29 Poll Result: Bandwagon-Underdog Message	69-31 Poll Result: Partisan Information

⁵ The subject of person perception is discussed in greater detail in Peter B. Warr and Christopher Knapper, *The Perception of People and Events* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1948).

tive in the United Fund. His relative lack of financial resources had forced him to conduct a door-to-door campaign in an effort to meet the voters.

Since voters in Group I did not receive this "bandwagon-underdog message" at this stage, it was possible to isolate the effect of polls from information that was more explicitly a qualitative appeal for either a bandwagon or underdog vote. This was accomplished by measuring the effect of the 71-29 poll on voters in Group I and comparing it to the effect of the same poll plus the bandwagon-underdog message on voters in Groups II and III.

In the fourth and final block of the design all voters received a new poll result announced as 69-31. Since this poll represented a change of only two percentage points from the previous 71-29 result, it was assumed that such a slight modification would have a negligible effect at most. In retrospect, as will be shown shortly, the assumption proved to have been a plausible one. Voters in Group I received the bandwagon-underdog message along with the new poll. The purpose of this variation was to determine whether voting transfers might be withheld until the final official vote rather than occurring after each discrete presentation during the campaign. In other words, if a substantial number of voters switched their loyalties in the fourth block of Group I (following the qualitative information), was there a corresponding turnover in the third block for Groups II and III, or were most transfers, if any, withheld until the fourth and final ballot?

Treatment III was identical to Treatment II through the third block. But in the fourth block, voters in Group III were given new information that hinted at the party affiliation of the two candidates even though the mayoralty election was being conducted as a nonpartisan affair. Again, this permitted one group to act as a control for the other. While Group III received the party information in the fourth block, Group II (which had undergone the same treatment up to this point) was given no new qualitative information. Thus, the "after" measurements of Groups II and III would be compared to assess the effect of partisan influences on any bandwagon or underdog effects engendered by the earlier stimuli.

III. Results

Little change was anticipated in response to the nearly balanced 52-48 poll, and this hypothesis was borne out empirically. Only 7 of 625 voters switched after the announced result, with 5 moving to the underdog and 2 to the

frontrunner. This transfer could not be distinguished from random processes on a statistical basis.

Following the announcement that the frontrunner had increased his percentage margin to 71-29, the expectation was that there might now be a pronounced shift in voter loyalties. Since voters in Groups II and III were exposed not only to the 71-29 poll but also to the bandwagon-underdog message, only the reaction of voters in Group I could be examined to test the poll hypothesis. Of the 222 voters in this latter group, only 6 individuals changed their preferences, 4 to the underdog and 2 to the frontrunner. Again, this represented a statistically insignificant movement that could be attributed to randomness. Thus, neither a relatively balanced poll result nor a markedly disparate poll result had any significant influence on the voters.

These results appear to be consistent with what professional pollsters have argued for years, and the failure to be manipulated by majority pressures is also supported by evidence from social-psychological studies dealing with conformity.⁷

Effect of the Bandwagon-Underdog Message.

While voters in Group I were receiving only the 71-29 poll in the third block, voters in the other two groups received the qualitative information describing the frontrunner's advantages and the underdog's handicaps. Of the 404 voters in these groups, 80 transferred their choices, 16 to the frontrunner and 64 to the underdog, a movement that was statistically significant (see Table 1). Since no corresponding turnover was detected in the control (Group I), the transfers could logically be ascribed to the effect of the message. The voters seemed to be reacting to psychological appeals that suggested an election contest between an advantaged frontrunner and a disadvantaged underdog. Where mere quantitative poll results had failed to dislodge earlier commitments, the presentation of a more explicit bandwagon-underdog stimulus exerted a significant influence.

When voters in Group I were subsequently

⁷The classic study on conformity behavior was based on a series of experiments conducted by Solomon E. Asch dealing with perceptual judgments in a group setting. The findings of that study indicate that a personal commitment is not easily shaken until one finds himself standing against a near unanimous majority. The presence of even a modicum of support seems sufficient to bolster one's confidence in his own judgments. See Solomon E. Asch, "Studies of Independence and Conformity: A Minority of One Against a Unanimous Majority," *Psychological Monographs*, LXX (1956), No. 9 (Whole No. 416).

Table 1. Effect of the Bandwagon-Underdog Message: Control Group and Treatment Groups*

Effect	Control Group I		Treatment Groups II-III	
	Be-fore	After	Be-fore	After
Voted for Frontrunner	136	134	234	186
Voted for Underdog	86	88	169	217
Chi Square	.04		11.44***	
Switched to Frontrunner	2		16	
Switched to Underdog	4		64	

* Omits the 7 vote switches made after the 52-48 poll which were found not to be statistically significant.
*** Significant at the .001 level.

exposed to the same bandwagon-underdog message in the fourth block, their reactions were remarkably similar to those of the Groups II and III voters. In response to the qualitative information, 47 of 222 voters changed their ballot preferences, with the underdog candidate benefitting by these transfers 37 to 10.

The results of the "before-after" measurements for all three groups, from initial voting intentions to post-message ballots, indicated that the significant vote changes came only after receipt of the bandwagon-underdog message, regardless of the block in which this information was presented (see Table 2).

In all three groups, the reaction to the qualitative information was a switching of votes, primarily to the underdog, that was statistically significant at least at the .05 level. Among the 625 voters, 26 switched to the frontrunner and 101 to the underdog.

Whether the bandwagon-underdog information was favorable to one candidate or the

other ultimately depended on the individual voter's own perceptions. Analysis of the voters' explanations of their ballots, obtained at the conclusion of the ballot sequence, seems to confirm this ambivalent effect. In reacting to the information that Candidate A was better known in the community than Candidate B, some voters concluded that Candidate A must have been a talented and able individual to have attained such distinction. But other persons sympathized with Candidate B's lack of popularity, feeling that being well known was not an important qualification for performance in public office.

Similarly, where the underdog's door-to-door campaign was regarded by some voters as evidence of his willingness to work diligently for the common people, others scoffed at this amateurish approach to office-seeking and saw it as evidence of the underdog's naivete and lack of political acumen. The difference in financial standing of the two candidates also cut both ways. While some voters opposed the frontrunner because he seemed to be the candidate of the community elite, others felt that the poorly financed underdog would be more prone to use his position to line his own pockets.

Effect of the Candidates' Party Affiliation. In the fourth block of the design the voters in Group II received only the 69-31 poll, which proved inconsequential in its effect. Only 3 of 158 voters switched allegiances, 2 to the underdog and 1 to the frontrunner. But for voters in Group III who received new qualitative information revealing the candidates' party affiliation, the result was a change of vote by 23 out of 245 voters. Since the bandwagon-underdog message had earlier resulted in 50 vote switches in this group, it appeared that the party infor-

Table 2. Effect of the Bandwagon-Underdog Message by Treatment Groups*

Effect	Treatment Group					
	I		II		III	
	Before	After	Before	After	Before	After
Voted for Frontrunner	136	109	94	74	140	112
Voted for Underdog	86	113	64	84	105	133
Chi Square	6.64**		5.08*		6.42*	
Switched to Frontrunner	10		5		11	
Switched to Underdog	37		25		39	

* Omits the 7 switches made after the 52-48 poll (in the three groups) and the 6 switches made after the 71-29 poll (in Group I) which were found not to be statistically significant.
* Significant at the .05 level.
** Significant at the .01 level.

mation, while significant in stimulating voters to change their ballots, was only half as effective as the bandwagon-underdog message. But the two stimuli were not equally comparable since they did not occur at the same stage in the design: the party stimulus was not made available until after the voters had reacted to the earlier message.

Generally, the effect of the partisan cue led voters to move to the party of their own identification. This was true even among some voters who had earlier switched as a result of the bandwagon and underdog appeals. It appeared, therefore, that under less than minimal-information conditions—specifically, when voters were able to identify the candidates by party affiliation—bandwagon and underdog effects were weakened. Perhaps even more importantly, the reaction to the party information again indicated that the voters responded to qualitative stimuli even though quantitative stimuli (the poll results) seemed to evince no reactions.

IV. Summary

An experiment was designed to test the possibility that the publication or dissemination of pre-election preference polls might affect voting behavior by stimulating bandwagon and underdog phenomena. In addition to the quantitative substance of poll results, voters were also exposed to qualitative information designed to produce the same types of reactions.

The experiment clearly demonstrated that mere poll results are insufficient to impel would-be bandwagon or underdog identifiers to switch their votes. Rather, the voting behavior that results from these identifications does not occur until sensitized or cued by a strong qualitative stimulus.

In unstructured electoral environments, especially in minimal-information elections, voters tend to be more "peripheral" or "marginal" in their participation and interest than they would be in highly competitive, issue-laden elections. And the more peripheral their involvement, the more susceptible they become to being influenced on their voting decisions. Because the voters in minimal-information elections possess so little information on which to make a considered choice, they are apt to formulate a decision on almost any information that comes their way. This may, of course, be true also for high-stimulus presidential elections. But where peripheral voters constitute only a small fraction of the electorate in

presidential elections,⁸ they undoubtedly are representative of the majority of voters in the minimal-information election.

The results of this experiment seem to be consistent with the above thesis. In a minimal-information election, a large number of voters was persuaded to change from original ballot preferences solely on information depicting one candidate as the frontrunner and the other as the underdog. The evidence further indicates that under the specific conditions contrived for the experiment, the appeal of the underdog was more effective than the appeal of the frontrunner. But when party information was available as an anchor for ballot preferences, bandwagon and underdog influences were weakened.⁹ While it seems clear that the bandwagon-underdog appeal acted as a catalyst influencing a marked switching of votes—to the extent of reversing the outcome of the election—it remains uncertain just what attitude or constellation of attitudes was responsible for the changes in voting behavior.

Common folklore holds that Americans are inclined to come to the aid of the underdog in an unequal fray between two antagonists. But there is also some evidence that underdog identification is partly a function of increased levels of education.¹⁰ Thus, whether the predisposition to react favorably to the underdog was a characteristic unique to the voting population of the experiment cannot be answered by this one study. In any event, the success of any psychological appeal depends fundamentally on the pervasiveness among the electorate of the attitude toward which the appeal is directed. In minimal-information elections the lack of information, involvement, and interest enhances the likelihood that ballot choice might be formulated on idiosyncratic grounds.

⁸ See Angus Campbell, "Voters and Elections: Past and Present," *Journal of Politics*, XXVI (November, 1964), 745-757; and Philip E. Converse, "Information Flow and the Stability of Partisan Attitudes," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XXVI (Winter, 1962), 578-599.

⁹ This finding is similar to that of another experimental study which found that a demagogic appeal is less effective in partisan than in nonpartisan contexts. See Dean Jaros and Gene L. Mason, "Party Choice and Support for Demagogues: An Experimental Examination," *American Political Science Review*, LXIII (March, 1969), 100-110.

¹⁰ See J. A. Laponce, "An Experimental Method to Measure the Tendency to Equibalance in a Political System," *American Political Science Review*, LX (December, 1966), 982-993; and Howard Schuman and John Harding, "Sympathetic Identification with the Underdog," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XXVII (Summer, 1963), 230-241.

"Party Effort and Its Impact on the Vote"*

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The influence of political party organizations and their activities in achieving their stated objectives, contesting elections, and winning elective office is not well understood. The lack of attention given this particular problem area represents an anomaly in a generally abundant literature on political parties. Political parties are perceived to be critically important institutions in the electoral process—presenting candidates for office, aggregating groups behind them, and conducting campaigns designed to place their representatives in public office. Yet, the success of the political party in achieving these objectives has not been extensively explored.

This study measures the impact of political party variables on increasing the electoral vote, which is a step toward quantifying party operations and measuring their contributions toward achieving specified goals.

Previous Research. Very few studies directly contend with related problems. The two best known studies are the analysis by Katz and Eldersveld of the influence of party effect on the 1956 presidential vote in Detroit, and the investigation by Rossi and Cutright of the relationship between indices of party output and the primary and presidential returns in Gary, Indiana.¹

* I wish to thank Robert Albritton for his help in this analysis.

¹ Daniel Katz and Samuel J. Eldersveld, "The Impact of Local Party Activity Upon the Electorate," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 25 (Spring, 1961), pp. 1-24; Phillips Cutright and Peter Rossi, "Grass Roots Politicians and the Vote," *American Sociological Review*, 63 (April, 1958), pp. 171-179; Cutright and Rossi, "Party Organization in Primary Elections," *American Journal of Sociology*, 64 (November, 1958), pp. 262-269; and Rossi and Cutright, "The Impact of Party Organization in an Industrial Setting," in Morris Janowitz, ed., *Community Political Systems* (New York: Free Press, 1961), pp. 81-116. Other studies related to the problem include: Cutright, "Measuring the Impact of Local Party Activity Upon the General Election Vote," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 27 (Fall, 1963), pp. 372-386; Cutright, "Activities of Precinct Commit-

Both studies are broadly related in focus and methodology. The Rossi and Cutright study employed a mail questionnaire to gain information on the activities of precinct leaders. These activities were correlated with an "expected" vote in each political unit, and the amount of variance between the actual and the "expected" vote explained by party leader involvement was employed as an index of the party's success in effecting the election.

The study, executed in 1957, involved the 1955 primary and 1956 general election campaigns. The expected vote for the 74 precincts chosen for analyses in the 1956 presidential election study was computed on the basis of demographic variables and of the Stevenson vote. A regression equation was used to estimate the vote expected in each of the precincts based on its social characteristics—namely, indices of estimated average rental, percentage of owner-occupied dwellings, and ethnic composition of the precinct. The latter index was determined through a 10 percent sampling of the names of registered voters in the precinct, who were then divided into two categories; "Old Immigrants," i.e., those with English, Scottish, German, or Scandinavian names; and "New Immigrants," i.e., all other whites.

The multiple correlation between the Democratic vote and the composite of social factors was $-.908$, accounting for roughly 80 percent of the variation in the vote among precincts.² The authors then concentrated on the residual differences between the estimated vote and the actual returns, relating gauges of party activity to the vote for each of the precincts in an attempt to explain the deviations from the pre-

teemen in Partisan and Nonpartisan Communities," *Western Political Quarterly*, 17 (March, 1964), pp. 93-108; Raymond E. Wolfinger, "The Influence of Precinct Work on Voting Behavior," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 27 (Fall, 1963), pp. 387-398; and Eldersveld, "Experimental Propaganda Techniques and Voting Behavior," *American Political Science Review*, 50 (March, 1956), pp. 154-165.

² The intercorrelations among the variables were as follows:

	Proportion "Old Immigrant"	Estimated Rental	Proportion Owner-Occupied Dwellings	Proportion Democratic 1956 Presidential Vote
Proportion "old immigrant"		+ .33	+ .10	-.76
Estimated rental			+ .15	-.67
Proportion home owners				-.35

Cutright and Rossi, "Grass Roots Politicians and the Vote," *op. cit.*, p. 173.

dicted returns. The gauge of the precinct committeeman's effort was devised from the following: median number of people contacted daily in the precinct, time spent on the job, the chairman's estimate of the number of voters (preferably one-half or better) in their precincts who could call them by name, their evaluation of "party support" in the last election, and whether or not the chairman was employed by the local government (or, for the Republicans, responses as to the role of the chairman). According to Rossi and Cutright, a "good" party chairman could result in as much as a five percent increase in the presidential vote as compared with the level of support in areas serviced by less able party representatives.

The study was most notable for its focus on the party organization and particularly for attempting to relate an index of the performance of party leaders, and implicitly of course the contribution of the party, to the vote. The manner in which an expected vote was calculated proved suggestive to other researchers in the studies that followed. The index of a "good" party leader within the precinct was crude, however, and composited a series of factors not necessarily, or theoretically, related to the performance of party workers. Even then, the two parties were matched on only four out of five items. The type of items chosen for inspection—talking to voters on an average day, time on the job, patronage appointees, etc.—does not reflect the scope or intensity of campaign activities (e.g., distributing literature, providing transportation to the polls, etc.) that could more reasonably be expected to gauge a "good" or "poor" party unit and hence correlate more directly with election outcome.³ The vote for President, the measure of import employed in the analysis, conceivably is far removed from immediate party concerns at the local level. In addition, presidential candidates have independent appeal and access to the electorate through the media. It may well be that local unit party activity has little direct relevance for the race for the presidency.

Rossi and Cutright also applied their techniques to the primary vote in four contests for each of the parties. Their measures of party effort concentrated on the organizational support given candidates for nomination in a precinct and consisted of four items: the number of

workers a candidate had in a precinct (as estimated by the party precinct leader); the number of house parties in a precinct the candidate attended; the number of voters in a sample survey who could recognize the candidate's name, or as the authors termed it, a measure of the candidate's "notoriety"; and the degree of precinct leader support, ranging from "no" support to "minor" (passed out literature, and, if asked, told voters whom he supported), "medium" (talked to friends and people he knew), and "strong" (conducted door-to-door canvass on behalf of candidate). The demographic variables employed in calculating a predicted presidential electoral division showed a weak correlation with the primary vote. As a result, the authors concentrated on developing the association between the four gauges of precinct-level effort with the votes for the selected offices contested in each of the primaries.⁴

Employing multiple correlation analysis, the authors correlated the four measures with a candidate's primary vote. The multiple correlation advanced from .90 to .96 in the Democratic races, accounting for a minimum of 80 percent of the variance. The Republican primary showed a less consistent pattern. The multiple R ranged from .53 to .89 and accounted for between 28 and 79 percent of the variance. The two most consistently important measures for both parties were the support obtained from the precinct captains and the number of workers a candidate had in a precinct.⁵

This analysis, like its predecessor, is imaginative. Its fault lies in the unreliability of the data gathered, particularly in the estimate of a precinct leader about the efforts of a series of candidates (some supported by him, others opposed) in different races; the highly selective indices of candidate and party organizational "input" developed; and the failure to introduce controls in the early stages of the analysis.⁶

⁴ The Democratic primary contests analyzed were those for County Surveyor, two County Commissioner races, and City Judge. The Republican primary contests were for U.S. Congressman, County Commissioner, Mayor, and City Judge. The races were chosen on the basis of two criteria: 1) the official party divided its support, and 2) there were at least two candidates seeking the nomination. Cutright and Rossi, "Grass Roots Politicians and the Vote," *op. cit.*, p. 204.

⁵ The one exception is the City Judge's race in the Democratic primary. Here a candidate's "notoriety" scored first, for which no explanation is advanced. See notes 6 and 7 below on controlling variables in the research design and the vagaries implicit in primary elections.

⁶ The authors find, for example, that the social attributes employed to predict the primary vote in the presidential election are not as effective in the primary races. No effort is made to isolate other variables that

³ The patronage appointees in the Democratic party did perform better. The Republicans received no local patronage. An item was substituted in the Republican leader index for this dimension of the Democratic index on "the role of the committeeman." Cutright and Rossi, "Grass Roots Politicians and the Vote," *op. cit.*, pp. 177-78.

Also, the primary races chosen for analysis are possibly, although not assuredly, unique. All primary races are not included.⁷ The extent to which "input" activities contribute to an understanding of the vote above and beyond other variables in a range of primary elections under controlled circumstances is not calculated. The analysis fails to relate the precinct leaders, candidates, and the vote to any on-going political process. Institutional restraints as to competi-

tion and factionalization in the political unit are not included in the analysis. The interrelationship among candidates and primary races (ranging from County Surveyor and City Judge to mayoral and congressional candidates), and the relation of both to the party organization's concerns and objectives, is not touched on. Did the precinct leaders actually commit the party and its resources to supporting an individual candidate in an internal party matter, the primary? If so, how well did the organization-supported candidates do when compared with individual entrepreneurs in such races? What did the party organization, as opposed to individual candidate effort, contribute to the outcome? The study is concerned more with effort expended on behalf of a candidate, independent of its source, than with the party organization and its concerns. The authors note that they treat the precinct captain (and, in reality, the candidates and their campaigns) less as disembodied entities unattached to other concerns within the party structure.

This final point is partially corrected in the last analysis of these data, which draws upon substantially the same materials but attempts to take into account the role of party activists within the overall bargaining and communication subsystems of the party organization.⁸

For present purposes, the concern with party effort in general elections, the strategy utilized in the analysis of the relationship between the indices of party support and the presidential vote, is most germane. This approach is also the one invoked by Katz and Eldersveld in their analysis of the party's contribution to the 1956 presidential vote in Detroit. Interviews were conducted with Democratic and Republican party leaders in 87 precincts chosen in a stratified probability sample. Census-type interviews were conducted in the precincts and these were employed in calculating an expected vote by precinct through multiple regression analysis, similar to the procedure of Rossi and Cutright. The four social factors employed in the multiple regression equation were: occupation (% blue collar), religion (% Catholic), race (% black), and education (% eight grades or better schooling). In calculating the multiple R the authors also added their index of strength of local party leadership.

This party leadership index was developed from interview questions that focused on four dimensions of behavior—the precinct leader's roles as (1) organizer of party workers, (2) communicator between upper echelons of the

might be better related, or to gauge party coalition support among electors in relation to the vote. The activity "input" variables probably pick up a large degree of shared variance, but whether this comes primarily from the social characteristics of the voting groups, the extent of inter-party competition in the precincts, or other organizational variables cannot be determined. For example, there is a need to control for the relative party position in the precinct. Quite different types of behavior could be expected from political parties in dominant, competitive, or minority status vis-à-vis their opponents. Later in their investigation, the authors do introduce two factors of conceivable importance—incumbency and "friends and neighbors" voting in primary elections—and find one ("friends and neighbors" voting) to be of significance in explaining their results. In similar analyses of party impact, the conscientious structuring and control of the research setting would appear to be particularly crucial factors contributing to the acceptance of the study's findings. Cutright and Rossi, "Grass Roots Politicians and the Vote," *op. cit.*

⁷ There is no way to tell if the specific races chosen for analysis are even fair representatives of primary races in the community, much less the voting coalitions that emerge in the general elections. In a primary race, the voting coalitions that form may have a great deal to do with the personality of the candidate, issues specific to the race, symbolic association with a candidate (through ethnic and/or religious name identification or "old family" status in the locality, as examples), the amount of money placed in advertising (media, mail circulars, and throwaways), the highly selective nature of the electorate that votes in these elections, the quality of objective information available in the local press and other media, and a host of additional factors that could result in unusual voting alignments. When the protective umbrella of party label is neutralized, as it is in primary races, other variables, ranging from the obvious to the particularized, can substantially modify the voting patterns that result. One of the first to argue the idiosyncracies of primaries was V. O. Key, Jr., in his *American State Politics* (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1956) and *Southern Politics* (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1949). Other studies which speak to aspects of the problem include: Austin Ranney and Leon D. Epstein, "The Two Electorates: Voters and Non-Voters in a Wisconsin Primary," *Journal of Politics*, 28 (August, 1966), pp. 598–616; Ranney, "The Representativeness of Primary Electorates," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 12 (May, 1968), pp. 224–238; Julius Turner, "Primary Elections as the Alternative to Party Competition in 'Safe' Districts," *Journal of Politics*, 15 (May, 1953), pp. 197–210; and William H. Standing and James A. Robinson, "Inter-Party Competition and Primary Contesting: The Case of Indiana," *American Political Science Review*, 52 (December, 1958), pp. 1066–1077.

⁸ Rossi and Cutright, "The Impact of Party Organization in an Industrial Setting," *op. cit.*

structure and his precinct party, (3) liaison with the community, and (4) organizational administrator. A fifth dimension related to individual motivation, the intensity of the party leader's desire to execute his duties.⁹

Several of these factors need not logically correlate with the presidential, or any other, vote: for example, a precinct leader may exhibit admirable motivation, but may be unable to affect the vote for party candidates because of organizational resource shortages (money, willing helpers, able candidates), inexperience, or his assumption of an already moribund organization. Motivation by itself may have little substantial impact on winning elections.

An organizational leader may also communicate well with his overseers and his colleagues but not mobilize his party in concentrated efforts to win votes. Indices that concentrate on the electoral activities that local parties perform rather than organization *per se* should have a more logical and demonstrable connection with the vote. Such indices, in turn, could be related to organizational gauges, for the sake of argument at the moment, roughly analogous to the four institutional dimensions in the Katz and Eldersveld study (although most assuredly the resources—patronage, number of workers, control of service agencies, money—available to the party and some measure of the environment in relation to how the party operated would have to be included in the analysis). Certain types of organizational arrangements or party leaders with specified orientations could prove most conducive to engaging in various forms of electoral combat. These efforts could produce differential results, some forms of activities giv-

ing a higher electoral payoff under varying political conditions.¹⁰ The broad Katz and Eldersveld index leaves out what could well be an important intermediate step—the activities the party engages in to promote its representatives.

The four demographic factors and the leadership index had a multiple correlation of .85 with the Stevenson vote for the 60 precincts in which data on the Democratic precinct leader was available, and .87 for the 71 precincts in which data on the Republican leaders were available. The index of Democratic leadership had a .21 correlation with the Stevenson vote, and the index of Republican leadership had an *R* of $-.25$. The partial correlations showed the demographic variables—occupation, race and education in particular—to be better predictors of the vote. The Republican leadership index showed a negative ($-.27$) partial correlation with the Stevenson vote and the Democratic one virtually none (.06).

From this point, the authors went on to stratify the precincts into five categories based on

¹⁰ Here is where the conventional literature on organizations could prove helpful as a source of indicators against which to measure the development of the party structure. The assumption would be that the porous nature of the party would result in something considerably less effective in mobilizing and focussing its resources than business, military, or service (hospitals, schools, etc.) organizations. Such criteria, however, do not represent the relevant test. The comparative arrangement of the parties along the dimensions should be correlated with an "objective" criterion of party success, the vote in general election races. Then the organizational emphasis that best achieves the specified end could be mapped out, as well as the social and political conditions under which such arrangements emerge. Such assessments could provide the basis for the comparative explorations of party structures and operations in varying environments.

⁹ This presentation does not account for the full range of the Katz and Eldersveld analysis. The study included interviews with a total of 596 respondents drawn from the 87 precincts in the sample. The interview data were employed to control for a "breakage" or "clustering" effect as it influenced the vote. For example, where blue collar workers were heavily concentrated, the predicted vote increased; where they were substantially less intensively located, their support for the Democratic candidate for president declined sharply. Still, strong party leadership, in this case Democratic, meant a 21 percent increase in the party vote with occupation controlled. Katz and Eldersveld, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

The survey information is further developed to assess the voter's awareness of party leaders and their activities, the relationship of party identification with the vote, the political information of the citizen, the perceived differences between the parties, and the other social groups affecting the voter's decision. The respondents showed a limited awareness of party activity and personnel, possibly in part because the survey was conducted several months after the election.

The leadership data are fully developed in Samuel J. Eldersveld, *Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis* (Skokie, Ill: Rand McNally, 1964).

Discussions relevant to this point include: Lee F. Anderson, "Organizational Theory and the Study of State and Local Parties," in W. J. Crotty, ed., *Approaches to the Study of Party Organization* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1968), pp. 375-403; Stanley H. Udy, Jr., "The Comparative Analysis of Organizations," (pp. 678-709) and Joseph A. Schlesinger, "Political Party Organization" (pp. 764-801), both in James G. March, ed., *Handbook of Organizations* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965); and William J. Crotty, "Political Parties Research," in Michael Haas and Henry S. Kariel, eds., *Approaches to the Study of Political Science* (Scranton: Chandler, 1970), pp. 267-322. In an unpublished paper ("Local Party Organization: The Caplow Model—A Study of Three Counties" [Evanston: Department of Political Science, Northwestern University, 1967]), George Antunes investigated the relevance of standard organizational measures, in this case Hemphill's Group Dimension Questionnaire, in examining the "vertical integration" patterns of the parties in three Illinois counties. The results were ambivalent, due in part at least to a series of constrictions built into the research design. The exploratory nature of the study, nonetheless, is well in line with the broader emphasis being argued here.

the relative matched strength of the leadership as measured by the index. The stratification of the precincts ranged from those where the Republican leaders were clearly superior to their Democratic counterparts through those where the leaders were evenly matched to those where the Democratic representatives were judged clearly the more competent. In analyzing the actual as against the expected vote in each of the sets of precincts, the authors found that where one party leader was markedly more productive than his opposite number there was a five percent discrepancy in the vote, a difference they attribute to the leader's superior performance. The effort expended by the party leaders, serving as a convenient representation of the overall party investment in the election, did affect the vote. Focussing only on the extreme categories of precincts (those in which one party or the other had a decisive edge in leadership performance), the study reports that "... a total of 10.5 [percent] difference in voting behavior ... can be attributed to the functioning of local party organization."¹¹ The percentage of the vote accounted for is twice that in the Rossi and Cutright studies.

Both the studies of Gary and Detroit break new ground in contributing to an understanding of the party organization and its activities as they affect the vote. Both demonstrate originality in conception, organization, and execution. Their limits reside in the nature of the indices developed, the limited assessment of organizational contributions to elections, and the attempt to explain only one dependent variable, the presidential vote. The analytic perspective is sound and the overall research strategy for this type of study most useful.

The Present Study

The research reported here employs an orientation similar to that of the above two studies. An effort, however, was made to broaden considerably the research canvass to include a wider variety of politically comparable units, to refine the predictors of the vote—specifically, by including institutional variables in patterns of party competition; to employ more variables reflecting organizational party activities (especially campaigns); and to gauge the effect of the party effort on a series of elections at different levels, ranging from presidential to state and local contests.

¹¹ Katz and Eldersveld, *op. cit.*, p. 12. See Cutright's explanation of the "majority effect" acting as an influence on the differences found which he argues are actually comparable. "Measuring the Impact of Local Party Activity Upon the General Election Vote," *op. cit.*, pp. 383-384.

The setting for the analysis is the state of North Carolina. The political unit employed in the research was the county, the single most important political subdivision within the state, and one for which demographic data from the U.S. Census as well as electoral data were readily available. The elections chosen for analysis were those for President (1960), Governor (1960), State Senate (1962), State Representative (1962) and Sheriff (1962). The information used in developing the organizational and party activity indices relates to the nature and activities of the parties in the elections and was collected from the Democratic and Republican county chairmen in 1962.¹²

Beyond establishing a surer basis for predicting a vote for each level of office, the analysis was designed to gauge the contribution of party effort to the actual vote.

A multiple correlation coefficient was developed by relating five demographic variables to the Democratic vote for each of the five offices being contested. The demographic variables were: race (% black); residence (% urban); two measures of occupation (% of working force in manufacturing and % of working force in agriculture); and wealth (% earning \$10,000 or more).

The multiple correlations between all the combined demographic variables and the Democratic vote in the five elections for all one hundred North Carolina Counties are presented in Table 1.¹³

It will be seen that a high correlation exists between the demographic variables and the

¹² An introduction to the study and the data collection can be found in William J. Crotty, "The Party Organization and Its Activities," *Approaches to the Study of Party Organization*, *op. cit.*, pp. 247-306. The present study is close in spirit, although significant differences exist in the conceptual design, to the emphasis on political factors and their relevance for explaining "deviant," as determined by social indicators, voting patterns in Indiana counties over time as reported in V. O. Key, Jr., and Frank Munger, "Social Determinism and Electoral Decision: The Case of Indiana," in Eugene Burdick and Arthur J. Brodbeck, eds., *American Voting Behavior* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 281-299.

¹³ Partial correlations isolating the relative contribution of the most important independent variables, intercorrelations among demographic, party competition, and election outcome variables, assumptions underlying the structuring of this aspect of the analysis and related commentaries on the findings and the model implicit in the analysis are included in the afterword. Significance tests are included in each of the tables. An addition to the debate on the utility of tests of significance in such analyses as the present is Robert F. Winch and Donald T. Campbell, "Proof? No. Evidence? Yes. The Significance of Tests of Significance," *The American Sociologist*, 4 (May, 1969), pp. 140-143.

Table 1. Demographic Variables and Democratic Vote for Five Offices*

Office	Multiple R	Variance Accounted For
President	.90	.81
Governor	.89	.79
State Senator	.75	.56
State Representative	.79	.63
Sheriff	.73	.54

* All correlations are significant at the .001 level.

Democratic vote, particularly for the office of President.

To refine the analysis, and to introduce a check for competitive variables that structure the environment in which the political parties compete, scales of party competition were developed from three groupings of the vote: national (President), state (Governor, U.S. Senator), and county (Representative to the lower house of the State Legislature, County Commissioner, Sheriff). These three party-competition indices were computed from the vote for each set of offices in the groupings (national, state, county) for all elections in the twenty-year period preceding the vote in question (1936–1956 for President, U.S. Senator, and Governor; 1940–1960 for State Representative, County Commissioner, and Sheriff). Each of the counties was scored on these indices and was ranked along a continuum from perfect competition (100%) to no competition whatsoever (.00). These three indices, in addition to the demographic variables, were then correlated with the Democratic vote for the five electoral contests. The results are shown in Table 2.

When the party competition indices are included the multiple R increases from 3 to 6 points and the proportion of variance explained

Table 2. Demographic Variables, Party Competition Scales, and Democratic Vote for Five Offices*

Office	Multiple R	Variance Accounted For
President	.93	.86
Governor	.92	.86
State Senator	.79	.63
State Representative	.85	.72
Sheriff	.79	.63

* All correlations are significant at the .001 level.

increases from five to nine percentage points. The smallest relative impact is made at the presidential level, the greatest in races at the county levels. The highest absolute correlation and the greatest variation accounted for is obtained for electoral races at the higher levels. In all cases, the multiple R is raised and each of the correlations is high, particularly those for President and Governor.

Party Activities

To this point, demographic and competition measures have been employed in correlations with the Democratic vote. The multiple R ranged from .79 (Sheriff, State Senator) to .93 (President) and accounted for between 63 and 86 percent of the variance as noted. These, then, proved to be strong predictors of the vote.

The contribution that party activity variables makes to the vote can also be measured. In order to explore what such activities would contribute to an understanding of the vote, 18 variables relating to the organization and the effort made by the parties during campaigns were composited with the demographic and party competition indices, and correlated with the Democratic vote for the five offices in question.¹⁴ The number of counties, 100 in the original analysis, has been reduced to only those for which there are data on both political parties—74. Table 3 shows the multiple R and the proportion of the variance accounted for in the Democratic vote for each office.

When the multiple R is already very high,

Table 3. Demographic Variables, Party Competition Scales, Party Activity Measures and the Democratic Vote for Five Offices*

Office	Multiple R	Variance Accounted For
President	.95	.90
Governor	.95	.90
State Senator	.90	.81
State Representative	.88	.78
Sheriff	.91	.83

* All correlations are significant at the .001 level.

¹⁴ These nine variables for each of the two parties included: campaign activities; time spent on the job by chairmen in the presidential and gubernatorial election year (1960); time spent by chairmen in the off-year election (1962); the amount of money spent by chairmen in the two election years; the amount of patronage distributed by chairmen; the percentage of precincts in a county maintaining record files; the number of precincts in a county actively organized; and the election day activities engaged in by the parties.

the inclusion of the party activity variables can increase it relatively little; yet, the multiple R for both President and Governor goes up to an impressive .95 with 90 percent of the variance accounted for when these party activity variables are added. The multiple R for the vote for the other three offices increases to between .88 and .91, accounting for between 78 and 83 percent of the variance.

The two weakest correlations, relatively, those for State Senator and Sheriff exhibit the most dramatic changes: the multiple R for both increases over 10 points and the variance explained moves up an average of 19 percentage points.

The party activity variables, similar to the party competition measures, make a notable contribution to explaining the election outcomes in this study. These indicators further refine the relationship developed from the demographic variables, adding an understanding of the importance of explicitly political factors to the electoral results. When combined with the demographic variables, these measures reintroduce a political perspective to the analysis. The political competition indices provide for politically relevant variables associated with the political traditions of the area. The party activity variables measure what the party organizations are doing within the context of the election, which permits determining the extent to which they affect the vote. By implication at least, this analysis calls into question those studies that employ aggregate demographic and electoral data, measuring either the relationship between these sets of variables or which employ one or both to explain indices of policy distribution. At a minimum, considerably more sophistication could be introduced into analyses of this nature through inclusion of measures of direct political relevance, thus extending the explanatory power to include an appreciation of the relationship between the political context and the outcomes observed.

The analysis, as a whole, provides a better appreciation of the forces influencing the election results. Equally important, the data indicate that party effort makes a considerable contribution to explaining what has occurred. A well organized party that extends itself to campaigning for its candidates can have a decided impact on increasing its proportionate share of the vote. Put more directly, organization, as the professionals have so long been contending, does appear important in achieving party objectives. Party activities, and those conducted during the campaign period in particular, are important influences affecting the vote.

Party Activities in Competitive and Noncompetitive Counties

It may be that party activity is more significant in explaining the vote in specified types of electoral circumstances. For example, both the Katz and Eldersveld and the Rossi and Cutright studies were able to account for the greatest difference in vote (10.5% and 5%, respectively) in the precincts with the greatest imbalance in effort between the two parties.

To explore the circumstances under which party activities appear to make the most decisive contribution to the vote, the 100 counties were stratified into two-party competitive; non-competitive Democratic; and non-competitive Republican. The categorizations were based on the 1960 vote for Governor.¹⁵ The highly competitive counties (32) were those that had a maximum 5 percent deviation from an even division of the vote. The non-competitive Democratic counties (54) were those in which the Democratic gubernatorial vote was more than 55 percent and the non-competitive Republican counties (the 14 remaining) in which the Republican gubernatorial vote was more than 55 percent.

Demographic variables are successful predictors of the vote in virtually all races in the non-competitive counties. When combined with the party competition indices, the correlations increase in some cases to very high levels. The multiple R for the non-competitive Democratic counties in the presidential and gubernatorial elections is an exceptionally high .98, with 96 percent of the variance accounted for. The correlations are of sufficient magnitude that adding party activity variables to the calculations would add little to the outcome. The non-competitive county races in which the correlations are lower are those for State Legislature Offices and county Sheriff, particularly in one-party Democratic counties. These races are tied more closely to local concerns and the personalities of those seeking office than to the concerted efforts of the local party organizations.

Of greater interest are the highly competitive counties. As can be seen in Table 4, demographic variables, outside of the Sheriff's races,

¹⁵ The gubernatorial vote was used because the office was competitive statewide. The total division of the two-part vote was 54% Democratic, 46% Republican. Also, and most importantly, the governorship is an office of direct importance to the county and state parties. The presidential election—the one other competitive race statewide—was also close, but it could have reflected emotional ties, broad national party and candidate appeals, and economic and campaign considerations not related to the state or county party efforts.

Table 4. Demographic Variables, Party Competition Scales and the Democratic Vote for Five Offices in Competitive and Non-competitive Counties

I. Noncompetitive Democratic (54 Counties)		
Office	Multiple R	Variance Accounted For
<i>SES</i>		
President	.84*	.71
Governor	.80*	.64
State Senator	.64*	.41
State Representative	.57*	.33
Sheriff	.30	.09
<i>SES, Party Competition</i>		
President	.96*	.93
Governor	.91*	.84
State Senator	.79*	.63
State Representative	.76*	.57
Sheriff	.59*	.35
II. Noncompetitive Republican (14 Counties)		
<i>SES</i>		
President	.92*	.84
Governor	.91*	.84
State Senator	.75	.56
State Representative	.70	.49
Sheriff	.82	.67
<i>SES, Party Competition</i>		
President	.98*	.96
Governor	.98*	.96
State Senator	.77	.60
State Representative	.81	.65
Sheriff	.83	.70
III. Two-Party Competitive (32 Counties)		
<i>SES</i>		
President	.49	.24
Governor	.36	.13
State Senator	.29	.08
State Representative	.54	.30
Sheriff	.76*	.58
<i>SES, Party Competition</i>		
President	.81*	.65
Governor	.73*	.54
State Senator	.44	.19
State Representative	.71*	.51
Sheriff	.80*	.65

* Correlations significant at the .05 level.

do not show a strong correlation with the Democratic vote. When the party competition indices are added to the calculation, the correlations increase decisively (again, except in the Sheriff's races, in which demographic variables alone are good predictors). There is an increase of more than 30 points in the multiple R

for the vote for both President and Governor, with the amount of variance explained rising 40 percentage points in both cases. In the State Legislature races, the multiple R increases by approximately 16 points and the variance accounted for is up by from 11 to 21 percentage points when party competition indices are included.

Data are available on the activities of both the Republican and Democratic parties in 25 of the competitive counties.¹⁶ Adding the party organizational and activity variables to the correlations in these competitive counties makes a substantial contribution to understanding the factors influencing the vote.¹⁷ The results are striking. Starkly presented, inclusion of these party activity variables increases the multiple R from 17 to 38 points depending on the office. The party activity variables raise the variance accounted for 28 to 60 percentage points. We can conclude that party effort during campaigns in competitive areas has a pronounced

Table 5. Demographic Variables, Party Competition Scales, Party Activity Measures and the Democratic Vote for Five Offices in Competitive Counties*

Office	Multiple R	Variance Accounted For
President	.97	.94
Governor	.98	.96
State Senator	.98	.96
State Representative	.93	.86
Sheriff	.93	.86

* Correlations are not significant at the .05 level.

¹⁶ For these 25 counties, the multiple R and variance accounted for are as follows:

Office	Multiple R	Variance Accounted For
<i>SES</i>		
President	.49	.24
Governor	.27	.07
State Senator	.37	.13
State Representative	.53	.29
Sheriff	.72	.52

<i>SES, Party Competition</i>		
President	.76	.58
Governor	.75	.56
State Senator	.60	.36
State Representative	.70	.50
Sheriff	.76	.58

Correlations are not significant at the .05 level.

¹⁷ The party organizational and activity variables included in this analysis are the same as above, except that patronage has been omitted because of the inability of the minority Republican party to receive virtually any of these positions from any source, public or private.

effect on the outcome of the races. Including variables that measure such activities thus makes a distinctive contribution to comprehending the influences operating in these elections, regardless of the level of the contest. On the basis of this analysis, related studies linking demographic variables to electoral outcomes which exclude measures designed to gauge dimensions of party performance would seriously limit the applicability and the relevance of the research findings.

Summary

This analysis sought to predict the vote from a combination of demographic and party competition measures and then to add to the correlation obtained party activity indices, thus assessing the extent to which these latter factors explained the variance remaining. Stepwise multiple regression analysis was employed to determine the extent to which the differences between an actual and a predicted vote could be explained in the party operations.

Party activity made a difference, often substantial, in the proportion of the vote that could be explained. The variance accounted for increased from between 4 and 20 percentage points for the five contests examined. The multiple R was high, ranging from .79 in local contests to .92 for the gubernatorial race and .93 for the presidential vote.

When the highly competitive counties were isolated for analysis, adding party effort during the campaign period brought the multiple R, in effect, up to that of the non-competitive coun-

ties (where demographic data and the competitive indices only were used). The multiple R was raised in all cases above .90 and in three cases to .97 or better (.97 for President and .98 for both Governor and State Senator). The margin of increase ranged from 17 to 23 points. The proportion of variance accounted for was between 86 and 96 percent, and the margin of increase fluctuated between a low of 28 to a high of 60 percentage points.

These findings make a formidable argument for the inclusion of variables in related analyses that attempt to measure the influence of the party structure and its output in influencing the vote on election day. Party activity does make a difference in the vote and, as illustrated, can make a substantial contribution to understanding a particular election's outcome.

A Methodological and Substantive Afterword

A Note on Demographic and Political Factors. The demographic variables were chosen on a theoretical basis consistent with present knowledge. Table A.1 presents the simple correlations between demographic variables, the party competition scales and the Democratic vote for the five electoral races used in the analysis.

Among the demographic variables, percent urban correlates well with income. Percent black correlates negatively with manufacturing and positively with agriculture. The latter shows a negative correlation with both income and manufacturing.

V. O. Key contended in 1949 that race was the single most important variable affecting

Table A.1. Correlations Among Demographic Factors, Party Competition Scales, and the Democratic Vote for Five Offices*

Item	Demographic Variables				Party Competition			Vote				
	Race	Manu- facture	Agri- culture	In- come	National	State	County	Presi- dent	Gov.	State Sen.	State Rep.	Sheriff
<i>Demographic Variables</i>												
Urban	-.01	.23	-.54	.77	.05	-.10	-.19	-.10	-.14	-.06	.04	.15
Race		-.48	.49	-.15	-.80	-.82	-.77	.87	.86	.72	.78	.67
Manufacture			-.50	.24	.57	.57	.55	-.56	-.59	-.52	-.46	-.49
Agriculture				-.51	-.50	-.36	-.25	.53	.53	.43	.32	.26
Income					.20	.05	-.02	-.25	-.28	-.20	-.07	.03
<i>Party Competition Measures</i>												
National						.94	.85	-.83	-.81	-.69	-.71	-.66
State							.96	-.85	-.84	-.74	-.80	-.76
County								-.78	-.78	-.72	-.80	-.77
<i>Vote</i>												
President									.98	.81	.81	.75
Governor										.81	.82	.75
State Senator											.73	.67
State Representative												.74

* Correlation of .20 or above are significant beyond the .05 level.

Southern politics. This still appears to be the case.¹⁸ A high percentage black—and usually 30 percent of a county's population is taken to be the breaking point—correlates with rural and agricultural areas, a strong Democratic vote, and a lack of competition in the county. The assumption of the importance of race holds true for the 100 counties of North Carolina. The correlations between percentage Negro and the Democratic vote in the five races are strong and positive, ranging from .67 to .87. The correlations between the proportion of a county's black population and party competition at national, state and county levels, respectively, are high and negative: $-.80$, $-.82$, and $-.77$. A large black representation is associated with low competition and a high Democratic vote.

The more rural and agricultural the county, the greater should be its vote for the Democratic party in the South. These counties have been traditionally strong supporters of Democratic candidates. Agricultural counties are negatively associated with income, manufacturing (and percentage urban, of course), and positively correlated with percent Negro and with the Democratic vote for the five offices included in the study. The latter correlations are not as strong as those between race and the vote. The agricultural counties are also among the least competitive, showing a consistent negative correlation with the party competition indices.

The items on income, manufacturing, and percent urban were included on the assumption that they would correlate with an emerging Republican vote in the South and thus, also, the more highly competitive areas. It has been argued that the Republican party is building its strength in the areas high on these characteristics.¹⁹ Therefore, these variables should have a

¹⁸ V. O. Key, Jr. *Southern Politics*, *op. cit.* On the demographic variables more generally, see also: Joseph J. Spengler, "Demographic and Economic Change in the South, 1940-1960," in Allan P. Sindler, ed., *Change in the Contemporary South* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1963), pp. 26-63; Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro, *Negroes and the New Southern Politics* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966), and the correlations and analysis reported in the related article by Matthews and Prothro, "Social and Economic Factors and Negro Voter Registration in the South," *American Political Science Review*, 57 (March, 1963), pp. 24-44; and William H. Nicholls, "The South as a Developing Area," in Avery Leiserson, ed., *The American South in the 1960's* (New York: Praeger, 1964), pp. 22-40.

¹⁹ The research on this point is plentiful. See: Donald S. Strong, *Urban Republicanism in the South* (University, Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 1960); Strong, *The 1952 Presidential Election in the South* (University, Ala.: Bureau of Public Administration, 1955); Alexander Heard, *A Two-Party South?* (Chapel

negative correlation with the Democratic vote, which is true in all except three local races (the most difficult for a minority party to compete effectively in and the races most tied to local issues and personalities). Manufacturing does show the expected correlation with the party competition measures. The urban correlations are confounded by the absences of many truly large urban counties. The correlation in part results from the positive association between increasing percentages urban, based on the prevalence of a large number of small and medium sized towns in a county, and the Democratic vote. Finally, much of the older wealth in North Carolina and the South is tied to the Democratic party. The newer industries, and manufacturing represents a gauge of these, provide the seedbed of the emerging Republican party.

These assumptions appear correct. Manufacturing has a consistent negative correlation with the Democratic vote, and income and percent urban has a negative, although not as strong, correlation with the Democratic vote, at the higher levels in particular.

The statistical portrait of the forces supporting the Republican party is complicated by the bases of traditional support for the party in the state. The indices are gauged to detect the factors that relate to the rise of Republicanism in the decades after the Second World War. Historical Republican support in western counties dates back to the Civil War as does the split

Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1952); Coleman B. Ransone, Jr., "Political Leadership in the Governor's Office," (pp. 197-220) and O. Douglas Weeks, "The South in National Politics" (pp. 221-240), both in Leiserson, *op. cit.*; Bernard Cosman, "Presidential Republicanism in the South, 1960," *Journal of Politics*, 24 (May, 1960), pp. 303-322; and Robert J. Steamer, "Southern Disaffection with the National Democratic Party" (pp. 150-173), Donald S. Strong, "Durable Republicanism in the South" (pp. 174-194), and Philip E. Converse, "A Major Political Realignment in the South?" (pp. 195-222), all in Sindler, *op. cit.*

The Goldwater presidential vote in the South presented exceptions to this pattern. Consult: Bernard Cosman, *Five States for Goldwater* (University, Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 1967); Bernard Cosman and Robert J. Huckshorn, eds., *Republican Politics: The 1964 Campaign and Its Aftermath for the Party* (New York: Praeger, 1968); Walter Dean Burnham, "American Voting Behavior and the 1964 Election," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 12 (February, 1968), pp. 1-40; Philip E. Converse, Aage R. Clausen, and Warren E. Miller, "Electoral Myth and Reality: The 1964 Election," *American Political Science Review*, 59 (June, 1965), pp. 321-336; and Charles O. Jones, "The 1964 Presidential Election—Further Adventures in Wonderland," in Donald G. Herzberg, ed., *American Government Annual, 1965-1966* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), pp. 1-30.

Table A.2. Most Significant Variables in Stepwise Regression Model For Democratic Vote in 74 Counties*

Office	Variables	Multiple R	Variance Accounted for
President		(.95	Total .90)
	Percent Negro	.86	.75
	Republican Campaign Effort	.89	.80
	State Level Party Competition	.91	.83
Governor		(.95	Total .90)
	Percent Negro	.84	.71
	Republican Campaign Effort	.88	.78
	State Level Party Competition	.90	.82
State Senator		(.90	Total .81)
	Percent Negro	.76	.59
	Percent of Republican Precincts Organized	.81	.65
	Percent Engaged in Manufacturing	.82	.68
	County Level Party Competition	.83	.70
State Representative		(.88	Total .78)
	Percent Negro	.76	.57
	Percent of Republican Precincts with Records	.80	.65
	County Level Party Competition	.82	.67
	Percentage of Republican Precincts Organized	.83	.69
	Presidential Level Party Competition	.84	.71
Sheriff		(.91	Total .83)
	County Level Party Competition	.83	.69
	Percent of Republican Precincts Organized	.86	.74
	Percent Negro	.87	.75

* All correlations are significant beyond the .001 level.

between on the one hand the mountain counties (pro-Union) and on the other, the plantation counties and those that followed their lead (in effect, the rest of the state). The historical Republican counties are rural, agricultural, sparsely populated, low income counties with a limited amount of manufacturing, as well as a small percentage of blacks. They have always voted for the Republican party, yet they are not the base from which the party is presently building. Virtually the only thing they hold in common with the newer centers of Republican strength is support for the same party—although for historical rather than economic reasons.²⁰

The three indices of party competition show a strong positive inter-correlation, indicating a relationship among competitive patterns at all levels. These measures also have a high, consistently negative correlation with the Democratic vote.

²⁰ See Key, *Southern Politics*, *op. cit.*, ch. 10; Heard, *op. cit.*; and Jack D. Fleer, *North Carolina Politics* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1968).

Finally, the Democratic vote for each of the five offices is highly intercorrelated, particularly between the presidential and gubernatorial votes ($r = .98$).

A More Parsimonious Model. Parsimony was not the principal concern of the model employed in the analysis. The objective was to gain the highest correlation and explain as much of the variance as possible consistent with the assumptions underlying the research and in accord with the nature of the data employed. Parsimony can be achieved, however. For example, the summary Table A.2 isolates in descending order the variables that contribute most heavily to the multiple correlation in each of the five races in the stepwise multiple regression analysis.

The single variable with the greatest explanatory power is percent black. This finding was expected, given the historical importance of race as a touchstone of Southern politics. The high incidence of Republican activities in the rankings suggests that this is an extremely important influence on the vote: Democratic ef-

fort, in fact, may be a direct response to the organized challenge of the Republican party. Although this particular analysis is not designed to examine this specific point, the Democratic party, for generations the predominant party in state and local politics, may develop its campaign effort in response to the intensity and seriousness of the Republican party challenge.²¹

Under different conditions, the rankings in importance of the individual variables can drastically change. As an example, in the non-competitive counties, as shown in the text, demographic variables, and, to a more limited extent, the party competition scales correlate very highly with the vote. In the competitive counties, these variables do not approximate such correlations (see Table 4). There the variables relating to the party are very important in contributing to an understanding of the vote and, in fact, are over-represented in the rankings of those influencing the voting. The demographic and competitive factors are re-ordered accordingly; and in the vote for Governor, percent black, a consistently powerful predictor, ranks last in the stepwise regression model.

²¹ This problem is explored to an extent in Crotty, "The Party Organization and Its Activities," *op. cit.*

In Table A.2, the vote for President well illustrates the utility of a more parsimonious model in the analysis. As shown in the table, three factors account for 83 percent of the variance explained and a multiple R of .91. The other 23 variables add only .04 to the multiple R and 7 percent to the variance accounted for in the 74 counties investigated. There are 18 individual variables with partial correlations ranging between .11 and .58, and thus presumably of some importance in understanding the vote. Fifteen of these, of course, are lost from the analysis (at least, their direct effects are) when it is limited to the most significant variables from the regression model. The strategy employed depends on the intentions of the researcher. In this case, the objective was to predict to a vote from both theoretically important demographic and political variables and then to measure the extent to which party structural and activity variables could explain the difference remaining between the actual and expected vote in the counties. Still, predictions based on the individually most powerful variables in the regression model could make a direct contribution to the analysis at hand, depending on the researcher's needs.

Statistical Models of Senate Roll Call Voting*

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The purpose of this paper is to use statistical analysis to consider what factors influence the way senators vote and how important these influences are. The answers will be specific statements about individual senators' decision processes and quantitative estimates of the weights applied to the different variables in these models. The form of the voting models and the variables in them are developed from hypotheses about individual decision-making and descriptions of the legislative process.

I. Individual Voting Models

A basic assumption in the models to be developed here is that senators' decision processes for roll call votes can be described as repetitive problem-solving behavior. This set of behavioral assumptions has been used in various ways to study the pricing and production decisions of industrial firms,¹ the resource allocation decisions of the federal² and municipal governments,³ and U.S. foreign policy decisions.⁴ It is hypothesized that people behaving in this fashion develop more or less standard procedures for reaching a solution. These same procedures are used each time the problem is encountered.⁵

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¹Richard M. Cyert and James G. March, *A Behavioral Theory of the Firm* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963).

²Otto A. Davis, M. A. H. Dempster, Aaron Wildavsky, "A Theory of the Budgetary Process," *American Political Science Review*, LX (September, 1966), 529-547, and "On the Process of Budgeting: An Empirical Study of Congressional Appropriation," in Gordon Tullock (ed.), *Papers on Non-Market Decision-Making* (Charlottesville, Virginia: Thomas Jefferson Center for Political Economy, University of Virginia, 1966), pp. 63-132.

³John P. Crecine, *Governmental Problem Solving: A Computer Simulation of Municipal Budgeting* (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1969).

⁴Graham T. Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," *American Political Science Review*, LXIII (September, 1969), 689-718.

⁵James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, *Organizations* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1958), p. 140.

There are several important factors which help make roll call voting a series of repetitive problems and influence the procedure used to solve them. The first is simply the large amount of quite complicated and diverse legislation which the Senate must consider and vote on each year. Mastery of even a small subset of these bills each year would be a very time consuming, if not impossible, task when combined with all of a senator's other obligations. The Senate, like most large organizations, has resorted to a division of labor to cope with this problem. Thus substantively organized committees are responsible for considering proposed legislation and making recommendations to the whole Senate.

A less apparent means of specialization is the socialization process undergone by new members. The neophytes are encouraged to attach themselves to particular committees and become experts in the problems handled by those committees. Future rewards in the Senate become dependent, in part, on how well the person performs in his specialized role, how quickly he becomes "one of the experts" on specific problems, and to what extent he is willing to make sacrifices for his committee. Matthews has documented this very clearly in his book, *U.S. Senators and Their World*.⁶ Lehnen has added to Matthews' work by showing that the majority of senators participating in the floor debates on a bill are recognized as "experts" in that field.⁷ This specialization makes it even more difficult for a senator to adequately study and understand the legislation outside his areas of interest and expertise.

In addition to the difficulties created by the complexity and diversity of most legislation, and the consequent specialization of activity, the circumstances under which amendments are made and voted on also affect the senators' decision processes. These decisions may require specific and technical understanding of a subject the legislator may not be familiar with. Decisions on amendments and possible passage of the amended bill will often have to be made

⁶Donald R. Matthews, *U.S. Senators and Their World* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960), chap. v.

⁷Robert G. Lehnen, "Behavior on the Senate Floor: An Analysis of Debate in the U.S. Senate," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, XI (November, 1967), 505-521.

rapidly and sometimes in a fairly disorganized state. During the 87th Congress, the U.S. Senate took formal roll call votes on eighty days of the First Session and seventy-eight days of the Second Session. On fifty-nine of those 158 days, they considered three or more different amendments, and there were twenty-one where six or more were considered. In all, 55 percent of all roll calls occurred on days where four or more votes were taken. These votes competed for a senator's time with consideration of private bills, non-roll call votes, committee work, office chores, and constituency case work.

The essence of the problem then, is that senators who become technically and politically sophisticated in areas of taxation, for example, must still make voting decisions concerning manpower training and education, and experts on foreign affairs must weigh alternative price support schemes for wheat and corn.

The consequences of this large volume of complex business, specialization, and multitudinous demands upon a senator's time shape the way he perceives the problem posed by the floor vote and the way a decision is made. The precise stimulus may be the ringing of the bells or the announcement several days in advance that a particular bill is going to be considered. In either case, the stimulus will usually evoke the routine activity described in abstract fashion by March and Simon,⁸ unless the senator has been active in writing or planning strategy for the bill. The routine or program evoked is a fairly simple search for information about the content, implications, or even the "best" vote on the proposed amendment. These routines save the individual senator a lot of work and time, which he can then devote to his area of specialization, constituents, speeches, etc.

These sources of information and cues on how to vote become the variables hypothesized to influence how a senator votes. It is expected that a senator's votes will correspond to the positions of his sources of information.

A second and extremely important aspect of these responses is that they become routine and should be independent of the bill being considered. Thus, if a senator's procedure is to vote on the basis of how a bill will affect his constituency, his constituency will be important on every bill. Or if a senator relies on the party leader and the party whip, he will listen to them on every bill, except for the few he has spent considerable time on, not just some bills. It is this particular attribute of their decision functions which permits the process to be modeled with expressions like the following equa-

tions. If this hypothesis is not true, then each bill becomes a unique event, with a different factor or set of factors influencing the outcome.

The explanatory variables which affect a senator's voting behavior were hypothesized to be his constituency and the opinions of different individuals. These individuals are his party's formal floor leader and whip, the chairman, ranking minority leader, or trusted member of the reporting committee, informal or regional leaders, his senior partner if both are from the same party, and the President. All senators were not expected to have identical decision models, so consequently all the variables do not appear in each senator's model. A least-squares multiple linear regression was used to estimate the systematic influence of these variables in each senator's voting behavior.⁹

The basic specification used for Democrats was

$$(1) \text{Vote} = a_0 + a_1 \text{Constituency} + a_2 \text{Majority Leader} + a_3 \text{Majority Whip} + a_4 \text{President} + a_5 \text{Committee Chairman} + e,$$

and the one for Republicans was

$$(2) \text{Vote} = b_0 + b_1 \text{Constituency} + b_2 \text{Minority Leader} + b_3 \text{Minority Whip} + b_4 \text{Ranking Minority Committee Member} + b_5 \text{Policy Committee Chairman} + b_6 \text{President} + e.$$

Since the Democratic floor leader is also chairman of the Democratic Policy Committee there is no need to include it separately. These basic equations were altered in some cases to incorporate more specific hypotheses. There were two major hypotheses added to these models for certain individuals. If both senators from a state were in the same party, then it was hypothesized that the senior senator influenced the voting behavior of his junior partner, but not vice versa. An example is that Prouty (Rep., Vermont) consistently listens to Aiken (Rep., Vermont) for advice and is influenced by this advice but does not systematically influence Aiken. The second hypothesis was that a variable similar to the Committee Chairman only representing a notable liberal on the reporting committee was included in the models for most Eastern Democrats. An analogous variable was constructed for notably conservative Republicans. These Committee Liberal and Conservative variables were based on senators with a generally liberal or conservative reputa-

⁹ Under the proper conditions, this technique yields unbiased estimates of the true coefficients and these estimated coefficients have the least variance about the true values of any unbiased linear estimator. For a more complete discussion of this, see J. Johnston, *Econometric Methods* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1963), pp. 106-112.

⁸ March and Simon, *op. cit.*

tion like Clark, McNamara, Hruska or Bennett. In many cases a signer of a Committee's minority report was the basis for these variables. There were also several hypotheses included about regional or ideological leaders. Table 1 shows the models estimated for each senator.

The model explaining the voting behavior of the majority leader was the most difficult to specify. He is responsible for scheduling the work of the Senate, getting bills from the committees onto the floor and passed, and for getting the President's program passed if they are from the same party. These responsibilities mean that the majority leader must be familiar with most legislation before it reaches the floor and the political strategies being employed to pass or defeat the bill once it is there. The majority leader also must try to accommodate more people than most senators. He is usually responsible for guiding the President's program, he must meet the demands of the other senators, and he must still get re-elected. Senator Lucas (Dem., Illinois) is usually cited as an example of a majority leader who pursued the first responsibility at the expense of the third. These descriptions suggest the hypothesis that the majority leader's behavior is influenced by the distribution of preferences within the Senate. David B. Truman has also hypothesized this process with regard to the distribution of preferences within the majority leader's party.¹⁰ The position of the median senator on each bill was included in the majority leader's model to incorporate this hypothesis. Thus, the votes of the majority leader were said to be a function of his constituency, the President, the Committee Chairman, and the median senator.¹¹

(3) $Vote_{M.L.} = a_0 + a_1Constituency + a_2President + a_3Committee\ Chairman + a_4Median\ Senator + e.$

II. Variable Measurement

A major obstacle to testing these hypotheses and estimating the parameters in each senator's model is measuring the variables discussed above. The measurements must provide as much and as accurate information about the variables as possible and facilitate statistical procedures. It is necessary to construct such a device since there is no readily available metric

¹⁰ David B. Truman, *The Congressional Party* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1959), pp. 106-108.
¹¹ It is quite possible that a simultaneous relationship exists between the majority leader and the median senator position, which he is trying to influence, and possibly the committee chairman. If this possibility is true, it violates one of the assumptions of multiple regression analysis. To try to correct for this, a two stage least-squares estimation procedure was used to estimate the majority leader's model. See Johnston, *op. cit.*, pp. 231-237.

as was available to Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky.¹² The method selected was the simple scalogram analysis developed by Louis Guttman, which provides an ordinal measure of each senator's voting behavior. This technique has been used quite often in previous quantitative legislative studies.¹³ In this study the scales are based on the votes on amendments and votes for passage of specific bills.

Thirty-six separate scales were constructed for the 87th Congress (1961-1962), eighteen from each session. Appendix A presents two summary statistics evaluating the individual scales and enumerating the votes used to construct each scale. These scales were designed to measure the voting behavior of senators on individual bills. Consequently the votes comprising each scale were limited to the amendments on a single bill as often as possible. Only four of the scales include roll call votes taken on several separate bills. This means that the range, and thus the number of categories, of each scale is limited. This loss should be offset by the advantages of having a clearer idea of what the scales are measuring—a senator's position on the Area Redevelopment Act, for example—and a greater number of scales.¹⁴

The votes used to construct these scales comprise 46 percent of all the roll call votes in 1961 and 36 percent of the 1962 votes. Additionally, there were many votes which were quite similar to votes included in the scales. These did not increase the information in the scales and were usually deleted. This was particularly true in 1962 with the filibuster over the Communications Satellite Act. Counting the votes excluded for this reason raises these percentages above 65 percent. These scale

¹² Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky, *op. cit.*
¹³ See discussion and bibliography in Lee F. Anderson, Meredith W. Watts, Jr., and Allen R. Wilcox, *Legislative Roll Call Analysis* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1966), chap. vi.

¹⁴ All the scales were standardized to a zero to four range. Zero was the most conservative position, e.g., voting to limit the legislation as much as possible. Any scales which had fewer than five categories were inflated to the zero to four range by multiplying each score by four divided by the scale value of the highest category. Thus if a scale only had four categories they were scored as 0, 1.33, 2.67 and 4.00. On scales with more than five categories, the categories with the fewest frequencies were added to the larger groupings, and the categories rescored. This aggregation was continued until there were five groups, scored zero to four. For example, the initial distribution on the Area Redevelopment Act was

0	1	2	3	4	5	6
18	7	8	4	8	5	50
This was re-scaled as						
0	1	2	3	4		
18	7	12	13	50		

Table 1. Hypothesized Models for Each Senator

Senator	State	Variables Added to Equation 1
<i>A. Eastern Democrats</i>		
1. Dodd	Conn.	
2. Muskie	Maine	Committee Liberal
3. Smith	Mass.	Committee Liberal, Muskie, Pastore
4. Pastore	R.I.	Committee Liberal
5. Pell	R.I.	Senior Senator
6. Williams	N.J.	Committee Liberal
7. Clark	Pa.	Committee Liberal
8. Douglas	Ill.	Committee Liberal
9. Hartke	Ind.	
10. Hart	Mich.	Senior Senator, Committee Liberal
11. McNamara	Mich.	Committee Liberal
12. Lausche	Ohio	
13. Young	Ohio	Committee Liberal
14. Proxmire	Wisc.	Committee Liberal, Douglas
15. Humphrey	Minn.	Committee Liberal
16. McCarthy	Minn.	Kerr ¹
17. Symington	Mo.	Committee Liberal
18. Long	Mo.	Senior Senator
19. Burdick	N.D.	Committee Liberal
20. Gore	Tenn.	Committee Liberal, Senior Senator
21. Kefauver	Tenn.	Sparkman, Clark
22. Byrd	W.Va.	
23. Randolph	W.Va.	Committee Liberal
<i>B. Southern Democrats</i>		
1. Byrd	Va.	
2. Robertson	Va.	Senior Senator, Russell
3. Hill	Ala.	Russell, Sparkman ²
4. Sparkman	Ala.	Senior Senator, Russell
5. Fulbright	Ark.	Senior Senator, Dummy for bills from For. Relations Comm. ³
6. McClellan	Ark.	Russell
7. Holland	Fla.	Russell
8. Smathers	Fla.	Russell, Senior Senator
9. Russell	Ga.	
10. Talmadge	Ga.	Senior Senator
11. Ellender	La.	Russell
12. Long	La.	Senior Senator
13. Eastland	Miss.	Russell
14. Stennis	Miss.	Russell, Senior Senator
15. Ervin	N.C.	Russell

Table 1.—(Continued)

Senator	State	Variables Added to Equation 2
16. Jordan	N.C.	Russell, Senior Senator, Ellender, Johnston
17. Johnston	S.C.	Russell
18. Thurmond	S.C.	Russell
<i>C. Western Democrats</i>		
1. Yarborough	Texas	Committee Liberal, Kefauver
2. Kerr	Okla.	
3. Monroney	Okla.	Senior Senator
4. Hayden	Ariz.	
5. Carroll	Colo.	
6. Church	Idaho	Committee Liberal
7. Mansfield	Mont.	Median Senator ⁴
8. Metcalf	Mont.	
9. Bible	Nev.	
10. Cannon	Nev.	Senior Senator
11. Chavez	N.M.	
12. Anderson	N.M.	Senior Senator
13. Moss	Utah	Church
14. Hickey	Wy.	Senior Senator
15. McGee	Wy.	
16. Engle	Calif.	Committee Liberal
17. Morse	Ore.	Committee Liberal
18. Neuberger	Ore.	Committee Liberal
19. Jackson	Wash.	Senior Senator
20. Magnuson	Wash.	
21. Bartlett	Alaska	Committee Liberal
22. Gruening	Alaska	Committee Liberal, Morse ⁵
23. Long	Hawaii	
<i>D. Eastern Republicans</i>		
1. Bush	Conn.	
2. Smith	Maine	
3. Saltonstall	Mass.	
4. Bridges	N.H.	Committee Conservative
5. Murphy	N.H.	Senior Senator
6. Cotton	N.H.	Senior Senator, Committee Conservative
7. Aiken	Vt.	
8. Prouty	Vt.	Senior Senator
9. Boggs	Del.	Senior Senator
10. Williams	Del.	
11. Case	N.J.	
12. Javits	N.Y.	
13. Keating	N.Y.	Senior Senator
14. Scott	Pa.	
15. Cooper	Ky.	
16. Morton	Ky.	

⁴ This is the Guttman scale score exceeded by at least 50 senators.

⁵ Suggested by Sam Merrick, Office of the Mayor, Boston, Mass., in an interview in February, 1968. Mr. Merrick formerly was Administrative Assistant to Senator Morse.

¹ Suggested by James Sundquist, The Brookings Institution, in an interview March 13, 1968.

² See footnote 27.

³ This variable takes on the value 1 for bills reported by the Foreign Relations Committee, 0 otherwise.

Table 1.—(Continued)

Senator	State	Variables Added to Equation 2
17. Beall	Md.	
18. Butler	Md.	Committee Conservative
<i>E. Mid-West and Western Republicans</i>		
1. Dirksen	Ill.	Committee Conservative
2. Capehart	Ind.	Committee Conservative
3. Wiley	Wisc.	
4. Hickenlooper	Iowa	
5. Miller	Iowa	Senior Senator
6. Carlson	Kans.	Senior Senator ^a
7. Pearson	Kans.	Senior Senator
8. Curtis	Neb.	Senior Senator, Committee Conservative
9. Hruska	Neb.	Committee Conservative, Curtis ^a
10. Young	N.D.	
11. Case	S.D.	Senior Senator
12. Mundt	S.D.	Committee Conservative
13. Tower	Texas	Committee Conservative
14. Goldwater	Ariz.	Committee Conservative
15. Allott	Colo.	
16. Dworshak	Idaho	Committee Conservative
17. Bennett	Utah	Committee Conservative
18. Kuchel	Calif.	
19. Fong	Hawaii	

^a The senior senator was Schoeppel until his death after the 1961 session. Schoeppel was excluded from the analysis because of a lack of observations due to his death and absences in 1961.

scores provide measures for both the information we wish to explain, individual senator's voting behavior, and for all the explanatory variables which represent people in the Senate—the party leaders, committee chairmen, etc.¹⁵

¹⁵ Zavoina and McKelvey have pointed out the difficulty with using ordinal Guttman scales as the dependent variable in a linear regression model. An examination of the results to be described here supports many of their assertions. However, their paper and this examination suggests that least-squares estimation underestimates the coefficients and is conservative from a hypothesis testing standpoint. This means that the null hypothesis of no influence on the part of an independent variable may be accepted when it should be rejected. See W. J. Zavoina and R. McKelvey, "A Statistical Model for the Analysis of Legislative Voting Behavior" (paper presented at the 65th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in New York, September 2-6,

This still leaves the President and constituency variables unmeasured, however. President Kennedy's behavior was measured by two variables, a position variable and a dummy variable for whether or not the President had taken a public position on the bill. The Presidential position variable tries to assess the President's position on the votes comprising the Guttman scale for each bill. The Presidential dummy variable is simply a variable which is one if it appeared the President had not taken a public position on any of the votes used to construct a scale and zero if he had. The information for these variables and the rationalizations for these two particular variables is based on information in the Congressional Quarterly.

The Congressional Quarterly in its yearly Almanac reports whether the President favored, opposed, or took no position on each roll call vote. These assessments are based on the Congressional Quarterly's interpretation of Presidential messages, speeches, conferences, etc. The CQ's reported positions were compared with the previously and independently constructed Guttman scales for the senators; they scaled almost perfectly. If CQ reported that the President had not taken a position on a vote, this was treated as the opposite of a favorable vote for scaling purposes. If there were five votes used to construct a particular scale and CQ had the President taking the liberal position on the three most conservative Guttman-ordered votes and opposing or taking no position on the two most liberal votes, then the President was scored a three. If CQ had the President taking the conservative position on all five votes, or no position at all, he was then scored as zero. This method was facilitated because the only patterns exhibited in the CQ reporting were combinations of favorable and unfavorable stands, favorable stands and no position, all favorable or all unfavorable. There were no combinations of all three or no position and unfavorable. Thus the President's positions were measured by the same scales as the senators. The Presidential scales were then treated just like the senators' scales with the exception of the dummy variable.

The dummy variable (for where CQ re-

1969). For a further examination of these problems see John Jackson, "Ordinal Data, Ordinary Least Squares and Senate Voting" (paper presented at the Conference on Structural Equation Models, Social Systems Research Institute, in Madison, Wisconsin, November 12-16, 1970), and reproduced as Program on Quantitative Analysis in Political Science Discussion Paper #1, Government Department Data Center, Harvard University.

ported that the President had not taken a public position on any of the votes used in the scale) was required because there were two reasons why the Presidential position variable could be zero for any bill. If the President had opposed all liberal and supported all conservative amendments to a particular bill then his scale position would legitimately be scored as zero for that bill. However, if CQ indicated that the President had not taken a position on any of these votes, his scale position would also be zero. These two situations provide senators with different cues about the President's position though. In the first case, any senator who placed a large weight on the President's position would be more likely to take a conservative position on the bill. In the second case, there is no reason to expect this senator to vote in as conservative a way as he would if the President had taken an unfavorable position on all votes. The dummy variable, which was one if the President had no recorded position and zero otherwise, should incorporate each of these situations into the models.¹⁶

The method used to estimate constituency preferences is derived from relationships between senators' voting behavior and the demographic and regional characteristics of their constituencies. This procedure has been used in several previous studies of the effects of constituency on voting behavior.¹⁷ The idea is based on the assumption that political opinion differs more among different groups of people than it does within these groups. For example, the distribution of public policy preferences will vary more between farmers and blue-collar workers than it does within each occupation. This assumption leads to the assertion that the differ-

ences in the mix of these groups in each state's population, at least within fairly broad regions, accounts for a high percentage of the observed variance in political opinion at the state level. Since we are interested in relative differences among states, we can use the distribution of these groups among the states to estimate the relative constituency opinion on each bill for each state.

The estimated constituency preferences were derived for each bill by regressing the one hundred senators' scale scores against the variables describing each state. A list of these variables is shown as Appendix B. This was done separately for each of the thirty-six bills. The observations are the fifty states and one hundred senators. The estimated vote for senators from the same state will be identical for each bill because the independent variables have the same values for both senators. For senators from a given state, their estimated vote on each bill is the measure of their state's preference on that bill. These estimated votes should represent the systematic effects of the preferences of various groups in a state, the uneven distribution of these groups among the states in a region, and senators' responses to these distributions.

It was hypothesized that senators' voting behavior was more sensitive to differences in these constituency characteristics near the middle of their range—50 percent for a variable expressed as a percentage, for example—than for equal differences in these characteristics near the extremes. There will be greater differences in the voting behavior of a senator from a state with 35 percent of its population in urban areas and one from a state with 65 percent of its population in urban areas than there will be between the first senator and a third representing a state with only a 5 percent urban population. The log-reciprocal model discussed by Johnston was used to model this hypothesis.¹⁸ The general multivariate form for this model is shown in Equation (4) and the bivariate form in Figure 1, where z represents the constituency variables. This form for the constituency models also fits the observed distribution of scale scores, which showed a disproportionate number of zero and four scores, better than a linear relationship.¹⁹


¹⁶ Johnston, *op. cit.*, pp. 49–50.

¹⁷ This is a slightly different, but more straightforward, procedure than was used in a previous presentation of this work. However, the results for the Presidential variables did not change. See "Senate Roll Call Voting: A Statistical Model" (paper presented at the 65th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in New York, September 2–6, 1969).

¹⁸ The use of demographic and regional characteristics to proxy relative constituency opinions has been used in several previous studies. The justification was stated by MacRae as, "What we must investigate, if we are concerned with the connection between representatives and their constituencies is the degree of association between roll call votes and constituency characteristics. . . . If this association is high, we infer that in some way the constituencies have influenced the legislators. . . . For if the association is high, the representative may be said to represent relatively local interests, and this in itself has significance for the functioning of representative government." Duncan MacRae, *Dimensions of Congressional Voting* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958), p. 256.

¹⁹ This general form had to be modified in several ways to handle problems peculiar to this set of data. The value one was added to all the scale scores so that the log of these scores, the dependent variable, ranged from zero to 1.609. The reciprocal was not used for the dummy variables, Z_1 to Z_6 . The Z 's refer to the variables in Appendix B. This in effect raises or lowers the asymptote depending on the sign of the coefficients. The reciprocal form for Z_{17} , Farm

$$(4) \log_e V = b_0 - \frac{b_1}{z_1} - \frac{b_2}{z_2} - \dots - \frac{b_n}{z_n}$$

Figure 1: $\log_e V = b_0 - b_1/z_1$ 

The most interesting result of these constituency models is the amount of variance in voting behavior which can be explained by these characteristics. The coefficient of determination ranged from 0.220 for the National Wilderness Preservation to 0.895 for extending the Civil Rights Commission. The civil rights issues, as a group, had by far the highest explained behavior. This issue, even in 1961 and 1962, probably had the most homogeneous distributions of

Union membership per 100 people over 25, was not used because there were a large number of zero values for this variable. For any remaining variables with any zero observations, these zeroes were replaced by 0.001 so that the reciprocal took on the value 1000. Finally, since a positive coefficient for any of the reciprocal terms implies a vastly different model than the one hypothesized, any variables with a negative effect on senators' voting behavior was entered as the reciprocal of 100 minus the variable. The following is an example of the constituency model estimated for the Area Redevelopment Act,

$$\begin{aligned} \log(V + 1) = & 15.57 + 0.02Z_1 + 0.32Z_2 - \frac{0.0003}{Z_6} \\ & - \frac{125.2}{100 - Z_7} - \frac{688.4}{100 - Z_8} - \frac{0.04}{Z_9} \\ & - \frac{19.8}{Z_{10}} - \frac{13.7}{Z_{11}} - \frac{42.1}{Z_{12}} - \frac{40.8}{100 - Z_{14}} \\ & - \frac{8.6}{100 - Z_{16}} + 0.08Z_{17} - \frac{4.74}{Z_{18}} \end{aligned}$$

The constituency variables were then obtained by subtracting one from the exponential of the estimated value of each senator on each bill. These are not designed to be the "best" equations, and it is not appropriate to make any definite statements about the causal effects of any one variable on Senate voting behavior. Many of the variables are quite co-linear causing additional problems in assigning significance to them. No attempt was made to purge the equations of all the statistically insignificant variables because only the estimated vote is important, not the individual coefficients. Deletion of these insignificant variables would not appreciably change these estimates.

opinion within each state and was a very salient political issue. Senators had a clear understanding of their constituency's preferences and the knowledge that their constituencies were concerned over this issue. This result and interpretation are consistent with the study by Miller and Stokes analyzing the votes of House members on Civil Rights in 1958.²⁰ They found a high correlation between constituency attitudes and the representative's perception of these attitudes and between this perception and the Congressman's roll call behavior. These correlations were higher for civil rights than for the social welfare and foreign policy issues included in the study. Only three bills—the Cultural Exchange Program, the National Wilderness Preservation, and Comsat—had an explained variance below 30 percent. The latter two bills in particular were largely centered on questions of very little concern to a majority of people in most states. Consequently, it was difficult for a senator to get as clear an idea of his constituency's preferences or the bills' impacts on them.

The constituency variable for each state was obtained from the estimated vote for that state's senators in each of the thirty-six regressions. This makes the constituency variables comparable to the measures of senators' voting behavior and the President's positions. The voting model hypothesized for each senator in Table 1 was then estimated by regressing the senator's Guttman scale score on each of the thirty-six bills against his state's constituency variable, the two Presidential variables, and the Guttman scale scores of the other senators, or variables based on individual senators, in the hypothesized model. Variables such as the Committee Chairman, Committee Conservative, etc., were measured by the Guttman scores of the appropriate members of the committee reporting the bill. The results of these estimations will be discussed in the next section.

III. Estimates of the Individual Models

The results of the estimations for the individual senators were statistically significant and accounted for a high percentage of the variance in the voting of each senator, as measured by the R^2 . Table 2 shows the distribution of the R^2 values corrected for degrees of freedom for five different groups of senators. These distributions should substantiate the statement that the simple models postulated previously explain a high percentage of the variance in senators' roll call

²⁰ Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," *American Political Science Review*, LVII (March, 1963), 51-53.

Table 2. Distributions of the R^2 's for Eastern, Southern, and Western Democrats and Eastern and Western Republicans

	0.00- 0.29	0.30- 0.39	0.40- 0.49	0.50- 0.59	0.60- 0.69	0.70- 0.79	0.80- 1.00	N
E. Dem.	2	1	2	9	8	0	1	23
S. Dem.	0	1	3	2	5	4	3	18
W. Dem.	4	3	7	2	6	1	0	23
E. Rep.	0	2	2	7	3	3	1	18
W. Rep.	1	0	1	7	6	0	4	19
Total	7	7	15	27	28	8	9	101

voting behavior. Only two models were not significant at the 0.05 level, as measured by the appropriate F-test. These were Senators Tower (Rep., Texas) and Neuberger (Dem., Oregon).

It is interesting to note the generally poorer performance of these models for the Western Democrats and better than average performance for the group of Southern Democrats. The factors hypothesized as contributing to the better fits for members of the latter group will be discussed subsequently. One explanation for the poorer fit of the Western Democrats' models is the hypothesis that these senators have a higher propensity to trade their votes for other considerations, such as support on a public power bill or reclamation project or future committee assignments. Several people mentioned that on most bills it was easier to bargain with these senators than most other senators. A former aide to Lyndon Johnson when he was the majority leader said, "Thank goodness there was a group of senators like the Western Democrats. You could always count on getting a vote or two from them if you needed it."²¹ These comments strongly suggest

that vote trades and special pleas from party leaders play a more important role in the voting of Western Democrats than for other senators. These considerations were excluded from the formal part of the model in Equation 1, and included in the error term, e . This reduces the explanatory power of the models and results in lower R^2 's, as observed.

The first variable included in these models, and the one which was most consistently significant, was constituency. Table 3 presents the distributions of constituency coefficients for the different groups of senators.

These distributions indicate that the constituency variables have a large influence on the distribution of senators' scale scores. This is particularly true for Republicans and Southern Democrats. Over half the constituency coefficients for senators in these two groups exceeded 0.80. Since the constituency variables were based on the Guttman scale scores and the dependent variables were the scale scores, these coefficients mean that a one point change in constituency position is associated with close to a one point change in the senator's voting

²¹ Interview with Mr. William Gibbon, presently the Chairman of the Department of Political Science,

Texas A&M College, College Station, Texas, March 15, 1968.

Table 3. Distributions of Constituency Coefficients

Group	Number Insig. ¹	Number of Senators with Significant Coefficients in Each Range									
		0.20- 0.29	0.30- 0.39	0.40- 0.49	0.50- 0.59	0.60- 0.69	0.70- 0.79	0.80- 0.89	0.90- 0.99	1.00- 1.19	≥ 1.20
E. Dem. (23)	12 (4) ²	0	2	5	0	1	1	1	0	0	1
S. Dem. (18)	3 (3) ²	1	0	0	0	2	2	0	2	3	5
W. Dem. (23)	8 (2) ²	0	0	4	1	2	2	3	1	1	1
E. Rep. (18)	2 (2) ²	0	0	1	1	2	2	3	2	2	3
W. Rep. (19)	7 (3) ²	0	0	0	0	0	3	2	3	1	3
Total (101)	32 (14) ²	1	2	10	2	7	10	9	8	7	13

¹ Insignificant at the 0.05 level for a two-tailed test.

² The numbers in parentheses are the number of senators with insignificant constituency coefficients, but significant coefficients for the other senator from his state.

Table 4. Distribution of Coefficients for Party Leaders and Whips

Group	Number Insig. ¹	Number of Senators with Significant Coefficients in Each Range								Tot. >0
		≤ -0.50	-0.25 -0.49	0.00- -0.24	0.00- 0.24	0.25- 0.49	0.50- 0.74	0.75- 0.99	≥ 1.00	
<i>E. Dem. (23)</i>										
Lead.	18		1		1 ²	2	1			4
Whip	14 ³					4 ²	1	2	1	8
<i>S. Dem. (18)</i>										
Lead.	17	1								0
Whip	18									0
<i>W. Dem. (23)</i>										
Lead.	17 ⁴				1	1	3			5
Whip	20 ⁴						2			2
<i>E. Rep. (18)</i>										
Lead.	14					3	1			4
Whip	17				1					1
<i>W. Rep. (19)</i>										
Lead.	13 ⁵		2			3				3
Whip	17 ^{5,6}									0

¹ Coefficient not significant at the 0.05 level for a two-tailed test.

² Senator Randolph (Dem., West Virginia) had significant coefficients for both Mansfield and Humphrey.

³ Senator Humphrey excluded from total.

⁴ Senator Mansfield excluded from total.

⁵ Senator Dirksen excluded from total.

⁶ Senator Kuchel excluded from total.

behavior. This suggests a very strong influence, and to the extent that this variable is accurately measuring constituency preferences, indicates that constituencies are an important influence on the voting behavior of Republicans and Southern Democrats.

The distribution of constituency coefficients for the non-Southern Democrats is markedly different from the distributions for the previous groups. Even excluding those senators who had significant coefficients for the other senator from their state, over half the non-Southern Democrats had insignificant constituency coefficients or coefficients less than 0.50. This indicates that constituencies were generally much less influential for these non-Southern Democrats. These senators also give considerably more weight to the positions of the party leaders and committee members than the Southerners and Republicans did.

The most important institutional variables were the four variables measuring the party leaders—the majority and minority leaders and whips. Table 4 presents the distribution of the coefficients on these variables for the different groups developed previously. The varying amounts of the party floor leaders' influence is very apparent in these results. Between one half and one third of the non-Southern Democrats had significant coefficients for either Senator Mansfield, the majority leader, or Senator

Humphrey, the majority whip. Randolph (Dem., W.Va.) was the only senator having significant coefficients for both. A majority of these coefficients were larger than 0.50 and one was as high as 1.10. These results would indicate that the Democratic leadership was quite influential among the non-Southerners during this session. The extent of Mansfield's effective influence can be seen by considering the set of senators who are not affected by Mansfield directly but are influenced by Humphrey, who in turn is influenced by Mansfield. (The coefficient on Mansfield's scale scores in Humphrey's model was 0.33.) Thus, in all, seventeen of the forty-four non-Southern Democrats, excluding Mansfield and Humphrey, are directly responsive to the positions of these two leaders. For those non-Southern Democrats with significant coefficients for the party leadership, Humphrey seemed to be more influential among senators from Eastern states and Mansfield more so among Western senators, influence being assessed by the number of senators with significant coefficients.

In direct contrast to Mansfield and Humphrey is the influence of Dirksen and Kuchel, their Republican counterparts. The Republican Party leaders had significant positive coefficients in the models of less than a fourth of the other Republicans. Only one of these coefficients exceeded 0.50 compared to 53 percent of

the significant coefficients for the non-Southern Democrats. More importantly, the coefficient on Dirksen's votes in Kuchel's model was only 0.22 with a standard error of 0.17. Thus, at most confidence levels, the hypothesis that Dirksen exerted no influence on Kuchel cannot be rejected. In turn, Kuchel has virtually no apparent consistent influence among other members of his party. These two circumstances constitute a real weakness in the Republican party senatorial organization. Again, compare this with the Democrats, where Mansfield's coefficient in Humphrey's model was 0.33 with a standard error of 0.09 and Humphrey himself had significant coefficients in as many other models as Mansfield did.

These results are also consistent with an earlier paper which tried to construct constituency models for five bills from the 81st and 83rd Congresses.²² These models fit much better for the non-incumbent party, the Republicans during the 81st and the non-Southern Democrats in the 83rd. It was suggested in the paper that for the party in control of both the Presidency and the Senate the formal leaders' influence is greater, and consequently the constituency influence explains less of their behavior. James Sundquist suggested a similar interpretation.²³ He maintained that the 1961-1962 sessions of the Senate were not the most interesting ones to study because most Democratic senators were supporting President Kennedy's positions and the votes of Mansfield and Humphrey were essentially the Administration's positions. Although this is an oversimplified hypothesis and Mansfield's and Humphrey's votes were not identical, it indicates that Mr. Sundquist believed that the Kennedy Administration was unusually influential, and worked through the Democratic leaders in the Senate.

The results of the estimations for Republicans and non-Southern Democrats are consistent with these suggestions. However, there are personality and organizational differences which could lead to these results.

There are significant differences in each party's organizational structure. In the Democratic party the floor leader is also chairman of the policy and conference committee, while the Republican party gives these functions to different people. The decentralization of leadership in the Republican party inhibits the development of a strong floor leader because he does not have effective control of the resources neces-

sary to make other senators dependent upon him. The division of leadership also makes it harder for Dirksen than for Mansfield to maintain that he is speaking for the party. The selection of the senators to fill these secondary roles will also possibly create or exacerbate existing conflicts within the party. There were some suggestions that the contest at the beginning of the 1962 session between Hickenlooper and Saltonstall to succeed Bridges as chairman of the policy committee increased the split between the Midwest, more rural and conservatively oriented Republicans, and the Eastern, more urban ones. This kind of conflict is avoided in the Democratic party by making the floor leader chairman of the committee automatically.

The antipathy of Southern Democrats towards the Senate leadership of their national party was apparent. Neither Mansfield nor Humphrey entered any of their equations with a statistically significant positive coefficient. Coincident with this lack of influence by the party leaders, the Southern Democrats exhibited very strong constituency coefficients, both in statistical significance and in magnitude. In an interview early in the study, Sam Merrick cited the Eastern Republicans and Southern Democrats as the groups most responsive to their constituencies.²⁴ This seems to be born out by both the relative size of the constituency coefficients for these senators, and by the lack of statistical significance for most of the other variables hypothesized to affect voting behavior.

There is also substantial support for the hypothesis that senators are influenced by positions taken by the chairman or leading members of the reporting committee. Nearly a third of all senators had significant positive coefficients for either the committee chairman (ranking minority member) or committee liberal (committee conservative) variables. These coefficients are shown in Table 5. Half of these coefficients are for a member of the committee other than the chairman or ranking minority member. These people were chosen for their ideological identifications and presumably have less political leverage in the traditional sense. Their influence is based largely on their positions as experts. This lends support to the hypothesized expertise function for committee members in addition to the political pressure and lobbying influences usually ascribed to the committee chairman. It is also important to

²² John Jackson, "Some Indirect Evidences of Constituency Pressures on the Senate," *Public Policy*, XVI (1967), pp. 253-270.

²³ Interview with Mr. James Sundquist, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., March 13, 1968.

²⁴ Interview with Mr. Sam Merrick, Office of the Mayor, Boston, Massachusetts, November, 1967. Mr. Merrick had previously handled Congressional Relations for the Labor Department.

Table 5. Coefficients for the Committee Variables

Group	Number Insig. ¹	Number of Senators with Significant Coefficients in Each Range							Total >0
		0.25- -0.49	0.00- -0.24	0.00- 0.24	0.25- 0.49	0.50- 0.74	0.75- 1.00	≥1.00	
<i>E. Dem.</i>									
Chairman	19	1	1 ²	1					1
Liberal	15				3	2	2	1 ²	8
<i>S. Dem.</i>									
Chairman	15		1	1	1				2
Liberal	17			1					1
<i>W. Dem.</i>									
Chairman	16		1	2	3	1			6
Liberal	21					2			2
<i>E. Rep.</i>									
Ranking									
Rep.	16			2					2
Cons.	17				1				1
<i>W. Rep.</i>									
Ranking									
Rep.	15			1	3 ³				4
Cons.	13				1	2	1 ³	2	6

¹ Coefficients insignificant at the 0.05 level for a two-tailed test.

² Senator Douglas had significant coefficients for both the Committee Chairman and Committee Liberal variables.

³ Senator Bennett had significant coefficients for both the Ranking Committee Republican and Committee Conservative variables.

point out that in terms of the size of their coefficients, the committee liberal and committee conservative variables are more important than the committee chairman and ranking minority member variables. The committee liberal variable had larger coefficients in the Eastern Democrats' models than the committee chairman variable did among the Western Democrats. The committee conservative variable also had larger coefficients than the ranking minority member variable among Western Republicans. Neither of these variables had much influence among Eastern Republicans. (The two coefficients shown for Eastern Republicans for the ranking minority member were barely significant at the 0.05 level.) If a senator's objective was to establish a reputation for being a committed ideologue, as several of these men were—Goldwater, Tower, Douglas, McNamara, for example—then coefficients of this magnitude would be expected for the member of the reporting committee representing this ideology.

There is also a significant difference in the geographic distribution of the committee chairman's and committee liberal's influences. The number of significant positive coefficients for the committee chairman variable was virtually confined to Democrats from the Rocky Mountain and Southwestern states, while only one senator from these states (Church) had a coefficient for the committee liberal variable which

was statistically significant when it was added to their models. The other Western Democrat with a significant coefficient for the committee liberal variable was Morse. Conversely, the committee chairman variable had a negative coefficient in two of the Eastern Democrats' models and the committee liberal variable is statistically significant in eight of the models. This is hardly surprising when it is noted that all but one of the committee chairmen were Southerners or Southwesterners during these two years.

The final influence hypothesized to be consistently important in senators' voting behavior is the position of the President. The two variables used to measure the President's positions did not perform as well as anticipated. Table 6 shows the distributions of the Presidential position variable. The dummy variable was significant in only four models. The presidential position variable entered eight non-Southern Democrats' and three Republicans' models. It had a positive coefficient in two of the Republican models, Prouty and Case (New Jersey), and in seven of the eight Democratic ones. However, only the Presidential dummy variable entered either of the Democratic floor leaders' models with even marginal statistical significance. It was significant in Mansfield's model and indicated that he took a more liberal position if the President did not take a position. Mr. Sund-

Table 6. Distribution of Coefficients for Presidential Position Variable

Group	Number Insig. ¹	Number of Senators Having Significant Coefficients in Each Range				
		≤ -0.50-	-0.25- -0.49	0.00- -0.24	0.00- 0.24	0.25- 0.49
E. Dem. (23)	19				1	3
S. Dem. (18)	14		2	1		1
W. Dem. (13)	19			1		3
E. Rep. (18)	16				1	1
W. Rep. (19)	18		1			

¹ Coefficient not significant at the 0.05 level for a two-tailed test.

quist had argued that the positions taken by Mansfield and Humphrey were essentially the Administration's positions.²⁵ Although this is an oversimplification, it does suggest that the Presidential variable should be statistically significant in their models. These coefficients' lack of significance casts doubt on the construction of the variables rather than on the hypotheses themselves. The Congressional Quarterly's assessment of the President's public statements to determine his being for, against, or neutral on each vote does not adequately measure the information Mansfield or Humphrey would receive about the President's feelings towards each amendment and bill. Mansfield and Humphrey are probably responding to more subtle information on the President's position which is not measured by the variables used here. The only solution is to try to find additional information which will permit the inclusion of these subtleties.

The results for other senators suggest a small amount of Presidential influence exerted directly on individual senators. However, the results for the party leaders, along with Mr. Sundquist's hypothesis, strongly suggest that there is a considerable amount of Presidential influence but that it is exerted through the formal party structure. This is still an hypothesis, unfortunately, and better data are required to test it.

The influence of the regional and informal leaders was the hardest to include in the models because of the difficulty in obtaining information with which to construct the hypotheses. Several were mentioned which were tested and can be evaluated. The most notable unsupported hypothesis here was the expected influence of a senior Southern senator, notably Senator Russell, among his Southern colleagues. Russell did not have a significant, positive coefficient in any of the Southern Democratic senators models. There are several conceivable ex-

planations for these results. If all the Southerners voted as a very cohesive group on most bills, down to the last amendment, then these effects would be included in the constituency variable. If all eighteen senators voted the same way, the effect of a Russell would be contained in the coefficient of any variable in the constituency model which is highly correlated with "Southness," such as the regional dummy. This would overstate the importance of constituency and understate the role of personal leaders within the Senate.

An alternative explanation is that the observed bloc voting is the effect of similar constituencies, not adroit political leadership. In this case, the senators who are popularly mentioned as the leaders of one group are spokesmen rather than cue-givers or all-powerful solons, as they have been characterized. Thus Russell is a spokesman for the Southern senators, who arrive at the same positions because they are the products of and represent similar social environments. In this model, the publicized leaders are actually acting as the strategists or spokesmen for a group that already exists rather than the force which creates the group. On bills where the constituency interests change, either the bloc doesn't exist or it consists of different members with possibly a different spokesman. As bills shift, so may the bloc's membership as senators come and go depending upon their own factors.

Finally, the concept of a monolithic Southern bloc on all bills could be a myth. This stereotype could have been generated if one or two types of legislation on which the eighteen senators were in general agreement, even though they significantly diverged on other issues, received a disproportionate amount of national attention. This could create the popular impression of a solid bloc with the spokesman on the few convergent issues appearing to exert significant influence among this group of senators.

Reality probably consists largely of the latter two explanations, although the possibility of the

²⁵ Interview with Mr. James Sundquist, *op. cit.*

first is not excluded. There is considerable evidence in the overall voting patterns of Southern senators to indicate that they are not a monolithic bloc. The individual mean-scale scores for all bills range from 0.40 for Strom Thurmond (Dem., South Carolina) to 2.88 for John Sparkman (Dem., Alabama). There is a fairly even distribution between these points with only a slight concentration between 1.0 and 1.3. This analysis is consistent with V. O. Key's conclusion that, "The preceding analysis indicates that on the race question, and on that question alone, does a genuine southern solidarity exist. On other questions Southern Democrats split and southern solidarity becomes a matter of degree."²⁶ This supports the third explanation that "the bloc" is cohesive on a few bills which may have received a disproportionate amount of publicity. In these cases, the supposed leader was functioning as a tactician rather than an influential leader. Southern senators probably had very little trouble deciding how their constituencies felt about the Civil Rights Commission, and they needed little coercion from Russell or Eastland to vote against its extension.

A partial test of the first explanation was conducted by deleting the constituency variable altogether and seeing how the coefficients for the hypothesized leaders would behave in other senator's equations. This had the general effect of making the hypothesized leader's coefficients more positive, but they were less significant than the constituency variable, and the R^2 's were lowered considerably. There was evidence of multicollinearity between Russell and some of the constituency variables, however. When Russell's votes were entered as an explanatory variable, in addition to the constituency variable, it had a very insignificant t-statistic and the constituency coefficient did not change appreciably, but its t-statistic would drop, although it was always statistically significant. Although there is evidence for the first explanation—that constituency is acting as a proxy for other factors—it is weaker than the arguments supporting the second and third arguments. The conclusion to be drawn is that on many bills, Russell was probably a widely recognized and respected strategist and spokesman for a group which was held together primarily by convergent constituency interests on several very salient issues.

There were several informal leader hypotheses which were supported, however. A hypothesis suggested by Huitt's description of Senator Proxmire's decision to be an "outsider"

in the Senate, "... he would be a senator like Wayne [Morse] and Paul [Douglas]..."²⁷ is that Douglas might be an important explanatory variable in Proxmire's model. This was substantiated, the Douglas variable was quite statistically significant in Proxmire's equation. The hypothesis suggested by Mr. Sundquist that Senator Kerr (Dem., Oklahoma) was influential in how Senator McCarthy (Dem., Minnesota) voted was tested and found to be statistically significant, although the coefficient was not very large.

One of the best confirmed hypotheses was that of the influence of a senior senator on his junior partner if both are in the same party. In fourteen of these cases, the senior senator had a significant positive coefficient in the junior's model, and in two others had a significant negative coefficient. These coefficients are shown in Table 7. The Western Democrats were the only senators who consistently did not fit the hypothesis.²⁸

²⁷ Ralph K. Huitt, "The Outsider in the Senate: An Alternative Role," *American Political Science Review*, LV (September, 1961), 569.

²⁸ These senior-junior influences were examples of relationships where simultaneity was suspected. This possibility was tested in five different cases. The five cases were Magnuson and Jackson (Dem., Washington), McNamara and Hart (Dem., Michigan), Hill and Sparkman (Dem., Alabama), Schoeppel and Carlson (Rep., Kansas) and Hruska and Curtis (Rep., Nebraska). The estimations of these models were made using a two-stage least squares procedure to test for the presence of simultaneity. In three cases, the coefficient for the effect of the junior senator on the senior senator went to zero, or very close and was not statistically significant, while the effect of the senior on the junior senator stayed very close to the same value, and was still statistically significant. Senators Magnuson and Jackson (Dem., Washington) provide an excellent example of this result. Equations (a) and (b) are the two stage least squares estimates of their models.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{(a) Magnuson} &= -0.89 + 0.42 \text{ Washington} \\ &\quad (0.96) \quad (0.26) \\ &\quad + 0.67 \text{ Humphrey} + 0.07 \text{ Jackson} \\ &\quad (0.27) \quad (0.58) \\ R^2 &= 0.54 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{(b) Jackson} &= 1.33 + 0.26 \text{ Mansfield} \\ &\quad (0.51) \quad (0.13) \\ &\quad + 0.37 \text{ Magnuson} \\ &\quad (0.17) \\ R^2 &= 0.47 \end{aligned}$$

(Standard Errors in parentheses)

The significant point in this result is that when the appropriate two-stage procedure is used, the hypothesized influence of Jackson on Magnuson is both small and statistically insignificant. The reverse relationship, that of Magnuson on Jackson, was fairly high and statistically significant. The conclusion is that this is not a simultaneous relationship and that both senators' models can be estimated using an

²⁶ V. O. Key, Jr., *Southern Politics* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf Co., 1949), pp. 359-360.

Table 7. Distribution of Coefficients for Senior Senator Hypothesis¹

Group	Number Insig. ²	Number of Senators with Significant Coefficients							
		≤ -0.50	-0.25 -0.49	0.00- -0.24	0.00- 0.24	0.25- 0.49	0.50- 0.74	0.75- 0.99	≥ 1.00
E. Dem. (7)	2					1	3	1 ³	
W. Dem. (8)	6					1	1 ⁴		
E. Rep. (7)	2	1	1			1	1		1
W. Rep. (5)	1 ⁵					1		3	

¹ Entries are the coefficient of the senior senator in the junior's model. Totals refer only to possible senior-junior pairs in the same party, not all senators.

² Coefficient not significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level for a two-tailed test.

³ The effect of Humphrey on McCarthy which was also included in the discussion of party leaders' effects.

⁴ The effect of Mansfield on Metcalf which was also included in the discussion of party leaders' effects.

⁵ Insignificant pair is Curtis-Hruska. See further discussion in Footnote 27.

The hypothesized relationship between the majority leader's voting and the median senator position was not supported by the results of the two-stage least squares regression. The coefficient for the median senator was always less than 0.10 with a standard error close to three times as large, even though several alternative model specifications were tested.

This lack of significance could be attributable to the selection of the median senator variable. The definition of the median senator created a cumbersome variable as the scale value exceeded by at least 50 percent of the scalable members. Due to the lumpiness of the scale distributions on each bill, the estimate of the median position may have substantially underestimated the actual median in some cases. On several bills, the measured median was exceeded by as many as 70 percent of the senators. The median senator variable would be seriously un-

derestimated in these cases. The result of these possible errors could be to make the relationship statistically insignificant.

It is also quite conceivable that the majority leader tries to accommodate the majority opinion in the Senate only on a few key bills or on bills that potentially could severely disrupt the normal proceedings of the Senate. There was one clear example of where Mansfield was possibly accommodating himself to the distribution of opinion in the Senate. This was on the four Civil Rights bills. All the models tested severely overestimated his votes on these bills. When a dummy for these four bills was included in Mansfield's equation it had a significant negative coefficient. Given the polarization of positions and the strength of constituency feeling on these bills, it seems reasonable to assume that there was little way for the normal techniques to affect the outcomes. The only way passage could be achieved was to determine what the Senate would accept, agree to that in advance, and then prevent any amendments which would destroy this position. In this case the results support the simple median senator hypothesis.

Another reason for the insignificance is that the hypothesis is over-simplified. There are many other mechanisms by which Mansfield could be accommodating the desires of the Senate without actually voting for or against amendments solely because of their effect on the probability of the bill passing. Since the majority leader is in a position to control the scheduling of legislation and to some extent the debate, he can accommodate many individual wishes just by scheduling arrangements. Additionally, his timing of the legislative agenda could be used to influence the outcome. The more rushed senators are while considering legislation, the more likely they are to turn to peo-

ordinary least squares technique, with Jackson omitted from Magnuson's equation.

A minor aberration was Curtis and Hruska (Rep., Nebraska). In the two-stage estimations only the influence of Curtis on Hruska was significant. These two men came into the Senate less than two months apart, Hruska on November 8, 1954, and Curtis on January 1, 1955, so technically Hruska is the senior senator. However, both were former members of the House, Curtis for 16 years and Hruska for only 2. Thus, prior to coming to the Senate, Curtis was clearly the senior person. Consequently, the formal definitions of senior and junior senator are hypothesized to have broken down in this case.

The exception, of the five pairs, was Senators Hill and Sparkman of Alabama. Each of these two has been in the Senate a long time and is a clear anomaly among the other Southern senators as far as their voting records are concerned. For these reasons, I expected that there would be a considerable amount of discussion and interaction between these two and a breakdown of the formal senior-junior role. In spite of these factors, Hill, the senior, had a larger effect on Sparkman, the junior, than vice versa when both were estimated by a two-stage least squares method.

ple familiar with the legislation for advice and information. An alternative version to the above hypotheses, but still based in part upon the majority leader's ability to set the legislative calendar, is that his voting behavior on the bill under consideration is partially determined by arrangements made for past and future bills. Many of these arrangements could be the log rolling or bargaining of positions on amendments on successive bills. The majority leader is in a better position to make use of these tools in arranging trades. He can schedule several bills in succession on which he knows he can alter several votes by this kind of bargaining. A high percentage of the information for this hypothesis would have to come from familiarity with how Mansfield behaved as majority leader.

IV. Comparison with Other Models

Another way of evaluating the results from the individual senators' estimations is to compare the predicted scores on each bill with the actual scores and examine the distribution of the errors on a bill-by-bill basis. Most people and proponents of particular items of legislation are more interested in voting behavior on individual bills rather than the voting decisions of individual senators. Thus, the evaluation of the bill-by-bill results may be more interesting. The distribution of these prediction errors will be evaluated by comparing them to the errors produced by two alternative methods of predicting the scale scores observed on each bill.

The statistic which will be used to compare the errors from each model is the sum of the squared errors from the individual models discussed in Section III divided by the sum of the squared errors from the prediction method they are being compared with. This alternative method will be referred to as the simple or naive model.

Let,

$V_{i,j}$ = The actual scale score of the i th senator on the j th bill,

$P_{i,j}$ = The predicted scale score of the i th senator on the j th bill from the individual models discussed previously, and

$S_{i,j}$ = The predicted scale score of the i th senator on the j th bill from the simple, naive model.

The statistic used to make these comparisons then is

$$(5) \quad U_j = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^N (V_{i,j} - P_{i,j})^2}{\sum_{i=1}^N (V_{i,j} - S_{i,j})^2}$$

where N is the number of senators voting on bill j . This statistic will be computed separately for each bill.²⁹

This U statistic will always be zero or positive with no upper bound, $U_j \geq 0$. A value of zero indicates that there are no prediction errors. If U equals 1, the implication is that the prediction model is doing as well as, but no better than, the naive model.³⁰ A U_j less than 1 implies the prediction model is performing better than the naive model and a value greater than 1 means it is predicting worse than the naive model.

The first naive model is simply the mean score of all the senators voting on each bill. In this case, $S_{i,j} = \bar{V}_j$ for all senators. It should be noted that $(1 - U_j)$ for this naive model is comparable to the conventional R^2 value for a regression model.³¹ Although the mean scale score is an absurdly naive model, it is being used because of the similarity it produces to one minus the R^2 statistic which is widely used to evaluate regression models.³² The U

²⁹ This procedure for testing a model's predictions against those of a naive model is suggested by Henri Theil. Theil's models are usually trying to predict changes in an economic time series and his naive model is that there will be no change. Consequently, his statistic, called the Theil U , is the positive square root of

$$U^2 = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n (A_i - P_i)^2}{\sum_{i=1}^n A_i^2}$$

(where A_i is the actual change and P_i is the predicted change. The similarity between this and Equation (5) should be apparent). See Henri Theil, *Applied Economic Forecasting* (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1966), pp. 26-29.

³⁰ These evaluations of better and worse are based on a mean squared error criteria. This implies a quadratic loss function which means that small errors are preferable to one large error. See *ibid*.

³¹ This interpretation of the R^2 can be shown from the formula used to compute the R^2 from a regression model.

$$R^2 = 1 - \frac{\sum e_i^2}{\sum (Y_i - \bar{Y})^2} = 1 - \frac{\sum (Y_i - \hat{Y}_i)^2}{\sum (Y_i - \bar{Y})^2}$$

where Y_i is the observed value of Y and $\hat{Y}_i$ is the predicted value of Y_i from the regression model. The similarity between this and one minus Equation 5 if $\bar{Y}_j$ is substituted for all $S_{i,j}$ should be obvious.

³² The idea of using the R^2 value obtained by regressing the actual scores against the predicted scores, which is the simple correlation between the two variables squared, was rejected for two reasons. In the first place, this comparison favors the procedure used to make the predictions. Regressing the actual scores on the predicted scores corrects for any systematic errors, such as overpredictions or underpredictions, before the comparison of the type in Equation 5 is made. In fact Theil suggests this precise procedure as one way to improve the forecasting ability of a model. Theil, *op. cit.*, pp. 34-36. Thus the procedure used here will lead to higher values of U than the

Table 8. Distribution of *U* Statistics

Naive Model	Number of Bills with <i>U</i> Statistics in Each Range							
	0.100– 0.199	0.200– 0.299	0.300– 0.399	0.400– 0.499	0.500– 0.599	0.600– 0.699	0.700– 0.799	0.800 0.899
Mean Score	16	15	4			1		
Constituency and Party		1	9	10	7	4	3	2

statistics from comparisons with this model will be called *U* (MEAN). The second and more plausible naive model is obtained by regressing the scale scores of each senator voting on a bill against his constituency variable for this bill and his party. This model is shown as Equation 6.

(6) $S_{i,j} = b_0 + b_1 \text{State}_{i,j} + b_2 \text{Party}_i + e$.
Party is measured as 1 for Republicans and 0 for Democrats. The *U* statistic for comparisons with this model will be shown as *U* (BILL).

The implication of this second naive model is that on each bill, all senators apply the same weights to their constituencies and to the positions of their party leaders. Since these latter positions don't vary from senator to senator on any particular bill, they are summarized by the party variable. Since these predictions are made separately for each bill, the formulation allows the influences of constituency and party leadership to vary from bill to bill, which was not possible in the individual models developed earlier. This should be contrasted to the individual models discussed in Section III which hypothesized that each senator had a different decision

comparison of simple correlations or R^2 between predicted and actual scores. The second reason for using this procedure, is that it permits a direct comparison between the errors of the postulated models and a naive model. A comparison between an R^2 or a simple correlation does not provide this because both are arithmetic transformations of the errors from the two models.

model, but that the model and the coefficients in it for a given senator are the same for each bill, e.g. the influence of constituency is the same on all types of legislation. The distribution of *U* statistics for both alternative models is shown in Table 8.

The distribution of the *U* values indicates that the predictions based on the individual models are definitely superior in all cases to predictions based on the mean scale score and in a high percentage of the cases are superior to predictions based only on constituency and party. For the naive model based on the mean, nearly half the bills had *U* values less than 0.20. Only one bill, Amendments to the Sugar Quota Act, had a *U* value greater than 0.40. The implication of these ratios is that the individual models are explaining the scale scores at least twice as well as the mean on all but one bill, and five times as well on sixteen of the thirty-six bills.

When the errors of the individual models are compared to the errors from the naive model of constituency and party, twenty had *U* values less than 0.50. Thus on 55 percent of the bills, the individual models had less than half the mean squared error of the constituency and party model. Models which postulate different decision models for each senator but constrain each model to be the same for all bills perform better than models which permit the influence of different factors to vary with each bill but

Table 9. Bills with *U* (Bill) Values Greater Than 0.60

Bill	<i>U</i> (Bill) ¹	Rank ¹	<i>U</i> (Mean) ²	Rank ²
Civil Rights Commission (1961-13)	0.95	36	0.15	5
Sugar Act (1962-10)	0.89	35	0.61	36
Agriculture Act of 1961 (1961-8)	0.76	34	0.36	33
Poll Taxes (1962-2)	0.74	33	0.24	26
Literacy Tests (1962-4)	0.71	32	0.21	20
Omnibus Public Works (1961-18)	0.71	31	0.34	32
Maritime Subsidy (1962-18)	0.64	30	0.38	34
D.C. Voting Rights (1961-17)	0.64	29	0.24	27
National Wilderness (1961-14)	0.60	28	0.39	35

¹ *U* values and ranks for comparing individual models with the bill models based on constituency and party.

² *U* values and ranks for comparing individual models with the mean scale score on each bill.

constrain each senator to the same set of weights for these factors.

The bills with U (BILL) values greater than 0.60 are shown in Table 9. There appeared to be two types of bills where the individual models did not do significantly better than the simple constituency and party model. Of the nine bills with U (BILL) values greater than 0.60, four were civil rights bills, four were pork barrel or local interest issues, (sugar amendments, public works, maritime subsidy, and the national wilderness), and the other was the amendments to the Agriculture Act of 1961 (trying to limit farm cooperative mergers).

The four civil rights bills had very large and significant coefficients for the constituency variable and negligible coefficients for the party variable in the party and constituency model. Both the individual and the constituency and party models explained a high percentage of the variance in the voting behavior on these bills. This would suggest that if there is strong and pervasive pressure exerted by one of the variables, e.g., constituencies, then constraining the coefficients of the variables in the individual models to be the same values for all bills reduces the explanatory ability of these models. However, it is not reduced to the level which resulted for assuming the same coefficients for all senators, as was done in the constituency and party model.

The remaining set of bills, where the difference in the explanatory power of the two models was small, are bills where neither model predicted the voting well. These five remaining bills all had high values for the U (MEAN) statistic. Since this is analogous to a ranking by an explained variance (R^2) criteria, these U (MEAN) values indicate that the individual models do not account for as much of the variance in voting behavior on these bills as on the other bills.

There are interesting similarities among these five bills which suggest additional hypotheses about legislative voting behavior. These five bills had the highest U (MEAN) values and were the only bills with values over 0.30. The bills with U (MEAN) values above 0.30 evoke strong images of local interest, pork barrel legislation and the accompanying vote trading and log rolling. The increased importance of these factors decreases the explanatory power of both the individual models and the constituency and party models, since neither explicitly included these influences.

One possible explanation for why vote-trading activities are more prevalent on these bills is that they are being used as side payments to gain support for other legislation. The five bills

are of limited interest to most voters in a majority of the states, even though they may be extremely important to groups in some states. Thus senators trying to pass or defeat civil rights, Medicare, or school assistance legislation may agree to support or oppose these special interest bills in exchange for support for their bills. There are fragmentary bits of evidence for this hypothesis. Evans and Novak recounted an instance where Lyndon Johnson, as majority leader, got a Rocky Mountain Democrat to support a civil rights bill in return for Johnson's support for a public works project in the Democrat's state.³³ This behavior requires that the senators interested in civil rights, Medicare, and school assistance are relatively indifferent about public works, exemptions for farm cooperatives, and maritime subsidies and vice-versa for the senators desiring public works, exemptions and subsidies.

This explanation is consistent with both the results of the individual models in Table 2 and the bill models in Table 9. The Western Democratic senators, as a group, had the poorest fits for the individual models, and the bills they are hypothesized to be most interested in had the poorest fits in the bill analysis. Thus Northern senators concerned with civil rights, Appalachian senators sponsoring the Area Redevelopment Act and farm state senators interested in support prices may have traded their votes on the wilderness preservation bill or the West Coast maritime subsidy to gain one or two votes on their particular legislation.

V. Conclusion

The hypothesis was made that senators develop standard routines for obtaining information and deciding how to vote on a majority of bills. It was further hypothesized that the important influences in this process are the senator's constituency, his party leaders, knowledgeable committee members, the President, and informal leaders. These hypotheses were stated as simple mathematical models and the coefficients are estimated using regression analysis. The results of these estimations were discussed in Sections III and IV.

The most obvious conclusion is that these simple models explain a high percentage of the variance in the Guttman scales used to measure the senators' voting behavior. This was true when the results were examined on the basis of individual senators' voting behavior in Table 2 and when they were compared with two alter-

³³ Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, *Lyndon B. Johnson: The Exercise of Power* (New York: The New American Library, 1966), Signet Edition, pp. 141-142, 150.

native models explaining the voting behavior on individual bills in Table 8. A more important question than goodness of fit, however, is how well the results support the hypotheses stated in Section I versus other plausible models. The statistical significance of the individual senators' models strongly supports the hypothesis that senators develop standard routines for deciding how to vote on roll call votes. It does not appear that they are influenced by one person or one set of influences on one bill and an entirely different person or set on the next. With only one clear exception, this routine is largely invariant with the type of legislation. The models generally work as well for foreign aid and trade legislation as for civil rights and farm subsidies. It is also apparent that senators develop quite different individual models. These differences are with respect to what influences are important and the weight accorded these influences. However, these results do not effectively discriminate between a traditional "political pressure" hypothesis, a coalition theory, the simple information requirements model which was given more emphasis in Section I, or a combination of the three.

The political pressure model would argue that a senator follows the preferences of his party leaders in return for their support and cooperation on future committee assignments, pet legislation, or access to the inner "club." The estimated coefficients for the individual models would measure each senator's responsiveness to these pressures and the amount of influence held by the various leaders. The hypotheses based on a coalition theory would indicate that groups of senators with similar interests agree to vote as a bloc on most legislation. Each senator in a coalition agrees to trade his future votes for the support of the other members on legislation which is important to him. The senator may feel that most of the positions adopted by the coalition are ones he would take on his own, so that he is only trading his vote on a few bills to increase the probability of passage of legislation he is interested in. An important variable in each coalition member's model would be the voting behavior of the coalition member whose legislation is being considered, or the recognized leader of the coalition if it is more formally organized. This process could easily describe the group of liberal Democrats mentioned by several staff people and represented by the committee liberal variable in the models.

Both the pressure and coalition hypotheses outlined here help satisfy the information requirements hypothesis outlined in Section I. Reliance on the leaders or other coalition mem-

bers provides a senator with a readily available source of cues on how to vote on each roll call in addition to the inducements of personal advancement or the passage of his legislation. This leaves the senator free to work on his own legislation, committee work, or speaking engagements.

Appendix A. Legislative Scales for 87th Session of Congress

Bill and Roll Calls 1961	C.R. ¹	M.M.R. ²
1. S 1—Area Redevelopment Act R.C. 5, 9, 10, 6, 7, 8 ³	0.962	0.653
2. HR 4806—Temporary Extended Unemployment Compensation R.C. 15, 16, 14, 17	0.978	0.673
3. HR 4510—Emergency Feed Grains Act HR 5188—Third Supplemental Appropriations HR 7444—Appropriations for Department of Agriculture and Commodity Credit Cor- poration S 1643—Agriculture Act of 1961 —Amendment to eliminate extension of feed grains pro- gram R.C. 99, 4, 20, 78	0.928	0.665
4. HR 3935—Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1961—These dealt with extension of the minimum wage R.C. 30, 29, 26, 31	0.987	0.593
5. S 1021—School Assistance Act of 1961 R.C. 54, 51, 53, 47	0.978	0.695
6. S 1922—Housing Act of 1961 HR 7445—Appropriate Funds for housing research R.C. 68, 65, 62, 71, 74, 59, 58, 73, 75, 115	0.967	0.621
7. S 1154—Educational and Cul- tural Exchange Act R.C. 93, 90, 91, 92, 89, 88, 96	0.977	0.680
8. S 1643—Agriculture Act of 1961 —Amendments to limit mergers of cooperatives and make them subject to anti- trust laws R.C. 101, 103, 102, 100, 98	0.963	0.590

¹ Coefficient of Reproducibility

² Coefficient of Minimal Marginal Reproducibility

³ Roll Call vote number

Appendix A. (Continued)

Bill and Roll Calls 1961	C.R. ¹	M.M.R. ²
9. HR 7035—Appropriations for HEW (Specifically NIH) R.C. 119, 121, 120, 118	0.982	0.649
10. Amendments to various bills to extend aid to schools in areas "impacted" by federal installations R.C. 186, 185, 150, 123, 122	0.944	0.646
11. S 1983—Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 R.C. 148, 149, 137, 134, 146, 141, 130, 142, 139, 147, 151, 140	0.952	0.663
12. S 1991—Manpower Development and Training Act R.C. 152, 153, 154, 155	0.985	0.598
13. HR 7371—Amendments to State-Justice-Judiciary Appropriations extending the Civil Rights Commission R.C. 161, 162, 160, 165	1.000	0.691
14. S 174—Establish a National Wilderness Preservation R.C. 172, 173, 175	0.977	0.650
15. S 2180—Establish a U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency R.C. 177, 178, 179	0.990	0.657
16. HR 2010—Amend and extend the Mexican Farm Labor Program R.C. 183, 201, 202, 181, 182, 184	0.971	0.626
17. HR 8444—Establish voting machinery to permit D.C. residents to participate in Presidential elections R.C. 195, 196, 197, 198	0.973	0.681
18. Various Public Works Projects R.C. 56, 69, 97, 22, 169, 159, 12	0.967	0.801
1962		
1. S 1241—College Facilities and Scholarship Aid R.C. 8, 7, 10, 9	0.951	0.687
2. S J Res 29—Constitutional Amendment to abolish poll taxes R.C. 21, 20, 22	0.993	0.667

Appendix A. (Continued)

Bill and Roll Calls 1962	C.R. ¹	M.M.R. ²
3. S 2768—Authorize the President to purchase U.N. Bonds R.C. 25, 26, 28, 24, 23	0.976	0.770
4. S 2750—Void literacy tests for people with greater than a sixth grade education R.C. 3, 37, 34, 35	0.965	0.665
5. S 3225—Food and Agriculture Act of 1962 R.C. 46, 47, 44, 45, 196, 43, 42, 144, 143, 146	0.972	0.671
6. S 2965—Standby Public Works Act of 1962 R.C. 52, 54, 60, 174, 59, 208	0.990	0.765
7. S 2996—Foreign Assistance Act of 1962 R.C. 94, 95, 65	0.983	0.640
8. S 2996—Foreign Assistance Act of 1962 HR 13175—Foreign Assistance Appropriation of 1962 These are amendments relating specifically to Communist Nations R.C. 213, 61, 212, 64, 63	0.960	0.685
9. HR 10802—Interior Department Appropriations R.C. 66, 69, 68, 72	0.970	0.633
10. HR 12154—Sugar Act Amendments of 1962 R.C. 78, 86, 85, 79	0.952	0.785
11. HR 10606—Public Welfare Amendments of 1962 These were amendments trying to establish Medicare R.C. 91, 92, 93	0.993	0.677
12. HR 10904—Appropriations for HEW and Labor R.C. 99, 102, 97, 96	0.964	0.607
13. HR 11040—Communications Satellite Act of 1962 R.C. 142, 135, 116, 139	0.993	0.750
14. HR 10650—Revenue Act of 1962 (Revision Amendment) R.C. 164, 161, 166, 151, 163, 155	0.941	0.721
15. HR 11970—Trade Expansion Act of 1962 R.C. 178, 182, 181, 185, 180, 188	0.985	0.713

Appendix A. (Continued)

Bill and Roll Calls 1961	C.R. ¹	M.M.R. ²
16. HR 7927—Amendments to a postal rate and federal pay raise bill to limit delivery of Communist political propaganda through the mail R.C. 197, 198, 203	1.000	0.723
17. HR 13175—Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act of 1962 R.C. 213, 217, 211, 210, 219	0.971	0.653
18. S 2800—Extension of maritime ship construction subsidy, amendments to eliminate the West Coast preferential rate of 6% HR 12580—Appropriations for the West Coast preferential subsidy R.C. 190, 221	0.954	0.682

Appendix B. Variables Used in Estimating Constituency Model

Var. No.	Description
1.	Border states: Delaware, Maryland, West Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee.
2.	Midwest states: Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, North Dakota, Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, Missouri, South Dakota.
3.	Southern states: Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana.
4.	Southwestern states: Oklahoma, Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada.
5.	Mountain and Far West states: Montana, Idaho,

Appendix B. (Continued)

Var. No.	Description
	Utah, Colorado, Washington, Oregon, California, Alaska, Hawaii, Wyoming.
6.	Percent living in metropolitan areas. Metropolitan is defined as cities over 100,000 population and their suburbs.
7.	Percent of the population over 25 who have completed 12 years or more of schooling, but have not finished college.
8.	Percent of the population over 25 who have completed college.
9.	Percent of the employed male labor force employed as farmers and farm managers.
10.	Percent of the employed male labor force employed as managers, officials, and proprietors, excluding farm.
11.	Percent of the employed male labor force employed as clerical, sales, or service (except private household) workers.
12.	Percent of the employed male labor force employed as craftsmen, foremen, operatives, and laborers (except farm and mine).
13.	Percent of the families and unrelated individuals with incomes between \$10,000 and \$15,000.
14.	Percent of the families and unrelated individuals with incomes over \$15,000.
15.	Percent of the over 25 population who are 55 or older.
16.	Farm Bureau membership per 1000 people over 25.
17.	Farm Union membership per 100 people over 25.
18.	Unemployment as a percent of the civilian labor force.

Notes: The variables for the Southern states are only for the white population with the exception of Variable 6, which includes the total population.

Variables 1–5 are expressed as dummies.

Sources: Variables 6–15 and 18 are from the 1960 Census of Population.

Variables 16 and 17 are from Hadwiger and Talbot, *Pressures and Protests* (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1965), pp. 266–267.

Predicting Voting Patterns in the General Assembly¹

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Introduction

The purpose of this study is to explore the relationships of General Assembly voting patterns with national attribute data² through correlational techniques.

In this connection, national attribute data have already been shown to have considerable predictive relevance for United Nations delegate attitudes and measures relating to "economic development" have been of particular importance. In one study, completed in 1961-62 (sample = 61), it was found that the average per capita GNP of the members of caucusing groups could be used to predict, in a number of instances, the kinds of attitudes held by delegate members in such groups toward the major organs of the United Nations.³ In general, the higher the average per capita GNP of the groups, the more "negative" the attitudes tended to be. For example, higher ratios of delegates from the developed groups tended to be dissatisfied with the role and performance of the General Assembly than in the underdeveloped groups. In 1965-66 (sample = 68) it was found that when a large number of variables (48) were factor analyzed and then used as predictors of delegate attitudes, a dimension called "Economic Development" was the best predictor, in the sense that it generated numerous significant associations with questionnaire items and stood in contrast with other national attribute predictors such as "Authoritarianism" and "U.S. Relations."⁴ Again, high development, generally speaking, predicted negative attitudes. For example, there was a .59 correla-

tion between the delegates' home country scores on the "Development" dimension and the delegates' tendency to see the General Assembly as decreasing in importance in the future. Also, when these attitude scores were correlated with certain voting scores, a large number of significant associations became evident, with Western Community voting scores predicting "negative" attitudes, and Brazzaville African, Afro-Asian, and Communist Bloc voting scores predicting "positive" attitudes.⁵ Finally, it has been shown that "Economic Development" is a good predictor of caucusing group organization and activities as well as delegate attitudes toward such organization and activities (1967-1968 data, $n = 124$).⁶ In general, the higher the "Economic Development" of a caucusing group's members, the less "supranational" the organization, activities, and attitudes.

At a more general level, Rudolph J. Rummel has developed propositions about the relationship of attribute data to national behavior, under the title of Social Field Theory. The axioms of this theory may be summarized as follows: (1) "international relations is a field consisting of all the attributes and interactions of nations and their complex interrelationships"; (2) "the international field can be analytically divided into attribute, A, and behavior, B, spaces in which attributes and interactions are projected, respectively, as vectors"; (3) "the attribute and behavioral spaces are generated by a finite set of linear independent dimensions"; (4) "nations are located as vectors in attribute space and coupled into dyads in behavior space"; (5) "the distance vectors in A-space that connect nations are social forces determining the location of dyads in B-space"; (6) "the direction and velocity of movement over time of a dyad in B-space is along the resolution vector of the forces, d "; and (7) "B-space is a sub-space of A-space."⁷

¹I would like to thank Gail Glassmeyer, Norm Otto, and Ed Schwerin for their work as coders on the project; Bruce Alper, Carol Jones, and Pauline Kartude as programmers; the FAU Research Committee for its support out of NSF monies; and R. J. Rummel for kindly reading and commenting upon portions of this manuscript.

²The phrase "national attribute data" is used to refer to qualities of national units as determined by some kind of measurement, such as "Large Percentage of Labor Force Employed in Agriculture." In this usage I view all measures in this study, other than voting measures, as "national attribute" measures.

³Jack E. Vincent, *The Caucusing Groups of the United Nations: An Examination of Their Attitudes Toward the Organization* (Stillwater: Oklahoma State University Press, 1965).

⁴Jack E. Vincent, "National Attributes as Predictors of Delegate Attitudes at the United Nations," *American Political Science Review*, 62 (1968), 916-931.

⁵Jack E. Vincent, "The Convergence of Voting and Attitude Patterns at the United Nations," *Journal of Politics*, 31 (1969), 952-983.

⁶Jack E. Vincent, "An Analysis of Caucusing Group Activity at the United Nations," *Journal of Peace Research*, 2 (1970), 133-150.

⁷For a full treatment, see the various Dimensionality of Nations *Research Reports*, in particular, R. J. Rummel, "The DON Project, A Five-Year Research Program," *Research Report No. 9*, Dimensionality of Nations Project, University of Hawaii,

Applications of the model have, typically, involved the factor analysis of attribute measures and then, separately, behavior measures. Predicted relationships between the resulting dimensions are then tested by correlation techniques. In this connection, two models or equations have been developed. The first, Model I, is expressed as

$$w_{i \rightarrow j, k} = \sum_{l=1}^p \alpha_l d_{i-j, l},$$

where $w_{i \rightarrow j, k}$ is the behavior of nation i to nation j on the k th dimension of behavior space, d is the distance vector between i and j on the l th dimension of the p -dimensional space of nation attributes, and α_l is the corresponding parameter.⁸

This equation may be understood as saying that if we select any particular behavioral dimension, we may explain the behavior on it by summing the weighted attribute dimensions expressed in terms of distance vectors. Distance vectors, in this connection, are calculated using the factor score differences on a particular at-

tribute dimension. To put the whole matter in other terms, the differences between nations in respect to their attributes determine their behavioral relationships to one another.

The second equation, Model II, is expressed as⁹

$$w_{i \rightarrow j, k} = \sum_{l=1}^p \alpha_{il} d_{i-j, l},$$

The primary difference between the two equations is that parameter weights are allowed to vary for each actor i , in respect to the distance vectors, in attempting to account for the dyadic behavior. Thus, a fundamental factor dimension, such as "Economic Development," may be weighted one way for Albania but a different way for Afghanistan in attempting to account for some behavior such as their exports.

Rummel has compared and contrasted these two fundamental equations of Social Field Theory with that of Attribute Theory, the latter expressed by the equation

$$w_{ik} = \sum_{l=1}^p \beta_l s_{il},$$

where w_{ik} is the total behavior of nation i on the k th behavioral dimension, s_{il} is the l th attribute dimension of the p -dimensional space of nation attributes, and β_l the corresponding parameters.¹⁰

Rummel has demonstrated that the parameters α_l of Model I of Social Field Theory and β_l of Attribute Theory are mathematically interrelated,¹¹ that is, $\alpha_l = \beta_l/n$. In other words, the weights given to the attribute dimensions in attribute theory can be used to predict the weights of the distance vectors of Social Field Theory, Model I. Thus, if 10 states are treated in Attribute Theory, and the weight given to the "Economic Development" dimension is 7, in predicting some behavior dimension, the weight for the "Economic Development" distance vector would be .7 in Social Field Theory, Model I, with the same data.

Rummel further demonstrates that there is no similar simple mathematical relationship between the weights of Model II and Attribute Theory.

Unfortunately, the relationship described by Rummel only holds where the total behavior referred to, in connection with Attribute Theory, represents a summation of individual dyadic behaviors to arrive at the total behavior. That is, if the behavior dimension in question

1967; R. J. Rummel, "Field Theory and Indicators of International Behavior," *Research Report No. 29*, Dimensionality of Nations Project, University of Hawaii, 1969; David M. McCormick, "A Field Theory of Dynamic International Processes," *Research Report No. 30*, Dimensionality of Nations Project, University of Hawaii, 1969; R. J. Rummel, "Field and Attribute Theories of National Behavior: Some Mathematical Interrelationships," *Research Report No. 31*, Dimensionality of Nations Project, University of Hawaii, 1969; Tong-Whan Park, "Asian Conflict in Systematic Perspective: Application of Field Theory (1955 and 1963)," *Research Report No. 35*, Dimensionality of Nations Project, University of Hawaii, 1969; R. J. Rummel, "Social Time and International Relations," *Research Report No. 40*, Dimensionality of Nations Project, University of Hawaii, 1970; R. J. Rummel, "U.S. Foreign Relations: Conflict, Cooperation and Attribute Distances," *Research Report No. 41*, Dimensionality of Nations Project, University of Hawaii, 1970; Richard Van Atta and R. J. Rummel, "Testing Field Theory on the 1963 Behavior Space of Nations," *Research Report No. 43*, Dimensionality of Nations Project, University of Hawaii, 1970; R. J. Rummel, "Field Theory and the 1963 Behavior Space of Nations," *Research Report No. 44*, Dimensionality of Nations Project, University of Hawaii, 1970; Tong-Whan Park, "Measuring Dynamic Patterns of Development: The Case of Asia, 1949-1968," *Research Report No. 45*, Dimensionality of Nations Project, University of Hawaii, 1970; R. J. Rummel, "Indicators of Cross National and International Patterns," *American Political Science Review*, 63 (1969), 127-147; R. J. Rummel, "International Pattern and Nation Profile Delineation," in Davis B. Bobrow and Judah L. Schwartz, (eds.), *Computers and the Policy-Making Community* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), 154-202; and R. J. Rummel, "Some Attributes and Behavioral Patterns of Nations," *Journal of Peace Research*, 2 (1967), 196-206.

⁸ Rummel, "Field and Attribute Theories of National Behavior . . ." *op. cit.*, p. 6.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

concerns total exports, then the total export figure for a particular nation would be generated by summing together its exports to all other nations considered.

It should be apparent from subsequent discussion, that the theoretical implications developed from this paper relate better to Attribute Theory than to Social Field Theory, *in the sense that dyadic relationships are not the focus of attention*. Because United Nations voting is not dyadic in form, but nevertheless, in my opinion, is behavior, this work, although closely related to Rummel's, falls outside of the realm of Social Field Theory. That is, in discussing behavior, Rummel argues, "Interaction . . . is defined as a behavioral act: any action of one nation toward a specific other nation. This action then couples the two nations together. Thus, the exports of Peru to Bolivia is an action coupling the two nations. Two nations so coupled by the actions of one are called a dyad and the action involved is dyadic behavior."¹²

It should be evident that a country like the United States does not generate a dyadic relationship when it votes in the General Assembly as it does when it sends exports to other countries, such as Japan or Indonesia.¹³ This raises a question as to whether some important behavior in the international system is not dyadic in form and therefore not susceptible to treatment within the framework of Social Field Theory. However, if one ignores the constraint that total behavior in Attribute Theory should represent a summation of discrete dyadic acts, then, clearly, the present work can be viewed as a test of Attribute Theory. Because behavior, in this latter sense, is not a summation of discrete dyadic acts, it is no longer possible to deduce the Model I parameters from any findings because the behavior, that is, United Nations voting, is *not assumed to have a dyadic form*. Nevertheless, at the most general level, that is, in respect to the notion that attributes and behavior are linked, this project can be viewed as *complementary* to Social Field Theory.

Most important, perhaps, is the fact that "Economic Development," as measured by energy consumption divided by population, has had considerable predictive importance in tests of both Models I and II. As will be seen

shortly, "Developed," defined later, does emerge as an important predictor of voting behavior.

Rummel concludes *Research Report No. 29* by stating, "From this study nothing at all definite or reliable can be said yet about the linkage between nation behavior and attributes. The paper does represent a scientific direction, however, which looks promising and I hope others will be encouraged by this analysis to contribute to it."¹⁴

To repeat, although I do not view the analysis here as directly testing either Model I or Model II, I do share Rummel's enthusiasm for relating empirically derived indices to measures of behavior and also for developing predictive models of the international system.

In the attitudinal studies a possible explanation of the major findings took the following form:

States differ in their economic development. States with higher economic development generally have higher capabilities to supply human needs, regardless of international organization affiliation, than states with lower economic development. International organizations may be considered devices which augment, in a limited way, the capabilities of states. Because the capabilities of developed states are already high, the contributions of international organizations to their capabilities are generally less significant, as a fraction of total capabilities, than in the case of states with lower development. Because statesmen may value an augmentation of capabilities to the extent that it is a "significant increment," representatives from underdeveloped states may generally value international organizations more than those from developed states. This may be particularly true if representatives from underdeveloped states are in a position to have a considerable voice in the organization (i.e., have a majority where majority rule is used). Thus, attitudinal differences might be expected among statesmen toward the United Nations related to their home states' economic development. One might expect, for example, that representatives from economically underdeveloped states would be more satisfied, see things in more dynamic terms, and be more inclined to bolster the organization than representatives from developed states.¹⁵

Is it possible to extend this interpretation to UN voting patterns? That is, is it possible to evaluate known voting patterns in the same negative-positive cast adopted in the studies concerning attitudes? (A solution to this problem will be taken up later.) And, if so, what does this suggest?

¹⁴ Rummel, "Field Theory and Indicators of International Behavior," *op. cit.*, p. 39.

¹⁵ Vincent, "National Attributes . . ." *op. cit.*, p. 930.

¹² Rummel, "Field Theory and Indicators of International Behavior," *op. cit.*, p. 10.

¹³ When Rummel treats UN voting as behavior, he takes the Euclidean distance between the nations on the factor dimensions generated from an analysis of roll call votes (*Ibid.*, p. 26C). Although this may allow treatment of UN voting data for certain purposes, nevertheless, as pointed out above, voting does not appear to be dyadic in form in the same sense that exports, threats, etc., are.

In connection with this question, Alker and Russett have shown that voting in the General Assembly of the United Nations tends to fall into patterns which repeat over time.¹⁶ There is a tendency for certain kinds of voting alignments, such as "East-West" and "North-South," to appear session after session. The primary tool in uncovering these patterns and others has been factor analysis,¹⁷ which has also provided the method for scaling states in respect to the fundamental patterns. To make the analysis, roll calls were coded by assigning rank numbers, with "no" given the lowest rank, "abstain"

a higher rank, and "yes" the highest rank, with average rank values assigned in cases of ties. The data were then standardized and a correlation matrix was generated by correlating each roll call with every other roll call. The resulting correlation matrix was factor analyzed and the loadings of the votes on the resulting factor dimensions were ascertained, both in the unrotated and rotated cases. Factor scores were generated on the dimensions by application of the formula $F = ZA (A'A)^{-1}$.¹⁸ Each state, then, was given a factor score on the various factor dimensions and each set of factor scores possessed an explicit relationship to the original variables.

Considering the scale value of states on the "East-West" dimension, for example, generated from an analysis of 1961 roll call votes, Albania and Bulgaria, each with scale values of 1.52, tended to vote "East," while the United States and Luxembourg, with scale values of -1.36 and -1.44 respectively, tended to vote "West."¹⁹ The relationship of the factor scores to the original variables is given by a roll call's loading. Thus, if any particular set of factor scores is correlated with the original variable scores, the resulting correlations will be equal to the loadings of the variables on that dimension.

By ascertaining which variables load "heaviest"—that is, correlate best with a particular set of factor scores—the factor dimension can be "named." Thus, on the first unrotated dimension (of the analysis of concern in this study), labeled the "East-West" dimension, states with

¹⁶ In particular, see Hayward R. Alker, Jr., and Bruce M. Russett, *World Politics in the General Assembly* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965); Bruce M. Russett, "Discovering Voting Groups in the United Nations," *American Political Science Review*, 60 (1966), 327-339; and Hayward R. Alker, Jr., "Dimensions of Conflict in the General Assembly," *American Political Science Review*, 58 (1964), 642-658.

¹⁷ The uses and meaning of factor analysis will be made clear in subsequent discussion. In addition, see Harry H. Harman, *Modern Factor Analysis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960); Henry F. Kaiser, "The Varimax Criterion for Analytic Rotation in Factor Analysis," *Psychometrika*, 23 (1958), 187-200; Henry F. Kaiser, "Computer Program for Varimax Rotation in Factor Analysis," *Educational and Psychological Measurements*, 19 (1959), 413-420; Dean J. Clyde, Elliott M. Cramer, Richard J. Sharin, *Multivariate Statistical Programs* (Coral Gables, Florida: University of Miami, 1966), 15-19; Bruce M. Russett, *International Regions and the International System: A Study in Political Ecology* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967); Rudolph J. Rummel, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations," *General Systems*, Yearbook for the Advancement of General Systems Theory (Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1963); Arthur S. Banks and Phillip M. Gregg, "Grouping Political Systems: Q-Factor Analysis of A Cross-Polity Survey," *The American Behavioral Scientist*, 9 (1965), 3-6; Phillip M. Gregg and Arthur S. Banks, "Dimensions of Political Systems: Factor Analysis of A Cross Polity Survey," *American Political Science Review*, 59 (1965), 602-614; Raymond Tanter, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations, 1958-60," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 10 (1966), 41-64; R. J. Rummel, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within Nations 1946-59," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 10 (1966), 65-73; Jack E. Vincent, *Factor Analysis in International Relations: Interpretation, Problem Areas and An Application* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, forthcoming); R. J. Rummel, *Applied Factor Analysis* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970); Jack E. Vincent, "Factor Analysis as a Research Tool in International Relations: Some Problem Areas, Some Suggestions and An Application," *Proceedings of the 65th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association* (New York: 1969); Raymond B. Cattell, "The Measuring and Strategic Use of Factor Analysis," in Raymond B. Cattell (ed.) *Handbook of Multivariate Experimental Psychology* (Chicago: Rand, McNally & Co., 1966), 174-243; and Raymond B. Cattell, "The Basis of Recognition and Interpretation of Factors," *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, 22 (1962), 667-697.

¹⁸ Alker and Russett, *op. cit.*, p. 38. Where F is an $N \times m$ matrix of factor scores, Z is an $N \times n$ matrix of scores on the original variables in standard score form, A is an $n \times m$ matrix of factor coefficients (loadings) and N = subjects, n = variables and m = factors.

In the case of Alker and Russett's factor scores, because they chose to set loadings less than $\pm .25$ to 0, there is some discrepancy between such correlations and the loadings. Such procedures generally create stronger correlations of the heaviest loading variables with the factor scores than the loadings themselves would indicate. Also, such "factor scores" are correlated, which is not consistent with the "orthogonal" rotation. As will be seen, this problem is handled by re-factor analyzing Alker and Russett's factor scores (along with Russett's voting group scores) and computing new scores.

For a discussion of factor scores, see John L. Horn and Wilbur C. Miller, "Evidence on Problems in Estimating Common Factor Scores," *Educational and Psychological Measurements*, 26 (1966), 617-622; John L. Horn, "An Empirical Comparison of Methods for Estimating Factor Scores," *Educational and Psychological Measurements*, 25 (1965), 313-322; Gene V. Glass and Thomas O. Maguire, "Abuses of Factor Scores," *American Educational Research Journal*, 3 (1966), 297-304; and Jack E. Vincent, "Factor Analysis as a Research Tool . . ." *op. cit.*

¹⁹ Alker and Russett, *op. cit.*, pp. 299-307.

high factor scores tend to vote for resolutions where the loading is positive and against resolutions where the loading is negative, while low scoring states ("Western" voting) tend to exhibit the opposite pattern. The following are representative loadings: Censure South Africa (.63), General and Complete Disarmament (.88), Denuclearize Africa (.70).

In the case of the "North-South" dimension, states with high factor scores tend to vote "South" and the following are representative loadings: Stop 50 megaton bomb (.64), Regrets tests, need treaty (.86), Aid underdeveloped states with 1% of GNP (.74). The interpretation is, of course, as before.

Alker and Russett generated the labels "East-West," "North-South" in terms of the kinds of states having high or low scores on the dimensions. For example, the Afro-Asian, Arab, and Soviet states tend to be "East," while the Latin American, Scandinavian, Western European and Old Commonwealth states tend to be "West." On the other hand, Western European and Old Commonwealth and the Soviet states tend to be "North," while the Latin American, Brazzaville, Afro-Asian, and Arab states tend to be "South."

In respect to the rotated dimensions, a similar interpretation applies. For example, on the "Self-Determination" dimension, with high-scoring states voting for self-determination, the following are representative loadings: Censure South Africa (.77), Sanction South Africa (.88), No Petroleum to South Africa (.84), Oman self-determination (.67), and so forth.

Russett has also shown how the application of the Q-factor technique may be employed to identify voting groups such as "Western Community," "Brazzaville Africans," "Afro-Asian," etc.²⁰

The Q analysis treats the countries as variables and the roll call votes as observations. When a matrix has been constructed where this is the case, the factor analysis of the matrix identifies countries with similar voting patterns, in the sense that the countries, as variables, load on the dimensions cutting through the data.²¹ In this way Russett was able to identify six basic voting groups—"Western Community," "Brazzaville Africans," "Afro-Asians," "Communist Bloc," "Conservative Arabs," and

"Iberia." Russett was able to generate these titles for the voting groups by ascertaining which countries load most heavily on these dimensions. For example, on Factor I, named "Western Community," Russett found Denmark to load .90, Norway .89, Sweden .89, Finland .88, Austria .87, etc. Latin American countries, such as Chile, Brazil and Peru, load moderately on the factor, while African countries such as Chad, Nigeria, and Ivory Coast, load hardly at all and Communist countries load negatively. On the other hand, on Factor IV—"Communist Bloc"—Communist countries load heavily, while certain African countries load moderately, and a number of Western European countries load negatively. Conceptually, then, the Q analysis may be interpreted in the same terms as the R analysis once it is realized that the only change in the analysis is a transposition of variables and subjects.

Thus far, as implied above, only a limited effort has been made to determine what kinds of predictors relate well to such patterns.²² That is, if we scale states in respect to other variables (such as national attribute data), will such scales have significant predictive power in respect to the voting indices?

National attribute data are selected for correlational purposes, primarily because of their accessibility and relevance to the theoretical implications treated above. It is realized that other kinds of data, such as those relating to the personality characteristics of the delegates or the governmental elite which send them directives, may also have possible predictive relevance. Such information, of course, is extremely hard to come by. In short, like the attitude studies, the present project has a pilot character.²³

Data Sources

The sources of voting data have been suggested above. "Voting pattern" data are taken

²⁰ Alker treats eight group membership variables, nine economic variables, six political variables, and three sociological variables in his "Dimensions of Conflict . . .," *op. cit.*, pp. 653-654. Alker and Russett treat six economic variables, four political variables, five regional variables, and four social variables in their *World Politics in the General Assembly*, *op. cit.*, pp. 224-252. These variables, for the most part, showed varying degrees of association with the voting pattern data only, and no "overall importance analysis," of the type presented here, has been attempted. This observation is in no way intended to disparage such earlier efforts, but is made to set this analysis off from earlier ones.

²³ It should be apparent by examination of the primary resources that the time the states were scaled on the various variables considered in this study, treated as independent variables, is very close to the time the states were scaled on the voting data.

²⁰ Russett, "Discovering Voting Groups . . ." *op. cit.*, pp. 331-334.

²¹ Unlike factor scores computed by the formula $F = ZA(A'A)^{-1}$, given above, the subjects' scores, as loadings, tend to be correlated across factors. For this reason, as will be seen, Russett's Q analysis loadings are factor analyzed, along with Alker and Russett's factor scores, and the subjects re-scored using the formula given above.

from Alker and Russett's *World Politics in the General Assembly* (1961 analysis) while "voting group" data are taken from Russett's "Discovering Voting Groups in the United Nations."²⁴

The national attribute data were selected so that they cut across numerous economic, social, political, and geographic features of the states. Two sources can be considered primary: the *Cross Polity Survey* and the *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*,²⁵ well-known and carefully compiled resources. Variables were selected, for the most part, in terms of completeness—that is, as many states as possible should have values on the variables selected.²⁶ Appendix A gives the list of the variables selected and their sources.

Data Transformation

Because many of the variables selected are basically ordinal in character and others may have badly skewed distributions, it was decided to assign rank numbers to the original scores, in terms of available information. Thus, all those in the ascertainable *universe* of states were assigned rank numbers on each of the variables selected. For example, 128 states can be scaled on the variable of "Dollar Exports to the United States." The rank numbers, then, range from 1 to 128 on this variable. In cases of ties, states showing the same value were assigned average ranks. Data were then standardized and states with missing values were assigned 0's, or mean values. Finally, the data were re-ranked for those states *included in the study* (the range was 99 for voting pattern study and 103 for voting group study).

Basic Analytic Techniques

Three analytic techniques were used in the evaluation of the data, simple correlation, factor analysis and canonical correlation.

First, all variables were related to one another through the calculation of Spearman's *Rho*. Second, national attribute and voting data were separately factor analyzed. Third, the resulting factor scores were related to one another through the technique of canonical correlation.

Simple Correlation. Concerning the first stage of analysis, relating to Spearman's *Rho*, this statistic was chosen because, unlike the Pearson

r coefficient, it does not assume interval numbers or normal distributions and, as pointed out above, many of the variables selected in this study are basically ordinal in character and some have badly skewed distributions.²⁷ Because of the large *N* employed in this study, a "significant" correlation may be produced if it reaches $\pm .20$. This magnitude of correlation, from a descriptive point of view, is quite weak (only $.20^2 = .04$ of the variance of the rank numbers explained) so it was decided to distinguish between "significant" and "important" correlations. Important correlations will be defined as those which, when squared, indicate at least 25% of the variance of the rank numbers is accounted for. Thus, important correlations will be considered those that reach or exceed $\pm .50$, and will be the focal point of the first stage analysis.

The advantage of the first stage analysis is its microscopic clearness in showing what is related to what. Through its use it is possible to generate statements such as, "The higher a state is on the Per Capita GNP variable, the more likely it is the state will vote Western." The disadvantage of these procedures lies in the fact that many predictors are virtually identical in terms of the variance that they explain, such as "Newspaper Circulation" and "Per Capita Gross National Product," and, further, there is an extremely large number of correlations to deal with.

Factor Analysis. Factor analysis,²⁸ employed in the second stage of analysis, has had at least two different historic uses. The first use might be titled a "Search for Causes" and is exemplified by the work of Cattell, who argues, "the present writer's theoretical position, in contrast to that of many factor analysts . . . has always been that a factor . . . is a *cause*."²⁹ Basically, this school views factor analysis as a device which reveals that which explains observed common variance. A factor, then, is viewed as a cause of the variance which is shared between variables under consideration.

If a researcher is interested in causes, his research will require repeated factor analyses with numerous samples. In such cases, although the loadings of the tests may suggest the names to be given to the factors, the factors themselves are assumed to have independent existence beyond the tests. Certain psychologists, for example, have developed such factors as

²⁴ Alker and Russett, *op. cit.*; Russett, *op. cit.*

²⁵ Arthur S. Banks and Robert B. Textor, *A Cross Polity Survey* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1963); Bruce M. Russett, et al., *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964).

²⁶ Approximately 10 percent of the data was missing.

²⁷ See Andrew R. Baggaley, *Intermediate Correlational Methods* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964), pp. 21–23.

²⁸ See footnote 17.

²⁹ Cattell, "The Basis of Recognition . . ." *op. cit.*, p. 684.

"visual acuity," "mechanical aptitude," "fluency," as "standing behind" psychological test performance.

Related to the "Search for Causes" approach is one of the first, and perhaps most important, decisions facing a factor analyst. This concerns the principal diagonal of the correlation matrix. Generally speaking, the research option is viewed as two-fold, either to place estimates of communalities in the diagonal or to place unities. If estimates of communalities are entered, and are less than 1, only a fraction of the variance of each test will be accounted for by the factor analysis regardless of how many factors are computed. The variance of the tests, in this case, is viewed as being divided into common variance and specific variance,³⁰ and the factor matrix will only account for the common variance. The distinction between common variance and specific variance can be understood from definition of common variance, for a particular test, as the variance the test shares with other tests. The remaining non-shared variance, then, is specific.

There are various methods to estimate communalities, one estimate being the multiple correlation squared of the test in question with all other tests in the battery. An important consideration, when using the entry of estimates of communalities, concerns the fact that, conceptually, the total number of factors exceeds the total number of tests, except in the case when all estimates of communalities are equal to 1, which would hardly ever be the case. Thus, in all other cases, some of the variance of each test, with a communality less than 1, is relevant to the common factors and the rest of it relevant to a specific factor. Theoretically, then, if a factor analysis is performed on 25 tests, each with a communality less than 1, there are 25 specific factors and a lesser number of common factors.

An important consequence of this approach is that factor scores can never be directly calculated, only estimated. Godfrey Thompson has pointed out:

As soon, however, as any fractions, minimum or not, are placed in the diagonal cells, we have thereby decided to use, in describing our tests, more orthogonal axes than there are tests; for each test has then a specific factor, and there are in addition the common factors. This means in

³⁰ Sometimes the concepts of "unique," "specific," and "error" variance are developed. In such a case the variance left over, that is, not explained by the factors, is viewed as unique and subdivided into specific and error factors. The above discussion, then, ignores the problem of error factors and treats all of the unique variance as specific for the purposes of simplification. See Cattell, "The Meaning and Strategic Use . . ." *op. cit.*, pp. 177, 200-211.

terms of our spatial model that none of the axes, neither the common factors nor the specific factors, are in the test space at all (except at the origin where they all cross). It is only about the test space, of dimensions equal to the number of tests, that we have any information from our battery. These axes are away in outer darkness and we cannot know them, but only their projections or shadows on the test space. Psychologists invariably confine their attention, after making an analysis using communalities, to the "common factor space," of a comparatively small number of dimensions, without, I think, being usually aware that this space is not in the test space at all. . . . The effect of all this is that the factors arrived at by an analysis which has begun by placing fractions in the diagonal cells can never be measured in any man, but only vaguely estimated, and with maximum vagueness if minimum communalities are used.³¹

According to Cattell, those concerned with causes behind test performance should use estimates of communalities in the principal diagonal.³² The purpose is to examine and compare

³¹ Godfrey H. Thomson, *The Factorial Analysis of Human Ability* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1951), pp. 336-337.

³² Cattell argues, "The components model [putting unities in the principal diagonal] must be rejected for general scientific investigation, because it would be most unlikely that n variables would contain within themselves all the causes for accounting for their own variances. To do this, they would have to lie in a completely self-explanatory subuniverse, self-sufficient as a system entirely isolated from the rest of the universe." Cattell, "The Meaning and Strategic Use . . ." *op. cit.*, p. 177.

In the search for factors (viewed as causes) where oblique rotation is used, Cattell maintains that it is necessary to evaluate at least the following matrices: reference vector structure, reference vector pattern, factor pattern, factor structure, factor estimation weights, and reference vector estimation weights. Cattell, "The Basis of Recognition . . ." *op. cit.*, pp. 673-676. Cattell criticized most factor analysts, who search for causes, for usually dealing with only one of these matrices.

Probably four-fifths of all published factor analyses talk about factor loading patterns when strictly their tables present only reference vector correlations. But, in any case, there are at least six alternative possibilities of expressing the profile of variables upon a dimension, and it is time that they become clearly recognized. For they could have different degrees of usefulness for *identifying*, i.e., matching, discovered factors, and they certainly have different meanings for purposes of *interpreting* the influence revealed by a factor. *Ibid.*, pp. 671-672.

Further, Cattell does not view any of the oblique solutions (oblimax, etc.) as final if the investigator's quest is for simple structure. "All present analytical solutions fail because they are not working with a criterion rightly demanded by the model." Cattell, "The Meaning and Strategic Use . . ." *op. cit.*, p. 186. The search for simple structure, as developed by Cattell, is an extremely complicated matter and may prove to be very time consuming. In Cattell's words:

the common factors which generate the inter-correlations in tests. Such common factors, even if considerably smaller than the number of tests, have the property that they can reproduce the intercorrelation matrix with a small margin of error. They cannot predict the original test scores as accurately, however, because the specific variance in each test is not accounted for by the factors. The linkage between putting estimates of communalities in the principal diagonal and the "search for causes" can be understood if it is realized that *factors can account for non-shared variance* (as well as shared variance), if unities are placed in the principal diagonal. In such a case, if the factors are viewed as causes, variables, in a sense, would be (partially) "causing" themselves. In short, in using unities, the factor analysis *does not* deal with that which is *common*. It would seem desirable to restrict the concept of "cause" to refer to "that which explains that which is common."

The second approach—and the one employed in this study—is to use factor analysis to transform a set of variables which are inter-correlated into a set of variables which are uncorrelated. Because the later variables, called factor scores, are usually far fewer in number than the original variables, this second use of factor analysis may be referred to as "Data Reduction." (The advantages of using uncorrelated factor scores in place of the correlated original variable scores for subsequent correlational analysis will be taken up later.)

Formerly, a large factor analysis might take a month's calculation for two clerks, and the rotation to simple structure four or five months. Nowadays the former time can be reduced to minutes, and the latter to perhaps a month, but not, as some imagine, to a moment. And it remains true that three-fourths of published factor analyses are demonstrably nowhere near simple structures (editors having no standards or resources to check this) and constitute no contribution (except confusion) to the field that they are intended to clarify. What these casual and unworkmanlike studies have actually done in the last decade is to create an atmosphere of pointlessness and disillusionment by cumulating the junk heap in which factors can rarely be matched from any one research to another. *Ibid.*, p. 186.

To me, Cattell's case appears reasonable and the burden is on those to use such procedures if they view factor analysis as a search for causes. If we accept Cattell's arguments, the following kinds of practices prevalent in certain factor analytic studies are relatively meaningless: (1) "seeing" similarly in an orthogonal and oblique solution and then concluding that the factors are basically uncorrelated, (2) "seeing" similarly in the factors that emerge across several studies and concluding the same fundamental causes are operative, and (3) rotating to one of the oblique solutions and then concluding that the result is simple structure. Fortunately, those that follow the data reduction school of factor analysis escape the procedural burdens, imposed by Cattell, for the reasons developed above.

Normally, when data reduction is the objective, unities are placed in the principal diagonal. In this case the factor matrix can account for, if all factors are computed, the complete variance of each test. That is, the number of factors will not exceed the number of tests and all of the test variance can be accounted for by such factors because they will be equal to or less than the number of tests. Generally speaking, a factor analyst using unities in the principal diagonal will not calculate all of the principal components and therefore some of the test variance will be unaccounted for. If he did calculate all of the principal components, however, as stated above, every bit of the variance in the tests could be accounted for by the factors. Placing unities in the principal diagonal, then, is particularly compatible with the descriptive and/or data reduction objective, in contrast with the search for causes, in that the original data can be described completely by computing all of the principal components, or almost completely, by computing somewhat fewer principal components and does not deal solely with variance that is common, which is the case when estimates of communalities are placed in the principal diagonal.

The principal advantage of "unity approach" is that factor scores can be calculated exactly and there is no need for factor score estimation. Also, original scores can be predicted with a small degree of error, although, if fewer components than tests are extracted and the potential number of components is equal to the number of tests, the intercorrelation matrix cannot be reproduced as exactly as in the case of the common factor analysis.

To recap, if the object of the factor analysis is primarily descriptive and/or data reduction, the most appropriate entries in the principal diagonal are unities. That is, to use estimates of communalities (less than 1) would leave some of the information out of the analysis, although it would be possible, of course, to view the results as "descriptive of that which is common," remembering, however, the effects on factor scores. On the other hand, if the principal objective is to identify causes, standing behind similarities in test performance, the most appropriate entries are estimates of communalities, unless the term "cause" is used to refer to "that which, in part, is unique."

When factor analysis is used to describe data parsimoniously, it matters little what names are given to factors as long as the loadings are given. In the descriptive case, factors may be viewed as nothing more than sets of scores that have certain properties. That is, if properly computed, they are standardized, they are uncorrelated, and they predict the variables in the

study to the extent the variables load on the factors. Any naming of these sets of scores, then, is simply a device to simplify presentation. Thus, when I call a factor "Authoritarianism," I simply mean that the scores of this particular dimension are defined primarily in terms of certain variables. In the present study, then, I choose to call as "Authoritarian," states which tend to have ineffective constitutional limitations, noncompetitive electoral systems, non-representative regimes, ineffective legislatures, and so forth. I do not mean to imply that "Authoritarianism" causes ineffective legislatures, noncompetitive electoral systems, etc. *Factors, then, in descriptive usage, are the factor scores.* They have certain predictive power relative to the original variables, and, they may have predictive power to other variables, but the latter is an additional empirical question.

I have included this somewhat tedious discussion of factor analysis to make it completely clear what I am about and, particularly, to "answer" those who may feel that every application of factor analysis is, somehow, a search for causes and therefore may insist on a comparison of "factors" generated in one study with another. If the above arguments have been accepted, it should be clear that factor analysis is used here simply to reorganize the data for subsequent analytical purposes.

Canonical Correlation. Canonical correlation,³³ also employed in the second stage of analysis, assigns weights to two sets of variables so that scores generated from the two sets are maximally correlated. The canonical variate scores, themselves, (for one set), can be computed by the formula $C = SW$, where C is an N by 1 vector of canonical variate scores, S is an N by n matrix of subject's standard scores on the original variables and W is an n by 1 vector of canonical weights, where N = subjects and n = variables.³⁴

³³ See: Harold Hotelling, "Relations Between Two Sets of Variates," *Biometrika*, 28 (1936), 321-377; Harold Hotelling, "The Most Predictable Criterion," *Journal of Educational Psychology*, 26 (1935), 139-142; T. W. Anderson, *An Introduction to Multivariate Statistical Analysis* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1958), Chapter 12; M. S. Bartlett, "The Statistical Significance of Canonical Correlations," *Biometrika*, 32 (1941), 29-38; Paul Horst, *Generalized Canonical Correlations and Their Application to Experimental Data* (Seattle: University of Washington, 1961, mimeographed); Paul Horst, "Relations Among m Sets of Measures," *Psychometrika*, 26 (1961), 129-149; M. G. Kendall, *A Course in Multivariate Analysis* (London: Charles Griffin and Co., 1957), Chapter 5; G. Thomson, "The Maximum Correlation of Two Weighted Batteries," *The British Journal of Psychology: Statistical Section*, vol. 1, Part 1 (1947), 27-34; and Clyde, Cramer and Sharin, *op. cit.*, pp. 4-8.

³⁴ When this formula is applied to uncorrelated scores the weights become Pearson r correlations of

This formula is given here to make clear the meaning of canonical variate scores. The actual calculation of the weights, of course, is the solution to the basic canonical problem, which is to maximally correlate two such sets of scores, one generated from one set of variables and the other generated from the other set of variables. When weights are calculated where this is the case, the canonical variate scores predict the original variables to the extent of their loadings, *if the original variables are mutually orthogonal in each set.*³⁵ Thus, like factor scores, a great deal of information can be summarized by properly computed canonical variate scores.

Following the above suggested procedures in this project, it will be possible to combine the predictor variables (national attribute factor scores) into one set of canonical variate scores and likewise for the voting scores. After the canonical analysis, then, we will have two sets of canonical variate scores whose relationship will be given by a simple correlation (the canonical correlation) and whose relationship to the original variables (two different sets of factor scores) will also be given by simple correlations (i.e., the canonical weights). It should be clear that the variables with the heaviest weights will be those variables which have contributed most in defining the canonical variate scores, i.e., are the most important in the overall relationship between the two sets of variables. Also, because the canonical technique begins with a simple correlation matrix, it should be possible to evaluate it in attempting to answer some of our research questions.

The Analysis: First Stage

The first stage analysis is based on the application of the Spearman Rho formula to the two sets of data.³⁶

the variables with the canonical variate scores, a point discussed above.

³⁵ When the variables that are entered into a canonical correlation are not mutually orthogonal, that is, are correlated, the problems of interpreting weights are similar to the problems encountered in interpreting weights when using multiple regression analysis. For example, if there are two very good but correlated predictors, the one with the best relationship will receive the heaviest weight and the one with the second best relationship will receive hardly any weight, or, perhaps, an even opposite sign weighting. Weights in the correlated case, then, are no longer correlations of the variables with the canonical variate scores and, therefore, interpretation becomes difficult. It should be apparent that one of the primary uses of factor analysis can be to set up data in a form convenient for analysis and interpretation in a canonical correlation.

³⁶ Another possible mode of analysis is to relate independent factor dimensions to the dependent voting variables, one at a time. Such procedures would generate statements such as, "The higher a state scores on the Development factor, the more likely it will vote

The following table shows the relationship of the predictors to the voting pattern data, with "important" associations underlined.

These results may be interpreted by thinking in terms of the implications of high scores, indicated by variable title, and noting whether

Table I

SPEARMAN RHO CORRELATIONS OF THE NATIONAL ATTRIBUTE SCORES									
WITH THE VOTING PATTERN DATA. N = 99									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	ROWS	
VARIABLE 1	-0.05	-0.58	0.08	-0.48	-0.29	0.05	0.04	1.	LARGE % MILITARY PERSONNEL AS A % OF TOTAL POP.
VARIABLE 2	-0.05	-0.78	0.07	-0.22	-0.06	-0.10	-0.07	02.	LARGE POP. PER 1000 HECTARES OF AGRICULTURAL LAND.
VARIABLE 3	0.49	0.70	0.29	0.64	0.12	0.31	-0.03	03.	LARGE NUMBER OF INHABITANTS PER PHYSICIAN.
VARIABLE 4	0.20	-0.47	-0.06	-0.46	-0.10	0.15	0.05	04.	LARGE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT.
VARIABLE 5	0.42	0.53	0.18	0.52	0.07	0.42	-0.15	05.	LARGE NUMBER OF INHABITANTS PER HOSPITAL BED.
VARIABLE 6	0.46	0.38	0.20	0.51	-0.05	0.41	-0.24	06.	LARGE % OF LABOR FORCE EMPLOYED IN AGRICULTURE.
VARIABLE 7	0.16	0.27	-0.07	0.27	0.01	0.22	-0.16	07.	LARGE ANNUAL % RATE OF INCREASE IN POP.
VARIABLE 8	0.56	0.45	0.45	0.55	-0.10	0.55	0.02	08.	LARGE % MOSLEMS AS A % OF POPULATION.
VARIABLE 9	-0.42	-0.30	-0.44	-0.28	-0.12	-0.13	0.09	09.	LARGE % ROMAN CATHOLICS AS A % OF TOTAL POP.
VARIABLE 10	-0.51	-0.43	-0.34	-0.48	-0.02	-0.52	-0.00	10.	LARGE % CHRISTIANS AS A % OF TOTAL POP.
VARIABLE 11	-0.04	-0.35	0.09	-0.33	0.11	0.05	-0.12	11.	LARGE POPULATION PER SQUARE KILOMETER.
VARIABLE 12	0.12	0.15	0.03	0.21	-0.04	0.10	0.11	12.	LARGE AREA IN SQUARE KILOMETERS.
VARIABLE 13	-0.45	-0.61	-0.21	-0.66	-0.01	-0.41	0.07	13.	MANY RADIOS PER 1000 POPULATION.
VARIABLE 14	-0.09	-0.12	0.10	-0.09	-0.20	0.00	0.18	14.	LARGE DEFENSE EXPENDITURES AS A % OF GNP.
VARIABLE 15	-0.08	-0.39	0.07	-0.19	-0.10	-0.21	0.16	15.	MANY VOTES IN NATIONAL ELECTIONS AS A % OF VOTING AGE POP.
VARIABLE 16	-0.05	-0.36	0.09	-0.13	-0.24	-0.10	0.22	16.	LARGE % MILITARY PERSONNEL AS A % OF POP AGED 15-64.
VARIABLE 17	-0.39	-0.49	-0.23	-0.50	-0.10	-0.36	0.08	17.	LARGE NUMBER OF STUDENTS ENROLLED IN HIGHER EDUCATION PER 100,000 POP.
VARIABLE 18	-0.40	-0.67	-0.16	-0.50	-0.12	-0.34	0.00	18.	LARGE % PRIMARY AND SECONDARY STUDENTS AS A % OF POP AGED 5-19.
VARIABLE 19	-0.45	-0.50	-0.18	-0.34	-0.00	-0.51	0.17	19.	LARGE % LITERATE OF POPULATION AGE 15 AND OVER.
VARIABLE 20	0.16	0.01	0.05	0.03	-0.02	-0.15	-0.05	20.	LARGE % LITERATE OF POP. AGE 15 AND OVER, AVERAGE ANNUAL INCREASE.
VARIABLE 21	-0.44	-0.01	-0.51	-0.31	0.16	-0.36	-0.06	21.	LARGE % EXPORT OF TOTAL EXPORTS TO U.S.
VARIABLE 22	-0.41	0.07	-0.52	-0.28	0.23	-0.24	-0.14	22.	LARGE % IMPORTS OF TOTAL IMPORTS FROM U.S.
VARIABLE 23	-0.08	-0.37	-0.04	-0.26	-0.14	-0.00	-0.01	23.	LARGE NUMBER IN PERMANENT MISSIONS AT THE UN.
VARIABLE 24	0.38	0.45	0.28	0.32	0.07	0.24	-0.21	24.	RECENTLY ENTERED THE UN.
VARIABLE 25	-0.23	0.11	0.04	-0.31	0.17	0.00	0.00	25.	ALLIED WITH THE U.S.S.S.R.
VARIABLE 26	-0.58	-0.27	-0.43	-0.61	0.18	-0.75	0.08	26.	LARGE DOLLAR EXPORTS FROM THE U.S.
VARIABLE 27	-0.55	-0.36	-0.44	-0.62	0.10	-0.44	0.12	27.	LARGE DOLLAR EXPORTS TO THE U.S.
VARIABLE 28	0.01	-0.38	0.22	-0.28	-0.12	-0.03	0.07	28.	LARGE DOLLAR EXPORTS TO THE U.S.S.S.R.
VARIABLE 29	0.08	-0.37	0.30	-0.24	-0.14	-0.06	0.02	29.	LARGE DOLLAR IMPORTS FROM THE U.S.S.S.R.
VARIABLE 30	0.12	-0.35	-0.26	-0.19	-0.10	-0.11	0.05	30.	LARGE DOLLAR EXPORTS TO COMMUNIST CHINA.
VARIABLE 31	-0.21	-0.28	0.36	-0.08	-0.15	-0.17	0.03	31.	LARGE DOLLAR IMPORTS FROM COMMUNIST CHINA.
VARIABLE 32	-0.02	0.32	-0.03	0.21	0.18	-0.12	0.00	32.	SMALL POPULATION.
VARIABLE 33	0.39	0.53	0.25	0.57	0.04	0.26	-0.01	33.	LOW URBANIZATION.
VARIABLE 34	-0.59	-0.51	-0.34	-0.69	0.04	-0.51	0.12	34.	VERY LOW AGRICULTURAL POPULATION.
VARIABLE 35	0.47	0.66	0.20	0.60	0.07	0.45	-0.10	35.	VERY LOW PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT.
VARIABLE 36	0.29	0.53	0.05	0.52	0.13	0.17	-0.13	36.	VERY LOW INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS.
VARIABLE 37	0.42	0.62	0.14	0.52	0.09	0.37	-0.15	37.	VERY UNDERDEVELOPED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT STATUS.
VARIABLE 38	0.56	0.73	0.41	0.68	0.36	0.62	0.24	38.	CENSORSHIP
VARIABLE 39	0.42	0.68	0.15	0.69	0.03	0.39	0.01	39.	VERY LOW NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION PER 1000 POPULATION.
VARIABLE 40	0.09	0.26	0.07	0.29	0.03	-0.01	0.12	40.	RELIGIOUS HETEROGENEITY
VARIABLE 41	-0.12	0.04	-0.25	0.04	-0.09	-0.07	-0.14	41.	RACIAL HETEROGENEITY
VARIABLE 42	0.36	0.52	0.24	0.45	0.13	0.24	-0.01	42.	LINGUISTIC HETEROGENEITY
VARIABLE 43	0.47	0.60	0.29	0.64	0.03	0.39	0.04	43.	LATE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE
VARIABLE 44	0.46	0.68	0.20	0.63	0.07	0.46	-0.09	44.	NON-WESTERN
VARIABLE 45	0.20	0.53	0.05	0.52	0.10	0.12	0.10	45.	PRE-TRANSITIONAL POLITICAL
VARIABLE 46	-0.58	-0.17	-0.54	-0.25	0.31	-0.53	0.19	46.	NON-MOBILIZATIONAL SYSTEM STYLE
VARIABLE 47	0.58	0.13	0.45	0.38	0.44	0.53	0.16	47.	NO EFFECTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
VARIABLE 48	-0.18	-0.42	-0.12	-0.33	0.17	-0.25	-0.29	48.	UNSTABLE GOVERNMENT.
VARIABLE 49	0.56	0.13	0.35	0.51	-0.31	0.53	-0.16	49.	UNREPRESENTATIVE REGIME.
VARIABLE 50	0.66	0.08	0.41	0.51	-0.33	0.49	-0.05	50.	NON-COMPETITIVE ELECTORAL SYSTEM.
VARIABLE 51	0.66	0.02	0.50	0.58	-0.40	0.56	-0.14	51.	OPPOSITION GROUPS NOT TOLERATED
VARIABLE 52	0.25	0.28	0.04	0.38	-0.11	0.27	-0.13	52.	LOW POLITICAL INCULTURATION.
VARIABLE 53	-0.24	-0.22	-0.15	-0.29	0.12	-0.31	-0.09	53.	NEGLECTIBLE SECTIONALISM.
VARIABLE 54	0.53	0.44	0.35	0.73	-0.19	0.55	-0.15	54.	NEGLECTIBLE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS.
VARIABLE 55	-0.67	-0.15	-0.41	-0.53	0.25	-0.70	0.21	55.	LIMITED INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS.
VARIABLE 56	-0.56	-0.62	-0.30	-0.70	0.03	-0.52	0.04	56.	NEGLECTIBLE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS.
VARIABLE 57	0.43	-0.42	-0.15	-0.50	-0.00	0.47	0.21	57.	VERY INFREQUENT INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS.
VARIABLE 58	0.42	0.27	0.01	0.31	-0.33	0.30	0.00	58.	NEGLECTIBLE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES.
VARIABLE 59	-0.09	-0.19	-0.14	-0.20	0.01	0.06	-0.17	59.	NEGLECTIBLE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY EXECUTIVE.
VARIABLE 60	0.57	0.30	0.33	0.66	-0.23	0.50	-0.09	60.	NEGLECTIBLE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY LEGISLATURE.
VARIABLE 61	0.00	0.36	-0.23	0.23	0.21	0.11	-0.15	61.	UNSTABLE PARTY SYSTEM.
VARIABLE 62	0.03	-0.26	0.21	-0.16	-0.04	-0.05	0.21	62.	NEGLECTIBLE PERSONALISSIMO.
VARIABLE 63	-0.32	0.20	-0.20	-0.12	0.30	-0.41	0.29	63.	NON-ELITIST POLITICAL LEADERSHIP.
VARIABLE 64	-0.49	-0.41	-0.44	-0.52	0.11	-0.40	0.09	64.	NEGLECTIBLE LEADERSHIP CHARISMA.
VARIABLE 65	0.07	-0.06	0.15	-0.02	0.00	0.01	-0.16	65.	UNITARISM
VARIABLE 66	0.63	0.19	0.41	0.57	-0.29	0.58	-0.16	66.	NEGLECTIBLE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION.
VARIABLE 67	0.61	0.10	0.39	0.54	-0.34	0.56	-0.17	67.	WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE LEGISLATURE.
VARIABLE 68	0.34	-0.13	-0.32	-0.39	0.10	-0.23	0.07	68.	BI-CAMERAL LEGISLATURE.
VARIABLE 69	-0.54	-0.02	-0.45	-0.43	0.34	-0.49	0.07	69.	WEAK EXECUTIVE.
VARIABLE 70	0.53	0.59	0.20	0.71	0.01	0.48	-0.18	70.	TRADITIONAL BUREAUCRACY.
VARIABLE 71	-0.30	-0.18	-0.17	-0.12	0.27	-0.44	0.22	71.	NEUTRAL MILITARY.
VARIABLE 72	-0.54	-0.14	-0.33	-0.44	0.18	-0.58	0.25	72.	POLICE NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT.
VARIABLE 73	-0.52	0.44	-0.43	-0.23	0.48	-0.40	0.21	73.	NON-COMMUNIST BLOC.
VARIABLE 74	0.39	0.41	0.28	0.41	-0.07	0.34	0.04	74.	LONG DISTANCE FROM THE U.S.
VARIABLE 75	-0.38	0.34	-0.44	0.10	0.28	-0.24	-0.03	75.	LONG DISTANCE FROM THE U.S.S.S.R.
VARIABLE 76	-0.37	0.12	-0.37	-0.01	0.28	-0.39	0.07	76.	LONG DISTANCE FROM CHINA.
VARIABLE 77	-0.06	-0.56	0.05	-0.40	-0.26	0.05	-0.06	77.	LARGE NUMBER OF MEN UNDER ARMS

COLUMNS

1. VOTES EAST
2. VOTES SOUTH
3. VOTES EAST IN COLD WAR
4. SELF-DETERMINATION
5. SUPRANATIONALISM
6. PRO-ARAB
7. AGAINST U N INTERVENTION

Western." The advantage of this method is the elimination of virtually identical predictors on the independent side, but the disadvantage lies in fairly low predictive power compared to the canonical correlation technique.

Another possibility is to run a multiple regression analysis of independent factors against each of the dependent factors taken individually. These procedures

would produce statements such as, "The higher a state is on the Development factor and the Authoritarianism factor, but the lower it is on the U.S. Relations factor, the more likely it is to vote Eastern." The advantage of this technique is to increase the size of the correlations, and therefore, the accuracy of predictions, by considering numerous independent variables. The disadvantage is in the problem of assessing the overall

the correlation is positive or negative. For example, states that vote "East" tend to: (1) have a large percentage of Moslems as a percentage of total population, (2) have a small percentage of Christians as a percentage of total population, (3) be allied with the U.S.S.R.,³⁷ etc.

It should be evident from the above results that some predictors, such as "Large Area in Square Kilometers," have little relevance to any of the voting dimensions. Other predictors, such as "Large Percentage Military Personnel as a Percentage of Total Population," relate well to only one of the voting dimensions, and some predictors, such as "Opposition Groups Not Tolerated," relate well to several of the voting dimensions. Also, some voting dimensions, such as "Votes East," generate numerous important associations while others, such as "Supranationalism," and "U.N. Intervention," don't generate any. A summarizing table will be presented on these matters after the presentation of the relationships in connection with the voting group data given below.

The results, of course, may be interpreted as before. For example, states that load heavily on the "Western Community" dimension tend to: (1) have a small percentage of Moslems as a percentage of total population, (2) be allied with the U.S., (3) have large dollar imports from the U.S., etc.

Again, the number of significant associations varies with the dimension under consideration and it might be noted that the "Conservative Arab" and "Iberia" dimensions are unrelated to any of the predictors at an important level.

The above analysis shows the relationships when we think in terms of the voting data, variable by variable. We may also summarize the results by thinking in terms of the independent

variables, taken one variable at a time. This is given in the following table.

This table makes clear that the following predictors lack important predictive relevance for the voting data: Population per 1,000 Hectares of Agricultural Land, Annual Percentage Rate of Increase in Population, Percentage Roman Catholics as a Percentage of Total Population, Population per Square Kilometer, Area in Square Kilometers, Defense Expenditures as a Percentage of GNP, Votes in National Elections as a Percentage of Voting Age Population, Percentage of Military Personnel as a Percentage of Population Age 15-64, Percent Literate of Population, Age 15 and Over, Average Annual Increase, Number in Permanent Missions at the U.N., Population Size, Religious Heterogeneity, Racial Heterogeneity, Government Stability, Political Inculturation, Sectionalism, Interest Articulation by Political Parties, Interest Aggregation by Executive, Party System Stability, *Personalissimo*, Degree of Elitism in Political Leadership, Unitarism, Bicameral Legislature, Neutrality of Military, Distance from the U.S., Distance from China.

The remaining predictors' importance can be assessed in two ways. First, we can indicate for each voting variable which predictors explain the most variance. Taking, arbitrarily, the best three predictors (or four or five, if necessary, in case of ties), we find the following patterns:

Best predictors of "Eastern" voting: (1) Allied with the U.S.S.R. (.83); (2) Considerable Interest Articulation by Institutional Groups (.67); (3) Negligible Interest Articulation by Associational Groups (.63); (4) Negligible Horizontal Power Distribution (.63).

Best predictors of "Southern" voting: (1) Large Number of Inhabitants per Physician (.70); (2) Low Newspaper Circulation (.68); (3) Non-Western (.68).

Best predictors of "Eastern Voting in the Cold War": (1) Allied with U.S.S.R. (.71); (2) Mobilized Systems Style (.54); (3) Small Percentage of Total Exports to U.S. (.52).

Best predictors of "Self-Determination" voting: (1) Negligible Articulation by Associational Groups (.73); (2) Traditional Bureaucracy (.71); (3) Much Interest Articulation by Non-Associational Groups (.70).

Best predictors of "Pro-Arab" voting: (1) Much Interest Articulation by Institutional Groups (.70); (2) Allied with U.S.S.R. (.67); (3) Censorship (.62).

Best predictors of "Western Community" voting: (1) Allied with the U.S. (.77); (2) Competitive Electoral System (.66); (3) Much Interest Articulation by Association Groups (.65); (4) Considerable Horizontal Power Dis-

importance of the predictors, because the weights assigned to the predictors may vary and probably will vary from dependent variable to dependent variable. As explained above, once both sets of data have been factor analyzed, the most effective way of answering the basic research question is to apply the technique of canonical correlation.

³⁷ In connection with this variable, it should be understood that Alliance was coded as 3 = U.S.S.R. ally, 2 = neutral, and 1 = U.S. ally. Thus, there is a tendency for U.S.S.R. allies to be among the most "Eastern" voting states, neutrals to be more "Eastern" than U.S. allies, and U.S. allies to be the least "Eastern" in their voting patterns. In this connection, the vast majority of variables are not either/or propositions. For example, considering the censorship variable, those with the most censorship tend to be the most "Eastern" voting states. However, the censorship variable expresses four gradations of censorship from complete censorship to cases where censorship is internally and externally absent.

Table II

SPEARMAN RHO CORRELATIONS OF THE NATIONAL ATTRIBUTE SCORES

		WITH THE VOTING GROUP DATA. N = 103						ROWS	
		1	2	3	4	5	6		
VARIABLE	1	0.10	-0.57	-0.24	-0.05	-0.11	0.14	1.	LARGE % MILITARY PERSONNEL AS A % OF TOTAL POP.
VARIABLE	2	0.09	-0.15	-0.11	-0.11	-0.19	0.07	02.	LARGE POP. PER 1000 HECTARES OF AGRICULTURAL LAND.
VARIABLE	3	-0.40	0.46	0.58	0.29	0.04	-0.17	03.	LARGE NUMBER OF INHABITANTS PER PHYSICIAN.
VARIABLE	4	0.29	-0.51	-0.19	-0.23	-0.17	0.20	04.	LARGE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT.
VARIABLE	5	-0.40	0.38	0.55	0.31	0.17	-0.02	05.	LARGE NUMBER OF INMIGRANTS PER HOSPITAL BED.
VARIABLE	6	-0.46	0.26	0.50	0.38	-0.01	-0.05	06.	LARGE % OF LABOR FORCE EMPLOYED IN AGRICULTURE.
VARIABLE	7	-0.18	0.31	0.30	0.21	0.29	-0.03	07.	LARGE ANNUAL % RATE OF INCREASE IN POP.
VARIABLE	8	-0.52	0.10	0.62	0.44	0.07	-0.15	08.	LARGE % MOSLEMS AS A % OF POPULATION.
VARIABLE	9	0.22	0.10	-0.34	-0.20	0.09	0.30	09.	LARGE % ROMAN CATHOLICS AS A % OF TOTAL POP.
VARIABLE	10	0.46	-0.12	-0.57	-0.38	-0.11	0.18	10.	LARGE % CHRISTIANS AS A % OF TOTAL POP.
VARIABLE	11	0.06	-0.29	-0.12	-0.09	-0.15	0.05	11.	LARGE POPULATION PER SQUARE KILOMETER.
VARIABLE	12	-0.07	-0.05	0.13	0.06	0.07	0.15	12.	LARGE AREA IN SQUARE KILOMETERS.
VARIABLE	13	0.49	-0.42	-0.58	-0.38	-0.05	0.12	13.	MANY RADIOS PER 1000 POPULATION.
VARIABLE	14	-0.07	-0.25	-0.00	0.01	-0.18	0.20	14.	LARGE DEFENSE EXPENDITURES AS A % OF GNP
VARIABLE	15	0.11	-0.28	-0.29	0.13	-0.32	-0.08	15.	MANY VOTES IN NATIONAL ELECTIONS AS A % OF VOTING AGE POP.
VARIABLE	16	0.01	-0.35	-0.17	-0.07	-0.25	0.03	16.	LARGE % MILITARY PERSONNEL AS A % OF POP AGED 15-64.
VARIABLE	17	0.43	-0.30	-0.54	-0.35	-0.16	0.18	17.	LARGE NUMBER OF STUDENTS ENROLLED IN HIGHER EDUCATION PER 100,000 POP.
VARIABLE	18	0.46	-0.45	-0.56	-0.32	-0.16	0.21	18.	LARGE % PRIMARY AND SECONDARY STUDENTS AS A % OF POP. AGED 5-19.
VARIABLE	19	0.42	-0.32	-0.60	-0.32	-0.21	0.12	19.	LARGE % LITERATE OF POPULATION AGE 15 AND OVER.
VARIABLE	20	-0.09	-0.02	-0.05	0.06	-0.20	-0.02	20.	LARGE % LITERATE OF POP. AGE 15 AND OVER. AVERAGE ANNUAL INCREASE.
VARIABLE	21	0.42	0.22	-0.38	-0.34	0.21	0.20	21.	LARGE % EXPORT OF TOTAL EXPORTS TO U.S.
VARIABLE	22	0.46	0.25	-0.30	-0.33	0.37	0.26	22.	LARGE % IMPORTS OF TOTAL IMPORTS FROM U.S.
VARIABLE	23	0.17	-0.37	-0.19	-0.03	-0.05	0.26	23.	LARGE NUMBER IN PERMANENT MISSIONS AT THE UN.
VARIABLE	24	-0.37	0.28	0.36	0.25	-0.01	-0.36	24.	RECENTLY ENTERED THE UN.
VARIABLE	25	-0.18	-0.12	0.85	0.87	0.10	0.33	25.	ALLIED WITH THE U.S.S.R.
VARIABLE	26	0.61	-0.18	-0.52	-0.47	0.13	0.33	26.	LARGE DOLLAR IMPORTS FROM THE U.S.
VARIABLE	27	0.60	-0.18	-0.57	-0.48	0.03	0.23	27.	LARGE DOLLAR EXPORTS TO THE U.S.
VARIABLE	28	0.11	-0.56	-0.16	-0.09	-0.26	0.09	28.	LARGE DOLLAR EXPORTS TO THE U.S.S.R.
VARIABLE	29	0.03	-0.57	-0.06	-0.02	-0.20	0.01	29.	LARGE DOLLAR IMPORTS FROM THE U.S.S.R.
VARIABLE	30	-0.05	-0.53	-0.02	0.10	-0.19	-0.04	30.	LARGE DOLLAR EXPORTS TO COMMUNIST CHINA.
VARIABLE	31	-0.18	-0.53	0.11	0.17	-0.17	-0.03	31.	LARGE DOLLAR IMPORTS FROM COMMUNIST CHINA.
VARIABLE	32	-0.40	0.73	0.06	0.03	-0.11	-0.31	32.	SMALL POPULATION.
VARIABLE	33	-0.41	0.41	0.56	0.22	-0.00	-0.22	33.	LOW URBANIZATION.
VARIABLE	34	0.57	-0.32	-0.50	-0.42	-0.00	0.22	34.	VERY LOW AGRICULTURAL POPULATION.
VARIABLE	35	-0.47	0.49	0.54	0.33	0.15	-0.17	35.	VERY LOW PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT.
VARIABLE	36	-0.34	0.51	0.33	0.23	0.13	-0.26	36.	VERY LOW INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS.
VARIABLE	37	-0.46	0.46	0.51	0.31	0.10	-0.14	37.	VERY UNDERDEVELOPED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT STATUS.
VARIABLE	38	-0.53	-0.27	0.35	0.49	-0.08	0.03	38.	CENSORSHIP
VARIABLE	39	-0.43	0.52	0.54	0.30	0.13	-0.17	39.	VERY LOW NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION PER 1000 POPULATION.
VARIABLE	40	-0.14	0.56	0.58	0.04	-0.06	-0.08	40.	RELIGIOUS HETEROGENEITY
VARIABLE	41	0.07	0.23	0.02	0.00	0.20	0.12	41.	RACIAL HETEROGENEITY
VARIABLE	42	-0.35	0.29	0.36	0.20	-0.06	-0.06	42.	LINGUISTIC HETEROGENEITY
VARIABLE	43	-0.47	0.38	0.55	0.41	0.14	-0.35	43.	LATE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE
VARIABLE	44	-0.49	0.51	0.60	0.40	0.16	-0.22	44.	NON-WESTERN
VARIABLE	45	-0.26	0.50	0.36	0.18	0.07	-0.09	45.	PRE-TRANSITIONAL POLITICALLY
VARIABLE	46	0.58	0.32	-0.38	-0.36	0.09	0.17	46.	NON-MOBILIZATIONAL SYSTEM STYLE
VARIABLE	47	-0.57	-0.22	0.36	0.47	-0.00	-0.21	47.	NO EXPECTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
VARIABLE	48	-0.16	0.42	0.26	0.21	0.21	0.01	48.	UNSTABLE GOVERNMENT.
VARIABLE	49	-0.57	-0.01	0.43	0.46	-0.06	0.09	49.	UNREPRESENTATIVE REGIME.
VARIABLE	50	-0.66	-0.00	0.42	0.50	-0.05	-0.08	50.	NON-COMPETITIVE ELECTORAL SYSTEM.
VARIABLE	51	-0.72	-0.12	0.48	0.50	-0.14	-0.15	51.	OPPOSITION GROUPS NOT TOLERATED
VARIABLE	52	-0.27	0.26	0.20	0.17	0.01	0.15	52.	LOW POLITICAL INCULTURATION.
VARIABLE	53	0.24	0.08	-0.29	-0.19	-0.10	-0.07	53.	NEGLECTIBLE SECTIONALISM.
VARIABLE	54	-0.65	0.29	0.56	0.58	-0.00	-0.21	54.	NEGLECTIBLE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS.
VARIABLE	55	0.65	0.08	-0.49	-0.56	-0.01	0.05	55.	LIMITED INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS.
VARIABLE	56	0.49	-0.37	-0.56	-0.35	-0.07	0.10	56.	NEGLECTIBLE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS.
VARIABLE	57	0.44	-0.30	-0.47	-0.39	-0.20	0.03	57.	VERY INFREQUENT INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS.
VARIABLE	58	-0.49	-0.01	0.29	0.40	-0.10	0.03	58.	NEGLECTIBLE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES.
VARIABLE	59	0.13	-0.15	-0.14	-0.14	0.08	0.16	59.	NEGLECTIBLE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY EXECUTIVE.
VARIABLE	60	0.64	0.20	0.49	0.54	0.04	-0.14	60.	NEGLECTIBLE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY LEGISLATURE.
VARIABLE	61	-0.54	-0.40	0.15	0.05	-0.24	-0.17	61.	UNSTABLE PARTY SYSTEM.
VARIABLE	62	0.01	-0.42	-0.11	-0.04	-0.13	-0.09	62.	NEGLECTIBLE PERSONALISM.
VARIABLE	63	0.29	0.23	-0.22	-0.20	-0.19	-0.10	63.	NON-MELTIST POLITICAL LEADERSHIP.
VARIABLE	64	0.47	-0.14	-0.57	-0.44	0.03	0.15	64.	NEGLECTIBLE LEADERSHIP CHARISMA.
VARIABLE	65	-0.11	-0.03	-0.02	0.11	0.01	-0.03	65.	UNITARISM
VARIABLE	66	-0.65	0.03	0.47	0.55	-0.08	0.01	66.	NEGLECTIBLE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION.
VARIABLE	67	-0.65	-0.05	0.45	0.53	-0.09	0.02	67.	WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE LEGISLATURE.
VARIABLE	68	0.79	-0.19	-0.29	-0.29	-0.16	-0.18	68.	BI-CAMERAL LEGISLATURE.
VARIABLE	69	0.62	0.11	-0.46	-0.53	0.03	0.06	69.	WEAK EXECUTIVE.
VARIABLE	70	-0.53	0.40	0.58	0.43	0.09	-0.13	70.	TRADITIONAL BUREAUCRACY.
VARIABLE	71	0.25	0.18	-0.16	-0.29	-0.04	-0.22	71.	NEUTRAL MILITARY.
VARIABLE	72	-0.52	-0.02	-0.41	-0.43	0.01	-0.06	72.	POLICE NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT.
VARIABLE	73	0.51	0.46	-0.15	-0.50	0.20	0.16	73.	NON-COMMUNIST BLOC.
VARIABLE	74	-0.33	0.18	0.44	0.24	-0.08	-0.23	74.	LONG DISTANCE FROM THE U.S.
VARIABLE	75	0.15	0.63	-0.10	-0.12	0.24	0.09	75.	LONG DISTANCE FROM THE U.S.S.R.
VARIABLE	76	0.21	0.77	-0.27	-0.21	0.16	0.06	76.	LONG DISTANCE FROM CHINA.
VARIABLE	77	0.13	-0.59	-0.20	-0.09	-0.14	0.30	77.	LARGE NUMBER OF MEN UNDER ARMS

COLUMNS

1. WESTERN COMMUNITY
2. BRAZZAVILLE AFRICANS
3. AFRO-ASIANS
4. COMMUNIST BLOC
5. CONSERVATIVE ARABS
6. TURKIA

tribution (.65); (5) Effective Legislature (.65).

Best predictors of "Brazzaville African" voting: (1) Long Distance from U.S.S.R. (.63); (2) Few Men Under Arms (.59); (3) Small Percentage Military Personnel as a Percentage of Total Population (.57); (4) Few Dollar Exports to the U.S.S.R. (.57).

Best predictors of "Afro-Asian" voting: (1)

Allied with the U.S.S.R. (.64); (2) Large Percentage of Moslems as Percentage of Population (.62); (3) Small Percentage Literate of Population Age 15 and Over (.60).

Best predictors of "Communist Bloc" voting: (1) Allied with the U.S.S.R. (.67); (2) Mobilized Systems Style (.56); (3) Opposition Groups Not Tolerated (.56); (4) Much Interest Articulation by Institutional Groups (.56).

Table III

SUMMARY OF IMPORTANT ASSOCIATIONS

5/69 18130180

1.	LARGE % MILITARY PERSONNEL AS A % OF TOTAL POP. Votes North, not Brazzaville Africans
2.	LARGE POP. PER 1000 HECTARES OF AGRICULTURAL LAND.
3.	LARGE NUMBER OF INHABITANTS PER PHYSICIAN. Votes South, self-determination, Afro-Asians
4.	LARGE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT. Not Brazzaville Africans
5.	LARGE NUMBER OF INHABITANTS PER HOSPITAL BED. Votes South, self-determination, Afro-Asians
6.	LARGE % OF LABOR FORCE EMPLOYED IN AGRICULTURE. self-determination, Afro-Asians
7.	LARGE ANNUAL % RATE OF INCREASE IN POP.
8.	LARGE % MOSLEMS AS A % OF POPULATION. Votes East, self-determination, pro-Arab, not Western Community, Afro-Asians
9.	LARGE % ROMAN CATHOLICS AS A % OF TOTAL POP.
10.	LARGE % CHRISTIANS AS A % OF TOTAL POP. Votes West, Anti-Arab, not Afro-Asians
11.	LARGE POPULATION PER SQUARE KILOMETER.
12.	LARGE AREA IN SQUARE KILOMETERS.
13.	MANY RADIOS PER 1000 POPULATION. Votes North, Against self-determination, not Afro-Asians
14.	LARGE DEFENSE EXPENDITURES AS A % OF GNP
15.	MANY VOTES IN NATIONAL ELECTIONS AS A % OF VOTING AGE POP.
16.	LARGE % MILITARY PERSONNEL AS A % OF POP AGED 15-64
17.	LARGE NUMBER OF STUDENTS ENROLLED IN HIGHER EDUCATION PER 100,000 POP. Against self-determination, not Afro-Asians
18.	LARGE % PRIMARY AND SECONDARY STUDENTS AS A % OF POP AGED 5-19. Votes North, Against self-determination, not Afro-Asians
19.	LARGE % LITERATE OF POPULATION AGE 15 AND OVER. Votes North, Against self-determination, Anti-Arab, not Afro-Asians
20.	LARGE % LITERATE OF POP. AGE 15 AND OVER, AVERAGE ANNUAL INCREASE.
21.	LARGE % EXPORT OF TOTAL EXPORTS TO U.S. Votes West in Cold War
22.	LARGE % IMPORTS OF TOTAL IMPORTS FROM U.S. Votes West in Cold War
23.	LARGE NUMBER IN PERMANENT MISSIONS AT THE UN.
24.	RECENTLY ENTERED THE UN. self-determination
25.	ALLIED WITH THE U.S.S.R. Votes East, East in Cold War, self-determination, pro-Arab, not Western Community, Afro-Asians, Communist Bloc
26.	LARGE DOLLAR IMPORTS FROM THE U.S. Votes West, Against self-determination, Western Community, not Afro-Asians
27.	LARGE DOLLAR EXPORTS TO THE U.S. Votes East, Against self-determination, Western Community, not Afro-Asians
28.	LARGE DOLLAR EXPORTS TO THE U.S.S.R. Not Brazzaville Africans
29.	LARGE DOLLAR IMPORTS FROM THE U.S.S.R. Not Brazzaville Africans
30.	LARGE DOLLAR EXPORTS TO COMMUNIST CHINA. Not Brazzaville Africans
31.	LARGE DOLLAR IMPORTS FROM COMMUNIST CHINA. Not Brazzaville Africans
32.	SMALL POPULATION.
33.	LOW URBANIZATION. Votes South, self-determination
34.	VERY LOW AGRICULTURAL POPULATION. Votes West, North, Against self-determination, Anti-Arab, Western Community, not Afro-Asians
35.	VERY LOW PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT. Votes South, self-determination, Afro-Asians
36.	VERY LOW INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS. Votes South, self-determination, Brazzaville Africans
37.	VERY UNDERDEVELOPED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT STATUS. Votes South, self-determination, Afro-Asians
38.	CENSORSHIP. Votes East, Pro-Arab, not Western Community
39.	VERY LOW NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION PER 1000 POPULATION. Votes South, self-determination, Brazzaville Africans, Afro-Asians
40.	RELIGIOUS HETEROGENEITY
41.	RACIAL HETEROGENEITY
42.	LINGUISTIC HETEROGENEITY. Votes South
43.	LATE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE. Votes South, self-determination, Afro-Asians
44.	NON-WESTERN. Votes South, self-determination, Brazzaville Africans, Afro-Asians
45.	PRE-TRANSITIONAL POLITICALLY. Votes South, self-determination, Brazzaville Africans
46.	NON-MOBILIZATIONAL SYSTEMS STYLE. Votes West, Anti-Arab, Western Community, not Communist Bloc
47.	NO EFFECTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. Votes East, Pro-Arab, not Western Community
48.	UNSTABLE GOVERNMENT.
49.	UNREPRESENTATIVE REGIME. Votes East, self-determination, Pro-Arab, not Western Community
50.	NON-COMPETITIVE ELECTORAL SYSTEM. Votes East, self-determination, not Western Community, Communist Bloc
51.	OPPOSITION GROUPS NOT TOLERATED. Votes East, East in Cold War, self-determination, pro-Arab, not Western Community, Communist Bloc
52.	LOW POLITICAL INCULTURATION.
53.	NEGLECTIBLE SECTIONALISM.
54.	NEGLECTIBLE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS. Votes East, self-determination, pro-Arab, not Western Community, Afro-Asian, Communist Bloc
55.	LIMITED INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS. Votes West, Against self-determination, Anti-Arab, Western Community, not Communist Bloc
56.	NEGLECTIBLE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS. Votes West, North, Against self-determination, Anti-Arab, not Afro-Asians
57.	VERY INFREQUENT INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS. Against self-determination
58.	NEGLECTIBLE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES.
59.	NEGLECTIBLE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY EXECUTIVE.
60.	NEGLECTIBLE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY LEGISLATURE. Votes East, self-determination, Pro-Arab, not Western Community, Communist Bloc
61.	UNSTABLE PARTY SYSTEM.
62.	NEGLECTIBLE PERSONALISM.
63.	NON-ELITIST POLITICAL LEADERSHIP.
64.	NEGLECTIBLE LEADERSHIP CHARISMA. Against self-determination, not Afro-Asians
65.	UNITARISM
66.	NEGLECTIBLE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION. Votes East, self-determination, pro-Arab, not Western Community, Communist Bloc
67.	WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE LEGISLATURE. Votes East, self-determination, pro-Arab, not Western Community, Communist Bloc
68.	BI-CAMERAL LEGISLATURE.
69.	WEAK EXECUTIVE. Votes West, Western Community, not Communist Bloc
70.	TRADITIONAL BUREAUCRACY. Votes East, North, self-determination, not Western Community, Afro-Asians
71.	NEUTRAL MILITARY.
72.	POLICE NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT. Votes West, Anti-Arab, Western Community
73.	NON-COMMUNIST BLOC. Votes West, Western Community, not Communist Bloc
74.	LONG DISTANCE FROM THE U.S.
75.	LONG DISTANCE FROM THE U.S.S.R. Brazzaville Africans
76.	LONG DISTANCE FROM CHINA
77.	LARGE NUMBER OF MEN UNDER ARMS. Votes North, not Brazzaville Africans

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We may also list the variables in terms of the number of "important" associations they have with the voting variables. Doing this, we have:

Seven important associations: Allied with the U.S.S.R.

Six important associations: Very Low Agricultural Population, Opposition Groups Not Tolerated, Negligible Interest Articulation by Associational Groups.

Five important associations: Large Percentage Moslems as a Percentage of Population, Non-Mobilizational Systems Style, Limited Interest Articulation by Institutional Groups, Negligible Interest Articulation by Non-Associational Groups, Negligible Interest Aggregation by Legislature, Traditional Bureaucracy.

Four important associations: Large Percentage Literate of Population Age 15 and Over, Large Dollar Imports from the U.S., Large Dollar Exports to the U.S., Very Low Newspaper Circulation Per 1,000 Population, Non-Western, Non-Competitive Electoral System.

Three important associations: Large Number of Inhabitants Per Physician, Large Number of Inhabitants Per Hospital Bed, Large Number of Christians as a Percentage of Total Population, Many Radios Per 1,000 Population, Large Percentage of Primary and Secondary Students as a Percentage of Population Age 5-19, Very Low Per Capita Gross National Product, Very Low International Financial Status, Very Underdeveloped Economic Development Status,

Censorship, Late Date of Independence, Pre-Transitional Politically, No Effective Constitutional Limitations, Weak Executive, Police Not Politically Significant, Non-Communist Bloc.

It can be seen that various kinds of economic indices do indeed have "important" predictive power for the voting data, although other kinds of other indices also show predictive relevance. As indicated above, although this analysis yields a microscopic clearness as to what is related to what, it is difficult to untangle what is important, in overall terms, because the variables are highly correlated in both sets of data. On the national attribute side, for example, the variable, Large Number of Inhabitants Per Physician, correlates .80 with Large Number of Inhabitants Per Hospital Bed, while on the voting side, Votes East correlates -.90 with Votes Western Community. As previously suggested, such redundancy can be eliminated through factor analysis.

The Analysis: Second Stage

Treating the independent variables first, a factor analysis yields the following factor dimensions.³⁸

This matrix may be interpreted by concentrating on loadings over $\pm .50$ (underlined).

To illustrate, states standing high on the first factor dimension tend to have few inhabitants per physician, few inhabitants per hospital bed, a small percentage of the labor force employed in agriculture, a small percentage of Moslems as a percentage of population, and so forth. Considering all such loadings, this dimension can conveniently be named "Economic Development." The remaining dimensions may be similarly interpreted and named: "Democracy," "U.S. Relations," "Bigness," "Executive Leadership," "Population Dispersion," "Increase in Percent Literate," "Religious Homogeneity," "Militarism," "Instability," "Population Rate Increase," "Sectionalism," "Voting Intensity" and "Communist China Economic Relations."³⁹

³⁸ The most salient points of the analysis may be summarized as follows: The principal component solution was employed. Unities were placed in the principal diagonal of the correlation matrix and the factor matrix was rotated using Kaiser's varimax criterion. The minimum eigenvalue for which a factor was rotated was 1.0.

The "column sum square" gives the total variance explained in the variables by any particular factor, remembering there are as many units of variance as there are variables, and the "row sum square" gives the variance explained in any one variable by the factors taken collectively. Thus, the first factor explains 17.28 units, of the 77 units of variance, while variable 1 is 86% "explained" by the factors calculated.

³⁹ One should be careful not to confuse the factor

States can be located on these dimensions through the calculation of factor scores, using the formula $F = ZA (A'A)^{-1}$.⁴⁰ Such scores have great advantage over the original variable scores in that, consistent with the factor model, they are completely uncorrelated. Properly computed, however, they correlate with the original variables exactly to the extent the variables load on the dimensions. The following table gives the factor scores.

Using identical techniques for the voting data we obtain:

The above analysis may be surprising to some because different presumably orthogonal factors, such as "Votes East in the Cold War" and "Pro-Arab," load heavily on the same dimension. The answer is that Alker and Russett, although using the complete formula $F = ZA (A'A)^{-1}$, set loadings less than $\pm .25$ to zero. This had the effect of creating correlated factor scores. For example, "Votes East in the Cold War" correlates .62 with "Pro-Arab." Also, the unrotated dimensions, such as "Votes East" tend to correlate with the rotated factors, such as "Votes East in the Cold War" (.79). In addition, the ranked loadings of the voting group analysis tend to be correlated. "Western Community" loadings, for example, correlate -.70 with "Afro-Asian" loadings. In short, there was considerable redundancy in *both* the voting pattern and group data.

The names given to the dimensions are to be interpreted as before, as convenient labels to facilitate analysis, but the actual predictive power of the factor scores to the variables should be ascertained by examination of the loadings. Thus, looking at Table VIII, the "Eastern Voting" scores have considerable predictive power in respect to "Votes East," "Communist Bloc," "Pro-Arab," "Afro-Asian," "Self-Determination," "Votes East in the Cold War," and "Western Community."

To recap the analysis, we now have two groups of factor scores. One group represents the original independent variables, in the sense that such scores can be used to predict the original variables to the extent of their loadings; and the second group represents the original

names with the really crucial aspects of the analysis. That is, regardless of what name is given to a factor dimension, using the techniques employed here, the factor scores predict all of the variables to the extent of their loadings. Thus, with the exception of a .00 correlation, each variable has some predictive power relative to any particular factor dimension and every factor dimension has some predictive power relative to each variable. Names, then, in descriptive usage are simply convenient labels to describe the heaviest loading variables.

⁴⁰ See footnote 18 for a complete definition of this formula.

Table IV

ROTATED LOADING OF NATIONAL ATTRIBUTE DATA

FOR 50 S.W.

1. LARGE % MILITARY PERSONNEL AS A % OF TOTAL POP.	-0.08	-0.08	-0.14	0.30	0.23	-0.11	0.21	0.17	0.50	0.06
02. LARGE POP. PER 1000 HECTARES OF AGRICULTURAL LAND.	-0.08	-0.09	0.09	0.03	0.01	-0.03	-0.01	-0.10	-0.06	0.01
03. LARGE NUMBER OF IMMIGRANTS PER PHYSICIAN.	-0.08	-0.08	-0.13	-0.04	-0.07	0.05	-0.07	-0.11	-0.07	0.02
04. LARGE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT.	-0.10	-0.09	-0.10	-0.02	0.00	-0.06	-0.03	-0.03	0.00	0.03
05. LARGE NUMBER OF IMMIGRANTS PER HOSPITAL BED.	-0.12	-0.06	0.03	0.03	0.02	-0.06	-0.13	0.00	-0.02	0.05
06. LARGE % OF LABOR FORCE EMPLOYED IN AGRICULTURE.	0.11	0.13	-0.02	-0.06	0.10	-0.07	-0.05	-0.00	0.00	0.00
07. LARGE ANNUAL % RATE OF INCREASE IN POP.	0.05	0.16	-0.03	0.27	0.22	0.06	-0.07	0.05	-0.01	0.02
08. LARGE % ROYALTY AS A % OF POPULATION.	0.20	0.08	0.00	-0.09	-0.11	0.06	-0.07	0.05	-0.02	0.02
09. LARGE % ROMAN CATHOLICS AS A % OF TOTAL POP.	-0.05	0.01	0.13	-0.17	-0.03	0.06	-0.10	-0.17	-0.10	0.00
10. LARGE % CHRISTIANS AS A % OF TOTAL POP.	0.02	-0.02	0.23	0.02	-0.06	-0.06	-0.10	-0.17	-0.10	0.00
11. LARGE POPULATION PER SQUARE KILOMETER.	0.70	0.09	0.26	0.02	0.02	0.06	-0.12	-0.03	-0.10	0.04
12. LARGE AREA IN SQUARE KILOMETERS.	0.17	0.01	-0.09	0.27	0.12	-0.03	-0.01	0.05	-0.02	0.00
13. MANY RADIOS PER 1000 POPULATION.	-0.00	0.19	0.02	0.14	0.05	-0.02	-0.05	0.13	0.13	0.00
14. LARGE DEFENSE EXPENDITURES AS A % OF GNP	-0.01	-0.14	-0.09	0.11	-0.10	0.01	0.01	0.05	0.03	0.00
15. MANY VOTES IN NATIONAL ELECTIONS AS A % OF VOTING A	0.04	-0.05	-0.00	0.08	-0.06	-0.09	0.21	-0.17	0.27	0.00
16. LARGE % MILITARY PERSONNEL AS A % OF POP AGED 15-60	0.20	-0.07	0.05	0.00	0.07	-0.00	0.17	-0.10	0.00	0.00
17. LARGE NUMBER OF STUDENTS ENROLLED IN HIGHER EDUCATION	-0.17	-0.01	-0.06	0.03	0.00	-0.03	0.15	-0.03	0.01	0.03
18. LARGE % PRIMARY AND SECONDARY STUDENTS AS A % OF POP	0.03	0.20	-0.04	0.23	0.06	-0.10	0.11	-0.02	0.14	0.00
19. LARGE % LITERATE OF POPULATION AGE 15 AND OVER.	-0.11	0.01	-0.09	0.10	0.00	-0.06	0.11	-0.00	0.03	0.00
20. LARGE % LITERATE OF POP. AGE 15 AND OVER, AVERAGE A	-0.21	-0.07	-0.18	-0.01	0.13	0.04	0.78	-0.02	0.05	0.03
21. LARGE % EXPORT OF TOTAL EXPORTS TO U.S.	0.08	0.18	0.76	0.06	0.17	0.06	0.01	-0.06	-0.18	0.27
22. LARGE % IMPORTS OF TOTAL IMPORTS FROM U.S.	-0.01	0.14	-0.08	0.11	0.02	0.05	-0.01	0.11	-0.05	0.00
23. LARGE NUMBER IN PERMANENT MISSIONS AT THE UN.	0.19	0.13	0.05	0.07	0.00	-0.05	-0.11	0.02	0.14	0.05
24. RECENTLY ENTERED THE UN.	-0.02	0.20	0.10	-0.00	-0.00	0.04	0.17	-0.21	-0.12	0.00
25. ALLIED WITH THE U.S.S.R.	-0.19	-0.12	0.04	0.07	0.00	-0.06	0.21	-0.11	-0.04	0.00
26. LARGE DOLLAR IMPORTS FROM THE U.S.	-0.28	-0.08	-0.08	-0.11	-0.07	-0.06	0.21	-0.11	-0.04	0.00
27. LARGE DOLLAR EXPORTS TO THE U.S.	-0.21	0.34	0.55	0.55	0.07	-0.09	0.05	0.15	0.05	0.00
28. LARGE DOLLAR EXPORTS TO THE U.S.S.R.	-0.01	-0.09	0.07	-0.06	-0.06	-0.03	0.01	0.05	0.05	0.00
29. LARGE DOLLAR IMPORTS FROM THE U.S.S.R.	0.26	0.32	0.54	0.50	0.00	-0.03	0.01	0.05	0.05	0.00
30. LARGE DOLLAR IMPORTS FROM COMMUNIST CHINA.	-0.11	-0.10	0.02	0.06	-0.07	-0.06	-0.06	0.10	0.00	0.00
31. LARGE DOLLAR EXPORTS FROM COMMUNIST CHINA.	0.38	0.08	-0.00	0.30	0.20	-0.05	-0.06	0.10	0.00	0.00
32. SMALL POPULATION.	-0.06	-0.21	-0.05	0.20	0.20	-0.15	-0.05	0.13	0.07	0.00
33. LOW URBANIZATION.	0.23	0.07	-0.25	0.25	0.00	0.06	0.01	0.02	0.13	0.00
34. VERY LOW AGRICULTURAL POPULATION.	-0.02	-0.02	0.03	0.02	0.00	-0.07	0.01	0.04	0.02	0.00
35. VERY LOW PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT.	-0.01	0.15	0.10	0.10	0.00	0.05	-0.01	0.00	-0.06	0.00
36. VERY LOW INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS.	0.10	0.01	-0.02	0.08	0.10	0.00	-0.01	0.00	-0.06	0.00
37. VERY UNDERDEVELOPED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT STATUS.	-0.72	-0.28	0.07	-0.07	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
38. CENSORSHIP	-0.12	-0.70	0.01	0.15	0.15	-0.07	0.16	0.06	0.11	0.03
39. VERY LOW NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION PER 1000 POPULATION.	0.08	0.06	0.13	0.11	-0.06	0.12	-0.06	-0.08	-0.03	0.01
40. RELIGIOUS HETEROGENEITY	-0.07	-0.08	0.10	-0.11	0.13	0.01	-0.04	0.70	0.05	0.00
41. RACIAL HETEROGENEITY	0.02	-0.07	0.07	0.02	0.06	0.00	-0.03	-0.06	-0.07	0.00
42. LINGUISTIC HETEROGENEITY	-0.09	-0.06	0.14	0.07	0.19	0.20	-0.53	-0.06	-0.27	0.00
43. DATE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE	0.23	0.26	-0.26	-0.12	0.22	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
44. NONWESTERN	-0.56	-0.09	-0.02	0.10	-0.21	-0.09	0.13	-0.49	0.02	0.00
45. PRE-INDEPENDENCE POLITICAL	0.07	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.06	0.05	-0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00
46. NONCONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM STYLE	-0.03	-0.15	-0.10	-0.10	-0.10	0.05	-0.01	0.00	-0.06	0.00
47. NO EFFECTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.	0.01	0.08	0.28	0.28	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
48. UNSTABLE GOVERNMENT.	-0.03	-0.19	-0.05	-0.26	-0.12	0.12	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.00
49. UNREPRESENTATIVE REGIME.	0.16	0.06	0.10	-0.00	-0.02	0.00	-0.05	-0.04	0.05	0.00
50. NONCOMPETITIVE ELECTIONAL SYSTEM.	-0.02	-0.14	-0.07	-0.09	0.09	0.00	-0.12	-0.10	0.02	0.00
51. UPOSSIDIT GROUPS NOT TOLERATED	0.05	0.67	0.15	-0.12	0.09	0.00	-0.12	-0.10	0.02	0.00
52. LOW POLITICAL INCULTURATION.	0.10	-0.25	-0.19	-0.15	0.10	0.00	-0.02	-0.06	0.05	0.00
53. NEGLECTIBLE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL G	-0.01	0.00	0.28	0.28	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
54. LIMITED INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUP	-0.03	-0.19	-0.05	-0.26	-0.12	0.12	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.00
55. NEGLECTIBLE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NONASSOCIATION	-0.00	-0.10	0.10	-0.30	-0.04	0.07	-0.05	-0.04	0.05	0.00
56. VERY INFLUENT INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOTHER GROUP	0.02	0.14	-0.07	-0.09	0.09	0.00	-0.12	-0.10	0.02	0.00
57. NEGLECTIBLE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES	-0.02	-0.14	-0.07	-0.09	0.09	0.00	-0.12	-0.10	0.02	0.00
58. NEGLECTIBLE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY EXECUTIVE.	-0.22	-0.06	-0.00	-0.22	-0.11	-0.08	-0.02	-0.07	0.00	0.00
59. NEGLECTIBLE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY LEGISLATURE.	0.10	-0.25	-0.19	-0.15	0.10	0.00	-0.02	-0.06	0.05	0.00
60. UNSTABLE PARTY SYSTEM.	-0.01	0.08	0.28	0.28	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
61. NEGLECTIBLE PERSONALISM.	-0.03	-0.19	-0.05	-0.26	-0.12	0.12	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.00
62. NONMILITARY POLITICAL LEADERSHIP.	0.16	0.06	0.10	-0.00	-0.02	0.00	-0.05	-0.04	0.05	0.00
63. NEGLECTIBLE LEADERSHIP CHARACTER.	0.02	-0.14	-0.07	-0.09	0.09	0.00	-0.12	-0.10	0.02	0.00
64. UNITARISM	0.05	0.67	0.15	-0.12	0.09	0.00	-0.12	-0.10	0.02	0.00
65. NEGLECTIBLE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION.	0.10	-0.25	-0.19	-0.15	0.10	0.00	-0.02	-0.06	0.05	0.00
66. WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE LEGISLATURE.	-0.01	0.00	0.28	0.28	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
67. BICAMERAL LEGISLATURE.	-0.03	-0.19	-0.05	-0.26	-0.12	0.12	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.00
68. WEAK EXECUTIVE.	0.16	0.06	0.10	-0.00	-0.02	0.00	-0.05	-0.04	0.05	0.00
69. TRADITIONAL HIERARCHY.	0.02	0.14	-0.07	-0.09	0.09	0.00	-0.12	-0.10	0.02	0.00
70. MILITARY MILITARY.	-0.22	-0.06	-0.00	-0.22	-0.11	-0.08	-0.02	-0.07	0.00	0.00
71. MILITARY NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT.	0.10	-0.25	-0.19	-0.15	0.10	0.00	-0.02	-0.06	0.05	0.00
72. NONCOMMUNIST BLOCK.	-0.01	0.08	0.28	0.28	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
73. LONG DISTANCE FROM THE U.S.	-0.03	-0.19	-0.05	-0.26	-0.12	0.12	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.00
74. LONG DISTANCE FROM THE U.S.S.S.	0.16	0.06	0.10	-0.00	-0.02	0.00	-0.05	-0.04	0.05	0.00
75. LONG DISTANCE FROM CHINA.	0.02	0.14	-0.07	-0.09	0.09	0.00	-0.12	-0.10	0.02	0.00
76. LARGE MARCH UP BY NEW UNDER ARMS	-0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01

COLUMN 50 S.W.

17.26 11.00 0.27 0.07 0.07 0.01 1.00 0.00 0.76 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.20

Table V

LOADINGS OVER .50 AND FACTOR NAMES
OF NATIONAL ATTRIBUTE DATA

01. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT		05. EXECUTIVE LEADERSHIP	
13. MANY RADIOS PER 1000 POPULATION.	0.88	59. NEGLECTIBLE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY EXECUTIVE.	0.86
59. NEGLECTIBLE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATION	0.84	63. NON-ELITIST POLITICAL LEADERSHIP.	-0.39
19. LARGE % PRIMARY AND SECONDARY STUDENTS AS A % OF POP	0.83		
19. LARGE % LITERATE OF POPULATION AGE 15 AND OVER.	0.81		
17. LARGE NUMBER OF STUDENTS ENROLLED IN HIGHER EDUCATI	0.77		
34. VERY LOW AGRICULTURAL POPULATION.	0.74		
10. LARGE % CHRISTIANS AS A % OF TOTAL POP.	0.71	06. POPULATION DISPERSION	
57. VERY INFREQUENT INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GRO	0.62	12. LARGE AREA IN SQUARE KILOMETERS.	0.76
63. NEGLECTIBLE LEADERSHIP CHARISMA.	0.61	07. LARGE POP. PER 1000 HECTARES OF AGRICULTURAL LAND.	-0.78
43. LATE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE	-0.55	11. LARGE POPULATION PER SQUARE KILOMETER.	-0.83
47. LINGUISTIC HETEROGENEITY	-0.54		
74. LONG DISTANCE FROM THE U.S.	-0.57		
54. NEGLECTIBLE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL G	-0.50		
04. LARGE % OF LABOR FORCE EMPLOYED IN AGRICULTURE.	-0.49		
45. PRE-TRANSITIONAL POLITICALLY	-0.49		
09. LARGE % MUSLIMS AS A % OF POPULATION.	-0.70	07. INCREASE IN PERCENT LITERATE	
33. LOW URBANIZATION.	-0.71	20. LARGE % LITERATE OF POP. AGE 15 AND OVER. AVERAGE A	0.72
37. VERY UNDERDEVELOPED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT STATUS.	-0.72	41. RACIAL HETEROGENEITY	-0.33
70. TRADITIONAL BUREAUCRACY.	-0.77		
44. NON-WESTERN	-0.83		
05. LARGE NUMBER OF INHABITANTS PER HOSPITAL BED.	-0.85		
39. VERY LOW NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION PER 1000 POPULATION.	-0.85		
35. VERY LOW PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT.	-0.86		
03. LARGE NUMBER OF INHABITANTS PER PHYSICIAN.	-0.88		
02. DEMOCRACY		08. RELIGIOUS HOMOGENEITY	-0.79
69. WEAK EXECUTIVE.	0.81	40. RELIGIOUS HETEROGENEITY	
55. LIMITED INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROU	0.72		
72. POLICE NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT.	0.77		
73. NON-COMMUNIST BLOC.	0.63		
46. NON-MOBILIZATIONAL SYSTEM STYLE	0.62	09. MILITARISM	
65. NON-ELITIST POLITICAL LEADERSHIP.	0.58	14. LARGE DEFENSE EXPENDITURES AS A % OF GNP	0.83
71. NEUTRAL MILITARY.	0.58	18. LARGE % MILITARY PERSONNEL AS A % OF POP AGED 15-64	0.70
54. NEGLECTIBLE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL G	-0.56	1. LARGE % MILITARY PERSONNEL AS A % OF TOTAL POP.	0.50
50. NEGLECTIBLE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTI	-0.45		
80. NEGLECTIBLE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY LEGISLATURE.	-0.48		
86. CENSORSHIP	-0.70		
40. UNREPRESENTATIVE REGIME.	-0.81		
50. NON-COMPETITIVE ELECTORAL SYSTEM.	-0.84	10. INSTABILITY	
51. OPPOSITION GROUPS NOT TOLERATED	-0.86	48. UNSTABLE GOVERNMENT.	0.82
60. NEGLECTIBLE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION.	-0.86	61. UNSTABLE PARTY SYSTEM.	0.77
67. WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE LEGISLATURE.	-0.90	42. NEGLECTIBLE PERSONALISSING.	-0.67
47. NO EFFECTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.	-0.92		
03. US RELATIONS		11. POPULATION RATE INCREASE	
22. LARGE % IMPORTS OF TOTAL IMPORTS FROM U.S.	0.70	07. LARGE ANNUAL % RATE OF INCREASE IN POP.	0.69
21. LARGE % EXPORT OF TOTAL EXPORTS TO U.S.	0.76		
27. LARGE DOLLAR EXPORTS TO THE U.S.	0.58		
75. LONG DISTANCE FROM THE U.S.-S.R.	0.56	12. SECTIONALISM	
28. LARGE DOLLAR IMPORTS FROM THE U.S.	0.55	53. NEGLECTIBLE SECTIONALISM.	-0.48
25. ALLIED WITH THE U.S.-S.R.	-0.58		
04. BUSINESS		13. VOTING INTENSITY	
04. LARGE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT.	0.81	15. MANY VOTES IN NATIONAL ELECTIONS AS A % OF VOTING A	0.55
77. LARGE NUMBER OF MEN UNDER ARMS	0.80		
23. LARGE NUMBER IN PERMANENT MISSIONS AT THE UN.	0.64		
26. LARGE DOLLAR EXPORTS TO THE U.S.-S.R.	0.59		
26. LARGE DOLLAR IMPORTS FROM THE U.S.	0.55		
29. LARGE DOLLAR IMPORTS FROM THE U.S.-S.R.	0.55		
77. LARGE DOLLAR EXPORTS TO THE U.S.	0.80		
76. VERY LOW INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS.	-0.79	14. COMMUNIST CHINA ECONOMIC RELATIONS	
12. SMALL POPULATION.	-0.91	30. LARGE DOLLAR EXPORTS TO COMMUNIST CHINA.	-0.60
		31. LARGE DOLLAR IMPORTS FROM COMMUNIST CHINA.	-0.81

dependent variables in the same way. The factor scores have a tremendous advantage over the original variable scores in that, within each group, such scores are mutually orthogonal to each other—any variance explained by one variable cannot be explained by another when both are related to other variables. Thus, thinking in terms of the independent variables, the “Economic Development” dimension, if it explains any variance in connection with, say, the “Eastern Voting” dimension, the variance explained will be unique in the sense that if some other predictor is also related to this dimension, say, the “Democracy” dimension, the variance explained by the latter will not overlap with the former. Hence, if “Economic Development” explains 25 percent of the variance and “Democracy” 25 percent of the variance, together they account for 50 percent of the variance of the “Eastern Voting” dimension.

The associations of the groups of factor scores will be given in two ways. First, the sim-

ple correlation matrix will be interpreted and then the canonical correlation. The following table gives the simple correlation matrix.

The above matrix shows that “Eastern Voting” is best accounted for by the predictors considered. Thus, concentrating on the three best predictors, “Economic Development” accounts for 21 percent, “Democracy” 34 percent, and “U.S. Relations” 19 percent of the variance of the “Eastern Voting” factor scores, with a total 74 percent of the variance being accounted for by these predictors. In other words, underdeveloped, authoritarian states with few relations with the U.S. tend to be “Eastern Voting,” remembering these latter factor scores also predict (in addition to “Votes East”) “Communist Bloc,” “Pro-Arab,” etc. This finding suggests that a multiple interpretation is needed to account for the bulk of the variation in the “Eastern Voting” dimension. Although “Democracy” is the overall best predictor (34 percent of the variance), “Economic Development” and “U.S.

Table VI
FACTOR SCORES OF NATIONAL ATTRIBUTE DATA

AFGHANISTAN	-1.97	-0.47	-0.38	1.12	2.22	0.18	-0.42	0.98	-0.38
	-1.12	0.15	-2.04	1.26	0.83				
ALBANIA	0.61	-1.67	-0.83	-1.51	0.80	-0.67	0.89	-0.72	0.63
	-0.90	2.35	0.80	0.63	-0.86				
ARGENTINA	1.46	-0.28	0.74	0.77	-0.29	2.06	0.69	0.71	-0.64
	2.30	-1.92	1.11	-0.53	-1.04				
AUSTRALIA	1.16	1.09	1.17	0.16	-0.11	2.19	1.17	-0.78	-0.01
	-0.97	-0.16	0.59	-0.66	-2.09				
AUSTRIA	1.04	1.06	-0.85	0.12	0.23	-0.42	-0.13	0.18	-1.55
	-1.00	-1.13	0.23	0.79	-0.48				
BELGIUM	0.86	1.26	-0.30	0.78	0.07	-1.69	-1.50	-0.39	1.11
	-0.56	-1.53	1.35	-0.04	1.66				
BOLIVIA	0.02	0.57	0.88	-0.58	-0.56	0.98	-0.69	-0.54	-0.81
	1.32	0.22	-0.12	2.01	1.20				
BRAZIL	0.22	0.49	0.29	1.72	0.74	1.54	-1.45	0.38	-0.63
	1.78	0.77	0.95	0.27	0.40				
BULGARIA	1.31	-1.86	-1.67	0.42	-0.07	-0.41	1.04	0.22	0.01
	-0.41	-0.11	0.32	0.73	1.69				
BURMA	-1.09	-0.25	-0.43	0.87	-0.16	0.12	0.45	0.02	0.14
	0.57	0.55	0.87	-0.02	-1.41				
CAMBODIA	-1.29	-0.62	0.12	-0.76	-0.79	-0.79	-0.62	0.52	1.90
	0.35	1.00	-0.66	0.98	-1.70				
CAMEROON	-1.03	0.57	0.00	-0.54	-1.28	0.57	0.61	-1.17	0.03
	0.26	-1.13	1.16	1.54	0.63				
CANADA	0.89	0.94	1.20	1.14	-0.37	1.86	-0.60	-1.72	1.04
	-1.13	0.53	0.51	-0.23	-1.21				
CENTRAL AFRICAN RE	-0.61	-0.70	0.13	-0.98	-1.72	0.49	0.48	-0.58	-0.10
	0.19	-1.55	-0.84	-0.41	0.79				
CEYLON	-0.96	1.34	-0.82	-0.17	1.58	-2.00	-0.28	-1.82	-1.28
	0.73	0.29	0.00	0.55	-2.57				
CHAD	-0.83	-0.10	-1.05	-0.55	-1.40	0.79	-0.59	-1.43	0.04
	0.31	-1.16	-1.15	-0.42	1.14				
CHILE	0.98	0.65	1.17	-0.41	0.41	0.27	-1.27	0.23	0.54
	0.98	0.15	-0.34	-1.47	-0.70				
COLOMBIA	0.36	0.38	0.97	0.64	0.26	0.78	-1.48	0.01	-0.97
	0.18	0.51	0.24	-0.85	0.96				
CONGO (BRA)	-0.33	-0.46	-0.81	-1.05	-1.63	0.31	-0.11	-1.18	0.16
	0.62	-2.35	0.08	-0.18	0.64				
CONGO (LEO)	-1.00	0.20	0.69	0.16	-0.49	1.07	1.13	-1.46	0.10
	1.22	-0.64	1.58	0.81	0.47				
COSTA RICA	0.74	0.85	1.01	-1.18	-0.92	-0.54	-0.41	0.76	-1.68
	0.48	1.26	-0.25	0.58	0.17				
CUBA	1.28	-1.66	-1.19	0.23	-0.47	-0.08	-2.69	1.20	-1.26
	0.38	0.16	0.32	0.82	-1.44				
CYPRUS	0.30	1.05	-1.72	-0.76	0.19	-0.98	1.24	-0.75	0.14
	0.46	-0.32	0.63	0.69	1.47				
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	1.65	-1.86	-0.95	0.60	0.13	-0.96	0.26	-1.60	0.25
	-0.47	0.29	1.31	-0.46	-1.18				
DAHOMY	-0.73	-0.43	-0.77	-1.01	-1.59	-0.42	-0.45	-0.94	0.06
	0.35	-0.98	-0.02	-0.37	0.75				
DENMARK	1.24	1.16	-0.11	-0.20	0.07	-1.22	0.38	0.72	-0.16
	-0.83	-0.58	-1.07	0.05	-0.42				
ECUADOR	0.33	0.64	0.88	-0.34	1.19	-0.14	-0.76	-1.51	-0.14
	1.51	1.05	0.40	-0.93	0.55				
EL SALVADOR	0.40	-0.72	1.04	-1.06	0.94	-1.66	-1.84	0.43	-1.25
	1.25	0.31	-0.48	-0.19	0.30				
ETHIOPIA	-1.55	-0.76	0.59	0.71	1.97	0.13	-0.60	-0.59	-0.76
	-0.30	-1.26	-1.23	0.14	-0.72				
FINLAND	1.04	1.20	-0.80	-0.09	-0.31	-0.20	1.53	0.20	-0.52
	-0.60	-0.57	-1.36	0.38	-0.57				
FRANCE	0.94	0.45	0.54	1.07	-1.12	-0.18	-0.94	0.58	2.02
	0.65	-0.96	-0.84	0.49	-1.02				
GREECE	0.86	1.05	-0.52	0.08	-0.47	-0.26	1.25	1.04	1.22
	1.47	-0.88	-1.49	0.98	1.42				
GUATEMALA	0.16	-0.06	1.15	-0.37	0.76	-1.34	-1.04	-0.81	-1.25
	1.55	1.15	-0.38	0.01	0.57				
GUINEA	-0.88	-1.18	1.27	-1.05	-1.36	-0.25	0.34	-0.49	0.18
	-1.50	0.66	0.75	0.25	0.11				
HAITI	-0.38	-1.03	1.88	-1.10	1.00	-1.24	-1.30	-0.00	-0.38
	-0.08	0.33	-0.24	1.31	0.57				
HUNGARY	1.60	-1.86	-1.78	0.32	-0.06	-1.04	-0.98	-0.58	-0.73
	0.02	-0.35	0.46	0.80	-0.54				
ICELAND	1.22	1.34	-0.10	-1.87	0.10	0.91	0.23	1.06	0.08
	-1.01	-0.11	-0.52	1.19	0.13				
INDIA	-2.11	1.42	-0.15	3.14	-0.77	-1.01	-0.87	0.51	-1.05
	-1.56	0.26	0.39	0.20	1.35				
INDONESIA	-1.52	-0.58	1.24	1.77	-2.02	-0.96	0.85	0.44	0.13
	0.61	-0.97	0.30	1.20	0.29				
IRAN	-1.24	-0.34	0.02	1.52	1.06	0.95	0.55	0.97	1.64
	0.94	-1.61	-0.86	0.36	0.40				
IRAQ	-0.71	0.21	-1.28	-0.82	0.30	0.17	0.36	0.79	1.36
	1.93	0.94	0.53	-0.50	-0.38				
IRELAND	-1.17	1.10	-0.59	-0.96	0.26	-0.35	-0.13	0.73	-0.97
	-1.26	-0.64	0.67	0.34	0.47				
ISRAEL	0.64	1.18	0.13	-0.35	-0.88	-1.60	2.00	0.77	1.20
	-0.44	1.58	1.28	-0.49	0.56				
ITALY	0.74	1.04	-0.09	0.97	0.06	-0.46	-1.14	-0.05	0.54
	0.00	-1.15	0.27	0.88	-0.87				
IVORY COAST	-0.77	-0.66	0.95	-0.93	-2.11	-0.01	0.16	-0.73	0.13
	-0.24	-0.80	0.46	1.58	0.04				
JAPAN	0.23	1.23	0.34	1.63	0.18	-0.67	1.21	-1.03	-1.45
	-0.14	-0.03	-2.44	0.17	-1.94				
JORDAN	-0.43	-0.41	-1.09	-0.76	1.33	-0.14	-0.08	1.42	2.34
	1.30	-0.34	1.35	-0.85	-0.75				

Table VI (Continued)

LAOS	-1.27	-0.08	0.43	-0.71	1.01	0.17	0.42	-1.41	2.71
	1.16	0.49	-0.16	0.98	0.51				
LEBANON	0.44	0.74	-1.14	-0.10	0.40	-1.47	1.32	0.22	-0.61
	2.18	0.61	1.46	-1.89	0.77				
LIBERIA	-0.71	-0.75	1.96	-1.32	1.86	-0.54	0.22	-0.48	0.07
	-1.73	-1.29	0.49	-0.02	0.19				
LIBYA	-0.92	0.65	0.09	-0.98	0.87	1.80	-0.45	1.57	1.22
	-1.34	-0.58	1.73	0.35	-0.75				
MALAGASY REP	-1.07	1.39	-0.28	-1.26	0.76	1.39	-0.45	-0.84	0.13
	-0.87	0.14	1.32	1.72	0.13				
MALI	-0.82	-0.12	-1.22	-0.55	-1.61	0.63	-1.19	-1.10	-0.20
	0.10	0.66	-1.79	-1.31	-0.29				
MAURITANIA	-1.06	0.10	-0.29	-0.88	-1.39	0.64	-0.63	-0.05	0.13
	-0.89	1.81	-1.40	-1.56	0.04				
MEXICO	0.21	-0.00	1.00	1.15	-0.35	1.34	-2.21	0.21	-0.39
	-1.47	1.35	-0.29	-0.43	1.92				
MONGOLIA	0.43	-1.62	-0.75	-1.14	0.52	1.15	1.26	0.54	-0.30
	-1.15	2.32	-0.95	1.19	-0.51				
MOROCCO	-1.14	0.43	-0.31	0.12	-0.98	0.07	-1.06	1.63	0.22
	-0.65	0.98	1.46	1.73	-1.06				
NEPAL	-1.15	-0.57	-1.10	-0.02	1.84	-0.65	0.05	-0.88	-0.44
	0.30	0.11	-1.60	0.17	0.90				
NETHERLANDS	0.93	1.24	0.25	0.19	0.51	-1.44	-0.42	-0.82	1.24
	-0.74	-0.42	-0.10	0.10	-1.06				
NEW ZEALAND	1.64	0.96	0.81	-0.92	-0.52	0.83	1.53	-0.23	-0.16
	-0.64	-0.35	-0.07	-0.80	-0.47				
NICARAGUA	0.41	-0.69	1.79	-1.42	0.95	0.20	-1.43	0.82	0.68
	0.65	0.57	-0.27	0.94	0.49				
NIGER	-1.01	-0.03	-0.77	-0.81	-1.11	0.89	-0.35	-1.43	-0.25
	0.04	0.24	-2.05	-1.71	-1.17				
NIGERIA	-1.61	0.75	-0.06	0.66	1.22	0.14	-0.03	-0.97	-1.31
	-1.00	-0.76	2.46	-0.63	-0.14				
NORWAY	1.02	1.30	0.03	-0.40	0.46	-0.07	0.10	0.58	1.02
	-0.96	-0.53	-1.72	0.54	-0.84				
PAKISTAN	-1.26	-0.80	1.16	1.62	-0.88	-0.57	0.29	0.51	-0.98
	0.26	-1.05	1.72	-1.55	-1.73				
PANAMA	1.04	0.44	1.12	-0.92	0.17	-0.13	0.99	0.15	-1.80
	1.87	0.96	-0.47	-0.83	0.56				
PARAGUAY	0.78	-1.43	1.35	-1.58	0.79	0.46	-0.50	0.71	0.31
	0.43	-0.28	-0.28	-0.61	0.19				
PERU	0.35	-0.11	1.37	0.51	0.11	0.84	-0.83	-0.87	-0.19
	1.64	-0.40	-0.20	0.26	0.55				
PHILIPPINES	-0.44	1.19	1.10	1.39	-0.77	-1.12	1.57	-0.48	-1.20
	-1.37	1.90	0.18	-1.63	1.41				
POLAND	1.34	-1.99	-0.45	1.08	-0.07	-0.45	0.79	-0.10	-0.98
	-0.24	0.19	-0.22	1.54	0.09				
PORTUGAL	0.92	-1.49	0.83	-0.50	1.44	-0.32	-0.04	0.86	0.10
	-1.31	-1.49	0.03	-1.32	1.21				
ROMANIA	1.17	-2.04	-1.27	0.91	-0.14	-0.29	1.04	-0.15	-0.71
	-0.19	0.13	-0.42	1.53	0.06				
SAUDIA ARABIA	-1.35	-0.57	0.36	0.44	1.60	1.07	0.33	1.98	-0.11
	-1.23	-1.15	-0.84	-2.31	0.38				
SENEGAL	-0.95	-0.43	-0.24	-0.84	-1.43	-0.20	-0.04	0.68	-0.77
	-0.64	-0.01	0.30	-0.74	-0.68				
SIERRA LEONE	-1.35	1.39	-0.82	-0.96	0.67	-0.60	0.25	-0.64	-0.52
	-0.33	1.52	1.08	-0.32	-0.07				
SOMALIA	-0.93	0.33	-1.11	-1.21	1.41	1.14	1.27	0.65	-0.43
	-0.55	-0.89	0.37	-0.70	0.29				
SPAIN	0.93	-1.75	0.46	1.05	0.46	-0.32	0.72	-0.02	-0.94
	-0.70	-1.33	0.22	-1.70	1.11				
SUDAN	-1.08	-0.40	-1.16	0.67	0.62	1.25	0.37	-0.25	-2.07
	0.66	0.95	0.06	-0.60	-1.65				
SWEDEN	1.06	1.16	-0.08	0.07	0.23	-0.01	0.16	0.45	0.55
	-0.92	-0.98	-1.25	0.54	-1.27				
SYRIA	-0.35	0.30	-1.42	-0.02	0.34	-0.19	0.16	1.41	1.24
	2.54	0.84	0.27	0.23	-0.83				
THAILAND	-0.65	-0.70	1.18	0.54	1.22	-0.11	2.33	-0.45	0.28
	0.99	0.14	-2.14	0.11	-0.06				
TOGO	-0.75	0.01	-0.51	-1.41	-0.28	-0.41	0.08	-0.54	-0.26
	0.24	-0.40	0.74	0.23	-0.40				
TUNISIA	-0.40	-0.38	-0.93	-0.50	-1.49	-0.35	-0.52	2.77	-1.17
	-1.28	0.08	0.64	0.55	-0.18				
TURKEY	-0.46	0.95	-0.05	1.71	0.32	0.68	2.24	1.67	0.15
	0.39	1.27	-1.33	1.54	1.75				
U.S.S.R.	1.27	-1.92	-0.43	1.36	0.24	2.08	0.95	-1.66	1.34
	-0.93	1.57	0.58	-1.12	-0.74				
U.A.R.	-0.21	-1.14	0.10	1.15	-1.80	-0.62	-0.61	2.48	0.00
	0.59	-0.04	-0.58	-1.17	-1.99				
UNITED KINGDOM	0.93	1.06	0.48	0.84	0.79	-0.99	-0.72	-1.13	1.20
	-1.04	-0.19	-0.30	-0.09	-1.52				
UNITED STATES	1.43	1.08	-2.86	1.63	-0.12	1.71	-2.69	-1.04	1.50
	-0.43	1.27	-0.82	-0.84	2.25				
UPPER VOLTA	-0.80	-0.78	-0.83	-1.10	-1.56	-0.11	-0.18	-0.83	-0.10
	0.01	-0.84	-1.18	-1.28	0.33				
URUGUAY	1.21	1.10	-0.09	-0.77	-0.35	0.63	0.13	0.78	-0.74
	0.45	-0.86	0.18	-1.05	0.80				
VENEZUELA	0.92	0.28	1.76	0.16	-0.96	1.84	0.97	1.04	-0.92
	0.68	1.60	1.20	0.89	0.68				
YEMEN	-0.80	0.21	-1.90	-0.81	1.02	0.19	-0.22	1.73	0.13
	-0.20	0.02	0.85	-1.81	0.85				
YUGOSLAVIA	0.41	-1.73	0.17	1.36	0.25	-0.10	0.35	-1.66	1.28
	-0.57	-0.34	1.44	1.13	0.56				
TAIWAN	-0.32	-0.55	2.14	0.37	-1.22	-2.49	0.22	0.60	3.00
	-0.98	1.56	-0.17	-2.07	0.74				

Table VII

ROTATED LOADINGS OF VOTING DATA					ROW SUM
1. VOTES EAST	0.96	-0.06	-0.04	-0.19	0.96
2. VOTES SOUTH	0.20	0.91	-0.04	-0.23	0.92
3. VOTES EAST IN COLD WAR	0.74	-0.34	0.30	-0.35	0.88
4. SELF-DETERMINATION	0.77	0.52	0.11	0.08	0.89
5. SUPRANATIONALISM	-0.46	0.56	-0.09	-0.49	0.78
6. PRO-ARAB	0.87	-0.12	-0.26	-0.07	0.84
7. AGAINST U.N. INTERVENTION	-0.16	0.11	0.79	0.24	0.73
8. WESTERN COMMUNITY	-0.95	-0.00	-0.04	0.00	0.91
9. BRAZZAVILLE AFRICANS	-0.12	0.90	-0.11	0.10	0.85
10. AFRO-ASIANS	0.85	0.17	-0.05	-0.20	0.80
11. COMMUNIST BLOC	0.69	-0.07	-0.17	-0.06	0.84
12. CONSERVATIVE ARABS	-0.02	0.29	-0.77	0.13	0.70
13. IBERIA	-0.30	-0.09	0.07	0.80	0.75
COLUMN SUM					
5.65 2.50 1.46 1.24					

Table VIII

LOADINGS OVER +.50 AND FACTOR NAMES OF VOTING DATA	
01. EASTERN VOTING	
1. VOTES EAST	0.96
11. COMMUNIST BLOC	0.89
6. PRO-ARAB	0.87
10. AFRO-ASIANS	0.85
4. SELF-DETERMINATION	0.77
3. VOTES EAST IN COLD WAR	0.74
8. WESTERN COMMUNITY	-0.95
12. SOUTHERN VOTING	
2. VOTES SOUTH	0.91
9. BRAZZAVILLE AFRICANS	0.90
5. SUPRANATIONALISM	0.56
4. SELF-DETERMINATION	0.52
03. U.N. INTERVENTION	
7. AGAINST U.N. INTERVENTION	0.79
12. CONSERVATIVE ARABS	-0.77
04. IBERIA	
13. IBERIA	0.60

Relations" add substantially to the interpretation, together accounting for 40 percent of the variance.

The "Southern Voting" dimension is the second best accounted for when we consider the predictors of "Economic Development" (33 percent of the variance). "Democracy" (5 percent of the variance), "Bigness" (13 percent of the variance), and "Executive Leadership" (6 percent of the variance), for a total of 57 percent of the variance. Thus, "Southern Voting" states tend to be underdeveloped, democratic, small, and have interest aggregation by their executives. Again, a multiple interpretation is suggested, although the contributions of "Economic Development" and "Bigness" are considerably greater than those of "Democracy" and "Executive Leadership."

Of the two remaining voting dimensions, considering the best predictors, "UN Intervention" is partially accounted for, "Executive Leadership" (6 percent of the variance), "Religious Homogeneity" (5 percent of the variance), "Instability" (8 percent of the vari-

Table IX

FACTOR SCORES OF VOTING DATA

AFGHANISTAN	1.26	-0.80	0.39	0.48
ALBANIA	1.41	-1.68	-0.03	-0.49
ARGENTINA	-0.82	0.20	0.21	0.98
AUSTRALIA	-1.34	-0.93	1.23	1.03
AUSTRIA	-0.93	-0.74	1.28	-0.51
BELGIUM	-1.36	-0.91	1.56	1.31
BOLIVIA	-0.56	0.53	-1.27	-0.24
BRAZIL	-0.25	0.50	-0.26	0.94
BULGARIA	1.41	-1.76	-0.14	0.02
BURMA	0.80	0.04	0.88	-0.30
CAMBODIA	1.02	-0.64	-0.29	-0.44
CAMEROON	0.10	1.54	1.45	0.18
CANADA	-1.45	-0.71	0.96	0.83
CENTRAL AFRICAN RE	0.33	1.24	1.62	1.47
Ceylon	0.69	0.32	0.36	-0.91
CHAD	0.53	1.49	1.35	0.95
CHILE	-0.80	0.47	-0.80	0.27
COLOMBIA	-0.78	0.22	-1.23	0.63
CONGO (BRA)	0.49	1.63	1.65	0.27
CONGO (LEO)	0.41	1.31	0.89	-0.56
COSTA RICA	-0.60	0.29	-1.32	0.12
CUBA	1.29	-1.69	-0.18	-0.15
CYPRUS	-0.30	1.20	0.41	-0.62
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	1.42	-1.60	0.30	0.24
DAHOMEY	0.12	1.83	0.88	-1.11
DENMARK	-1.60	-0.94	0.30	-2.63
ECUADOR	-0.65	0.08	-1.83	0.02
EL SALVADOR	-0.93	-0.29	-1.85	1.48
ETHIOPIA	0.65	0.15	0.70	-1.37
FINLAND	-1.09	-1.15	1.46	-1.98
FRANCE	-0.75	-1.41	1.75	1.52
GREECE	-1.16	-0.91	-0.41	0.73
GUATEMALA	-0.80	-0.10	-0.69	-0.41
GUINEA	1.20	0.39	0.52	0.03
HAITI	0.06	0.71	0.01	1.66
HUNGARY	1.20	-1.67	-1.10	-0.26
ICELAND	-1.58	-0.58	-0.76	-2.19
INDIA	0.63	0.28	-0.38	-0.91
INDONESIA	1.29	-0.63	0.92	0.11
IRAN	-0.70	0.86	-1.82	-0.73
IRAQ	1.51	-0.60	-1.28	-0.16
IRELAND	-1.45	-0.85	-1.34	-0.45
ISRAEL	-0.71	0.43	0.35	-1.75
ITALY	-1.56	-0.44	0.34	0.65
IVORY COAST	0.16	1.94	0.17	-0.38
JAPAN	-1.29	-0.32	-2.01	0.01
JORDAN	0.88	0.48	-1.02	0.73
LAOS	-0.88	0.66	-1.18	-0.01
LEBANON	0.65	-0.10	-2.05	0.71
LIBERIA	-0.17	1.43	-0.96	-1.12
LIBYA	0.80	0.81	-0.86	0.07
MALGASY REP	1.37	1.35	0.08	1.16
MAURITANIA	0.81	-0.27	0.05	-0.68
MEXICO	0.44	1.32	-0.40	1.22
MONGOLIA	-1.42	0.62	-1.26	-0.37
MOROCCO	1.42	-1.24	0.14	-0.06
MOROCCO	1.09	0.00	-1.04	-0.79
NEPAL	0.47	-0.06	-0.16	-0.95
NETHERLANDS	-1.56	-0.70	1.26	-0.07
NEW ZEALAND	-1.39	-0.47	0.78	0.40
NICARAGUA	-1.03	0.27	0.97	0.66
NIGER	0.58	1.66	1.08	1.64
NIGERIA	0.53	1.30	1.08	0.29
NORWAY	-1.80	-0.95	0.57	-2.24
PAKISTAN	-0.09	0.26	-0.97	-1.66
PANAMA	-0.88	0.47	-1.15	-0.14
PARAGUAY	-1.11	0.41	-1.14	0.72
PERU	-0.72	0.42	-0.07	1.70
PHILIPPINES	-0.28	0.56	-1.81	0.84
POLAND	1.43	-1.56	-0.10	0.05
PORTUGAL	-0.60	-1.62	1.50	1.28
ROMANIA	1.42	-1.73	-0.21	0.32
SAUDIA ARABIA	1.00	-0.68	-0.99	1.44
SENEGAL	0.53	1.80	0.15	0.86
SERRA LEONE	0.40	1.60	1.31	-1.47
SOMALIA	0.82	0.67	0.61	-1.22
SPAIN	-0.76	-0.94	0.27	1.64
SUDAN	1.02	-0.19	-0.20	-0.64
SWEDEN	-1.41	-0.98	0.73	-2.57
SYRIA	1.34	-0.65	0.17	0.28
THAILAND	-0.65	0.40	-1.69	0.50
TOGO	0.67	0.82	0.07	0.71
TUNISIA	0.55	0.66	0.51	-1.78
TURKEY	-1.29	-0.25	1.19	0.51
U.S.S.R.	1.42	-1.60	0.30	0.24
U.A.R.	1.52	-0.76	-0.28	0.41
UNITED KINGDOM	-1.32	-1.35	1.08	0.39
UNITED STATES	-1.15	-0.82	0.02	0.83
UPPER VOLTA	0.40	1.86	1.72	-1.04
URUGUAY	-0.53	0.98	-1.31	0.16
VENEZUELA	-0.90	1.01	-0.60	-0.65
YEMEN	1.20	-0.53	0.01	-0.54
YUGOSLAVIA	1.28	-0.23	0.37	-0.38
TAIWAN	-0.67	-0.44	0.51	1.25

ance), and "Population Rate Increase (10 percent of the variance), for a total of 29 percent of the variance, and "Iberia" by "Voting Intensity" (5 percent of the variance), "U.S. Relations" (4 percent of the variance), and "Democracy" (4 percent of the variance), for a total of 13 percent of the variance.

If the variance explained by all of the predictors taken together is of interest, this is given by sum of squares of the columns. Thus, from a purely descriptive point of view, the predictors considered can account for 83 percent of the variance of the "Eastern Voting" dimension, 77 percent of the variance of the "Southern Voting" dimensions, etc.

It may be concluded from the analysis that the predictors considered have much more relevance to the observed variation in "Eastern Voting" and "Southern Voting" than for "UN Intervention" or "Iberia."

What is the best overall predictor of the voting scores? As suggested above, this can be most conveniently answered by the technique of canonical correlation.

When the variables are weighted as previously suggested we get the results shown in Table XI on page 491.

When the subjects are scored according to the above formula we get the results shown in Table XII on page 492.

This information, then, supplements but doesn't contradict the earlier analysis. We might have guessed, from the simple correlation matrix, that "Economic Development" would be the most important overall predictor but here we are given scores (Table XII, first set) with a precise relationship to each of the variables in the national attribute set which is precisely related to other scores (Table XII, second set) which have a precise relationship to variables in the voting data set. Also, we know exactly where each subject stands through his scores which, when correlated, express the overall relationship between the two sets of variables.

As suggested earlier, a "multiple interpretation" seems necessary to account for the bulk of the variance in the voting scores. That is, when we score states so that the most underdeveloped and undemocratic, with the fewest U.S. relations, stand at the head of the list, and those with the highest development, democratic practices, and close U.S. relations are at the bottom of the list, such a list is highly correlated (its scores) with that which is formed when the states are scored so that the most Eastern and Southern voting states stand at the head of the list and the most Western and Northern voting states stand at the bottom of the list. A

Table X

SIMPLE CORRELATION OF NATIONAL ATTRIBUTE
FACTOR SCORES WITH VOTING FACTOR SCORES

01. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT	-0.46	-0.57	-0.02	0.06
02. DEMOCRACY	-0.56	0.22	0.04	-0.20
03. US RELATIONS	-0.43	0.19	-0.15	0.21
04. BIGNESS	0.01	-0.36	-0.03	0.10
05. EXECUTIVE LEADERSHIP	-0.08	-0.23	-0.24	-0.02
06. POPULATION DISPERSION	0.01	0.17	0.04	0.12
07. INCREASE IN PERCENT LITERATE	0.03	-0.02	0.04	-0.16
08. RELIGIOUS HOMOGENEITY	0.01	-0.16	-0.22	-0.10
09. MILITARISM	-0.05	-0.13	0.17	0.12
10. INSTABILITY	0.01	0.16	-0.26	0.19
11. POPULATION RATE INCREASE	0.18	-0.11	-0.31	-0.01
12. SECTIONALISM	0.19	0.12	0.0	0.01
13. VOTING INTENSITY	0.02	-0.10	0.08	-0.22
14. COMMUNIST CHINA ECONOMIC RELATIONS	-0.12	0.20	-0.06	0.16

COLUMN SQ SUM
0.63 0.77 0.34 0.29

COLUMNS

01. EASTERN VOTING
02. SOUTHERN VOTING
03. U. N. INTERVENTION
04. IBERIA

correlation of .93, of course, only leaves 13 percent of the variance unaccounted for between the two canonical variate scores. In this connection, the odds are less than .00001 that such a correlation could have occurred by chance.⁴¹

The validity of the analysis can be subjectively checked by examining the earlier tables and identifying which states are most underdeveloped and undemocratic and have few U.S.

⁴¹ The exact probability is even less than this. The .93 correlation produced a Chi-square of 349 with 56 degrees of freedom. The probability in this case is so small as to exceed printout (10 places) capacity on the program used. However, even a third of this Chi-square produces a probability of less than 47 chances out of one million. In this connection the probability statement assesses the likelihood of getting a correlation of a particular magnitude (in this case .93) if we had begun with random numbers in the two sets of variables. This use of the test of significance is distinct from its use in connection with "sampling variability" where the characteristics of a "universe" are estimated from a sample. That is, from one perspective, we are dealing with a universe in this study and the correlations are descriptive. It is of interest, however, to compare the observed correlation with the probability of getting it if we had started with random numbers.

Table XI

CANONICAL CORRELATION WEIGHTS ASSIGNED
TO VARIABLES FOR CORRELATION OF .93

01. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT -.71
02. DEMOCRACY -.46
03. US RELATIONS -.35
04. BIGNESS -.16
05. EXECUTIVE LEADERSHIP -.20
06. POPULATION DISPERSION .08
07. INCREASE IN PERCENT LITERATE .02
08. RELIGIOUS HOMOGENEITY -.08
09. MILITARISM -.09
10. INSTABILITY .05
11. POPULATION RATE INCREASE .09
12. SECTIONALISM .24
13. VOTING INTENSITY -.01
14. COMMUNIST CHINA ECONOMIC RELATIONS -.03

01. EASTERN VOTING .93
02. SOUTHERN VOTING .43
03. U. N. INTERVENTION .07
04. IBERIA -.02

Table XII

CANONICAL CORRELATION SCORES ASSIGNED
TO SUBJECTS FOR CORRELATION .93

NATIONAL ATTRIBUTE CANONICAL VARIATE SCORES		VOTING CANONICAL VARIATE SCORES	
SUDAN	1.69	UPPER VOLTA	1.32
SENEGAL	1.45	NIGER	1.28
DANOMBY	1.39	GUINEA	1.28
GUINEA	1.35	CONGO (BRA)	1.26
BURMA	1.29	SENEGAL	1.26
MALI	1.28	MAURITANIA	1.25
TOGO	1.25	CHAD	1.20
PAKISTAN	1.20	SIERRA LEONE	1.19
NIGERIA	1.18	MALI	1.13
UPPER VOLTA	1.18	NIGERIA	1.12
NIGER	1.18	SOMALIA	1.10
MOROCCO	1.15	YUGOSLAVIA	1.08
CHAD	1.13	CONGO (LEO)	1.02
CONGO (BRA)	1.13	IVORY COAST	1.02
CAMBODIA	1.13	LIBYA	1.01
CAMEROON	1.13	IRAQ	1.01
YEMEN	1.10	U.A.R.	1.00
SIERRA LEONE	1.10	ETHIOPIA	1.00
MAURITANIA	1.08	DANOMBY	1.00
TUNISIA	1.07	TOGO	0.95
CONGO (LEO)	1.06	INDONESIA	0.94
ALBANIA	1.05	MOROCCO	0.93
CENTRAL AFRICAN RE	0.95	SYRIA	0.92
IVORY COAST	0.92	CENTRAL AFRICAN RE	0.92
INDONESIA	0.91	JORDAN	0.91
SOMALIA	0.90	TUNISIA	0.86
MONGOLIA	0.85	CAMEROON	0.86
IRAQ	0.83	YEMEN	0.85
NEPAL	0.77	SUDAN	0.83
JORDAN	0.76	CEYLON	0.81
MALGASY REP	0.71	BURMA	0.61
LAOS	0.63	AFGHANISTAN	0.60
SYRIA	0.61	MONGOLIA	0.74
LIBYA	0.51	INDIA	0.69
AFGHANISTAN	0.49	CAMBODIA	0.62
U.A.R.	0.49	MALGASY REP	0.61
INDIA	0.48	POLAND	0.59
ETHIOPIA	0.44	CZECHOSLOVAKIA	0.59
YUGOSLAVIA	0.42	U.S.S.R.	0.59
CUBA	0.40	ALBANIA	0.54
RULGANIA	0.37	ROMANIA	0.49
ROMANIA	0.37	SAUDIA ARABIA	0.49
HUNGARY	0.36	BULGARIA	0.48
U.S.S.R.	0.34	LIBERIA	0.43
CEYLON	0.33	NEPAL	0.41
SAUDIA ARABIA	0.28	CUBA	0.41
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	0.23	LEBANON	0.38
LEBANON	0.11	HAITI	0.32
IRAN	0.09	CYPRUS	0.30
CYPRUS	0.06	HUNGARY	0.27
POLAND	-0.06	LAOS	0.14
LIBERIA	-0.12	PAKISTAN	-0.01
HAITI	-0.12	BRAZIL	-0.05
BOLIVIA	-0.17	URUGUAY	-0.14
THAILAND	-0.35	PHILIPPINES	-0.15
SPAIN	-0.35	MEXICO	-0.20
HAZIL	-0.34	BOLIVIA	-0.35
PARAGUAY	-0.41	IRAN	-0.36
GUATEMALA	-0.44	ISRAEL	-0.38
PHILIPPINES	-0.45	VENEZUELA	-0.38
EL SALVADOR	-0.47	COSTA RICA	-0.50
VENEZUELA	-0.58	PERU	-0.51
TAIWAN	-0.59	THAILAND	-0.54
MEXICO	-0.61	CHILE	-0.58
ECUADOR	-0.62	ARGENTINA	-0.66
PERU	-0.65	PANAMA	-0.66
ISRAEL	-0.65	ECUADOR	-0.68
COLOMBIA	-0.69	COLOMBIA	-0.71
TURKEY	-0.72	NICARAGUA	-0.75
NICARAGUA	-0.73	TAIWAN	-0.79
COSTA RICA	-0.77	GUATEMALA	-0.80
ARGENTINA	-0.77	PARAGUAY	-0.91
PORTUGAL	-0.88	AUSTRIA	-1.05
UNITED STATES	-0.91	SPAIN	-1.11
PANAMA	-0.95	EL SALVADOR	-1.12
AUSTRIA	-1.01	PORTUGAL	-1.18
IRELAND	-1.03	TURKEY	-1.20
URUGUAY	-1.09	FRANCE	-1.21
CANADA	-1.23	FINLAND	-1.33
AUSTRALIA	-1.27	UNITED STATES	-1.41
FINLAND	-1.28	NEW ZEALAND	-1.41
ITALY	-1.35	JAPAN	-1.44
ICELAND	-1.39	GREECE	-1.48
BELGIUM	-1.42	BELGIUM	-1.54
GREECE	-1.46	AUSTRALIA	-1.55
CHILE	-1.46	CANADA	-1.56
JAPAN	-1.49	SWEDEN	-1.57
NEW ZEALAND	-1.54	ITALY	-1.58
FRANCE	-1.55	NETHERLANDS	-1.60
NETHERLANDS	-1.71	ICELAND	-1.66
SWEDEN	-1.82	NORWAY	-1.67
UNITED KINGDOM	-1.83	UNITED KINGDOM	-1.74
DENMARK	-1.85	IRELAND	-1.75
NORWAY	-2.01	DENMARK	-1.76

relations, and then determining if they do indeed tend to vote Eastern and Southern.

In overall terms, "Economic Development" is the most important predictor on the independent side and "Eastern Voting" is the best accounted for by the canonical variate scores of the dependent side.

One significant aspect of these findings is that the biggest dimensions on both sides of the analysis are those which receive the heaviest weights in the canonical correlation. Thus, those factor scores which relate to the bulk of the variance of the original variables are those with the most explanatory power.

It might be wise to summarize, at this point, the most salient points of the entire analysis.

Two sets of scores were considered—national attribute scores and voting scores (with the voting scores having predictive relevance to a large number of roll call votes). Many of the national attribute scores had considerable predictive relevance in respect to the voting scores. Tables I and II give the associations. These tables, although specifically answering the question of whether predictions such as "Dollar Imports From the U.S." have predictive relevance to voting dimensions such as "Western Community," are hard to work with to generate general findings because of the complexity of interrelationships among the variables. A useful simplifying device, factor analysis, was used to eliminate redundancy in both sets of data. This left 14 national attribute factor scores, accounting for 82 percent of the original variance in the 77 variables of the national attribute data and 4 voting factor scores, accounting for 83 percent of the variance in the 13 variables of the voting data. "Economic Development," "Democracy," "Bigness," and "U.S. Relations" were the biggest dimensions on the national attribute side and "Eastern Voting" and "Southern Voting" on the voting side. Simple correlations between the factor scores showed that each of the "big" national attribute dimensions had good predictive power relative to certain of the voting dimensions. However, the canonical technique shows that "Economic Development" must be given the most weight on the national attribute side and "Eastern Voting" on the voting side if we wish to maximize the correlation between canonical variate scores.⁴²

⁴² There are, of course, many ways of weighting the variables in the sets to produce correlations smaller than the maximal correlation. If this is done, the weights are usually assigned under the restriction that each new set of canonical variate scores, generated from a particular set, be orthogonal to all other canonical variate scores generated from that set. Operating under these restrictions, the second largest possible canonical correlation is .86. In this case,

These results are not surprising but they are gratifying. I say this because they tie in so well with previous research, treated above, which stresses the importance of economic development in predicting UN attitudinal data.

The question naturally arises as to whether the previous findings can be fitted together with the present ones. Is it possible to evaluate Eastern-Western and Southern-Northern voting in the same negative-positive cast adopted in the studies concerning attitudes? To probe this possibility, a panel of judges⁴³ were asked, in their opinion, whether voting for or against the following resolutions (used in Alker and Russett's 1961 study) indicates a tendency to bolster the interests and development of the United Nations (positive tendency), or shows the opposite (negative tendency). The judges were also given an opportunity to indicate if they felt a particular resolution was basically irrelevant to such tendencies. The resolutions were, using Alker and Russett's abbreviations: those depicted in Table XIII on page 494.

The judges agreed that voting *for* items indicated by an "F" and *against* items indicated by an "A" are votes which express a positive tendency to bolster the interests and development of the United Nations. (The percentage of agreement is given behind the sign and irrelevancy indicated by I⁴⁴). Thus, if the opinion of

Economic Development receives a weight of $-.34$, Democracy $.50$, U.S. Relations $.42$, and Bigness, $-.36$, with the remaining variables (independent) not weighted at all. On the dependent side, Eastern voting receives a weight of $-.43$ and Northern voting $.88$, with very little weight given to the remaining variables. Similarly, operating under the same restraints, still another pattern of weights can be assigned to generate a correlation of $.62$. In this connection, a number of such canonical correlations can be "statistically significant." In this study, of course, a decision was made to focus attention upon and interpret the largest correlation, although, in some studies, it may be desirable to interpret several correlations.

⁴³ The judges were 28 upper division students at Florida Atlantic University who had just completed a course focusing on the United Nations.

⁴⁴ The ratio of "positive" to "negative" votes, as evaluated by the judges, is approximately 2 to 1 in the case of the "Eastern" voting dimension (when the votes are "Eastern") evaluating all votes loading $\pm .50$ or above (59 votes, 39 "positive") while the "Southern" voting dimension is "pure" with all 10 votes, loading $\pm .50$ or above, being viewed by the judges as evidencing a "positive tendency," when the votes are "Southern." If the judges' responses are evaluated by the loadings ($\pm .50$ or above), viewing Eastern and Southern votes as "correct answers" and Western and Northern votes as "incorrect answers" and votes on loadings below $\pm .50$ as "irrelevant," Kuder-Richardson Formula 20 shows a reliability of .78 for the "test." If the judges' most popular categories (positive, negative or neutral) are viewed as providing the "correct answers" and the judges' responses are then evaluated, Kuder-Richardson Formula 20 shows a reliability of .83 for the "test."

Table XIII

JUDGES' EVALUATIONS OF VOTES ON THE EAST-WEST (E VOTES EAST) AND NORTH-SOUTH (S VOTES SOUTH) DIMENSIONS IN TERMS OF WHETHER AFFIRMATIVE VOTES INDICATE POSITIVE (F), NEGATIVE (A), OR NEUTRAL (I) TENDENCY TOWARD THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

E S			E S		
ROLL CALLS			ROLL CALLS		
	1	2		1	2
F82 8004. Censure South Africa *	.63	.33	F68 8065. Friendly relations with *		
F79 8022. Sanction South Africa *	.84	.25	Cuba	.92	.05
F86 8023. Security Council &			F86 2002. Hold trade conference *	.88	.23
S. Africa *	.88	.28	F93 2005. Help primary		
F79 8024. No arms to			producers	.44	.41
South Africa	.33	.22	F86 8038. Study trade conference *	-.74	.37
F61 8025. No petroleum to Africa *	.85	.21	F93 2010. Special int. devel. *		
F81 8027. Oman self-			agency	.57	.38
determination	.84	.06	F57 2015. Conference on patents	-.53	-.21
F96 0018. Reconstitute Pal.			F75 8039. Aid with 1% GNP *	-.25	.74
Con. Com.	.38	-.03	F82 8041. Population & econ.		
F86 8045. Reconstitute Pal.			devel.	.53	-.13
Con. Com.	.72	-.01	F100 8001. Tibet on agenda *	-.83	.31
F89 8046. Protect Arab refugees	.77	-.02	F82 8043. Resolution on Tibet	-.79	.41
F86 8047. U.N.R.W.A.	.64	.20	I75 3001. Absentee marriage		
F82 8048. U.S. Palestine			legal	-.02	-.38
Resolution	-.70	.22	F93 3007. Disallow "hatred and		
F86 0003. Czech Res. on			hostility" *	.78	.17
UNSCAR	.81	-.09	F82 3013. Safeguard right of		
A71 8006. Czech Res. important?	-.87	.05	reply	.68	-.17
F89 8007. Admit Mauritania	-.77	.17	F93 8011. Algerian prisoners	.78	.30
F84 8029. China question			F89 8017. 1962 end of colonialism	.91	-.05
important?	-.74	.19	F100 8019. W. Irian self-		
F50 8030. China declaration	.67	.15	determination	-.74	.11
F50 8031. Seat People's Rep. of			F82 8020. Commission on *		
China	.63	.16	W. Irian	-.78	.09
A68 8032. Representation of			F93 8021. Indian res. on W. Irian	.76	.01
China	.74	-.13	F82 8035. Regrets Port. non-		
F79 8008. Stop 50 megaton bomb *	-.55	.64	compliance	-.83	-.29
F93 1010. General & complete			F89 8037. Renew CINSCT	-.26	.84
disarm. *	.88	.04	F93 4009. Swedish res. on		
F96 8009. Regrets tests; need *			South Africa	-.80	-.12
treaty	-.01	.86	F86 8066. Ask SC 17: S. Rhodesia		
F68 8010. Regrets rejection of			SGT	.87	.32
US-UK	-.70	.30	F79 8068. S. Rhodesia on agenda *	.84	.34
F86 8012. Denuclearize Africa *	.70	.06	F82 8073. "I man I vote"		
F75 8016. Charter bans nuclear *			S. Rhodesia	.86	.24
weapons	.87	.31	F82 8075. Regret UK acts on		
F86 1023. Form Non-nuclear club *	.67	.10	S. Rhodesia	.75	.40
F79 8044. Question of Algeria	.68	.16	F89 8056. Condemn Portugal		
A68 1026. N. Korea & UNCURK	-.75	.32	re Angola	.92	.04
F89 8054. Report of UNCURK	-.88	.25	F89 8058. Report on Angola	.80	.05
F96 8055. Deplores Hungary on			F93 8059. Angola & SC 17	.89	.16
disrespect *	-.92	.07	F64 4001. Burundi Prime		
F64 8064. Noninterference in *			Minister	-.88	-.24
Cuba	.86	-.08	F89 4021. Rwanda & Burundi		
			sovereign	-.82	.01

E S		
ROLL CALLS		
	1	2
F100 8069. Evacuate R. & B. by		
1 July '62	.95	.02
F96 8070. Rwanda & Burundi		
evacuation	.30	.40
F86 4023. Rwanda & Burundi		
evacuation	-.30	.73
F86 8071. \$2 million to S.G. for		
R. & B.	-.24	.66
F68 5004. Five Sec. members/		
country	.57	.56
F89 8049. Congo expenses and		
ICJ.	-.74	.39
F93 8031. Congo cost	-.42	.55
F100 8052. UNEF expenses	-.30	.45
F93 8053. Budget for year 1962	-.39	.60
F86 8033. "All" attend conference *	.91	-.06

the judges is accepted, when votes are evaluated in basically the same terms as the questionnaire items—that is, in negative-positive terms—our findings for the most part tend to converge, in the sense that it is shown here that high economic development scores predict (for the most part) “negative” tendencies as revealed by voting scores, and it has been shown elsewhere that high development scores predict “negative” attitude scores toward U.N. organs. In this connection, it should be recalled that voting and attitude patterns are also mutually predictive. These findings also tie in with Rummel’s finding that “Economic Development” is an important predictor of certain kinds of behavior in tests of Models I and II and Sawyer’s view that “Size,” “Wealth,” and “Politics” are basic in the international system.⁴⁵

All of this suggests that economic development might be viewed as something fundamental to the attitudes, operations, and outcomes at the United Nations. If one of the primary concerns of modern social science is prediction, the “economic hypothesis” seems to have more relevance than any other so far examined, in the sense of evidencing a persistence over time, consistency of interpretation, and application to a considerable range of data. One can’t help but feel pessimistic about such findings (if one is a supporter of the United Nations) when it is realized that the chief source of financial sup-

port of the United Nations is from, and must continue to be from, the economically advanced states. In short, a considerable portion of the future of the United Nations, in terms of support, seems to rest upon the policy orientations of those whose inclinations are, for the most part, negative in tone.

At a more general level, if the present study is viewed as a test of Attribute Theory, as expressed in the introductory equation and qualified by subsequent discussion, a substantial “fit” seems evident which may augur well for subsequent theoretical development along these lines.⁴⁶ In this connection, the development of a system of fundamental axioms may some day allow the prediction of the “weights” in the equation as different dimensions of behavior are considered. The same may be true, of course, for Social Field Theory, which, as previously indicated, is closely related.

⁴⁶ Because both sets of variables (attribute and voting) are internally uncorrelated, the simple correlations of the attribute measures with any voting measure are equal to beta weights in a multiple correlation (of such variables with the voting measure) and the sum of the simple correlations squared equal R^2 . See Vincent, *Factor Analysis in International Relations* . . . *op. cit.* Strictly speaking the “fit” ought to be evaluated in such terms because, although the attribute theory formula allows weights and linear combinations on the “attribute side,” it does not make such an allowance on the “behavior side,” and, of course, weights and linear combinations do occur on both sides, in the application of the canonical model. The section dealing with the simple correlation of the factor scores, then, if this limitation is imposed, can be viewed as evidence for the above statement.

⁴⁵ See: Jack Sawyer, “Dimensions of Nations: Size, Wealth and Politics,” *The American Journal of Sociology*, 73 (1967), pp. 145–172.

APPENDIX A—VARIABLES AND SOURCES

1. Military Personnel as a Percentage of Total Population (1)
2. Population per 1,000 hectares of agricultural land (1)
3. Inhabitants per Physician (1)
4. Gross National Product (1)
5. Inhabitants per Hospital Bed (1)
6. Percentage of Labor Force Employed in Agriculture (1)
7. Annual Percentage Rate of Increase in Population (1)
8. Moslems as a Percentage of Population (1)
9. Roman Catholics as a Percentage of Total Population (1)
10. All Christians as a Percentage of Total Population (1)
11. Population per Square Kilometer (1)
12. Area in Square Kilometers (1)
13. Radios per 1,000 Population (1)
14. Defense Expenditures as a Percentage of Gross National Product (1)
15. Votes in National Elections as a Percentage of Voting Age Population (1)
16. Military Personnel as a Percentage of Population Age 15-64 (1)
17. Students Enrolled in Higher Education per 100,000 Population (1)
18. Primary and Secondary School Pupils as a Percentage of Population Age 5-19 (1)
19. Percentage Literate of Population Age 15 and over (1)
20. Percentage Literate of Population Age 15 and over, Average Annual Increase (1)
21. Percentage Export of Total Exports to U.S. (3)
22. Percentage Imports of Total Imports from U.S. (3)
23. Number in Permanent Missions at the United Nations (4)
24. Year Entered the United Nations (5)
25. Military Alliances (9)
26. Imports from the United States (7)
27. Exports to the United States (7)
28. Exports to the U.S.S.R. (7)
29. Imports from the U.S.S.R. (7)
30. Exports to Communist China (7)
31. Imports from Communist China (7)
32. Population (2)
33. Urbanization (2)
34. Agricultural Population (2)
35. Per Capita Gross National Product (2)
36. International Financial Status (2)

37. Economic Development Status (2)
38. Freedom of the Press (2)
39. Newspaper Circulation per 1,000 Population (2)
40. Religious Homogeneity (2)
41. Racial Homogeneity (2)
42. Linguistic Homogeneity (2)
43. Date of Independence (2)
44. Westernization (2)
45. Political Modernization (2)
46. System Style (2)
47. Constitutional Status of Present Regime (2)
48. Governmental Stability (2)
49. Representative Character of Current Regime (2)
50. Current Electoral System (2)
51. Freedom of Group Opposition (2)
52. Political Inculturation (2)
53. Sectionalism (2)
54. Interest Articulation by Associational Groups (2)
55. Interest Articulation by Institutional Groups (2)
56. Interest Articulation by Non-Associational Groups (2)
57. Interest Articulation by Anomic Groups (2)
58. Interest Articulation by Political Parties (2)
59. Interest Aggregation by Executive (2)
60. Interest Aggregation by Legislature (2)
61. Stability of Party System (2)
62. Personalissimo (2)
63. Political Leadership (2)
64. Leadership Charisma (2)
65. Vertical Power Distribution (2)
66. Horizontal Power Distribution (2)
67. Current Status of Legislature (2)
68. Character of Legislature (2)
69. Current Status of Executive (2)
70. Character of Bureaucracy (2)
71. Political Participation by Military (2)
72. Role of Police (2)
73. Communist Bloc (2)
74. Distance from U.S. (8)
75. Distance from U.S.S.R. (8)
76. Distance from China (8)
77. Military Strength (6)

The following are primary sources (following above code): (1) Bruce M. Russett, et al, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964); (2) Arthur S. Banks and Robert Textor, A Cross Polity Survey (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1963); (3) Dan Golenpaul, ed., Information Please Almanac 1968 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967); (4) Permanent Missions to the United Nations, United Nations Document, March 1968; (5) Golenpaul, op. cit.; (6) Readers' Digest Almanac and Yearbook 1968 (New York: Readers' Digest Association, 1967); (7) Direction of Trade Annual 1962-66 (Washington: International Monetary Fund and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1967); (8) Great circle distance on a standard globe used. States with common border originally coded 0; (9) S. H. Steinberg, ed., The Statesmen's Yearbook 1966-67 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1966). States coded "1" allied with U.S., "2" neutral, and "3" allied with U.S.S.R.

Additional resources include: Louis Barron, ed., Worldmark Encyclopedia of the Nations: Africa (New York: Worldmark Press, Inc., 1963); Louis Barron, ed., Worldmark Encyclopedia of the Nations: Africa; Asia; Australasia; Europe; the Americas (New York: Worldmark Press, Inc., 1965); British Information Services, Botswana (London: Curwen Press, 1963); British Information Services, Kenya (London: F. Mildner & Sons, 1963); British Information Services, Lesotho (Norwich, England: Page Bros., Ltd., 1966); British Information Services, Malta (Manchester, England: H. M. Stationery Office Press, 1964); British Information Services, Zambia (Wilts, England: Swindon Press, Ltd., 1964); Gallatin Business Intelligence: Africa; Asia; Oceania; the Americas (New York: Copley International Corporation, 1967); Norton Ginsburg, Atlas of Economic Development (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964); Colin Legum, ed., Africa: Handbook to the Continent (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1966); Information Please Almanac and Yearbook, 1967, 22nd ed. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966); The Europa Yearbook 1967, Volume I, II (London: Europa Publications, Ltd., 1967); The Gallatin Annual of International Business (New York: American Heritage Publishing Co., Inc., 1965); The Middle East, 10th ed. (London: Europa Publications, Ltd., 1963); The U.S. Book of Facts, Statistics and Information (New York: Washington Square Press, Inc., 1966); United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations Statistical Yearbook (New York: U.S. Statistical Office, 1967); United Nations Office of Public Information, Everyman's United Nations, 7th ed., (New York: U.N. Office of Public Information, 1964); United States Department of State Publications, Background Notes (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967); Whitaker's Almanac 1967 and 1968 (London: William Clowes & Sons, Ltd., 1966, 1967); World Almanac and Book of Facts 1967 and 1968 (New York: Newspaper Enterprise Association, Inc., 1966, 1967); World Economic Atlas, 3rd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1965); The Annual Register: World Events in 1966 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967); The International Yearbook and Statesmen's Who's Who (London: Burke's Peerage, Ltd., 1967).

COMMUNICATIONS

TO THE EDITOR:

The recent contribution by Aiken and Alford (this REVIEW, September, 1970, pp. 843-864) illustrates the serious alienation between substantive theory and statistical data analysis that continues to trouble political science. The authors attempt to test five theories of community innovation by means of a correlational analysis involving four measures of public housing effort and twenty-four measures of demographic, economic, and political characteristics for a sample of U.S. cities.

Their measures of innovation show consistent relationships with the explanatory variables; the first column of my Table 1 summarizes their results. While the authors acknowledge the inadequacy of their variables as indicators of such shadowy phenomena as "political culture," they must have some degree of confidence in them, since the principal purpose of the article would seem to be to confront theories of innovation with data. Without asking such questions as whether "community differentiation" can be measured by the logarithm of the city population, it may be useful to look at the second group of theories offered by the authors, relating the concentration of community power to public housing effort. Four possible explanations for high public housing innovation are listed. Such effort is said to be found when "derivative [systemic] power is concentrated" (Hawley), when there is low "citizen participation," thus no "stalemate" (Crain-Rosenthal). On the other hand, perhaps such effort is found when there is "diffused power (many power groups)" (Aiken), when there is low "centralization of power" (Clark). Each of these theories can be made consistent with the finding that there is more urban renewal and public housing effort in cities with a population relatively low in personal income and education. Certainly, these theories may be employed to cast doubt on one another. What I do not see is how the authors' employment, education, or voting participation correlations can be used to cast doubt on any of them: the authors simply lack a real measure of the concentration of community power, and it is incredible, in the context of the long debate about community power, that such routine variables as these should be offered—no matter how diffidently—as indicators of power concentration.

What the authors' statistics tell us is one big thing: cities with a population of higher socioeconomic status display relatively little innova-

tion in public housing. The five strongest correlates with housing effort include two income variables, two education variables, and race. Almost every variable used is either a direct indicator of SES or likely to be correlated with SES. Almost every variable directly related to public housing effort is inversely related to SES, and vice-versa. I note only the several exceptions: As the authors themselves point out, the "ethnic" and "Catholic" indicators are influenced by Southern cities, relatively poor, native, and Protestant. The turnout measure provided by Eugene C. Lee is known to be negatively correlated with SES. The evidence concerning the correlations between SES and the authors' governmental structure variables is incomplete and ambiguous; in any case, these political variables are only weakly related to public housing effort.

In an attempt to avoid the bland conclusion that cities that need public housing build it, the authors recalculate their correlations, this time controlling for city size and fraction of housing dilapidated. Noting that the pattern on relationships remains substantially the same, they conclude:

Clearly factors other than simply reflections of a needy population are efficient predictors of community innovation, and clearly the two measures of centralization of power that were consistent with the predictions—per cent of the adult population with four years of high school or more and MPO ratio—do not hold up when the other variables are controlled (p. 858)

This is statistical sleight-of-hand. The authors do not explain why they control for city size. They do not adequately control for need or demand by using the dilapidated housing variable, which is an indicator only of the physical condition of structures, taking no account of overcrowding, neighborhood conditions, etc. (I suspect the larger category, "dilapidated or deteriorating," might be better, anyway.) Most of their partial correlations are somewhat smaller than the corresponding simple correlations. This is exactly what we would expect if we had a set of "noisy" indicators of SES and calculated both simple correlations, and then partial correlations controlling for one or two of the noisy indicators. As to their remark that two indicators "do not hold up," the education variable remains one of the variables most highly correlated with housing effort; the MPO ratio retains its relative status as a moderately correlated variable.

Table 1. Observed and Expected Directions of Relationships Between Aiken-Alford Indicators and Socio-Economic Status and Its Correlates

Theories and Empirical Indicators	Correlation with Housing Innovation	Direct Indicator of SES	Known or Likely Demographic Correlate of SES	Political Correlate of SES
<i>Political Culture</i>				
Fraction of natives of foreign or mixed parentage	— ^a		—	
Fraction of ele. school enrollment in private sch.	— ^a		—	
Median family income	— [*]	+		
Fraction voting LBJ, 1964	+			—
<i>Concentration and Diffusion of Community Power</i>				
Fraction managerial, professional, and official	—	+		
Fraction of adults with high school education	— [*]	+		
Fraction of registrants voting	+			— ^b
<i>Political Structure</i>				
City-manager government	—			+? ^c
Nonpartisan elections	—			+? ^c
Fraction of city council elected at large	?			?
Number of members of city council	+			?
<i>Community Differentiation and Continuity</i>				
Age of city ^d	—		+	
Logarithm of city population	+		— ?	
<i>Community Integration</i>				
Fraction unemployed	+		—	
Fraction "migrant"	—		+	
<i>Supplementary indicators of poverty</i>				
Fraction housing dilapidated	+	—		
Fraction of families w/income under \$3000	+ [*]	—		
Fraction of adults with less than five years of education	+ [*]	—		
Fraction of 14–17 year-olds in school	—	+		
Fraction non-white	+ [*]		—	
<i>Supplementary indicators of differentiation of economic structure</i>				
Number of mfg. establishments with over 100 employees	+ [*]			
Number of indep. banks	+ [*]			
Fraction of plant workers unionized, North	+			
Fraction of plant workers unionized, South	+			

^{*} Average correlation with four housing indicators ≥ 0.43 in magnitude.
^a Explained by Aiken and Alford on basis of regional differences.
^b R. R. Alford and Eugene C. Lee, "Voting Turnout in American Cities," this REVIEW, 62 (September, 1968), p. 803.
^c R. L. Lineberry and Edmund P. Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities," this REVIEW 61 (September, 1967), p. 705.
^d Measured negatively, a smaller score indicating greater age.
^{*} Correlate of city size.

The authors' conclusions depend in substantial part on the question of whether city age and city size would retain their relationship with public housing effort if the SES-dependence were properly removed. One of their conclusions is that innovation may be accomplished more easily in older cities, and another, that it is easier to innovate in more complex and differentiated systems. How one can articulate these conclusions without even alluding to

such conventional arguments as those about teaching old dogs new tricks and multiplying veto groups, I cannot see.

Finally, with a few changes in wording, these comments could appropriately appear in the *American Sociological Review* as well as *APSR*. As the authors note, they have published an article on urban renewal activity in the August, 1970 *ASR* ("Community Structure and Innovation: The Case of Urban Renewal," vol. 35, pp. 650-665). The mode of analysis, the competitors' theories demolished, and the data base are just the same, except that measures of urban renewal activity are substituted for the public housing measures.

Our main empirical findings are that older and larger cities and those with low levels of education and income, high unemployment, fewer managers and officials, and low levels of in-migration and growth are more innovative (*ASR*, p. 658).

The main findings thus far are that older and larger cities, those with lower levels of education and income, fewer managers and officials, higher

voting turnout and Democratic voting, a lower degree of in-migration, and higher unemployment levels have participated more in public housing, entered it faster, and have higher performance levels (*APSR*, p. 858).

(Actually, the correlations with turnout are slightly higher in the case of urban renewal, but perhaps sociologists are not expected to be interested in such things. No variable, "growth," appears to be included in either analysis.) Based on a rough column-inch count, some two-thirds of the text of the *ASR* article appears in verbatim or paraphrased form in the *APSR* article; the latter being longer, only two-fifths of it appears in the former. This mode of publication is not only wasteful of space in the journals and of the reader's time, but has led to the failure to publish such interesting statistics as the correlation between the urban renewal and public housing measures; perhaps that will appear somewhere else sometime.

STEPHEN V. STEPHENS

The Johns Hopkins University

EDITORIAL COMMENT

Why Editorial Comment? The purpose of this space is to share with readers of the *Review* information that may from time to time be available to the managing editor about *Review* policies and activities. This space will not be used to comment on other Association activity. Like all other members of the Association (he is sure), the managing editor of this *Review* looks forward to having his say in *P.S.* whenever he feels the Association at large has need of his guidance.

New Format. It is not obligatory that the format of the *Review* change with each new managing editor. Indeed, it is not even traditional. In spite of this, the appearance of the *Review* has occasionally changed. Notable landmarks in the evolving design of the *Review* include: the change in the color of the cover from brown to its present gorgeous two-toned hue in the issue of March, 1952, by managing editor Taylor Cole; the change to double columns in June, 1960, in Harvey Mansfield's editorship, made necessary by considerations of space and expense, and managing editor Austin Ranney's new cover, which first made its appearance in March, 1966.

This is the second issue in a new format, which includes a new type face and style (New Times Roman monotype), new paper (Winnebago eggshell) somewhat whiter and more opaque than the previous stock, a new cover, and a new table of contents, which gives abstracts for all articles and lists all books reviewed. The *Review*'s new format was worked out in consultation with Mr. Barnard Norris of the periodicals division of the University of California Press, and Mr. John Robson of the George Banta Company, the *Review*'s printer. Since articles in the *Review* are in general sent in by authors rather than solicited by the managing editor, the format constitutes the major part of what a managing editor can contribute toward the intelligibility of the *Review*.

New Editorial Board. This is the first issue to be published by new management. The retiring editorial board labored for five years under the distinguished leadership of Austin Ranney. In that time, the *Review* grew greatly in circulation, and, reflecting Professor Ranney's own capacious and hospitable mind, readily opened its pages to new approaches to the writing of political science. The new board will be very happy to do as well as the old and begs the indulgence of readers while we struggle to measure up.

The new editorial board is more than twice the size of the old, and for the first time includes scholars from abroad. Political Science as a learned discipline has always reached across national boundaries. While the *Review* is a publication of the American association devoted to the study of political science, its contents are aimed at the general enlightenment of students of politics throughout the world. The foreign scholars presently serving on the editorial board are all, similarly, through their own writing benefactors of American political science. I think all the rest of us on the Editorial Board share the view that it is a distinct honor to be serving with them.

ERRATA

In "Dimensions of Candidate Evaluation" by Herbert F. Weisberg and Jerrold G. Rusk in the December 1970 issue, the list of candidates and "card #5" appearing above Figure 1 are not a part of Figure 1; they should have been placed instead at the end of the Appendix.

In C. W. Cassinelli's review of Rahul, *Government and Politics of Tibet* in the December 1970 issue, on page 1332, column 2, line 26, strike the words "political figure" to read "... Lama was a minor and the ..."

In the review of Breckenridge's *The Right to Privacy* in the March 1971 issue (p. 208) the reviewer's name mistakenly appeared as Louis B. Moreland; the name should read Lois B. Moreland.

Articles Accepted for Future Publication

Lawrence W. Beer, University of Colorado, "Freedom of Information and the Evidentiary Use of Film in Japan: Law and Socio-politics in an East Asian Democracy"

Gordon S. Black, University of Rochester, "A Theory of Political Ambition: Career Choices and the Role of Structural Incentives"

Robert S. Erikson, Florida State University, "The Electoral Impact of Congressional Roll Call Voting"

B. Michael Frolic, York University, "Decision-Making in Soviet Cities"

Iliya F. Harik, Indiana University, "Opinion Leaders and the Mass Media: A Reconsideration of the Two-Step Flow of Communication Hypothesis"

Jerry Hollenhorst and Gary Ault, Southern Illinois University, "An Alternative Answer To: Who Pays For Defense?"

J. Woodford Howard, Jr., The Johns Hopkins University, "Judicial Biography and the Behavioral Persuasion"

- Ronald Inglehart, University of Michigan, "The Silent Revolution in Europe: Inter-generational Change in Six Countries"
- Gerald W. Johnson, Auburn University, "Political Correlates of Voter Participation: A Deviant Case Analysis"
- Evron M. Kirkpatrick, American Political Science Association, "'Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System': Political Science, Policy Science, or Pseudo-Science?"
- Allan Kornberg, Duke University, and Robert Frasure, The University of the South, "Policy Differences in British Parliamentary Parties"
- Robert J. Lieber, University of California, Davis, "Interest Groups and Foreign Policy: British Entry Into Europe"
- Arend Lijphart, University of Leiden, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method"
- Lawrence S. Mayer, Ohio State University, "A Note on 'An Axiomatic Model of Voting Bodies'"
- Richard M. Merelman, University of Wisconsin, "The Development of Policy Thinking in Adolescence"
- David Nexon, Pitzer College, "Asymmetry in the Political System: Occasional Activists in the Republican and Democratic Parties, 1956-1964"
- Robert D. Putnam, University of Michigan, "Studying Elite Political Culture: The Case of 'Ideology'"
- Donald VanDeVeer, North Carolina State University of the University of North Carolina, "Oppenheim's Defense of Non-cognitivism"
- D. M. White, Monash University, "Power and Intention"
- Raymond E. Wolfinger, Stanford University, "'Nondecisions' and the Study of Local Politics"

The sixty-seventh Annual Meeting of the Association will be held September 7-11, 1971, at the Conrad Hilton Hotel, Chicago, Illinois.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Marx's Economics, Origin and Development.

By Alexander Balinky. (D. C. Heath and Co., Lexington, Mass., 1970. Pp. 178.) Foreword by P. A. Samuelson. No index.

Alexander Balinky's reason for writing "yet another book" on Marxian economics is to provide a unified exposition of the social philosophy and economic theory in suitable textbook form. Anyone who has attempted to teach the subject in American or English universities can appreciate the formidable task Balinky has set himself. Scholarship of both expositor and student is required in diverse fields before the Marxian edifice can be comprehended and made relevant to current issues. As an outgrowth of German philosophy, the early Marxism is not unrelated to current existentialist thought; in its mature form it is a materialist version of Hegelian rationalism. Marxian economics is rooted in classical English thought, but an appreciation of its significance entails issues that are still mooted in contemporary growth, production, and distribution theory. Inevitably a modicum of mathematics is required to make sense of these issues. Furthermore, since Marx was an historical theorist as well as a creature of his own *Zeitgeist*, it is absolutely essential to have some insight into the historical context of his work to appreciate both his vision and myopia. Last, and by no means least, the very complexity of Marx's theory, and the specialized vocabulary he adopted requires more than usual motivation to scholarship.

Shortcuts are available to selective groups. Graduate students of economics can use the modern tools of analysis to extract quickly the gist of Marxism, and then move on to compare it with his social philosophy. Orthodox Marxists study the master in the original with only passing reference to his antecedents, and a deprecating sneer at bourgeois economists who refuse to see the light. But while Balinky's book is aimed at the general college student, it is largely a paraphrase of the conventional Soviet reading of Marx. Surely that is not sufficient for western students. They need to compare Marx with the economics and social science learned in other classes; they need to understand alternative readings of Marx such as the Revisionists work or the recent emphasis on alienation; and they need some basic outline of the main lines of criticism and commentary on Marx so they can make up their own mind. None of these appears in any significant way in this book.

If one is going to give students a Marx primer which expounds his system from within, I think it is much better to let them read either the more popular works of Marx and Engels, or the expositions by Marxists from Lenin to Sweezy. They are then motivated to confront Marx even if it is at second remove. Balinky's Marx has been filtered through Josef Schumpeter as well as through Balinky in his attempts to simplify the subject matter for "Russian Area" undergraduates. The result contains an excessive number of errors, misinterpretations, and unnecessary changes in terminology that irritate the reader and will mislead the student who reads further. The problem is aggravated by the virtual absence of reference to sources, so the reader who explodes in the margin, "Marx never said that!" has no way of checking.

Although the bibliography contains the most advanced treatises, Balinky does not press ideas very far—perhaps in deference to the limitations of the students who are supposed to use the text. I think this is a mistake, and it underestimates the capacity of undergraduates to grapple with ideas. If there is a purpose to studying Marx, it is the challenge that he presents to orthodoxy more than the catechism intoned on Lenin's tomb every November.

There remains an issue of principle as well as presentation. All along Marx insists that capitalism is inevitably going to collapse, but he always qualifies these statements with "counteracting causes." On one hand Balinky says that Marx is actually predicting the specific events leading to breakdown, but then on the other hand, he follows Marx in using the counteracting causes to cover his traces. Surely a modern analysis should insist that to qualify as a prediction, a theory must be falsifiable.

All of these weaknesses come to a head in Balinky's chapter on "The Secular Decline in the General Rate of Profit." On page 129 he explains how the profit rate is reduced by increases in the organic composition of capital, but points out that it is increased proportionately to the rate of surplus value. Since Balinky believes that the rate of surplus value increases with the organic composition, he concludes that Marx's suggestion that the rate of profit will tend to decline is "poetic license" which Marx could not have believed to be an inevitable feature of capitalism. By the time he gets to page 133, Balinky writes: "Marx left no doubt about the fact that in the final analysis, all capitalists must suffer a drop in their respective rates of

return. What else could follow from the earlier proposition that the long-term rate of profit must decline?"

Following an ill-considered remark of Marx in Volume I of *Capital*, Balinky believes that the rate of surplus value must be limited, since even if workers "lived on air," the amount of surplus value they produced would be limited by the size of the labor force. Therefore technical progress in reducing the labor required to reproduce the laborers ultimately cannot offset the decline in the profit rate. A little mathematics would convince Balinky that, understood as a *ratio*, the rate of surplus value would go to infinity if the denominator approaches zero faster than the numerator. This is effectively what Marx posits. True, if the workers lived on air there would be no increase in the rate of surplus value, but that is because it would already be infinite.

One cannot help feeling that the difficulties should have been ironed out at the editor's desk. This might be a useful book if it were enlarged to meet the needs of its readers, and if it had been appropriately reviewed before publication. In its present state it lends credence to Paul Samuelson's fatuous preface which suggests there is nothing to be learned from Marx except a vague sense of the variability of social forms. Exposure of the inconsistencies and the dialectical fudging in Marx would make it possible to see that there is more to Marx than intimations of later developments in "respectable economics." By making his unit of analysis social class, Marx produced insights that are radically different. He insisted that class conflict is central to economics, rather than the individual's reconciliation of his preferences with technical possibilities through the market. Only Keynes approached this vision through aggregation of individual expenditures, but the notion of cohesive social groups still has not penetrated into "respectable economics" in a satisfactory way. Unfortunately, this does not really come through in Balinky's presentation of Marx either.

MURRAY WOLFSON

Oregon State University

Micro-Macro Political Analysis. By Heinz Eulau. (Aldine Books, 1969. 400 Pp. \$12.50.)

Micro-Macro Political Analysis is not a book with one central argument. It is, rather, a collection of Heinz Eulau's writings, including a wide variety of analytic and methodological pieces and research reports. Taken individually, most of the contributions contain much to engage the reader. The analytic and methodologi-

cal writings are often insightful and usually provocative, and the research reports present results which are interpretable in the context of explicit theoretical frameworks. Taken as a whole, the writings can be evaluated from several standpoints. They are interesting, for example, as data for perspectives on the sociology of political science. Eulau has been a particularly self-conscious participant in the development of a "behavioral" political science. As a result he has addressed himself at great length to the analytic and value premises upon which his empirical investigations are predicated. Those who approach *Micro-Macro Political Analysis* from a sociology of political science perspective will be particularly interested in chapter 20, "The Behavioral Movement in Political Science: A Personal Document," in which Eulau discusses the intellectual influences on his thoughts and writings as they have evolved to the present.

The research reports in *Micro-Macro Political Analysis* are particularly interesting from a theoretical standpoint. As Eulau notes, the common theme in these writings is a "... fascination with the relationship between individual and collective political behavior" (p. vii). What have characterized the theoretical frameworks in most of Eulau's writings are statements about relationships between individual attitudes and behaviors and collective outcomes. The research itself stands as a statement that relates the methodological individualism of psychologically oriented political behavior studies with the methodological holism that characterizes studies of social and political institutions. Eulau's perspective on this theoretical nexus is presented in his introductory chapter, "On Units and Levels of Analysis." This chapter taken together with chapter 19, "Values and Behavioral Science; Neutrality Revisited," provides a comprehensive statement on the criteria for evaluating social science research in general. Because these chapters set the tone for the volume as a whole, the positions argued in them will be the focus of the remainder of this review.

"Political inquiry," Eulau states, "is concerned with the actions of and relations between units of greatly varying size and complexity, ranging from individual persons or small groups to large organizations, associations, and exclusive territorial collectives like nations states." There are at least two important implications of this utterance, only one of which its author seems to appreciate fully. The first implication, to which Eulau addresses himself throughout the remainder of the book, is

that the statement, by itself, provides little guidance in any particular theory-building endeavor. He both suggests and demonstrates that one must select a "theoretical standpoint" to focus a particular political inquiry. The second implication derives from the fact that although the statement is expressed in descriptive rhetoric, it should be regarded, using John Austin's term, as a performative. Eulau's definition is a performative whose major meaning is illocutionary, i.e., in saying what political inquiry is, Eulau is doing something other than describing (Although the descriptive level of meaning is also present). He is promoting a particular aspect of human relations as being worthy of political inquiry. Among the values involved in the work of Eulau and others who have promoted behavioral approaches to political inquiry is a high priority placed upon the psychological inputs and consequences of political processes. Earlier, institutional approaches to political inquiry, by contrast, designated their subject matter in statements that expressed less concern with the aggregation and allocation of psychological resources.

Eulau would undoubtedly agree with this account of his definition. He does in fact take issue with the position that science can be value free, arguing that "values enter behavioral inquiry at many points . . ." What he fails to do, I think, is to deal adequately with the implications of this realization. His major recommendations for dealing with the relationship between values and behavioral science focus on the termination rather than the initiation of an inquiry. He urges value neutrality as a "norm of judicious conduct," by which he means lack of bias in situations where scientific truth and valued results conflict. This value neutrality should be activated, he argues, "... just at the point in the process of inquiry where that process reaches its (always tentative) termination—the point, in other words, at which the findings of behavioral research come within the purview of the public, indeed become 'public property'" (p. 367–8). There are, quite clearly, value problems associated with making public the results of one's research. What Eulau seems to ignore, however, is the fact that significant value questions arise at the *inception* of a scientific inquiry. In short, the important value question which Eulau ignores is the prior question one should ask when undertaking an inquiry, namely, what of value might arise from this inquiry.

Eulau's failure to appreciate this kind of value question is manifested not only in his chapter on values and behavioral science but

also in his chapter on units and levels of analysis. He seems to think that one can select an appropriate level of analysis for a particular problem on scientific grounds alone. In his discussion of levels of analysis he argues that once we select the object of analysis (the unit(s) whose behavior is to be explained, e.g., a legislative committee), we can proceed to take as our subject of analysis (the unit(s) whose behavior is to be observed), various levels, e.g., individual members, subcommittees, etc. It is one's theoretical standpoint, he suggests, that determines his choice of level or subject unit to scrutinize. Eulau is not at all clear on the grounds for selecting a theoretical standpoint. My own impression is that the choice of a theoretical standpoint is based upon one's expectations about what will *best* explain the object of analysis.

It is here, I would like to suggest, that Eulau (and for that matter the average social scientist) cashes in his critical acumen. If one assumes that there is a "best" explanation of a particular observed phenomenon or object of analysis, he is certain to predicate his inquiry on disguised value premises. The choice of a psychological rather than a sociological explanation of a particular form of social or political decision-making provides a model of policy choice that emphasizes changing attitudes, rather than changing the organizational frameworks within which attitudes are generated. In most circumstances, a number of explanations of social or political phenomena are equally valid on scientific grounds. The decision to pursue a particular type of explanation (including the level of analysis) should, if one is rational, be based upon one's image of what might be done with the explanation. This image, in the case of social science inquiry, includes one's conception of a desirable collectivity and desirable consequences for individuals. Thus the various empirical chapters in *Micro-Macro Analysis* are probably "good" for something. An examination of the epistemological chapters makes it clear why, unfortunately, it has been left to the reader to determine what that "good" is.

MICHAEL J. SHAPIRO

University of Hawaii

Robert Owen in the United States. By Oakley C. Johnson. (New York: Humanities Press, 1970, Pp. 86. \$3.50.)

It is doubtful that *Robert Owen in the United States* will end up on the list of most-widely read books in Western Political Thought. Nevertheless, this slim volume repre-

sents a minor but useful contribution to the literature.

Following reverses and disappointments in England, Owen came briefly to the United States in the mid-1820's and was influential in the establishment of such utopian experiments as Yellow Springs (Ohio), Franklin Community (New York) and, of course, the famous New Harmony (Indiana).

In the course of this American sojourn Owen had occasion twice to speak to joint sessions of Congress and to deliver a major Fourth of July oration at New Harmony. For years these evidences of Owen's social reform thought have remained out of print and inaccessible to the Owenite scholar. Mr. Johnson, in this work, seeks to correct this deficiency in the literature by collecting and printing these three speeches in a single volume.

Otherwise *Robert Owen in the United States* does little to alter or enhance our understanding of Robert Owen. Neither Johnson's introductory essay nor the three Owen speeches which follow it is likely to change prevailing views of Robert Owen or his social and political philosophy.

As a consequence, this volume is principally of interest to the archivist.

HAROLD V. RHODES

University of New Mexico

Macropolitics. By Morton Kaplan (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1969. Pp. 244.)

Morton Kaplan's *Macropolitics* is a collection of fourteen papers subtitled 'Selected Essays on the Philosophy and Science of Politics.' With a single exception—an integrating Chapter called 'Glimpses into a Philosophy of Politics' which starts things off—the papers are not new with the work, having first been submitted for public scrutiny at various earlier moments during the 1954-through-1968 period. The collection is divided into five Parts, which respectively are labeled "On Philosophy," "On Systems," "On Historical Explanations," "On Values," and "On Empirical Systems Research." Each Part is prefaced with a note on the origin of its constituent essays and the nature of the common topic. A Preface introduces the undertaking, an Index of Main Concepts closing it.

Kaplan's earlier work, upon which *Macropolitics* much depends and from which it draws three of its Chapters—I refer to *System and Process in International Politics* (New York, John Wiley, 1957)—argued, it will be recalled, for a new and more systematic approach to the study of the international order and what we

are pleased these days to call 'macropolitical' phenomena. The author there urged that that order be conceived as analogous to the individual human being, that is, as a self-regulating system, which thanks to the capacity of certain governor-like components to absorb, neutralize, or deflect environmental or other disturbances tends to persist in a given form called equilibrium state. He then differentiated types of such order (balance-of-power, loose-bipolar, tight-bipolar, etc.), the principle of differentiation being the degree of integration exhibited; he framed hypotheses about each type, notably hypotheses about the conditions of self-preservation and transformation, and about the behaviour therein of various kinds of State (directive, non-directive, etc.); and, finally, he invited others to test the hypotheses against the historical record.

Macropolitics, the work at hand, may not unfairly be looked upon, I believe, as an extended gloss upon Systems Theory thus summarily noted—a commentary distinguishing the Theory, illustrating it in the application, expanding it, placing it in the broader context of a philosophy of politics. The solitary Chapter of Part I, the 'Glimpses into a Philosophy of Politics' already referred to, provides the broader context for the Theory. It formulates and supplies epistemological underpinning for a view which the author characterises as scientifically oriented and names 'systemic pragmatism' (Preface, viii-ix): a view which owes much to Charles S. Peirce, and through him to Hegel, Kant, and others in the great philosophic tradition (Preface, viii); a view among the more interesting features of which are an implied affirmation of the amenability to scientific study of human valuational activity (pp. 34-45) and a definition (characterisation?) of the good as 'that which is appropriate to achieve man's resting states' (p. 43). The three Chapters of Part II, "On Systems," center on the Theory itself, its origin and nature. Chapter 3, 'Systems Theory', traces the ancestry to W. Ross Ashby's work on neurology called *Design for a Brain* (p. 57), explains key concepts such as 'equilibrium' and 'stability' (pp. 58-64), and contrasts with other approaches to the understanding of the international order like the study of the foreign policy of individual states (pp. 64-65) and something called the 'cross-sectional or biographical slicing of history' (p. 65). Chapter 4, 'Systems Theory and Political Science', comments that Systems Theory is really not theory at all, but a set of concepts (p. 71) and 'merely a tool for achieving a middle-level range of generalization about political

or social system macrostructures' (pp. 74-75). The opening Chapter of this Part, 'Traditionalism versus Science in International Relations', notes in order to rebut certain traditionalist objections to the application of the methods of science to the social domain—to the claim, for instance, that those who work with models are likely to mistake these for reality, the response is made that traditionalists are even more prone to err in the direction named, inasmuch as they not only also work with models but are unaware of so doing (pp. 54-56).

Part III, "On Historical Explanations," offers, in the first two of three chapters, analyses of important events of the post-war era which may perhaps be thought of as pointing up problems involved in testing the hypotheses of Systems Theory against the record. Chapter 5, on the causes of the 1948 Communist coup in Czechoslovakia, marshals and assesses the evidence for and against two competing interpretations—without, however, reaching a firm conclusion as to which is the more valid. (The interpretations are (1) that the coup was ideologically motivated and planned long in advance and (2) that it was more a response of the moment to the intensification of threat from the West perceived in the Truman Doctrine, etc.; and the one firm conclusion reached by the essay is one to the effect that estimating motives is a tricky business indeed—pp. 119-121.) Chapter 6 similarly deals with the causes of the Chinese intervention into the Korean War of late 1950 and, more specifically, General MacArthur's contention that the Chinese intervention would not have taken place without espionage and information passed along by British defectors to the effect that the U.S. air force was prohibited from bombing north of the Yalu—a contention which the author concludes cannot be sustained (p. 128).

Part IV, "On Values," in its six chapters, three of them lifted from *System and Process*, relates System Theorizing to the realm of values. System needs, which arise from system structure, we are told by way of elucidating the connection, are the source of objectives, and objectives are the valuable (p. 157). Chapter 8, on regulation, describes the various ways (mechanisms like learning and repression, and syndromes such as the compulsive and psychopathic) in which a system goes about satisfying needs, hence reaching objectives and presumably realizing values (pp. 137-156). Chapter 9, 'The Realm of Values', discourses on the foundation of same, and the distinction between them and facts. Chapter 10, 'The National Interest and Other Interests', assimilates

discussion of the much-abused term of the title to the broader discussion of values by noting that 'the interest of a system is to obtain the valuable' (p. 168). The two next Chapters, 'On Extreme Utilitarianism' and 'Restricted Utilitarianism', present the author's brief against the former, and for the latter and the need for recognizing some moral imperatives, while Chapter 13, 'A Nightmare', contains the author's well-named contribution to the list of possible scenarios constituting the stuff of Herman Kahn's and Anthony J. Wiener's *The Year 2000*. Finally, Part V in its solitary Chapter 14, 'The Systems Approach to International Politics', resumes the major propositions of Systems Theory and describes certain efforts in the author's Chicago workshops to test and refine some thereof.

There are a number of things to applaud about *Macropolitics* and the ideas it expresses. Kaplan's objective, of bringing together in one place various bits and pieces of thought, connecting them up one with another, and working out the philosophy underlying them, is a reasonable one. And one or two minor points aside, he has performed it reasonably well. The over-all objective of this and his earlier work—namely, providing a set of concepts to enable us more effectively to think about the international order and other macropolitical phenomena—is an important and worthy one, and turning for suggestive analogy to the individual human personality (and in this following an ancient and honorable tradition), he has, in this judgment, turned to the best of the possible sources. In many of the particular positions he takes (e.g. his defense of the possibility of applying the methods of science to the valuational activity of human beings; his retort to the traditionalist critique of the application in general of such methods to the human and social domain), he surely—in this view—has the right of it. His treatment of the complex question of cause in the affairs of the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia in early 1948 and the Chinese intervention in the Korean War in late 1950 are excellent: his weighing against the evidence of competing hypotheses is truly exemplary—thorough, careful, fair-minded.

Withal, this reviewer must register some rather vigorous adverse criticism. The lengthy introductory essay, in which the author sketches his underlying philosophy, and which constitutes the sole original component of the work, is too discursive, adding up to something the nature of which one is hard put to pin down. There appear too frequently in the work an imprecision of expression, an ellipticality of

exposition, and a pretentiousness of tone that one could well do without. Finally, more is needed, to the end of bettering our understanding of the international order, than a set of concepts, however elegant, however artful their articulation. What more is needed is a simple set, a set not too refined, a set accompanied by clear-cut rules for the instruction of the user in the difficult and all-important matter of application to the historical record. Provocative and interesting as is the set *Macropolitics* presents to us, it fails in this reviewer's judgment to meet these added needs. One concludes with the hope that Professor Kaplan will come to agree with the judgment and address himself to the solution of the problems involved, bringing to bear on them the high order of intelligence manifested in his historical analyses.

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Early Writings. By Walter Lippmann. Introduction and annotations by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. (New York: Liveright, 1970. Pp. 356. \$7.50.)

Men of Destiny. By Walter Lippmann. Introduction by Richard Lowitt. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1970. Pp. 244. Originally published in 1927.)

Walter Lippmann has advanced the political awareness of a worldwide audience for nearly sixty years. As might be expected, his own understanding of politics, his attitudes towards it, his philosophy of it, have gone through a process of evolution. The books under review contain elements of both continuity and change in Lippmann's thought. Some of the essays in *Early Writings* reflect his brief flirtation with Wilsonian idealism. Here Lippmann envisions a world where rivalries among nations might come under the civilizing dominion of international law and where the principle and practice of collective security might replace the traditional resort to the balance of power. World peace is indivisible, injury to one being injury to all. Wilson deserves the "gratitude of all decent men" for committing the United States to the establishment of a League to Enforce Peace. Gone is the "pernicious doctrine" of neutrality between the aggressor and his victim. A great advance in the development of international morality has occurred (pp. 33-35, 38-39, 66). There is even a bit of sermonizing to Europe: Americans cannot cooperate with Tories and chauvinists and imperialists like Carson, Northcliff, and Curzon. Europe must become genuinely liberal if it is to have their assistance (pp. 42-45).

But this is only a passing phase. Lippmann's observations in "Timid Neutrality," published in November 1914, represent his more enduring outlook on international politics: Treaties without the power to enforce them are worthless; conditions of peace will be determined by the balance of power in which the war results; disarmament of peaceful nations will not produce peace on earth; a stable international order cannot be built on the theories of pacifists and Quakers. "For it is peace on earth that men need, not peace in heaven, and unless you build from the brutalities of earth, you step out into empty space" (p. 13).

For the most part Lippmann has been a realist. But his realism has never been out of touch with decent, humane, and liberal urges. "The Defense of the Atlantic World" (pp. 69-75) is a superb example. If the United States favors the Allies, it is not because Britain is more humane and civil than Germany. It is rather that Germany is warring against "the civilization of which we are a part." The countries on the two shores of the Atlantic constitute a community "in their deepest needs and in their deepest purposes." But Germany too belongs to this same community, and she must be brought back into the fold. "Our aim must be not to conquer Germany as Rome conquered Carthage, but to win Germany as Lincoln strove to win the South . . ." (p. 74).

A central characteristic of Lippmann's approach to politics is the idea of the balance which, in his civilized version, includes a denial of absoluteness and an insistence that you concede a modicum at least of reason to the opposition. Not only has he advocated the maintenance of a balance of power as the best available means to national security, a constitutional balance between the President and Congress, a balance between ends and means in the making of policy choices, he has also insisted that in pursuing your own vital interests you must not disregard the vital (not merely "legitimate") interests of your adversary.

Lippmann's admirers speak of his "passion for the life of reason." But note that reason for him is more than disinterestedness in pursuing the "truth," or the disposition to look for the enduring and the essential underneath the transient, or the capacity of establishing causal or associational relationships between ideas or events. (Bank robbers, who wish to excel in the art of safecracking, must also be dedicated to reason in this sense.) The truth that reason is to aid in discovering may belong to the realm of morals. Already in *Men of Destiny* reason is not the servant of desire that it was in *A Pref-*

ace to Politics (1913), the very first of his books. Now there is a moral order in the affairs of men, and, operating in the framework of that order, reason is to govern the world of passions and appetites. A fuller statement of this position will be found in his subsequent writings, notably *The Public Philosophy*, but an initial version of it can be seen in the essay on "Bryan and the Dogma of Majority Rule" (pp. 45-60). Here Lippmann rejects the propositions that majorities are infallible, that there is no order of values among men, or that any opinion is intrinsically as good as any other. The assumptions on which the democratic faith was founded were of a moral character. You cannot prove that each man's personality is sacred and inviolable or that all souls are precious in the eyes of God. The doctrine of equality proceeds from a spiritual or "mystical" intuition.

The essays on Al Smith's candidacy for the Presidency, Calvin Coolidge's passivity, the relationship of House and Wilson, Borah's negativism, the "outlawry of war," political indifference, and the unwisdom of collecting war debts from European governments make instructive and enjoyable reading. Lippmann has had the tendency to go on from the particular to the general, to construct a theoretical framework in which the specifics of the case under comment may be seen, analyzed, and put together. Thus the essay on Borah soon develops into a competent scholarly discussion of the principles involved in determining the Presidential and Congressional roles in the conduct of foreign affairs. The essays on Brandeis and Hughes (*Early Writings*) offer valuable insights into the dynamics of constitutional interpretation and judicial propriety. The essays on Smith, Coolidge, Bryan, and Sinclair Lewis, contain a most interesting exposition of the emerging "metropolitan problem," of the confrontation between the new urban and old village civilizations of America. Older values were declining. More and more people partook of them only vicariously: While they had no intention of being simple or frugal or rural, they were delighted with the "antique grandeur," the oil lamps, and the "chores" at Coolidge's farmhouse in Plymouth. They were pleased that "the President comes of such stock, and they even feel, I think, that they are stern, ascetic, and devoted to plain living because they vote for a man who is" (p. 16). The opposition to Al Smith, Lippmann tells us, issued largely from his being a city man. By the same token the urban masses felt that "their own self-respect depends in some measure on the admission that Al Smith

might be President of the United States" (p. 7). In any case, the cities were bound to become the dominant force in America, "dominant politically and socially as they are already dominant economically" (pp. 31-33).

One should not expect that Lippmann has always been untouched by the professional hazards of his craft. He once wrote that journalists "hurried and limited as they are, can hardly help feeling that they are stumbling and stuttering most of the time. Unavoidably they say more than they meant or less, they take a tone or an emphasis which is partial and misleading" (*Early Writings*, pp. 58-59). I have never seen him stutter or stumble, but he has, on occasion, said more than he probably meant. Here it is well to remember that most often he has written as an editorial commentator—rarely as a reporter. In this role he has been a cool and dispassionate analyst, interpreter, and elucidator. But in this same role he has also been an advocate, advancing a certain interpretation, policy choice, or value preference. In advocating he has, *on occasion*, exaggerated. The passage from the "dialectic" to "rhetoric" is facilitated by his magnificent command of the English language. There is a flow in his writing that makes almost for poetic prose. Consider, for instance, this picturesque denunciation of a session of Congress:

This last session of Congress . . . showed the legislature of a supposedly democratic people degraded to that level from which violent convulsions ensue. . . . [It] was the final stage in a process of decay. It was garrulous, wasteful, amorphous, frivolous and foolish. It wasted money like a drunken sailor and time like a babbling idiot. It could not think, it would not imagine, it could not organize. . . . It spoiled whatever it touched, obstructed everything it was asked to assist, attended to everybody's business but its own. . . . It died with the curse of a nation upon it, a soiled and debauched thing. (*Early Writings*, pp. 151-153)

Republication of the essays in these two books, originally published between 1914 and 1927, is a welcome event. They take their place alongside *Public Opinion*, *The Good Society*, and *The Public Philosophy*, all of which have been reprinted many times. At a time when barbarity, on both the Right and the Left, threatens to destroy values of the democratic faith, men of tolerance, moderation, and "reason" may take satisfaction from the fact that for two-thirds of a century Walter Lippmann has ably elucidated the traditions of civility.

ANWAR SYED

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The Play Theory of Mass Communication. By William Stephenson. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967. Pp. x, 225. \$5.00.)

Play theory is both a poem to individuality and a not-so-gentle challenge to the ways most social scientists deduce expected findings from loaded hypotheses. Applied in this book to mass communication by a scholar with doctorates in physics and psychology, it should be noted by any political scientist who tends to feel that conflict resolution is a zero-sum game between self and society, or between peace and pure fun.

Play theory purports to explain, on the one hand, why opinions, attitudes and belief systems do not change as authority dictates, and on the other hand how images and notions intervene to confound elegant behavioral models. "Q-methodology," or Q-sorting with subsequent factor analysis, helps do it. Stephenson outlined Q-methodology in 1953, and while the technique still presents difficulties in cost and statistical inference, these difficulties do not scuttle this book.¹ Q-sampling has subjects sort statements along routine continuums. Non-routinely, though, the scores are subjective and relative to a parent population of statements, and *not* relative to a parent population of people. The emergent scores are standard scores, and the zero (with standard deviation) on all scales is the same absolute value for everyone. It is an intriguing attempt to begin explanation at the intrapersonal level. It is just at this level that other methods (albeit with convincing results) either assume away intrapersonal variation and intensities, or restrict study to behavior most clearly amenable to social control mechanisms and hence deal with interpersonal norms.

Stephenson compares social control, which gives us "our religious belief, our political faith, our status and place in life" in ways that make them practically impossible to change, with the individual's "convergent selectivity." Convergent selectivity governs "new or non-customary modes of behavior, our fads and fancies, which allow us opportunities to exist for ourselves, to please ourselves, free to a degree from social control"; in short, it is play.

Play and politics are surely clear to any careful observer of the red suspenders strain of deep Southern politics at state and particularly local levels (a tradition, alas, losing out to the notion that two-party politics must include Republicans, and suffering the tight-lipped, three-button grimness of the South's New Republi-

cans). Stephenson's play is more than games and more than frivolity, although it includes them. His play is the sheer fun of Pope's "Rape of the Lock," or Shakespeare's shocking failure to be morally consistent—or, for a people with TV sets, Nikita Khrushchev's 1959 shoe-thumping visit to the United States, or the 1954 Army-McCarthy hearings. His play is subjective and above all pleasureable, and since we live in mass society, we do much of it through the ways we respond to mass communication. Play doesn't offer the player much gain, but would the player be richer if he "worked" to understand Khrushchev's antics—or a Viet-Nam war? Hence, Stephenson argues, when we compare a Western drama, *Sesame Street*, or Jordan combat footage on television, Q-sort analysis that begins with individuals' self-enjoyment is less biased than socially regulated taxonomies of information, or *a priori* hypotheses about the alternately grim and heroic impacts of mass communication.

The Protestant work ethic comes in for another licking, but surely the book applies to non-Western behavior. Stephenson associates work with communication-pain, and it follows that however society gains from excellence in work—and social control intends as much—work inhibits the vital self-development that comes from communication-pleasure, or play, as others are more and more pointing out. In relation to Leon Festinger's work, play is the unafraid toying with cognitive dissonance—unafraid because nothing terribly good or bad can come from it. Stephenson's discussions of Harold Lasswell, C. E. Osgood, Lewis Richardson and David Riesman are equally provocative, and his grasp of psychology and communication theory is impressive. For the political scientist, Stephenson's findings suggest lines of work into the following sort of question about the social control mechanisms on which social scientists depend: if social control mechanisms say choosing a bath soap isn't important, but choosing a nuclear deterrent strategy is important, why don't attitudes and behavior vary with the socially defined importance of the issues? Scores based on parent populations of persons do not explain deviant behavior; they simply measure deviations from norms that social control mechanisms set in the first place. Play theory is not the only way to get at "irrational" behavior, but it ranks with some psychoanalytical techniques as a way to get around self-reinforcing definitions of rationality.

As a contribution to behavioral analysis, Stephenson's book is important for a political scientist who feels uncomfortable about making

¹ William Stephenson, *The Study of Behavior: Q-technique and Its Methodology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953).

assumptions cover the vagaries of intrapersonal responses. It is important for that generation of political scientists who wish they could operationalize Eric Hoffer's "playful mood." It is important for political scientists who aren't sure whether they're really interested in *political* behavior. Its prescriptive implications are strong for all these political scientists and more. What's more, it's fun to read.

TIMOTHY ALDEN WILLIAMS

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Private Wants, Public Means: An Economic Analysis of the Desirable Scope of Government. By Gordon Tullock. (New York, Basic Books, 1970, pp. 262. \$6.95)

The field of public choice (or non-market decision making or "the new political economy" as it is sometimes alternatively called) is currently undergoing a rapid expansion in its literature. *Private Wants, Public Means* attempts to systematize that part of the literature dealing with the range of activities that the public sector can be expected to perform more efficiently than the private marketplace. As such, it will probably be the most widely read of the five books that Professor Tullock has produced since his collaboration with James M. Buchanan on the seminal *The Calculus of Consent* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1962).

The book is structured around three basic proportions, all of which are unimpeachable by the canons of Paretian welfare economics. In the first place, voluntary private market transactions can have indirect consequences for third parties. There is hence a presumption that the state should intervene to internalize such externalities, and force individuals to take account of the beneficial or deleterious consequences they are imposing on others. However, secondly, there is a distinct possibility that the state by intervening, can impose externalities or deprivations of its own; collective action is not costless. This is because any collective decision may not correspond exactly with the preferences of any of its citizens; in the jargon, the tax that any individual is charged for providing a public good may not equal the marginal valuation he places on that good. Consequently, the third basic proposition is that the state should intervene only when it has a "comparative advantage" over the private marketplace. The proper scope of the public sector should be determined by the relatively higher net benefits that public provision of any good or service can bring, compared to private provision.

Part I of the book, 154 pages and entitled

"Theory," sets forward these three basic propositions and discusses some of the conditions that can lead to private and political externalities. It also discusses some of the alternative ways of internalization. On private externalities, this involves an analysis of property rights and of private bargaining and contracting, which leans heavily on the work of R. H. Coase and others. On political externalities, Tullock relies especially on his own previous publications to summarize the types of benefits and costs associated with the scale of government units, with the voting rules that may be operative for the making of public policy, and with the structure of public bureaucracies. None of this represents any intellectual path-finding, but the reader new to the field will appreciate the clarity and incisiveness of the presentation. Readers well versed in the literature will also appreciate the reprinting of Tullock's delightful "mosquito abatement example" as Chapter I of the book (from the *American Economic Review*, Volume 59, 1969, pp. 189-197). However, both sets of readers will be exasperated by the tendency of the author to cut short his logic and refer them to other published sources, something which is hardly justifiable in an introductory exposition such as this. Incidentally, the concept of "externality" is often used unconventionally; it is stretched to cover some areas of economic activity, such as "natural monopolies" and "competitive price-cutting," not usually associated with the term.

Part II called "Practice," and constituting the remaining 97 pages of the book, applies the theoretical analysis to a number of policy areas, including amenities, common pools, protection services, the production of knowledge, speech and information, and income redistribution. There is, in fact, little difference between this part of the book and Part I, since the applications, although often novel and illuminating, are almost entirely "data free." The reason, according to the author, is that the necessary empirical information does not exist. This is a dubious claim. There are, to take one example, over 70 works available on intergovernmental contracting, that could have been culled for some *prima facie* evidence to sustain the (probably valid) hypothesis that small-scale government units can capture economies of scale through mutual cooperation. Instead of considered evidence, we are treated to a vigorous explication of the author's own opinions on the topics, opinions which are philosophically of the Manchester School liberal variety. The end result is a series of discursive essays that could prove highly stimulating for freshmen, but

which more advanced scholars are likely to find merely contentious.

In sum, the book is useful supplementary reading for introductory courses on "the new political economy." If the author had been willing to invest more time and energy in an extended and polished presentation, the book could easily have become the required standard text for the field. Perhaps this is the price for making so many energetic indictments of political scientists uninterested in the theoretical approach!

MARK SPROULE-JONES

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Financing Politics: Recent Wisconsin Elections.

By David Adamany. (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1969. Pp. 302. \$10.00.)

The scholar who would undertake a systematic study of the place of money in American party politics would do well to begin with an examination of this book. It will not free him from the need to pore over Heard's *The Costs of Democracy* or to sift through Herbert E. Alexander's valuable continuing series of publications on campaign finance. It will, however, provide a useful perspective from which those and other studies can be meaningfully viewed.

The crucial questions are, of course, how is the money raised and how is it spent. Adamany asks these questions in a context which gives them added consequence. His concern is principally to see how the answers to these questions are dependent on the political environment. How do the belief patterns of the citizens, the forms taken by party organizations, the mechanics of nominations, the nature of inter-party competition, the backgrounds of the party's core supporters, the level at which the sought-for office exists, etc. constrain the politician in his search for funds? How do these factors and his strategic choices limit the ways in which he can transform such funds into other resources that promise to bring him votes on election day? Given these limits, do his choices seem to be reasonable and effective?

The identification of patterns of political finance is not the only task Adamany sets himself. Throughout the book he constantly inquires into the implications of these patterns for the political system. How is representation influenced by the multiple votes cast by those who contribute money to a campaign? What consequences seem likely to follow from the rapidly increasing cost of campaigning? Do patterns of fund raising promote or hinder the development of disciplined parties? How do the

sources of campaign funds affect the ideological convergence or divergence of the parties? His investigations into these and other questions lead him to advocate a system of government subsidies—not because he sees present arrangements as sinister but because he believes them to be inadequate to fund the public's business properly.

The book is not without faults. There is occasional citation of secondary sources not only for generalizations that have been repeatedly confirmed in the literature but also for generalizations that are based on rare findings (p. 169, fn. 84). In addition, parts of the work are poorly organized. For example, the fourth chapter begins with seven tables reporting amounts spent by the candidates of each party at several governmental levels. These tables are briefly examined in the text, but not until twenty-one pages have intervened. Further, the author is not entirely consistent about the interpretations he puts on data. Thus we are told that although fund raising is both more systematic and more centralized in the Republican Party, its elected officials have been subjected to no greater pressures "from a programmatically united support coalition than have Democratic officeholders" (p. 97). Yet further on in the book, we learn that "the role of parties in campaign finance has come a little closer to imposing responsibility on Republican candidates and officeholders than on Democrats" (p. 222).

The principal fault is that the opening chapters are so misleading that they might encourage students who would benefit from reading the book to dismiss it. The form is familiar to those who read dissertations: There is an opening chapter stating the problem and reviewing the literature, followed by a chapter setting forth the method of study, and two chapters presenting data developed by the use of that method. The failings common to many dissertations are manifest here. Sixteen tables are presented, and paragraph after paragraph summarizes additional data that might also be presented in tabular form. While these chapters offer occasional insights into the implications of party financial patterns for democratic government, they are rare.

Moreover the method of obtaining the data casts doubt on one of the findings that the author considers most important. To trace the growth of political receipts and expenditures in Wisconsin, Adamany examined almost four thousand of the campaign financial statements that state law requires both candidates and committees to file before and after primary and general elections. These reports covered seven

election years in the period from 1950–1966. In none of those years were all the necessary reports available. Therefore the author devised two methods for estimating the missing data. For the 1962, 1964 and 1966 elections, reports were usable for at least 20 per cent of the total number of districts or offices examined. In these cases, the median of those reports for which there was data was used to estimate expenditures for each missing unit. For the elections of 1950, 1954, 1956, and 1958, however, reports were often available for *fewer than 20 per cent* of the units. In those cases, whatever data was usable was compared to that for the same units for 1962. A ratio of spending for the two years was calculated, and this was used to estimate expenditures for the earlier years.

Adamany stresses the fact that the costs of state politics in Wisconsin have grown much faster than they have in the nation, and that the difference is due in large part to a marked increase in Wisconsin political costs in the last three elections he examined. The author attributes this upsurge to the rise of strong competition between the two parties following the election of Governor Gaylord Nelson in 1958. While that explanation is reasonable, it might also be the case that the increase results from the different ways in which the missing data were calculated during the two periods.

To dismiss the book for these reasons would be a mistake. For in spite of the impression given by the opening chapters, Adamany's work relies not only on the filed reports but also on systematic inquiries of mass media representatives, survey data collected both by the Wisconsin Survey Research Laboratory and by the Democratic Party, interviews with leading officials in that party, and on the author's own extensive political experience. In addition, Adamany makes creative use of the scholarly literature both to suggest hypotheses and to illuminate his findings.

A close friend who recommended that I read Tolkien's *The Lord of the Rings*, admonished me not to succumb to the temptation to abandon it unless I had first read one hundred and fifty pages. Similar advice would be appropriate in the case of this book. After such an investment, the reader is likely to persevere. The venture will be a profitable one, for Adamany's study tells us much about politics in Wisconsin, about politics in states with mass-membership, club-type party organizations, and about politics in America.

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Ombudsmen for American Government? Edited by Stanley V. Anderson. Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968, vii-181 p. \$4.95.

One of the few advantages of a delayed review is the possibility of assessing the worth of a publication since its appearance. Considering its brevity and introductory intentions, *Ombudsmen For American Government?* has stood the test of time quite well. In a legal and administrative subject as turbulent as that concerning the complaints of citizens about government actions, this book remains informative for the ordinary reader and academically challenging for the student and researcher. That some of its data would become obsolete is recognized by the five authors who cite the rapid march of events in the growing popular and official interest in the Ombudsman. That most of what the authors write is still pertinent, especially the excellent range of questions posed by Professors Gwyn and Moore, is evidence of how slowly moves the total understanding of the extent and nature of citizen grievances against administrative acts and the actual adoption of institutional machinery to handle such grievances.

The five articles in the book were originally used for an American Assembly conference on the Ombudsman in October 1967, and the book itself was the subject of discussion at several Assembly regional conferences in 1968. Professor Donald Rowat, well-known for his editorship of another collection on this same subject, provides a concise summary of the Scandinavian background of the Ombudsman office and touches briefly on the establishment or proposed adoption of such an office in a number of other countries. Brief "sample cases" of grievances dealt with in Sweden and New Zealand make interesting reading.

Professor William Gwyn addresses himself to the difficult matter of the transferability of the Ombudsman to the American system. Above all, he asks that there be more careful attention to the question whether, in fact, such an agency is needed. In addition, Gwyn posits the goals expected to be accomplished by the office and assesses the potential compatibility of the Ombudsman with the established governmental structure and cultural milieu. Professor John Moore contributes an insightful piece on the prospect of using the Ombudsman in state government, with special attention to early research in California. Moore's consistent plea is that we know too little about the current handling of citizen complaints by existing political and administrative institutions, however, on the basis of current data, he poses several interest-

ing hypotheses which are not only valuable for students of the subject but also support the need for adopting the Ombudsman.

Professors William Angus and Milton Kaplan summarize briefly the developments in what is probably the fastest growing area of ombudsmanic activity, the local government. The greatest detail is devoted to describing the work of an official grievance agent in Nassau County, New York, and the varying efforts in Buffalo. From the latter area there is also an interesting assessment of the role of newspaper "action lines" in the handling of complaints. It is these author's instructive finding that an Ombudsman at the lowest level of government is likely to receive complaints directed against all levels, thus presenting the complexity of trying to satisfy citizen requests.

Professor Anderson concludes with an occasionally wry account of some of the practical political difficulties which beset the adoption of Ombudsman proposals. He, along with this reviewer, is a scarred veteran of these efforts in California, and he writes from a well-informed experience. Of particular value is Anderson's brief review of the work of the California Commission on Judicial Qualifications as a well-established and functioning "Ombudsman" vis-a-vis complaints concerning the occupants of the California bench. A final plea, probably still honored in the breach, is that we not get carried away either by an effort to establish too many kinds of Ombudsmen doing too many things and not to expect that the new office will somehow right all wrongs, thus a warning against "Ombudsmania."

An "Annotated Model Ombudsman Statute" is appended authored by Professor Walter Gellhorn. This is helpful for showing the legal requirements which must be included or, better yet, to be left out of actual legislation on the subject. A select bibliography and a helpful index complete the volume.

Criticism of the work can only be minor. While he believes that the public opinion survey is not a sufficient guide for deciding whether the public wants or needs an Ombudsman, Professor Gwyn jumps to the conclusion that that small percentage of citizens who expect Government to treat them unfairly is "probably the kinds of people who . . . showed an interest in the Ombudsman idea." Because appreciation of the Ombudsman and resultant expectation of beneficial use of him is probably correlated to better education, social standing, etc., it might be expected that those minorities fearing ill-treatment would, in fact, be those least informed and most skeptical about an

Ombudsman's function or desirability.

In describing the work of an Ombudsman, Gwyn also notes that the official should be "an enthusiastic and convincing proselytizer" in making citizens aware of the office and its activities. In general this is true and necessary, but in the entrepreneurial politics of the United States where most office holders feel threatened, at least initially, by the existence of an Ombudsman, it might be advisable to play down the proposed "enthusiastic proselytizing" by such an official. In a similar vein, I rather object to Professor Moore's frequent use of the term Ombudsman without a preceding article. This makes "Ombudsman" sound like "Superman," a designation rightly decried by Professor Anderson.

There is no space here for bringing the subject of the Ombudsman up-to-date. Internationally the office continues under increased consideration although I am not aware of major adoptions. The English Parliamentary Commissioner, while limited in his scope, has now an experience in a large-state format that might show value for consideration of an American national Ombudsman. The Hawaiian Ombudsman has two years of experience that needs evaluation. In 1971 Denmark will select its second Ombudsman, a process worth observing because of the great influence of the incumbent, Professor Hurwitz, both at home and abroad. Sweden has recently appointed an Ombudsman for consumer affairs, a special field of development in the United States too. Ombudsmen of varying authority now abound on college and university campuses, and their work, however limited, should be analyzed. Partly in defense against the adoption of a "high-level" Ombudsman and in response to real need, there has been increased effort among established agencies of American government, in legislators' offices, etc. to improve their complaint handling facilities. Scholarly research, especially from the Institute of Governmental Studies at Berkeley, has enhanced the knowledge on the subject. It can be hoped that a second, revised and enlarged, edition of *Ombudsmen For American Government?* will soon be available, perhaps this time without a need for the question mark.

GERALD R. MCDANIEL

Sacramento State College

Carl Becker on History and the American Revolution. By Robert E. Brown. (East Lansing, Michigan: The Spartan Press. 1970. Pp. 285. \$7.50.)

In the boundless main of American histori-

ography there are a few charted islands. Or so it has seemed. One of those is Carl Becker, a distinguished historian who had been at Cornell University from 1917 until four years before his death, in 1945. Becker was the author of a few outstanding books, among them *The Eve of the Revolution: A Chronicle of the Breach with England* (1918); *The Declaration of Independence: A Study in the History of Political Ideas* (1922); and *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers* (1932). He also wrote a number of essays, the most memorable being "Everyman His Own Historian," which, as the title indicates, is a relativistic view of historiography. In Becker's view, not only did "everyman" write history as he saw it, but also constantly rewrote it. Becker accepted the dictum of his teacher and mentor, Frederick Jackson Turner of the University of Wisconsin, that each age "writes the history of the past anew with reference to conditions uppermost in its own time." Almost to the end of his life—he began to change his opinions after 1940—Becker believed that "history is only a pack of tricks we play on the dead" and that the facts from the past could be manipulated "to say, within reason, whatever we want them to say."

Becker had a wide influence on a whole generation of American historians. The reasons are not far to seek. He was what his student, Professor Leo Gershow of New York University, called a "masterly craftsman" who wrote with grace and charm; and in historiography, as is illustrated by the case of a Gibbon, a Hume, a Macaulay or a Carlyle (the latter a dreadful historian, actually), literary style has a powerful and lasting appeal. Becker had style. He was also one of those historians—a rarity among his American colleagues—who was not afraid of philosophizing and theorizing about historic forces and about his own craft. While not an original or deep mind, Becker distinguished himself, nevertheless, by raising relevant questions and propounding social-historical theories, particularly in the realm of the deeper meaning of the American Revolution (was it an aristocratic struggle?) and the underlying democratic movements (were they class struggles?) in this country.

Becker's theses are now under attack. Robert E. Brown's book is the latest contribution to the controversy. It is not complimentary to Becker as a professional historian. Brown thoroughly documents his charge that Becker's studies of the American Revolution were either based on insufficient evidence, or, what is equally devastating, his conclusions were actu-

ally contradicted by the existing facts. Becker misread or misused his statistics. To maintain his thesis that in New York State the aristocracy sustained a rigged political system in which the vote was severely restricted to a handful of the well-to-do, Becker stated: "The number of freemen was small," for as "late as 1790 there were only forty-five in Albany and ninety-three in New York [City]." This is wildly off the mark. As Brown's contemporary Tables show, the New York City electorate at that time consisted of 2,493 freemen, the great majority of whom were common people or artisans, including barbers, blacksmiths, bricklayers, butchers, cordwainers, curriers, peddlers, ropemakers, snuffmakers, weavers, and just plain laborers (362 of them). Thus, if judged by New York, the American Revolution was not, as Becker claimed, a social-class struggle for the franchise, but one for home rule.

"In short," Brown writes, "the Becker thesis does not stand up under critical analysis. It literally bristles with the words radicals, conservatives, privileged classes, underprivileged classes, franchised, and unfranchised, all designed to impress the reader with the importance of the internal revolution. But Becker's evidence points to a middle-class, democratic society living under an imperial system which the people opposed when the British attempted to make it effective. The question of home rule was fundamental."

The larger question, however, is not whether Carl Becker was wrong in his particular interpretation of the American Revolution or his attitude toward historical writing, but the meaning of History itself, and its purposes. What, in fact, is History, and why? Is it philosophy or literature or social science? Historians, be it noted, have not been part of the ferment that has agitated the social sciences in the last generation or so. Brown, who is also the author of *Charles Beard and the Constitution*, considers History as a disinterested search for truth. But, leaving aside Pontius Pilate's memorable question, one may ask: Whose truth? Is the historical method the guaranteed avenue to truth? And, moreover, truth for what?

Becker might have answered that a scholar is committed to his vision of truth, which could be viewed as a function of the problems of the time. Brown may well be right in his criticism of Becker's subjectivism, but his approach to the problem does not even begin to solve it. Written History has meaning—and is readable, as the examples of men like Carl Becker and Charles Beard show—primarily if it is rooted in some theory or philosophy—always subject

to re-examination, of course. Without guiding theories or principles, historians tend to flounder in methodological confusions or nit-picking. It is footling work. Brown has done an intelligent job on Becker, but for what purpose?

SAUL K. PADOVER

New School for Social Research

How Organizations Are Represented in Washington. By Lewis Anthony Dexter. (Indianapolis: The Bobbs Merrill Co., Inc., 1969. Pp. 157. \$2.95.)

In this slim volume a political sociologist draws upon his extensive Washington experience and research to discuss the relations among interest groups, their agents and decision makers in the nation's capital. It is the organizations that have or may wish to employ government relations specialists and these agents, themselves, who are the main publics for whom the author is writing. One might even say that he had in mind some sort of handbook for them. The questions raised by the author indicate, however, that he is much more concerned with how an organization *may best* be represented; how agents *should* proceed; and the *proper* relationship between the two rather than how organizations *are* represented.

Some of the questions Dexter poses and the answers he offers are as follows: Should a government relations specialist be based in Washington? Yes, although this will produce tensions with any employer whose headquarters is elsewhere. As the agent develops a frame of reference and mode of operation appropriate to the Washington environment, he will become increasingly suspect "back home." Such organizations might profitably adopt a rotating system by which different members of a Washington staff return to headquarters every three or four years. What are the advantages and disadvantages of separating in the Washington office activities aimed at public policy from those related to sales, contracts, and case work with the government? Why should some organizations become more active than they are? What are the best access routes—channels for exerting influence—in a well planned government relations program? Prospective clients are advised to choose Washington representatives who are not committed to any particular route since such programs should be appropriate to the variety of national decision-making centers and take into account the entire polity, not merely the national government. What situations are most suitable to the use of lobbying, and what considerations should a Washington represen-

tative keep in mind in order to be an effective lobbyist?

The author handles his material with confidence and skill, although in an abbreviated form. He is always clear and interesting even if he does move rather rapidly through some of his questions. And finally, Dexter has a particular style of his own; he resorts to the use of personal asides; and he relies heavily upon his own research.

How does this book fit into the existing field of knowledge regarding interest groups and Washington agents? On the whole the conclusions are familiar ones. Nevertheless political scientists and Washington representatives will disagree with a number of Dexter's conceptualizations. He defines the Washington representative in a very restrictive sense: only that individual who, in the interests of his clients, addresses himself to public policy matters or to policy implications of specific governmental decisions is the real Washington representative. Those engaged entirely or principally in the solicitation of sales, contracts, grants or with specific case work in dealing with the government are specifically excluded, although Dexter does concede that variations exist between the two extremes.

Legitimate questions may be raised regarding Dexter's special meaning for the term Washington representative. Does it reliably characterize those agents operating in Washington today? Might its use not foster unnecessary confusion? It contradicts, for example, the data and terminology in *The Business Representative in Washington* by Paul W. Cherington and Ralph L. Gillen. Many political scientists will also reject as too narrow and unrealistic Dexter's contention that lobbying applies to activities that focus solely on the Congress in terms of policy matters and the subsequent behavior of executive actors. This certainly does not coincide with Lester W. Milbrath's *The Washington Lobbyists* which considers lobbying as encompassing those efforts directed at influencing decision makers wherever they are in government—in the Congress, the White House, executive departments, regulatory agencies, and the courts.

Dexter is greatly interested in advancing the professionalization of Washington representatives. Perhaps it is this interest which induces him to insist that they be identified chiefly in terms of policy matters and, in part at least, to dismiss lobbying as irrelevant for many Washington representatives. Since lobbying, as he points out, is popularly associated with bribery and corruption, the cause of professionalism

suffers if these representatives are closely identified with lobbying. Dexter acknowledges the importance of lobbying for some Washington representatives, but he contends that generally they operate in a much broader framework. Ironically, he writes more thoroughly and perceptively about lobbying the Congress than he does about influencing executive policy makers.

What contributions does this book make to political science? In his treatment of Congress as a favor-giving and favor-trading institution, and the opportunities accruing thereby to outside groups and their agents, Dexter has something valuable to add. Secondly, he calls our attention to the critical relationship between Washington representatives and their clients or employers. Attention has hitherto focused almost entirely upon relations between client or agent with the target, the decision maker. We need much more research regarding client and agent to understand fully the problems and operations of the latter and their impact upon public policy making. Regardless, therefore, of the value of the book for organizations and agents, political scientists will find that they also have something to gain from reading *How Organizations Are Represented in Washington*.

ABRAHAM HOLTZMAN

North Carolina State University

Cities of the Prairie. The Metropolitan Frontier and American Politics. By Daniel J. Elazar. (New York and London: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1970. Pp. xiv, 514. \$15.)

The literature on federalism has surely quadrupled in recent years, and the flood shows no sign of abating. It seems every mail brings notice of a new title. One thus approaches yet another book on the subject warily, even one by someone as well established in the study of federalism as Daniel Elazar. Could he have something to say so soon after his last book? The answer is, he does—indeed, he has a great deal to say and much of importance. One can see from *Cities* where much of his thinking about federalism derives, for the research basic to this book underlies his work of the last several years. It is not too much to say that this book very likely gives Elazar the preeminent position among current students of American federalism.

Cities of the Prairie is the first in a new series of studies sponsored by the Center for the Study of Federalism at Temple University, of which Elazar is director. It reports some of the results of a four year comparative study (from 1959 to 1963) by Elazar of seventeen "civil communities" in ten heretofore largely unstu-

died "lesser" metropolitan areas in the Greater West—Pueblo, Colorado; Rockford, Champaign-Urbana, Peoria, Joliet, Decatur, and Springfield, Illinois; the Quad Cities (Rock Island and Moline, Illinois and Davenport, Iowa); Duluth-Superior; and Madison and St. Clair Counties, part of the St. Louis metropolitan area centered on Belleville, Illinois. Those particular communities and metropolitan areas were chosen for the study chiefly because of the original sponsorship of the project, by the Institute of Government and Public Affairs of the University of Illinois, but Elazar rationalizes their choice on several grounds: that about 40% of all metropolitan Americans (about 25% of all Americans) live in similar medium-sized urban communities and that such communities have their own unique type of politics, both of which facts make them worth study, and that in any case they need not be studied for themselves but as representative of "the range of metropolitan types found in the Midwest and West." (p. 16) But most important they are worth study because they offer a viable alternative to the giant metropolises developed earlier in American growth, so that the more we know about them, the better. Thus, Elazar concludes, "the civil communities included in this study can be studied as reflecting many basic elements of the metropolitan pattern in the United States as a whole." (p. 20)

Elazar conducts his study deliberately and methodologically. The object of his attention is neither cities nor metropolitan areas, but "civil communities," by which he means localities with many governmental institutions but each served by an identifiable comprehensive local political system, formal political boundaries notwithstanding. Thus he is interested in the whole package of governmental services and activities in a locality, ranging from the U.S. Post Office to the smallest special district, encompassed in one definable *political system*. Only such a community—such a system—makes sense in modern metropolitan America, he is convinced, and so should be the basic unit of study for anyone who seeks to understand the phenomenon of political decision-making and control in American urban centers.

As he proceeds, Elazar demonstrates his awareness that communities have historical, economic, and social aspects and so cannot be studied as contemporary political phenomena alone. "... the cumulative effects of each local community's evolving location in time and space on its political system must be considered as fundamental elements in determining community patterns." (p. 8) Knowing what he

calls the "social geology" of each community is thus basic to an understanding of its politics. His book offers more, then, than an analysis of contemporary community power structures in the several communities, though it does that too. It offers a series of in-depth historical, economic, and social analyses of each community as well.

Finally, the book is thematic. American civilization, Elazar asserts, is the product of four continuing, interrelated forces: the frontier, migration, sectionalism, and federalism. The classic land frontier was succeeded by the urban-industrial frontier, and that frontier is now being succeeded in turn by the metropolitan-technological frontier. The communities Elazar chose for study are all at the third frontier stage, and his intention is to show how population change, sectional ties, and governmental actions and interactions have been interwoven at each stage of earlier frontier development and at the present stage as well. For the past is truly prologue, and only by understanding what has brought us to our present state can the readjustments now necessary for accommodation to the current situation be made. All of the communities studied "have been affected by the opening of the metropolitan frontier, which has created new problems for each of them and has also given them the impetus needed for attempting to meet those problems in the political arena. It is their confrontation with the frontier problems of the age which has become the most important aspect of their political life. . . . Their respective response to those frontier problems and the reasons behind each response are of central concern in this study." (p. 59)

Once his general thesis has been stated in Chapter I (which is general in scope and should be read by anyone interested in metropolitan problems), he proceeds in case study fashion to look at his specimen communities under the empirical microscope and to describe how they resemble or differ from the model. There is something for every social scientist and historian in the nine chapters and postscript which follow. Political scientists may be most interested in the chapters on "Political Cleavages and Political Control" (Ch. 5) and "Political Culture and Politics in State and Community" (Ch. 6), which are in the best tradition of modern political science. And the chapter on "Competing Political Cultures in Illinois" (Ch. 7) is a jewel of analysis. Although Elazar's interest in federalism is evident throughout, he reserves Chapter 9 for an examination of "The Cities of the Prairie and the American Partnership." His conclusion as to

the importance of localities in the American federal system is well argued and persuasive. Finally, he turns in the postscript to a projective analysis of the impact of all his data on the future, which, he speculates, will be based on a fourth frontier featuring "megalopolitan settlement patterns and . . . the explosion of information technology." (p. 445) Once again, the social compact in each community will have to be renegotiated through the political mechanism, even as it has been at each frontier before, and it is obviously Elazar's hope that it will be renegotiated as successfully then as it has been three times in the past. For Elazar is basically hopeful and sees the pattern of social adjustment worked out at the community level as a possible model for national emulation.

Special note should be made of the extensive notes to each chapter and to the several appendices, two of which deal with the research procedures followed in obtaining the data for the study. The latter are worth reading for themselves by anyone interested in political science research techniques.

It is hard to be critical of such a work. If there is perhaps too much detail and too many communities to keep track of easily, and if Elazar's use of commas and semi-colons seems random and his tendency to split infinitives annoying, these are small fees to pay for a solid, informative, analytical study of American urban growth and development and of the politics which has been part and parcel of it. His theorizing challenges the reader, and the evidence marshalled to support it persuades him. This is political science at its best—that is, it can be read with profit by anyone interested in man in his modern structured environment. This is a book about politics, but it is more. It should be reviewed also as a study in sociology and as a chronicle of modern urban history. If other volumes in the series live up to this one, it will be quite a series. Hopefully, other volumes therein will not cost quite as much as this one; even so, there can be no complaint lodged against *this* addition to the literature. There should be room on any shelf for *Cities of the Prairie*.

RICHARD H. LEACH

Duke University

The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy: Volume XVII, John Foster Dulles. By Louis L. Gerson. Cooper Square Publishers Inc., New York, 1967. Pp. 372, \$7.95.

One of John Foster Dulles' many liberal critics once speculated that had Dulles been Secre-

tary of State during the Cuban Missile Crisis, he would have had the Russians condemned in the United Nations, immediately formed a Caribbean Defense Alliance, and, after all the flurry of activity, left the Soviet missiles standing. Louis L. Gerson's intriguing and sympathetic biography of Secretary Dulles reveals a strong strain of truth in that smug characterization of the Dulles diplomacy which was a combination of public rigidity and private flexibility.

Professor Gerson's straight forward narrative style develops no startling hypotheses, yet it challenges, at least implicitly, the stereotyped view of Dulles as the consummate practitioner of Cold War Diplomacy. Gerson unveils two Dulleses: one, the public figure, with a Manichean and fundamentalist view of world politics; the other, the private diplomat, whose policies were both cautious and pragmatic. Two brief but dramatic examples from the book may illustrate the point.

1) Soon after becoming Secretary, Dulles announced the "unleashing" of Chiang Kai-shek from his military sanctuary in Formosa. However, Gerson tells us that when Chiang was challenged over the off-shore islands of Quemoy and Matsu, Dulles urged restraint and told Chiang to "make no attempt to return to the mainland by force, to avoid commando raids and other provocations; and to accept any solution which would neutralize Quemoy and Matsu" (p. 212).

2) At the Geneva Conference of 1954, Dulles staged a hard line position while preparing the way for a compromise. By refusing to be photographed with Chou En-lai and leaving the Conference before the Accords had been concluded, Dulles symbolized the American reluctance to become associated publicly with any compromise settlement of the Indo-China War. But, in private, as Gerson indicates, Dulles staged a hard line position while preparation and informed French Premier Mendès-France he would sanction such a course. In a seven point memorandum to Mendès-France, Dulles suggested the division of Vietnam at the 17th parallel.

Dulles' urging of restraint upon Chiang and his sanctioning of the compromise at Geneva was consistent with his position on Suez in 1956: a public condemnation of Nasser for accepting Soviet aid and nationalizing the Canal, while carefully protecting his government from the Anglo-French-Israeli cabal.

Surely one may overdo this picture of the Secretary whose rigidity was not always so privately moderated. And Gerson's biography it-

self lacks any serious discussion of the Dulles role in the American interventions in Iran, Guatemala, Indonesia, and Burma; does not mention what part Dulles played in scuttling the re-unification election in Vietnam; and ignores completely the story of Dulles' effort to undermine Harold Stassen's attempt to secure Administration support for a modest "first step" arms control agreement with the Soviets in 1957.

Yet the Gerson portrait of Dulles remains compelling: a conservative diplomat—self righteous and cautious—whose brave slogans—"brinksmanship," "massive retaliation," and "liberation"—were never translated into hard policies and whose new alliances (SEATO and CENTO) were paper tigers. Dulles was unwilling to challenge the status quo by risking war be it over Suez, Indo-China, Quemoy and Matsu, or Hungary. But his evangelical fear and hatred of communism prevented him from ever admitting to its moral acceptability. As a result he could not accept diplomatic proposals which would provide it with a legal sanction and a new stability. Hence, Dulles steadfastly opposed the recognition of China, the Rapacki plan, Stassen's arms control schemes, and was suspicious of President Eisenhower's experiment in summitry. Dulles became accustomed to the rigid cold war system of the 40's and 50's but he found it morally distasteful. His compromise was to condemn the system in public, promising liberation and threatening massive retaliation while quietly supervising its maintenance. The world was too evil to accept and yet too dangerous to alter.

The Dulles diplomacy produced very little. No accomplishments to match the Test Ban Treaty or the Non-Proliferation Pact; but no disasters to match Vietnam.

In the public papers of Dean Acheson, Walt Rostow, or Dean Rusk, one finds little of Dulles' moral fervor and indignation over the evils of international communism. Yet it is in the diplomacy of these exponents of *realpolitik* that one finds the real drawing of the lines as in Korea and Vietnam. These realists have been much more inclined to act as if the Manichean world of John Foster Dulles really exists, while Dulles, himself, as Professor Gerson's book subtly underscores, behaved as if the real world was that of the balance and limitations of power.

In a private letter to Senator Mike Mansfield, one of the liberal critics of Dulles' willingness to participate in the 1954 Geneva Conference, Dulles reminded him, "It is a grave disservice to the United States to assume that it is a 'fail-

ure' of the United States if anywhere in the world others fail. The United States is not throughout the world 'Mr. Fixit' " p. 341). Spoken like a true conservative.

ROBERT J. BRESLER

Pennsylvania State University, The Capitol Campus

Federalists in Dissent: Imagery and Ideology in Jeffersonian America. By Linda K. Kerber. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970. Pp. 233. \$7.50)

Professor Kerber's purpose is to revise the image of the Federalists in Jeffersonian America. Revision is necessary, she argues, because the current picture of the Federalists after 1800 as mere complainers and partisan obstructionists is the work of such Jeffersonian historians as Beard, Turner and Parrington. To remedy this account she seeks answers to two related questions. First, how did the Federalists understand their own behavior. To this end the Emerson Rule that "every scripture should be read in the light of the spirit which brought it forth" is followed (p. 217). Second, "was there anything . . . in the Jeffersonian definition of the meaning of American life which made Federalist hostility reasonable?" (p. xi). The reply to these two questions is the content of the book. Investigation of extensive primary material, pamphlet, newspaper and manuscript, as well as recent historical studies on slavery, violence and disorder, leads Kerber to conclude that Federalist behavior in Jeffersonian America was cultural or ideological disagreement in the broadest possible sense, and not self-serving political obstructionism. "Articulate Federalists" engaged in principled dissent and a "Federalist Mind" genuinely persuaded that Jefferson's Administration posed a serious threat to the continued existence of the republic is Kerber's revised image of the Federalists in Jeffersonian America.

Professor Kerber poses the Federalist-Jeffersonian debate in terms of Ancient, English and Federalist thought, on the one hand, against Modern, French and Jeffersonian thought on the other hand. Her Federalist Party is not simply a political party, but a small intellectual group articulating disgust and concern over the demise of the traditional cultural order necessary for the continuance of republican government. These men expressed "a cast of mind and a set of beliefs that constituted a significant part of a more general Federalist Persuasion" (p. x). The Jeffersonians are accused, by Clement Clark Moore, of turning scientific inquiry away from the traditional study of natural phi-

losophy and pious English thinkers, such as Newton and Bacon, and towards the new study of natural history and impious French philosophers. But this disregards the difficulty of reconciling antiquity and piety with Newton and Bacon, on the one hand, and the fact that Jefferson considered Newton, Bacon and Locke the greatest men who ever lived. Using the English Augustan satiric mode, Josiah Quincy and Washington Irving accused Jefferson of tearing the cultural fabric of America apart, and terminating the Roman Augustan republican ideal, by embarking on a visionary journey to a new Laputa. But this underestimates the extent to which the Declaration of Independence and the wholly popular republican Constitution of 1787, created by other Federalists, had already placed the continuance of the old culture and the idea of an ancient republic in serious jeopardy. The Louisiana Purchase and the educational reforms of Noah Webster (a part-time Federalist) and Benjamin Rush are opposed by articulate Federalists in the name of Montesquieu (a Frenchman) in conscious opposition to Madison's *Tenth Federalist* (pp. 45, 108). But this suppresses the fact that Montesquieu was the Anti-Federalists' oracle in their 1787-1800 defense of small republics united confederally, and that his interest in the English Constitution shows considerable concern for institutional devices, liberty and commerce, in addition to educational instruction, wisdom and virtue. Finally, Kerber has John Rutledge and other articulate Federalists favoring the extension of commercial laws and strong national government in the 1801 Judiciary debates. But this overlooks the dependence of this defense on Madison's *Tenth Federalist*. Kerber's identification of debate over principle with debate over culture gives undue attention to those Federalists who doggedly defended either the image or reality of an ancient culture and republic as late as Jefferson's First Administration. Virtually ignored or irreconciled are such politically influential modern Federalists as Marshall, Hamilton and Publius, of the *Federalist Papers*, who, along with Jefferson, did much to replace the ancient order. The modern Federalists also spoke to the problems and defects of democracy, but emphasized remedies consistent with popular government and the spirit of the American people. An extended commercial republic, a system of opposite and rival interests, and an energetic representative democracy, rather than traditional religion, morality and education, were the means to secure the continuance of free government. Kerber, unfortunately, identifies the spirit of these measures with Jefferson.

Concern with the "failures and contradictions" of current American democracy influences Kerber's views of the articulate Federalists' case against Jeffersonian democracy and her selection of controversies. Oliver Wolcott argues that Jeffersonian America is an extension of Jeffersonian Virginia, a society sick with the hypocrisy of slavery. William Linn suggests that Jeffersonian principles and practice consider blacks naturally inferior and slavery a positive good. The articulate Federalists are credited for diagnosing the source of social disorder and revolution in an emerging urban proletariat, believing in the existence of a cyclical view of history, anticipating Galbraith's strictures on an affluent society, and siring the future leaders of the abolitionist movement. She recognises, albeit insufficiently, that not all the arguments against Jeffersonian America are completely sound (pp. 57, 68, 159). Severely truncated treatment is given to such massive political controversies as the Alien and Sedition Acts, Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, Embargo Act, Burr Conspiracy, War of 1812, Hartford Convention and Judge Chase's blatant partisanship. As a consequence, inadequate consideration is given to those principled political disagreements between modern Federalists and Jeffersonian Republicans over the nature and operation of American federalism and American republicanism. Lost is the fact that Madison, then a Federalist, initiated this debate in 1787, and that Jefferson understood himself to be defending the prerequisites of federal republican government. Omitted are Hamilton's arguments concerning the 1800 election which persuaded Congressional Federalists that Jefferson was neither so visionary nor dangerous that he would not defend and extend the Constitution founded and formed by Federalists. Instead, Kerber views the election as fraudulently elevating pro-slavery Jefferson over pro-ancient Adams by means of the 3/5 compromise clause. Lost is the interesting possibility of showing Federalists rising above narrow obstructionism and exercising the art of statesmanship and the virtue of patriotism by choosing Jefferson over Burr.

In conclusion, Professor Kerber's sound suggestion that the Federalist position be considered from a Federalist perspective and that the debate be placed at the level of principle are nullified by the identification of the least politically significant part of Federalist thought with the whole of Federalist thought and by imposing, as did the Jeffersonian historians, contemporary America as an independent variable in the analysis. Students of the early American period, especially those with an interdisciplinary perspec-

tive, will be interested in Kerber's revision of the Federalists' image and encouraged by the volume and quality of original material investigated.

GORDON LLOYD

University of Redlands

The Politics of Unreason: Right-Wing Extremism in America, 1790-1970. By Seymour M. Lipset and Earl Raab. (New York: Harper and Row. 1970. Pp. xxiv, 547. \$12.50.)

Twenty-five years after publication of *An American Dilemma*, the Myrdal prize has been won by two political sociologists for this historical analysis and contemporary appraisal of American right-wing extremism. Nativist bigotry is abundantly shown to be the convenient rhetorical instrument of 'backlash politics.' But it is not viewed as a significant causal factor in itself. To Lipset and Raab, right-wing extremism in America has been born out of the social displacement fears of groups declining in status or class.

Their conceptual scheme treats all extremism as 'monism'—the subordination of political and cultural pluralism to the moral discipline of an absolute, simplified and total value system. In the monistic view, democratic norms need to be replaced so that 'good people' come to power. Linked to this simplistic formula is a conspiracy view of history. Bad things happen because evil men intend them to occur.

The Right is preservative, nostalgic, preoccupied with bygone days, prone to displacement anxieties. Whereas right-wing extremism is restrictive, the Left is innovative; even in its morally intolerant versions, it puts demands forward in the name of aspiring groups who want to share in social conditions they have never had.

Applied to American history, their criteria work reasonably well, although some cases are hard to fit to the Right-Left parameter. Thus, in the nineteenth century they focus largely on Anti-Masonry, the Know Nothings, the American Protective Association and the first Klan—how they sustained their support coalitions and how they were eventually neutralized by the major parties. Abolitionism is harder to classify. In its demands for emancipation, its demonic view of southern slave-owners, and its monistic program of rectification, did it qualify as a movement of the Left? Or was it a right-wing phenomenon, since it was "largely a product of New England leadership which had become increasingly frustrated over the fact that it had lost its influence on the country" (p. 62)? The right-wing 'fire-eaters'—who took the

South first out of the Democratic party and then out of the Union—are not treated, although they would fit the criteria. And before 1900 the Populists and after 1900 the Progressives included their share of bigots, anti-Semites and racists—men who fomented a politics of backlash rhetoric attractive to nativist Protestant groups threatened with social displacement. Yet their innovative aims represented the aspirations of rising classes. As with the Abolitionists, equalitarian and libertarian aspects of militant Protestantism here can be seen to coexist with monistic bigotry.

In the 1920's the chief extremist manifestation was the anti-immigrant agitation of the second KKK, supported for a time by affluent nativist conservatives as well as by urban working class elements, especially those displaced from rural America. The depression years saw an end to the exclusively Protestant character of right-wing extremism. Father Coughlin, a nativist priest, was openly anti-Semitic in his radio talks; many who might have responded, however, were anti-Catholic as well. More significant in shifting the base for extremism was Huey Long. Doubtless his welfare-state demagoguery offended many respectable preservatives; at the same time the absence of bigotry in Long's message made his following untransferable to his notorious associate—Gerald L. K. Smith. But it was sufficiently serious as an electoral threat to prompt a private poll for White House study, as FDR prepared for the 1936 campaign.

In the early 1950's another Catholic tried to mobilize the American right. Senator Joseph McCarthy's extremist appeals were a kind of 'abstract and anomic nativism.' Lipset and Raab use polls taken between 1952 and 1954 to gauge approval for the Wisconsin Senator. Three population blocs favored him: economic conservatives, the status-volatile, and the uneducated. Over-all, McCarthyism is treated as a tendency rather than a movement. It lacked a 'corporealized target.' Communists were just too ephemeral. Moreover, it experienced a ritualized withdrawal of conservative support when the Senate voted censure.

McCarthyism was a mass tendency without political organization. By contrast, the Birch society represents an organizational structure without a mass following. Its doctrinal content is anti-statist and preservative. Its social base is middle class, especially those suffering from status loss: military men, small businessmen, physicians, policemen, and those whose education is not commensurate with their new middle class position. Not bigotry but *laissez faire* doctrine, coupled with a conspiratorial theory cast-

ing a statist intelligentsia in the role of arch-traitors are the ideological props of the Birch movement. It has never sought a mass following by appeals to the intolerance of the poor or the working class.

George Wallace's 1968 Presidential candidacy was perhaps the most ambitious right-wing extremist bid for national power in this century. To an impressive extent, the support configuration he achieved was a 'marriage between classes.' He was an economic populist, the poor man's friend, a welfare liberal. At the same time, his generalized preservatism could attract those preoccupied with statism, or national weakness, or moral breakdown, or Negro intrusion. While only 13 per cent voted for him, another 9 per cent admitted favoring him earlier in the campaign. He appealed to two kinds of intolerant voters, middle-class conservatives and working-class populists. In the event, large numbers apparently decided not to 'waste their votes' in gestures of support for him.

Their historical survey is careful, insightful and largely persuasive. What then are the hallmarks of American right-wing extremism and how are its sporadic manifestations to be contained and neutralized? Lipset and Raab analyze their own 1964 national survey to learn about the social and attitudinal correlates of extremism. The conceptual distinctions they make in displaying their data have important consequences for their discussion of the vitality of democratic pluralism and for their anti-extremist prescriptions.

Lipset and Raab approach the study of right-wing extremism by distinguishing economic conservatism—opposition to the welfare state—from cultural conservatism—opposition to people and ideas that are different. Thus the 'statism-individualism' axis is examined empirically in terms of economic conservatism while the 'monist-pluralist' parameter is operationally confined to questions of cultural tolerance. By crossing these two axes, some cases fall in middle ground while others cluster in the four corners of the matrix. One question is how many people remain in the ambiguous center where the typology lacks explanatory focus. Almost half the 1964 national sample scored outside the four corners of a nine-cell matrix. Consistent Liberals and Old Guards—the two tolerant types, who were poles apart on welfare-state issues—accounted for 8 and 11 percent respectively; Rednecks and Radical Rightists—the two intolerant types, who differed in their view of government's proper role—accounted for 15 and 19 percent each. The Radical Right group tended to be middle class, fundamentalist Protestants, living in small towns and rural

areas of the South and Border; the Rednecks more often were working class, urban Catholics. Surprisingly, 62 percent were women, a point not discussed. Parallel analysis of 1968 data suggests that 32 percent of the Rednecks backed Wallace and a comparable support level came from Radical Rightists.

The analytical scheme is both simple and powerful. The two dimensions—antistatism and intolerance—are demonstrably present as crystallized viewpoints (pro or con rather than in between) in the political thinking of about half the American public today. Presumably if new attitudinal cleavage lines emerge, they will be superimposed on these persistent parameters.

The value preferences of Lipset and Raab can readily be linked to this matrix. Anti-extremist strategy calls for prevention of alliances between the irrationally preservative rich and poor, the bigoted Right and Left, the nihilist young and old, and those displaced persons who project conspiratorial fantasies onto vulnerable targets. The advancement and enrichment of democratic pluralism is both means and end. As they phrase it, the "new American Dilemma is really just the old pre-Myrdal American Dilemma: can we provide new rewards and new status for the displaced as well as for the displacing segments of our population?" (p. 513)

A caveat is needed. Distinctive roles remain to be performed. Pragmatists are needed who keep open minds about whether and when to use public machinery to achieve social goals; mediators are needed who are sensitive to the tempo of cultural change and who recognize not only the danger of cultural tyranny but the chaos of cultural relativism. Are those in the middle cells of the matrix really of secondary importance? Many thoughtful citizens respond to questions by saying 'it depends . . .' The 'pragmatic mediator' may lack a crystallized commitment, whether it is always to be antistatist, or always intolerant, or whether it is a similar extremist position at the opposite pole of the continua. But he retains his judgment and uses it to act rationally and responsibly, in light of both circumstances and the need for continuity. Lipset and Raab are not insensitive to these points, though their emphases lie elsewhere. The commitment to democratic pluralism by future generations of Americans is uncertain at best. This book is an important contribution of social science in the struggle against extremism.

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Upgrading the American Police. By Charles B. Saunders, Jr. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution. 1970. Pp. 182. \$5.95).

For some years now "Law 'n Order" has been a dominant domestic political theme across the United States. In the past six years the public has received reports from three major Presidential Commissions: Crime in 1967, Riots in 1968, and Violence in 1969. Action, however, has not paralleled political rhetoric; periodic public outrage about crime, violence, and riots has slipped into the abyss of public apathy, and not too much has happened except more rhetoric.

No amount of anger, anguish, assassinations, and analyses has prompted the wholesale modernization of American police organizations and field practices. While some forces have made significant advances, a national survey of what progress has been made would probably feature what has *not* been accomplished since "Law 'n Order" became the politico's plaything but a phantom to the police executive. Small wonder, then, that police feel trapped between the promises of political hopefuls and the apathy of parsimonious legislative bodies.

Now enter a "state of the art" text, one which presents a current portrait of the American police system. In *Upgrading the American Police*, attorney Charles B. Saunders, Jr., of the prestigious Brookings Institution has successfully translated issues of mind-blowing complexity into logical sequences and orderly exposition. Saunders presents the scene in a bold fabric woven of such themes as crime as a political issue, the role of the police, the shortage of police manpower, and the urgent need for more and better educated police personnel who are also thoroughly trained.

Saunders' detailed, often lively book will not disappoint readers who seek a manageable synopsis of American police ills and their causes and cures. Although at times somewhat dry and textbookish, readable size (182 pages) and adequate documentation (280 footnotes) make the book an excellent reference for students, researchers, legislators, staff personnel, and others whose mission requires a fundamental understanding of contemporary American police problems.

Saunders presents an especially provocative analysis of the United States Congress' Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. Saunders argues that the Act "creates unrealistic expectations and accentuates many of the pressures which already limit police effectiveness" and may actually divert attention from major police problems! He points out that while the Act does provide some desperately

needed funds for police agencies, its failure to focus more than incidentally on manpower development programs effectively obviates any long-range impact. Saunders' discussion ends on an optimistic note, however, for he sets out a four-point program to upgrade the "quality" of American police manpower, a step which the 1967 President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice identified as central to improving crime control in America.¹

Although the entire book is documented with shocking statistics about crime in America and the quality of American law enforcement, its greatest impact is contained in the concluding chapter, "A Crucial Decision for Law Enforcement." Only in these final pages does Saunders break out in an unveiled crusade for upgrading law enforcement. Heretofore, he had been painfully clinical, shunning any hint of advocacy or overdramatization of a complicated subject.

Saunders' deliberate lack of emotionalism in developing the themes, linking them, and drawing the parts together into an action package will strike many readers as a major weakness of the text. It is only when he hints at criticism of certain police publics or unconsciously reveals his disillusionment with problem-solving processes that his work seems "human."

If this book was intended for those already familiar with police problems, it is excellent reference material. If, however, it was intended for the general public as a Ramsey Clark-like call to action, it will certainly miss its mark with all but the very discerning reader. Another criticism, although minor, deals with presentation. Charts could have added a great deal to minimizing the seemingly enormous amount of comparative and statistical material.

In summary, *Upgrading the American Police* is a very readable and pessimistic documentation of police problems and some ways to resolve them. It leaves the reader with a greater knowledge of and sympathy for the "cop on the beat" and the nature and complexity of issues which face police executives. But only upon conclusion will the discerning reader discover the irony that the title further twists the already twisted American perspective about police.

¹ The President's Crime Commission did not hedge the point for it pointedly declared that: "The Commission believes that substantially raising the quality of police personnel would inject into police work knowledge, expertise, initiative and integrity which would contribute importantly to improved crime control." See *The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), page 107.

This reader will declare that the text should be titled: *Updating the American Public*.

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Negroes and the Great Depression: The Problem of Economic Recovery. By Raymond Wolters. (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Publishing Corporation, 1970. Pp. 398. \$12.50.)

This study is an appraisal of the two principal macroeconomic reform measures of the New Deal and organized Negro efforts to share in the reforms which did so much to alter the basic institutions of American politics. Though frustration and disappointment were the principal themes of the decade for blacks, they moved, nonetheless, into the Democratic Party. The study curiously does not treat this movement from Republicanism and thus, the book falls short of the hope called up by its title; yet it is an extraordinary account of the failure of reformism in the critical years of the 1930's.

Wolter's premise is that there exists a "real need" to write "biracial history that takes both perspectives into account. . . ." He is true to his conception: he describes the context and contents of the AAA and NRA, then narrates the ways in which decision makers, invariably white, decided what political costs had to be paid to survive Congress and its committees. Wolters then shifts to examine the largely vain and barely audible protests from lobbyists of the NAACP and the Urban League, the voice of the Negro as these were then regarded. From primary sources he chronicles the manner of implementation of the reforms in the hands of the New Deal bureaucrats.

It is not of surpassing surprise that Wolters finds benefits from the recovery program were not so great as to admit the Negro community to economic parity, or even for the reforms to allow blacks more substantial social or economic leverage. Indeed, he is hard pressed to show gains for blacks except for symbolic recognition in advisory councils or as special consultants from the Negro middle class serving white officials or even more ethereal, greater sensitivity on the part of officialdom to the special problems facing black workers.

Far from alleviating the wide spread dislocations, New Deal reforms in many instances compelled low income groups to accept dislocation in order that what seemed to the reformers a greater good could be had, e.g., the restoration of the price of cotton necessitated the reduction of share-cropping and effectively the removal of families to the cities. Repeatedly,

Negro lobbyists made it clear what social and human costs were being exacted, only to have their reservations ignored. Hope remained among blacks that abuses would be corrected in administration; nearly as often these hopes were further eroded by the political "reality" of national funding and community acceptance where white racism was adamant.

In separate spheres farm policy and industrial policy demonstrated the frailty of the New Deal coalition. Reform foundered in rural America at the hands of white supremacist conservatives well positioned in Congress to resist changes in race relationships and class positions in the South. The same tension was manifest in the passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act and the Wagner Act. In the latter statute, its author had been sympathetic to the hopes of Negroes that in creating the closed shop it would also be possible to guarantee the rights of access by blacks to union membership and to the jobs under union control. The AFL and its leader William Green turned out to have greater power and what would have been a most significant step toward integration simply disappeared.

The New Deal's successes triggered an internicine quarrel in the NAACP which forms the third node of this book. Perhaps of most interest to contemporary political science, this segment recounts the struggle between Du Bois and White over what was in essence if not in terminology the question of black power. Their factional in-fighting was over stakes far greater than personal power within the NAACP: each group had a fully developed and contrary analysis of strategy and tactics. The pressing question, which surfaced as the New Deal wore on, was whether the NAACP would have an economic platform that would be directly responsive to the needs of the large majority of blacks in the lower economic strata, and whether, in its absence, Du Bois and those who shared his views, would continue to participate in the Association.

It is with a sense of *déjà vu* that one encounters Du Bois urging the sufficiency of community institutions already under black control to force concessions from whites, or Du Bois detection of the technological advances which were hurtling the society forward, even if concealed by the Depression, and which would have the likely result of leaving blacks even further behind whites once prosperity returned. White's position, that incremental educative programs exhausted the Association's capability, did much to mould the Association for another generation.

The assumptions each faction entertained about the character of white power and thus about black power are the more interesting because of the backdrop of critical decisions being made by the New Deal reformists. The inability of reform politics to deal with the economic forces which gave rise to the conflict in the NAACP is highly suggestive for contemporary analysis of liberal reform.

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Political Development. Gabriel A. Almond. (Boston, Little Brown and Company. 1970. Pp. 331. \$6.95).

Professor Almond in this volume has reprinted nine of his previous papers together with two lectures (also published elsewhere) given in Boston University in 1968. The volume begins with an introduction of twenty-four pages which sets out the circumstances in which the papers were written and briefly sketches the major influences on Professor Almond's career. Most of the nine papers had their origin in Professor Almond's period as chairman of the Committee on Comparative Politics of the S.S.R.C. and a good deal of space in the introduction is devoted, rightly, to the Committee and its projects. Yet, there is a sense of something missing from this account of possibly the most influential of the S.S.R.C.'s committees. We are not told how it was set up, how its membership was selected and why Professor Almond rather than Professor X was appointed to the Chair. And such questions are important precisely because the Committee changed the tone, emphasis and quality of comparative political studies during Almond's chairmanship not only in America but also outside. For better or worse the Committee was a crucial agency of change, and it would have been of very considerable interest to know just how this piece of political innovation (development!) was achieved.

The major weight of Professor Almond's contribution to political science is in the study of comparative politics and, more specifically, in his formidable capacity as a generator of typological schemes. In the first two papers the ideas of structure, function, system, performance, culture and so on are implicit but not really developed as they are in the important—and much criticised—third essay, 'A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics,' where a whole arsenal of categories is laid down for the study of political development. In this essay the concept of a political function is outlined and seven are identified; these func-

tions are performed by structures in the political system. Since functions are universal and necessary it follows that if a system is maintained it must perform them in some way. Comparative politics then consists, essentially, of discovering the structures which perform the necessary functions. Political systems are embedded in political cultures which partly determine their performance capabilities—a concept more fully discussed in the fifth and sixth papers. The concept of political culture is briefly explored in the fourth essay on citizenship in democracies. The three following essays attempt to discover political problems associated with European political development and to ask whether they are present and how they are tackled in the developing areas. Political structures in all their variety can then be explained by the systems response to the problem, challenges of state building, popular participation, nation building and popular welfare. Difficulties are also associated with the order in which these tasks occur or if they have to be tackled simultaneously. Political development can then be measured by constructing indices of capabilities evolved in meeting the four challenges.

These are the more influential essays reprinted in the volume. Essay eight argues that contemporary political theory relates itself to the major concerns of the old Tradition, to enduring and ever-present political problems. The ninth essay argues that not all is settled in the study of comparative politics.

In his very engaging introduction Professor Almond explains that his papers are reprinted in chronological order rather than rearranged to accord with a logical or thematic sequence, but the chronological order does show (I quote the dust-jacket) "clear and unmistakable progress in the sophistication of concepts and research techniques in the study of political development." A short review is not the place to dispute this claim in detail; however, one's impression is that Professor Almond's categories do not become more sophisticated but simply more and more labyrinthine and complex. He appears unable to appreciate that the answer to logical criticism is not to concede that it has "merit" and then to proceed with "an elaboration and adaption" of the argument criticized (p. 187). And proceed he does, so that the mind rebels at the prospect of further elaboration and adaption. Just at my personal point of rebellion, I discovered that the appropriate attitude to the categories thus elaborated is "secular" and that "They have a short and instrumental life, and we avoid becoming their prisoners as we once were of separation-of-

powers concepts" (p. 251). As if to prove the point, a while later on (p. 295) it is revealed that a category of system performance which used to be called "symbolic capability" is now called "political capital accumulation." No reasons are given for the new nomenclatural convention. But, if like May Flies the categories are only for the nonce, might it not be better to re-think the basis from which the categories are derived? At the very least a few Ph.D. students might find their work has more than an ephemeral existence until the next set of elaborations is published. However, judging by the massive programmes of proposed research that some of these articles contain (e.g. papers eight, nine and ten), Professor Almond does not really believe his categories likely to be short-lived.

The last chapters in the volume are two lectures delivered in Boston in 1968. In the first lecture Professor Almond sets out once again his categories for the study of comparative politics, but lays more emphasis than previously upon development as a series of problems to be solved or not by the elites of developing areas. He also pays more attention than previously to the task of assessing different systems performance, that is to the problem of measurement. Professor Almond is clearly well aware of the enormous difficulty and labour involved in measuring even much more obviously measurable categories than those he discusses—five types of system performance—but he does seem unaware of a practical problem. If the categories are ephemeral what is the incentive for scholars to spend the required energy in deriving and testing performance indices? And this brings us squarely back to the political problem: how are people appointed to the various committees of the S.S.R.C.? This question is asked simply to suggest that institutional backing for a particular intellectual approach may be as significant for its dissemination and acceptance as its intellectual qualities. It is, incidentally, a question that merits an answer in Britain.

In his last essay Professor Almond examines the unfinished revolution in Eastern Europe and detects a 'pluralistic, and participatory ferment' (p. 320). He also suggests that in the West too the revolution is unfinished and that the 'last generations' (p. 321) of political scientists failed to understand this fact. It was not official political science which detected 'our (U.S.) racial caste system, our rural and small town squirearchy, the persisting ideology of early industrialism, and a version of clericalism' (p. 321) but rather the Black *Jacquerie*, which forced attention to the unfinished revolution.

Professor Almond does not pursue the implications of this point, but it is a point that surely warrants further analysis! Was it simply an accident, a quirk, that official American political science with its enormous resources both of man power and finance should have failed to warn the fire next time? Or could it be the case, as Professor Dwight Waldo argued in 1956, that "American political scientists have tended to accept the 'political order'" whilst sharpening up the research techniques? Or is there an ideological element embedded in the various political science schools that blinkered them? Professor Almond offers no suggestions. This failure is really a pity since Professor Almond's final lecture is very interesting indeed.

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Turmoil and Transition: Higher Education and Student Politics in India. Edited by Philip G. Altbach. (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1968. Pp. 277. \$7.50).

This is the American edition of a book originally published in India,¹ and although the articles are of uneven quality (some reprinted from other sources, and others written especially for this volume), it is gratifying to find that the information and insights contained in *Turmoil and Transition* have now been made available to an American audience. Anyone interested in the university and student culture as well as those particularly interested in student unrest in India will gain by the wealth of materials Professor Altbach has brought together. Included among the contributors, Altbach continues his own work on the Indian student movement, tracing its decline from an idealistic national organization to a discontinuous response to local grievances, in an educational atmosphere characterized by academic disesteem, administrative rigidity and political intervention, while Edward Shils emphasizes the burdens under which students must labor, the pervasiveness of family and caste ties, the pressures of poverty and likely unemployment, and their own intellectual unpreparedness; Joseph Gusfield points to the consequences of this in the inability of Indian students to create autonomous student cultures as do their American counterparts.

In the case studies, Joseph DiBona shows how a new generation of students, from rural and lower caste backgrounds, coming to Allahabad University must cope with disinterested teachers, faculty intrigues and autocratic bu-

reaucrats, and so graduate without professional or intellectual commitments, but with superficial adherence to "values of acceptance, docility, silence and feigned humility" (p. 166); in Hyderabad, Robert Shaw demonstrates that the Osmania faculty has from time to time depended upon student indiscipline to strengthen its own position in conflicts with the local political class, and at Ranchi University in Bihar, A. K. Singh concludes that "the teacher-student relationship becomes a political equation rather than an academic and spiritual bond" (p. 219). Margaret Cormack attributes this to the rapid expansion of higher education since independence, and tries to locate some bright points in this overwhelmingly bleak picture of the Indian university—aptly described by DiBona as "an intellectually stifling, caste ridden, contentious environment where violence is ever close to the surface" (p. 165).

However, the editor has failed to tie the material together, and has not elaborated on any one of the rich and broader themes which emerge from the readings. For example, all the authors are agreed that the Indian university is at present well integrated with its social and political environment; it is an avenue of social mobility for rural youth of uneducated families who demand regional language curricula and easier degree requirements, and a source of prestige and patronage for local politicians who give into student demands in order to win wider support at the polls. The Indian university has become parochialized. But what are the implications of this for India's future development? Mrs. Cormack suggests that it might be "disfunctional" (p. 260) because the parochial institution cannot attract talented men to teach, nor educate the more talented members of the student body properly. DiBona even suggests that present conditions represent "a moving away from modernity" (p. 165), and the more universalistic English intellectual culture which once drew India to the world and united regional elites. These are just a few of the many speculative points raised by the contributors.

In the absence of a statement by the editor, a short introduction by Shils about the sources of student unrest fills the gap. Shils is struck by the students' hostility towards the shoddy quality of intellectual authority they experience daily in the university, in contrast to the firm authority of elders in family and caste that they can never fully escape. Their desire to be free, resentment—and their perception that in the university they can get away with it—takes the form of sporadic and violent protest. In a society which constantly demands deference from

¹ (Bombay: Lalvani Publishing House, 1968.)

the younger to the older generation, youth is never given the opportunity to develop its own sense of individuality and concomitant internalized restraints. The point is made by Gusfield when he compares the American student's ability to structure his relationships among campus peers in a commonly shared youth culture, and the Indian college student's continued adherence to the norms of caste and family. Without such restraints, Indian adolescents tend to react violently to administrative and academic rejection of their sometimes just demands. As Mrs. Cormack states,

Conformity to traditional roles and modes is one thing—calling for little more than 'acceptance' or 'obedience'—and the controls relating to individual freedom and social progress are another. The internalization of values of controls is not generally understood, though democratization is impossible without his understanding (p. 245).

For a beginning, Shils, writing for an Indian audience, exhorts the academic community, as did former Union education minister, Triguna Sen, to act in a morally courageous fashion. He calls upon them to withstand student pressure, and to support the state and police in its efforts to contain student violence. In this way, he feels, authority will appear less shoddy, and professors will gain the respect of their students. Beyond that, the solution lies in the classroom. If in America today the danger lies in the diffusion of youth's individuality among the peer group and it is the professor's task to help students define the limits of their personalities, in India his main task is to cultivate the student's sense of individuality, and to teach the latter to take pride in his own achievements. In both cases, it will have to come through the exercise of intellectual discipline.

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Marshall in China. By John Robinson Beal, with an introduction by Robert D. Murphy. (New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc. 1970. Pp. xix, 385. \$7.95).

It is a full quarter-century since President Truman, confronted with an incipient civil war between the Nationalists and Communists in China, despatched General George C. Marshall to that country with the mission of endeavoring "to persuade the Chinese Government to call a national conference of representatives of the major political elements to bring about the unification of China and, concurrently, to effect a cessation of hostilities . . ."

Marshall actually succeeded in engineering a military truce within a month after his arrival, and a Political Consultative Conference of

"major political elements" on January 31, 1946 agreed upon the fundamentals of a political settlement; less than a month later, agreement was reached for reorganization of the nation's armed forces, governmental and rebel. But the agreements eventually all broke down, the civil war built up to full fury, the Communists overturned the Nationalist rule—and in the American political hustings the "China Question" became a superheated partisan issue, centered on the charge that "the loss of China" was not the fault of any Chinese group, but of American policy-makers.

John Robinson Beal occupied an exceptionally good position to obtain an inside view of Chinese politics during the Marshall mission period. A member of *Time* magazine's Washington staff, he was nominated by Marshall to help the Nationalists in their public relations with the United States, and in April 1946 arrived in China to assume his duties as advisor to the National Government. His book is composed of extensive extracts from the diary he kept, accompanied by a brief running commentary of this later day.

Beal developed wide contacts with the American press corps (one of his prime targets). He also had frequent and close contacts with Marshall and U.S. Ambassador J. Leighton Stuart, and naturally with many Nationalist officials, from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on down. To a lesser degree, he met also with Communist leaders—and especially with Chou En-lai.

Some of the public figures come alive for the reader. The picture of Marshall is set forth clearly, as is that of Ch'en Li-fu, moving spirit (together with his brother Kuo-fu) of the powerful—and ultra-conservative—C-C Clique. Maverick Nationalist Premier T. V. Soong is made plainly visible as the man charged primarily with holding the economic situation together while others maneuvered in politics and war, only to be forced finally to resign the hopeless task. Beal in general sketches a sympathetic portrait of "Gimo" Chiang Kai-shek, but hard edges show: Chiang is depicted as confident that the Nationalists could defeat the Communists militarily in short order. And the Chinese leader expected of Beal something other than the latter had bargained for: "The Generalissimo was asking me, in effect, to devise ways of convincing Truman, Marshall, and the American people that the U.S. policy of truce and coalition was helping prolong the economic deterioration of China and was helping the Communists" (p. 121).

There is discovered, in Beal's account, much that gives added insights into the political developments of that critical year when it was be-

ing decided whether China should settle its problem of apportionment of political power by negotiation, or by the sword. But Beal's scanty 1970 commentary does not provide adequate context for many of the events recorded in his 1946–47 diary, itself Nanking-Shanghai oriented. Despite frequent passing references to the critical economic situation and to the Nationalist-Communist confrontation, the reader is given no comprehensive picture of the political maladministration and popular misery which were alike fostering a spirit of rebellion, and no precise appreciation of the balance of political and military forces between the Nationalist regime and its Opposition. Beal also neglects to give certain background data important for an understanding of his account of the Marshall mission as such. To derive full meaning from the account, in short, the reader requires an initial acquaintance with the Chinese history of the period.

One of the chief impressions left in the reader's mind is that of the extreme complexity of the postwar situation in China, and of the uncertainties involved in the clash of forces. There were the deep suspicions entertained (with reason) by the Nationalists and Communists for each other, and the rapid deterioration of the economic situation. Finally, there were the serious political and military miscalculations on the part of the Nationalists.

Oddly enough, Beal reverts in the end, for all of the Chinese intricacies he had viewed and recorded, to an old simplistic theme. As if the U.S. aid to the Nationalist regime had not totalled \$1.5 billion in Lend-Lease and credits prior to V-J Day, plus new grants, credits, deliveries of vast quantities of "surplus" war materials, and \$474 million as our share of the \$658.4 million in UNRRA aid, in the postwar period, he suggests in vague phraseology that, had the United States "backed Chiang" at the critical juncture, this "might have resulted in a friendly China as far north as the Yellow River instead of a mainland overrun by implacably hostile foes" (p. 365). Ambassador Robert D. Murphy in his introduction to the volume would seem to give a more discerning judgment in his observation that "The sad fact is that the civil war in China was beyond the control of the United States" (p. xviii).

O. EDMUND CLUBB

New York, N.Y.

Muslim Brotherhoods and Politics in Senegal.

By Lucy C. Behrman. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 180 + 34 pp. Index. \$7.25.)

In 1913 the great hold man (*marabout*) Saad Bu was forced to abandon his regular

alms-collecting tour of Senegal when he grew so fat that he could no longer fit through the door of the railway compartment on his departure from St. Louis. This is perhaps a good caricature image of economic motivation among the *marabouts* of the Islamic brotherhoods (*tarīqas*) who control the spiritual allegiance of the great majority of Senegalese Muslims (some 4/5 of Senegal's total population). The most important *marabouts* are wealthy men, deriving the bulk of their revenue (directly or indirectly) from the proceeds of peanut cultivation, and conspicuous display of this wealth affords them great social prestige in a country where *per capita* income averages some \$80. Under colonial rule they grew powerful as informal agents of French authority, and in more recent times (since 1945) they have further buttressed their position in acting as grand electors for the dominant political parties.

A number of scholarly studies over the years have been devoted to the Senegalese Muslim leadership, but this is the first systematic attempt to deal with the *marabouts'* activities and influence in Senegalese national politics. The author has drawn on the substantial documentation already published in French, on the local archives for the colonial period, and has also interviewed many of the leading contemporary figures—including members of each of the three dominant local brotherhoods (Qādiriyya, Tijāniyya, and Mourides). These various sources contribute to a detailed, factually accurate, and fluently written account of the political role of the *marabouts* under colonial rule and since independence.

The author's findings, in general terms at least, serve to confirm established views on the subject, notably the view proposed in earlier articles by William Foltz (see his "Senegal" in Coleman and Rosberg, *Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa*, 1964). The Muslim leaders are influential, their views must be taken into account by national politicians (especially on decisions affecting the rural world) but there are definite limits to their power. They are not directly involved in the governmental process to any significant extent, and the wealth and power of the governing bureaucracy leave them in a dependent relation similar to that of colonial rule. But they do retain a direct access to their peasant clientèles which local government organizations do not enjoy, and their influence is important in promoting a cooperative attitude to the national government. The exercise of maraboutic influence in this manner is of course financially rewarding: loans, subsidies, development projects, flow freely enough to the great Muslim leaders.

Beyond this general treatment, Dr. Behrman does provide some valuable information on a number of more detailed points. Her treatment of the great Tijāni notable Ibrahima Niasse is of particular interest, notably her revelations of the connection established between Niasse and Kwame Nkrumah. Niasse's entourage apparently claim that Nkrumah became a disciple (*talibé*) while President of Ghana, and it is at least clear that Niasse's Muslim magical resources were deployed on Nkrumah's behalf—not, it would seem, to wholly adequate effect! Among other topics of interest is that of the Muslim reform movements in Senegal, which have tried with little success to encourage the development of Islamic education, and some of which have frontally attacked the *marabouts* as an obscurantist clergy battering on popular ignorance.

The author concentrates on the relation of the Muslim leaders to the Senegalese political elite, and does also treat of the relations among the various *marabouts*, but she does not investigate the question of the *marabouts'* relation to their followers in any detail. Such an omission is significant, for the author tends to assume that this relationship is characteristically one of deference and fidelity. Recent research, notably that of a French multi-disciplinary team sponsored by the Office de la Recherche Scientifique et Technique Outre-Mer (unavailable at the time of writing to Dr. Behrman), indicates that the relationship of the *talibé* to his *marabout* is much more complex and ambiguous than outsiders had previously assumed. The subservience of the disciple, notably, now appears as very much more a matter of formal appearance than of concrete social action—and this even in the case of those Muslims most renowned for their deference to maraboutic authority. Such a finding of course suggests the need for a revised approach to the question of the *marabouts'* political influence in Senegal.

The lack of any independent investigation of the leader-follower relationship (admittedly a time-consuming project, perhaps excluded by material research considerations) leads to a rather doubtful treatment of the *marabouts* as a "traditional" force—at one point they are misleadingly identified as "feudal lords" (p. 104). They emerge as an elite group sharply contrasted with the national politicians, who are seen as modern and modernizing. This contrast seems to take the Senegalese government view too readily at face value, and it does not help in understanding the very significant independent response of the *marabouts* to various aspects of modernization.

A final comment. It is a great pity that this important work, which is a valuable addition to the growing scholarly literature on Senegal, should be marred for the reader by an appalling printer's production. The sustained use of an unaligned margin seems more suitable to epic poetry than to a monograph of this type, and the occasional purposeless insertions of sections of boldface type are unforgivable in a reputable publishing house.

DONAL CRUISE O'BRIEN

University of London

Islam in Egypt Today: Social and Political Aspects of Popular Religion. By Morroe Berger. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970. Pp. 138. \$6.95.)

Whereas many Americans and Britishers have taken a lively interest in the politico-economic career of contemporary Egypt, the role of Islam in the nation's affairs remains largely terra incognita. Morroe Berger, sociologist and Near Eastern expert, has undertaken to lift the veil of mystery from at least the social and political aspects of Egyptian religion. His procedure has been largely empirical. He has spent sufficient time in Egypt not only to gain access to pertinent governmental and private statistical data and reports. He has made the personal acquaintance of officials and citizens from various walks of life who have helped him interpret and evaluate these documents and data. What is most important, though he dedicates his book "To the People of Egypt," his sincere affection for the land and its inhabitants has not converted him into a sycophant of the government.

The dominant theme running through this investigation is the ever-increasing encroachment of the state in all spheres of religious life and the progressive elimination of religious action as a potentially independent countervailing force. A case in point is the status of the mosque. Long vested with governmental functions under a succession of diverse regimes, the mosque nonetheless persisted as the jealous guardian of self-directed local activities. A key instrumentality for this purpose has been the waqf, the special private fund of the pious "which confers the right to use the fruits of property without transferring ownership." The governmental Ministry of Waqfs sets up certification requirements for the principal mosque functionaries; inspects to determine whether these functionaries and their assistants discharge their duties; straight-jackets the investment practices of the waqfs; determines the distribution of mosques throughout the country; finances their repair, construction and sanitation

when deemed necessary; and directly administers so-called "governmental" mosques.

The military regime engineered the strategy of both eroding mosque power and circumscribing what power remained. In addition to the controls instituted as already outlined, it accomplished its objectives by adopting two other policies. The first placed Al-Azhar University, the seminary training imams and muezzins, completely under the government tutelage. The second set up the politically oriented Council for Islamic Affairs. Regarding the mosques themselves, although the government has sought to improve their operation, it has followed the incongruous procedure of annexing precisely the *best* of the private mosques. What lay behind this is cogently explained by Berger: "... the military regime . . . has sought to induce the masses to see beyond religion or to see religion . . . as the regime would like to use it: to buttress nationalism, socialism and one-party 'popular democracy'."

The voluntary benevolent societies have fallen victim to similar heavy-handed regulation with respect to disclosure of membership lists and finances, and supervision of officers and organizational activities. These societies (though religiously based in keeping with the Islamic exhortation to give alms) are actually multi-purpose welfare agencies. They *do* sponsor such religious services as instructing children in the memorization of the Koran, funding adult lectureships on religious topics, establishing nursery schools whose programs include religious indoctrination, publishing religious magazines, etc. However, they have also fostered health care, established clinics, founded girls vocational schools, and promoted recreation. The Ministry of Social Affairs has sought to raise the level of welfare services rendered by the societies, and has subsidized pay increases for employees. Berger questions whether the constraints introduced, including in some instances direct transfer of administration of clinics to the government, did not serve to weaken the religious impulse. The government tended to play up over-all planning, and declared that autonomy of beneficence is irresponsible and must be curbed in the interest of a total national conception.

Towards sufism, another major interest of the author, the state exhibits a basic ambivalence. Insofar as these religious orders extol poverty, they assuage the discontent arising from the state's inability to eliminate the penury of the Egyptian masses. On the other hand, the socio-economic austerity favored by the regime is to be accompanied by heightened pro-

ductivity (leading to capital formation earmarked for social overhead rather than private consumption) whereas sufi asceticism is *economically* counter-productive. Furthermore, the Egyptian dictatorship feels politically skittish in the presence of activities fenced off from governmental inquisition. Berger, in accounting for the survival of sufism in an age of increasing secularization, is persuaded by the hypothesis "that social stress and a strong authoritarian trend have sent people searching for relief in those few corners of social life where self-direction, trust and intimacy are still possible."

A panoramic theory that Berger entertains posits an historic tension between Islamic voluntarism and Near Eastern despotism. It is as if inherent tendencies in Islam to induce free religious association are nullified by the centralizing absolutistic forces within the political apparatus characterizing the region. This is indeed an intriguing notion, but too many variables involved would have to be sorted out and identified in subjecting this thesis to historical confirmation. Be that as it may, the point at issue is that no inner inexorability drives the Islamic faith to eventuate in an anti-democratic political order.

Berger dismisses secularism as a major threat to religious survival in Egypt. As he puts it, "the avowedly secular holders of power are themselves unwilling to be fully secular. . . . Controlling all the nation's institutions, it is they who connect religion with politics by using it in domestic and international affairs. . . . In some cases the regime . . . associates itself with religious organization and sentiment. . . . In other cases, as in that of the voluntary associations, the government takes pains to minimize their religious basis and to put them to other ideological uses."

In his opening chapter, Berger undertakes to provide "information about several aspects of religious behavior and organization in Egypt today." There is no question about his having fulfilled his second intention. With respect to the first, we are offered little penetration into the meaning dimension of religious expression. What does it mean to be a worshipper or a member of a religious fellowship in an experiential sense? How does one decide in a secularist world that he will become an imam or muezzin, and how is his life (and that of his kin) altered "behaviorally" once the decision is made? What impact upon the *religious* behavior of the Egyptian youth studying in the West does contact with *religious* Christians produce? What changes in the nature and quality of religious life occur with urbanization, occupational

specialization, feminist "intrusion," etc.? How does Egyptian Islam conduct itself in international relations with Soviet and sub-Saharan Islam? What are the socio-political objectives of the Moslem Brotherhood? Is there any interfaith dialogue with Copts, Jews, and other minorities? It is disappointing that Berger, sociologically trained and so at home in Egyptian society, has cast but little light on these larger religious issues.

The author writes clearly and authoritatively, especially when offering interpretive generalization. Organizationally, his book is marred in that he decided to incorporate tables and sundry details into the text proper. It would have been much less distracting to the reader to have had this data relegated to an appendix or to the close of each chapter. At times, the clutter overwhelms. Apparently, Berger is anxious to demonstrate that he *did* make every effort to comb available documents in an area where data are notoriously scant. Whatever its limitations, the study is very useful in helping to delineate significant aspects of contemporary Egyptian society.

ELMER N. LEAR

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Power and Society in Contemporary Peru. By Francois Bourricaud. Translated by Paul Stevenson. (New York: Praeger, 1970. Pp. 356. \$11.00.)

This book offers an excellent picture of Peru's social and political environment before the fall of Belaúnde's government and the takeover by a nationalist-populist military regime in October, 1968. In fact, the situation so ably described in *Power and Society in Contemporary Peru* goes far to explain why the civilian political system fell to pieces and the military found itself almost forced into taking control. Conditions in the country have shifted markedly since 1968, so some of the material included in the present study may be slightly dated, but as a whole the book provides a useful foundation upon which to construct any investigation of the emerging pattern of change.

Not all political scientists will like M. Bourricaud's book, for he uses materials and approaches which the "strict constructionist" behaviorist might disdain. Rather than a highly structured and mechanistically analytical research design replete with long tables of statistics, we find a freewheeling and rather subjective work. For example, many of the social and political situations described in the book are illustrated by quotations from or paraphrases of novels. And the various broad currents of na-

tional attitudes are expressed through citation of newspapers which act as their spokesmen—*El Comercio* for the old style and traditional landed interests, *La Prensa* for the newer large scale commercial agriculture and incipient industrial interests, and *La Tribuna* for the Aprista reform political movement.

For my part, I found M. Bourricaud's blending of systematic data where available and imaginative interpretation based on fiction and semi-fiction, whether in novels or on newspaper pages, an effective way of presenting a highly complex and unintegrated set of conditions. No investigator who has worked in Peru for any length of time, and particularly outside the capital city, is apt to fall under the spell of statistics, especially the sort produced to order by government agencies and planning units. The available information simply is not sufficiently complete or accurate. Moreover, in a state made up of regions as wildly divergent as Peru's, aggregate data often hide the real facts for a specific section of the country. On balance, I think I prefer M. Bourricaud's subjective and informed intuitive approach as offering a genuine sense of Peruvian conditions in the mid-1960's.

All this is not to suggest that *Power and Society in Contemporary Peru* does not include factual material or supply a systematic discussion of social and political factors, for it does. The author has divided his work into three broad sections, each containing several chapters. The first part, "Modernization in a Dualistic Society," discusses the oligarchies, the middle class, and the "have nots." The second, "What is to be Done?" considers the several political movements, and the third section, "The Rules of the Game," describes political maneuvering during and after the 1962 and 1963 presidential elections, almost up to the 1968 military *golpe*. As I suggested at the opening of this review, the combination of factors found in all three portions of the study goes far to demonstrate why civilian government in Peru broke down.

Speaking generally, this is an excellent book, one that could profitably have been translated from the original French earlier. The translation itself is good, though obviously by an Englishman rather than a North American. The use of a few unfamiliar terms is a bit confusing—"blacklegs" for strikebreakers, for example. And I found irritating a frequent repetition of "half caste" for *mestizo*. The pejorative tone is not present in the original Spanish meaning of the term. Finally, the index is not quite as inclusive as one might wish. But these minor technical matters do not detract from the real

substantive contribution of the study. M. Borri-caud knows Peru, and has done a first class job of presenting it to the reader. Even if I had my doubts on this matter, and I do not, the Peruvians themselves do not. Despite an objective and not always flattering discussion of the country's politics in general and of his Acción Popular party in particular, President Belaúnde decorated the author. I believe this recognition was well merited.

ROBERT E. SCOTT

University of Illinois

Refugees South of the Sahara, An African Dilemma. By Hugh C. Brooks and Yassin El-Ayouty, Editors. (Westport, Conn.: Negro Universities Press, 1970. Pp. 307. \$13.00.)

Independent Africa may be able to skip some of the distressing stages of development through which western political systems have gone, but currently it is producing one of the seemingly standard problems of the older states—that of refugees. Possibly more than 1,000,000 Africans are now involuntary exiles, seeking new homes, jobs or political loyalties. This volume tackles many of the issues surrounding refugee problems in sub-Saharan Africa, giving almost too many approaches, too many materials. If trying to do too much is a weakness, it is also the strength of the book for nowhere else can be found such a useful collection.

The size and scope of the refugee streams in the continent are given careful attention. Thus, to note some of the major ones, Uganda has 68,000 from Rwanda, 40,000 from the Sudan and 20,000 from the Congo. The Congo has at least 300,000 from Angola. Senegal 60,000 from Portuguese Guinea. Burundi has 54,000 from Rwanda. Malawi has 20,000 from Mozambique. Tanzania has 10,000 from the Congo, 13,500 from Rwanda, 19,000 from Mozambique. Dahomey has 16,000 from Niger. And so it goes—and the book does not list Nigeria. Seventy percent of the total of 1,000,000 are in the Congo or Uganda. Most are fleeing tribal or ethnic persecution and are not political refugees. Even with these figures, each month seems to bring news of new movements within or across borders.

The volume stems from a conference held at St. John's University in November, 1967. Sixteen major papers by men with experience in African refugee matters are the core of the work. Eight of these are followed by (sometimes very sharp) comments of equally qualified observers. The net result is, of course, uneven.

The historical causes of African refugee

movements are dealt with by John Hatch. Emphasis on internal refugee movements as well as across-the-border movements is included. Black fleeing black, black fleeing white—apartheid, tribalism or the flight from political opponents are dealt with as factors of the complicated problem. Legal aspects are handled thoroughly by Oscar Schacter of UNITAR. Colonial boundaries as causes are discussed by Thomas Hovet, Jr. David Scanlon discusses the educational and training requirements presented to host countries by large refugee groups, as well as the opportunities represented by the influx of people frequently with needed skills. In the papers, comments and evaluations concerning political development, colonial legacies, nationalism, and cultural conflicts all go far beyond the refugee problems themselves. Or, perhaps it is better said, the refugee problems are used to reflect on the efforts of Africans to establish satisfying political institutions and practices.

Six case studies bring into sharp focus individual problems. The one on the flood of refugees from the Sudan is discussed from a Sudanese government point of view, to be sharply attacked by a commentator. The refugees from Portuguese Guinea (Guinea-Bissau) are described as bettering their standard of living. The flight from South Africa is analyzed by a calm appraisal of the late Z. K. Matthews stressing efforts to bring international pressures against the governments of Rhodesia, South Africa and Portugal. B. V. Mtshali of the University of Zambia indicates that the refugee problem stemming from the application of *apartheid* in South West Africa will have to be solved, ultimately, by military cooperation between the various liberation movements. Chapters on the refugees from and within the Congo, and from French Somaliland both stress the need for effective regional (OAU) and general (UN) organizational solutions to these most difficult problems.

A strong statement from the Agan Khan, U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, stresses the role of legal protector fulfilled by his office, although it also operates refugee camps in several countries. Statistical tables and maps in the appendix show the extent of the UNHCR's field operations. A chapter outlining U.S. aid to refugee programs notes support to the UNHCR's activities, educational aid and food surpluses. Although the total is not impressive, the chapter is a reminder that even humanitarian intervention into the affairs of sovereign nations is subject to suspicion.

One of the unusual features of the book is the printing of all major texts of international agreements relating to African refugees. Thus

we have the 1951 U. N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (not yet acceded to by the U.S.); its important 1966 Protocol; the recommendations of the OAU's Conference on the Legal, Economic, and Social Aspects of the Problem of Refugees in Africa, 1968. A list of all the NGOs participating in UNHCR programs and a good index complete the work.

The answer to any refugee problem is, of course, to make certain it does not arise. The dilemma in the title is never faced squarely. Neither this book nor, to date, have African governments produced any adequate solutions to the vast human suffering of the refugee in that continent—no more than Europeans or Asians have produced solutions for their problems. However could it be, as one of the writers suggests, that in the African tradition of hospitality, in new-found strength of the OAU and the common interests of all African governments, Africa might find formulas for mitigating refugee suffering and, some day, show the rest of the world, a refugee-free continent? This book properly promotes knowledge and concern for this universal problem.

CHANNING B. RICHARDSON

Hamilton College

The Government and Politics of Ireland. By

Basil Chubb (with a Historical Introduction by David Thornley). (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970. Pp. 364. \$10.00.)

The political, economic, and social development of Ireland has long been a subject of interest to foreign commentators. Warner Moss' *Political Parties in the Irish Free State*, published in 1933, is very possibly the first systematic effort by an American political scientist to describe the party structure and system of a political unit. *Family and Community in Ireland* by Conrad M. Arensberg and Solon T. Kimball, first published in 1940 and reissued in revised form in 1968, represents one of the earliest efforts to apply the techniques of cultural anthropology to the study of the social institutions of a literate people. Nor have Americans been the only foreign observers to display such an interest in things Irish; the German Leo Kohn's *The Constitution of the Irish Free State* (1932) remains the classic study of independent Ireland's first constitution while Erhard Rumpf's *Nationalismus und Sozialismus in Irland: Historischsoziologischer Versuch über die irische Revolution seit 1918* (1959) provides the most thorough elucidation of Irish electoral patterns.

Even the general treatises on Irish government have been written first by outsiders and

Raouel de Warren's *L'Irlande et Ses Institutions Politiques* (1928) was replaced in 1934 not with an Irish but with a British work: Nicholas Mansergh's fine *The Irish Free State: Its Government and Politics*. Despite the great changes in both Irish society and Irish government since, no work has been available to replace Mansergh's until now; it has been at last provided in an excellent and extensive work by Basil Chubb, Professor of Political Science at Trinity College, Dublin, the first volume to appear in the general series on "The Politics of the Smaller European Democracies" edited by Hans Daalder, Robert A. Dahl, Val R. Lorwin, and Stein Rokkan.

It is difficult to criticize a book of such value, particularly when it is presented with such modesty and sincerity by a scholar of courtesy and ability. In his preface Chubb notes that he has written the book "primarily for students of Irish politics—for my students, in fact, and others like them" (p. v) and he concludes with an invitation to correct "errors and omissions," promising all comers that "if the work should hereafter be reprinted, due attention shall be paid to such corrections." (p. vi) Since, however, interest in the book may—and should—extend to an audience wider than this it is important to note what the book is and what it is not.

I would suggest three particular aspects of the study of comparative politics to which the book adds something of greater or lesser value. In the first place our general lack of knowledge of the functioning of the Irish political system has excluded one interesting case from comparative analysis. In some ways the case simply confirms, or at least adds weight to, existing generalizations about the operations of parliamentary systems on the Westminster model; in other instances the Irish system is unique or at least unusual as in its use of the single, transferable vote, of a (largely non-functioning) system of vocational representation in its Senate, or of a judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation. Here the book makes its strongest contribution. Although the organization of the book is generally quite conventional—with successive chapters on the constitution, political parties, interest groups, mass media, elections, Cabinet, legislature, central administration, state corporations, and local government making up the bulk of the book—it is rich in detail and heavily reinforced with tabular material. (Surely others besides myself, however, must be struck by the fact that prevailing trends call for big books on little countries and little books on big countries.)

Since these institutions date either from the creation of the Irish state out of the Anglo/Irish war of 1919–1921 or were subjected to modification at that time (or, if unmodified, are interesting precisely for that reason), a second utility of the Irish case lies in the opportunity to study the processes of institution-building within a new nation, unlike the newest nations of Africa and Asia in many respects, but like them in terms of some of the problems faced. Here the book is valuable, but less satisfactory. Its subject-matter organization pulls apart the separate strands of change and blurs much sense of the onward thrust of political development, but its comprehensiveness provides nonetheless materials that can be quarried and put to other uses.

But still a third application of Irish data to comparative political analysis can be visualized, for before the process of institution-building in a new nation came the process of nation-building in what was for political purposes a colonial dependency of Great Britain, and an understanding of the Irish experience can contribute to our insight into political modernization, political development, or whatever we choose to call it. And here the contribution of the book is curiously mixed. Persuaded of his own deficiencies as an historian, Chubb has prefaced his book with a brilliantly brief "Historical Introduction" by David Thornley, at once his colleague at TCD and a Labour member of the Irish parliament, *Dail Eireann*. Although not cast in the mould of the jargon of political development these 42 pages must be of great advantage to any student of the topic. Rather oddly, however, they come to conclusions at times directly contradictory to Chubb's and we are told, for example, by Chubb that "as the franchise was extended in Britain, so, too, in Ireland" (p. 45) while Thornley—more accurately, be it said—reports that "None of the English franchise reform acts passed between 1832 and 1884 was extended to Ireland without substantial dilution" (p. 31). Chubb asserts that "from O'Connell to Parnell and beyond, the political experience of most Irish leaders was gained in British political life, and they practiced the parliamentary ways of Westminster," (p. 45), a conclusion difficult to match with Thornley's references to the activities of Young Ireland, Fenians, and Land Leaguers, to say nothing of the members of the Irish Republican Brotherhood who organized the 1916 Rising.

More serious by far, however, is the strange deterioration in the quality of Thornley's account as he reaches within the last few pages

the more recent events of Irish political history. In bald, unqualified assertions he states conclusions that range somewhere between arguable and untrue. During the Anglo/Irish War "the Dail was never wholly happy about the war, which it did not officially endorse until March 1921" (p. 40); leaving aside the question whether any legislative assembly is ever "wholly happy" about anything, there is good reason to believe the parliamentarians were more unhappy with the conduct of the war in 1921 when they endorsed it than they had been before when they did not, while the outcome of the Treaty debate in the Dail at the end of the year must make clear the strength of the war party. King George V's speech in June, 1921, is described as "the appropriate regal cue for the inevitable negotiations" but other accounts suggest the British Cabinet was at the time preparing an escalation of the fighting, a decision defeated by the successful use of royal initiative. In the peace negotiations that followed "the Irish delegation allowed itself to be outmaneuvered both in its own cabinet and at the conference table" (p. 41); perhaps, or perhaps it is only that the Irish delegates were—in Michael Collins' magnificent phrase—"always loyal to the facts." The Treaty agreement itself "scarcely improved upon the Home Rule Bill of July 1916 sufficiently to justify the blood that had been shed since" (p. 41); since there never was a Home Rule Act of 1916 the comparison must be an exercise in imagination.

One last example may be cited: "To the bulk of the Irish Catholic Hierarchy the evangelization of England took precedence, by 1900, over the gaining of Irish independence" (pp. 41–42). As a result "the politically inactive majority" were "cowed by the antirevolutionary strictures of an authoritarian Church." Evidence? "Only one bishop could be found to offer even a qualified defense of the men of 1916" (p. 42). As Father Thomas O. Fiach has demonstrated the story is vastly more complex than this, and Thornley's bald statement is hard to square with the "nearly two hundred priests" who marched in Thomas Ashe's funeral procession; the eight bishops in attendance at the funeral of Cork's heroic lord-mayor, Terence MacSwiney, dead after seventy-five days of hunger strike; or with Archbishop William Walsh of Dublin, who appeared at the polls only once during his episcopal tenure—to vote for Sinn Féin in 1918.

The book is an excellent one. The contributions of both Chubb and Thornley offer much that is of interest and much that is of value to the student of comparative politics. But it is

necessary to be frank. This is not the book that would be written by two authors more impressed with the vision of an Irish Ireland and less convinced that the concern of the Irish people and their political leaders with "the problem of the six Ulster counties" still under British rule constitutes their "irredentist obsession."

FRANK J. MUNGER

University of Florida

Sukarno and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence. By Bernhard Dahm. (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1969. Pp. 374. \$15.00.)

The late President Sukarno of Indonesia was about as multi-faceted and full-blooded a political figure as any who strutted and fretted upon a national and international stage in recent political history. To anyone familiar with his many masks and multiple roles, he would seem to defy simplistic treatment by any serious biographer, even one who has confined himself to the period preceding Indonesia's declaration of independence. It is therefore startling and disappointing to find that Dr. Dahm has succeeded in producing a somewhat single-dimensional and anemic study of Sukarno.

In fairness to the author, it should be noted that this work is primarily devoted to Sukarno's political thought and does make some real contributions to an understanding of Sukarno, the ideologist. In the first place, Dahm has performed a valuable service in making available to those who do not read Indonesian or Dutch the major ideas embodied in Sukarno's many early speeches and articles. To the best of my knowledge, a compilation of these in English translation has not yet been released for public distribution. More important is the author's emphasis on and evidence for the continuity of Sukarno's ideological orientations throughout his long political career. Dahm demonstrates that, contrary to the popular myth of the progressive radicalization of Sukarno in later years, he espoused essentially the same goals and views in his earlier career that he propounded later, principally: (1) the attempt at syncretic unification of nationalism, Marxism, and Islam; (2) an aversion to Western modes of decision by majority vote; (3) the institutionalization on the national level of traditional village-based procedures of decision through prolonged joint deliberation, compromise and eventual consensus; and (4) some form of democratic centralism. Finally, Dahm amply documents what has been known or suspected by most scholars of Indonesian politics, that

Sukarno's originality was not in his ideas but in the uses he made of them. He not only borrowed plentifully, but frequently misquoted or transposed the ideas of the authorities from whom he borrowed to suit his own objectives.

Had the author confined himself solely to intellectual biography and provided more penetrating and sustained analyses of Sukarno's ideas and their origins than he does, this might have been a more satisfactory work. However, he also attempts to utilize two Javanese cultural myths as partial explanation for Sukarno's mission and its appeals and he tries briefly to contrast the beliefs and behavior of other Indonesian nationalists during this period with those of Sukarno. Oversimplification and distorting dichotomies mar both these enterprises.

Despite Sukarno's selective and successful invocation of traditional myths and despite the predilection of Indonesians for trying to fit contemporary events within the framework of their mythology, Dahm's use of myth is somewhat misleading. Thus, he employs the *Bharatayuddha*, the legendary war between the Pendawas and the Kaurawas, as a symbolic superstructure and recurrent leitmotif for the anti-colonial struggle, going so far as frequently to substitute the terms "Pendawas" and "Kaurawas" for "Indonesians" and "Dutch" in his own account of developments. However, in the Indonesian context the Pendawas and Kaurawas are considered to be linked together as "insiders" within the same cultural system. Indeed, the Javanese are wont to associate their historical wars of succession and, more recently, the civil war of 1958 to the Pendawa-Kaurawa conflict. It is therefore strange to assume, as Dahm does, that this myth influenced and symbolized the Indonesian desire "to remove from the native order the intruder who would not fit into it." As the works of Berg, Geertz and Anderson indicate, Javanese mythology is complex, and correct attribution of symbolic meaning calls for considerable sophistication.

It is true that there are subcultural differences in Indonesia and that some Sumatran cultures tend to be more oriented to economic activity and legalism than is the Javanese subculture with its emphasis on psychological well-being and aesthetic values. However, there is some naivete about Dahm's characterization of Sukarno's Sumatran rivals, e.g. Sjahrir, Hatta, as European and analytical in contrast to his portrayal of Sukarno as an irrational, unanalytical Javanese. One is reminded of Dutch businessmen and journalists who similarly classified Indonesians into two categories, those "almost European" and "rational" (i.e. those with

whom they had little difficulty in communicating) and those they found "native" and "mythic" (i.e. those with whom they had difficulty in arriving at common agreement). This facile dichotomy falls short of the author's purpose of explaining Sukarno's popular appeal and his failure to unify the nationalist movement. It neither accounts for Sukarno's appeal to non-Javanese nor the opposition to him among some Javanese nationalists.

This reviewer was also disturbed by a number of internal inconsistencies in this book. Dahm writes of the "universal desire for independence" (pp. 9, 285), which was certainly far from universal, while elsewhere referring to the nationalists' discouragement at the widespread disinterest in their cause (p. 255). He takes issue with Kahin's statement that Sukarno's speeches contained innuendoes understandable only to Javanese and not to the Japanese occupiers (p. 281), after having made the same point himself and provided an example (pp. 267-268). His attacks on Benda's interpretations of cleavages during the Japanese occupation are vitiated by the evidence he himself provides for such cleavages. His zeal for portraying Sukarno as a unifier leads him to occasional confusions between achievement and aspiration, as when he refers to Sukarno as "the magician of unity" on the same page as he discusses the splits in the nationalist movement (p. 128).

This study illustrates the shortcomings of attempting to write a political biography solely from limited documentary sources and of attempting explanations couched in cultural terms without personal immersion in the culture of the country of the subject. If Dr. Dahm is engaged in a sequel to this work, one hopes that he will spend considerable time in Indonesia, interviewing in depth the associates and opponents of Sukarno.

ANN RUTH WILLNER

University of Kansas

Russia, China, and The West. By Isaac Deutscher. (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1970. Pp. 360. \$7.00.)

Remarking on the differing verdicts on the Russian revolution, Leo Labedz once said that the ultimate division is between the optimists and the pessimists. Isaac Deutscher, the brilliant biographer of Trotsky and Stalin, was until his untimely death one of the incorrigible optimists.

How could it have been otherwise? While Deutscher, like his intellectual hero, Trotsky, was merciless in his criticism of Stalin and Stal-

inism, he never doubted, as he wrote in the postscript of his third volume on Trotsky, that "after Soviet Society had progressed towards socialism, 'Stalinism' would be seen as merely 'an episodic relapse'" on the road to a truly humane socialist society. To believe otherwise, he went on, to believe that all the Bolsheviks aimed at "was no more than a *fata morgana*, that the revolution merely substituted one kind of exploitation and oppression for another, and could not do otherwise" would mean that Trotsky would appear as the "high priest of a god that was bound to fail, as Utopia's servant mortally entangled in his dreams and illusions." Deutscher steadfastly refused to accept this pessimistic judgment. His Marxist view of history convinced him that social forces set loose inside Russia as a result of the revolution would sooner or later "erode Stalinism from the inside" and rid Russia of "bureaucratic despotism."

The major difficulty with this interpretation of Soviet development is not that it is necessarily wrong. The evidence is not yet all in. The difficulty is that in adhering to this view, Deutscher never came to grips with the more penetrating Marxist analyses of Stanislaw Ossowski who, along with Djilas, Aron and others suggested that political power had become so important in all the Soviet countries that the political elite was able to dominate society rather than being itself a product of that society. Deutscher never updated his Marxism to take account of a "socialist" polity in which social forces have only marginal impact on an entrenched bureaucratic elite.

Instead he remained to the end torn between faith in the ultimate outcome of the Soviet experiment and despair over immediate reality. Thus, in characterizing the last decade of post-Stalinist reforms in the collection of his syndicated articles under review, Deutscher's judgment was as harsh as those of many non-Marxist observers of the Soviet scene.

The bureaucracy has been unable to free the country from the absurdities and rigidities of its method of government. Its rule, though preferable to Stalin's autocracy, is still misrule. It is immensely wasteful; and it deadens or weakens all progressive impulses within the social organism.

More than ever, he went on, the Soviet Union needs "at every level of its existence, political freedom, the freedom of expression and association, the freedom for citizens to criticize the powers that be..." Otherwise, "all talk about 'socialism and the transition to communism' is empty and hypocritical chatter."

At the same time, Deutscher seldom expressed much confidence that the Brezhnev's of Russia were going to move in libertarian directions. And he recognized the absence of any articulate popular movement rising from below in the wake of "decades of totalitarian suppression."

That his optimism seemed grounded more on faith than on analysis was evident when he wrote in April, 1966, about the rise of the "crypto-Stalinists" at the 23rd Party Congress. In spite of his own analysis, he could still conclude that "the next five or ten years are going to bring a dramatic rejuvenation of Soviet life, something like an explosion of youth and an irruption of new age groups into national politics. . . ." The events of the past four years hardly lend much credence to such forecasts. What Deutscher calls "crypto-Stalinism" is even stronger today than it was in 1966.

If the reader can separate Deutscher the prophet from Deutscher the analyst, there is a fair amount of shrewd and incisive coverage of Soviet internal and foreign policy over the past 20 years. Yet in the end the collection is disappointing because it is not illuminated by the insight and empathy which characterized his monumental work on Trotsky, and because these articles were never intended to be published in book form. Journalism, even at its best, is no substitute for long range historical, social and political analysis. There is little of that in these pages. Finally, the book is mistitled inasmuch as it contains relatively little on China and adds little to our knowledge of Sino-Soviet relations.

DONALD S. ZAGORIA

Hunter College, CUNY

Burma. By F. S. V. Donnison. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970. 263 pp. Index and Map. \$8.00.)

By the standards of research, political and social science, this is not a scholarly book. A mixture of history derived from standard works, personal reminiscences drawn from a long career in the British Civil Service and value judgments, this is a study meant, in the main, for the ex-colonist who "knew all along that things would get worse after independence was granted." But if it is devoid of new data and in places is heavy with prejudice, it also is rich in insight and one will get the feel of Burma as it was, from a man with a good memory of the immediate past. Of particular interest to scholar and general reader alike is Donnison's chapter "Britons and Burmans." In many ways what he writes, has been written be-

fore by Orwell, Furnivall, Htin Aung and others. What is valuable here is that in a few pages he manages to suggest the differences between the two peoples and the gulf which never was bridged. Political and social scientists could use his several generalizations as points of departure for any re-study of colonialism in Burma and also as to whether or not the problems Donnison relates are unique or typical of colonial relationships between Europeans and Asians in the period before World War II.

Among the several other chapters of more than passing interest are two worthy of note, *The Economy* because it is good and *Burma and the Outside World*, because it is bad. In the former, the author analyses with skill, data, and logic the reasons for the decline of rice exports and draws several unfavourable conclusions which cannot be dismissed on the grounds of bias alone. He understands agricultural economics, and in a relatively short essay gives some of the best analysis this reviewer has seen in a long time. His conclusions follow logically from his assumptions and evidence. Most important, the problems of Burmese agriculture are not unique to that country alone. As a result the reader will get a perspective for considering questions comparatively with other countries which are also tied to a single crop.

One wishes that Donnison's discussion of foreign affairs was as good as on the economy. He limits his inquiry to China, U.S.A. and India with only a few lines allowed for other countries. Given Burma's isolation during the past nine years, one might have expected the author to look at the roots and implications of this policy with the same critical care as he did in examining agriculture. Instead he treated his topic with brevity, based mainly on the historical past and offered neither new data nor fresh analysis. In view of the fact that Burma appears to be moving away from extreme isolation, it is unfortunate that he treated this subject so poorly.

Overall, this is a useful book if one knows something about Burma. If he does not, he should read it with care and use other sources as companion pieces.

JOSEF SILVERSTEIN

Rutgers University

Student Politics in France: A Study of the Union Nationale des Etudiants de France. By A. Belden Fields. (New York: Basic Books, 1970. Pp. 198. \$7.95.)

Student groups in France, like most other interest groups, mirror the political and ideological divisions within the polity. After World

War II there was a constant struggle within the *Union Nationale des Etudiants de France* (UNEF) between advocates of political action and defenders of student "trade-unionism." In this useful monograph, Mr. Fields traces the ascendancy of the activists from 1946 to 1950, followed by the dominance of the "corporatists" from 1950 to 1956. The Algerian issue enabled the activists to regain control of UNEF, which led to serious defections among conservative and moderate students. The government withdrew its subsidy, and encouraged the formation of a rival, moderate student union. Meanwhile, the French Communist party established its own group, draining off students on the Left. The Communist student movement itself was splintered when party dropouts created Trotskyist and Maoist organizations. The result of this political factionalism and organizational rivalry was to reduce UNEF to little more than an office staff without a membership. The author concluded, as of 1967, that UNEF "is capable of little more than occupying the offices on rue Soufflot and printing and distributing tracts" (p. 60).

The author also presents a good account of the factors conducive to student activism: the low percentage of students from working class backgrounds, the harrowing attrition rate among entering students, serious overcrowding of academic facilities, lack of suitable housing, impersonal pedagogy, stylized exams, absence of seminar instruction, and shortage of employment opportunities for students in the liberal arts and social sciences.

Far less satisfactory is his attempt to elaborate a typology of student organizations. He identifies three basic types of student organizations: student-oriented, environment-oriented, and a combination of the two. After discussing the ordeal of UNEF he concludes: "... that student organizations with a high degree of autonomy from non-student hierarchies are more dependent upon a favorable external context than are interest associations composed of almost any other category of people and that, under conditions of political stability, the indulgence of decision-makers is the most important determinant of the power of such organizations" (p. 161). In a postscript added after the May Revolt, Mr. Fields defends his "theoretical propositions" by arguing that the revolt was a highly spontaneous explosion of antiregime sentiment, and therefore not the work of UNEF. The revolt, he contends, was the graphic result of the failure of student organization.

The typology, conclusions, and postscript all

illustrate the limited range of this case study. The "theoretical propositions" are murky, of dubious analytic utility, and offer only a partial view of student politics in France. There is no analysis of the anarchist element within the student movement, and little on the Trotskyist and Maoist groups. UNEF played virtually no role in the events of May 1968; but that does not mean the Revolt was "highly spontaneous." There were other groups in the field as well. "Innocence," as the author comments in another context, is "... the most blessed of all American virtues."

BERNARD E. BROWN

City University of New York (Brooklyn)

Opposition in the U.S.S.R., 1917-1967. By Roland Gaucher. Translated from the French by Charles Lam Markmann. (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1969. Pp. 547, \$10.00.)

Vlasov. By Sven Steenberg. Translated from the German by Abe Farbstein. (New York: Knopf, 1970, Pp. 231, \$7.50.)

With all the drift and change and upheavals in our own world, the Soviet experience seems to have little to say to us—much less, probably, than at any point since 1917. Nor does Western thought appear to have much to say these days about things Soviet. All this could of course change once more, and perhaps soon. Meanwhile, these books may tell us less about their subject than about where we ourselves are at.

These books strike one as dated. Both grow out of the Stalin era and Cold War anti-communism. They echo the questions and notions and torments of those by-gone days. For each author, the main goal would seem to be To Tell the West, once more, about the foul deeds of Bolshevism and the valor of its slighted native foes. While the world moves into the struggles and horrors of the 1970's, these books retell an old tale with the words and thoughts of the forties and fifties.

Both books are dated not only in spirit but intellectually. Neither of them says a word about the themes that stirred the mind in the years since. Bureaucracy, technology, mass society, mass culture, alienation, totalitarianism, convergence, pluralism, the welfare state, the warfare state, modernization, political development, The New Class, The Unfinished Revolution, industrial society, postindustrial society, futurology, postindustrial fascism—not one of these recent and current concerns of intellectuals and scholars do the authors deal with or even raise. While each cites a major contribution to thought from time to time, none of

these works have had a demonstrable effect on the approach or conclusions of the authors. That goes for significant writers of all stripes, be it Arendt or Rostow, Djilas or Deutscher, Barrington Moore or Inkeles, Solzhenitsyn or Academician Sakharov. Nor do these books grapple with the big intellectual issues raised in the years they focus on. Not only are the books dated, then; they are pedestrian through and through.

Within these stark limits, neither book is wholly bad. At least on the level of "facts," the authors, both Western European journalists, know their subject. Both chose stories worth retelling, and they do the job clearly and adequately. While neither author shows close knowledge of all the specialized research in and around his subject, each brings together sources that were previously scattered or unknown. In short, these books can serve as competent introductions.

The author of *Vlasov* served in World War II as a German liaison officer on the Eastern Front. As a Baltic German familiar with the Russian language, Mr. Steenberg evidently came in touch, at the fringes, with that strange, still disputed phenomenon of the wartime history of Germany as well as the Soviet Union, the Vlasov Movement. His book deals with the symbol and leader of that movement, a rising young Soviet general who after capture became a half-collaborator with Hitler Germany. Through extensive interviews and correspondence with surviving German and Russian emigre eyewitnesses, the author reconstructs a good deal more of the details than did earlier Western works (George Fischer, 1952; Jürgen Thorwald, 1953; Alexander Dallin, 1958).

This latest study revolves around a familiar and simple question: was Andrei A. Vlasov a traitor or a patriot? Like all of the general's wartime German and Russian supporters, Mr. Steenberg shows no doubt about his answer. To him, Vlasov was very much a patriot, an intensive Russian nationalist who at no point during his captivity made Quisling-like concessions to any of his sponsors or would-be sponsors in Hitler Germany. The author pays no heed to doubts and complications stressed in the West soon after the war, in part by this reviewer and especially by mutually diverging socialist Russian emigres (Dvinov, Kuskova, Nicolaevsky). Just as Mr. Steenberg offers new details but no new perspective on the charismatic and still enigmatic figure of Vlasov—would that an Erik Erikson or Rebecca West took on that task—the same is true of the oft-told story of German

policy. Once more, we hear of mental rigidity, of inhuman excesses, and of revealing chaos and rivalries in the decision-making process of Nazi totalitarianism. On this subject, too, students of politics will find in this book a plethora of specifics but little more than that.

If *Vlasov* deals with one historical episode, *Opposition in the U.S.S.R.* covers a far larger canvas. Step by big step, the author reviews each and every major case of internal resistance to the Soviet regime, from October 1971 to its fiftieth anniversary in 1967. The focus moves from the seizure of power to the civil war, from Kronstadt to the party struggles of the mid-twenties, from forced collectivization to the great purges and show trials. The author, a French journalist and historian, tells in brief of the wartime defections and resistance by Vlasovites and by separatist nationality groupings, notably Ukrainian and Baltic. Less fully, he sketches postwar opposition—within the party, among nationalities and religious currents, by the youth and the intellectuals. A telling chapter sums up the postwar (and post-Stalin) strikes and revolts in concentration camps, and offers some hints about what bearing this whole phenomenon might have on the future of the system and the country.

Mr. Gaucher shows much more familiarity with emigre, ex-Communist and anti-Communist writings on his subject than he does with either Soviet primary sources or specialized Western scholarship. And his book's translation into English suffers from frequent misspelling of Russian words and, still more seriously, from a failure to cite English versions of standard sources and quoting from the French versions instead. Nor, among the type of sources he favors, does he lend nearly enough credence to that unique treasure on the subject, the Mensheviks' long-lived exile monthly, *Sotsialisticheski vestnik* (Socialist Courier), and to its unsurpassed authority on internal opposition, Boris I. Nicolaevsky. This last omission leads Mr. Gaucher to slight Nicolaevsky's important research on the monarchist underground organization of the early 1920's, the "Trust" (run in fact by the Soviet secret service), on Bukharin's historic private talk with leading Mensheviks in Paris in 1935, on wartime defections, and on a host of other key developments right up to his own death in the mid-sixties. (A bibliography and biography of Nicolaevsky will appear this year in memorial volume, edited by Ladis K. D. Kristof and Alexander Rabinowitch for the Indiana University Press.)

Mr. Gaucher's book constitutes a "first,"

since no other single work tells all of that story. What conclusion does the book offer? At the very end, in all too few words, the author gives us food for thought. He points to three main spheres of resistance—"language, land, and religion." He concludes, rightly, that "In fifty years the government has been unable to gain total victory on any of these fronts. On the contrary, however slightly it slackens its grip, the 'dark forces of the past surge up again' (pp. 524-525). Yet he says nothing about how these 'dark forces of the past' relate to all the new elements in Soviet life, be they unique to that long-suffering land or common to advanced industrialism.

In the end, the dated and pedestrian nature of the books reviewed may point to a significant feature of present-day Western and especially American thought and scholarship, critical as well as mainstream. We appear to have very little to say about the Soviet experience in terms of our own concerns, here and now.

GEORGE FISCHER

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The Methodology of Comparative Research.

Edited by Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner. (New York: The Free Press. 1970. Pp. 419. \$8.95.)

This book is an outgrowth of papers presented to a graduate seminar in comparative methodology in political science at the University of Minnesota in 1966. The revised papers, prepared by distinguished scholars in several fields, are of high quality and the seminar must have been an important educational experience for the graduate students. The greatest strength of the published work is the editors' clear recognition that "methodological issues can never be resolved unless theory and methodology are clearly articulated." For this reason they have presented us with a volume addressed to the problem of the relationship between theory and research, rather than merely a handbook of techniques.

The book is not, despite the contributions of the editors, a comprehensive overview of the general field of methodology in comparative research. As one might expect in a collection of papers, various important problems are treated sketchily, introduced in divergent contexts, or even ignored. The success of the book thus depends solely on the insights of eight individual essays. Several of these, however, are very good. Four of the papers address general problems of methodology or strategy in comparative

research; two papers are addressed primarily to problems of cross-national survey research; and two papers present personal statements of theoretical stance towards macro-level conceptualizations and analysis. Most readers of the REVIEW will, of course, be familiar with the general work of David Apter and Fred Riggs, of which the latter two essays are excellent examples. Of the other contributions, LaPalombara's discussion of the strategy of middle-level institutional analysis has appeared elsewhere, and Thrupp's call for historical studies is already outdated by various studies published and in progress. But the other four papers call for some specific comment here.

The title essay by the editors, like the subsequent discussion of competing paradigms by Holt and Richardson, is a useful methodological contribution for the graduate student in comparative politics. Holt and Turner begin by discussing, too briefly, the use of specification and randomization as means by which comparative research can be used to control background factors in testing political theory. They then turn to the problem of nonculture-bound operational concepts. This short essay is helpful and suggestive, although various important problems, such as levels and boundaries of analytic units, the appropriate role of typologies, and the limits of our historical-empirical situation in testing theory are left to other essays to raise (or ignore) in an *ad hoc* fashion.

The longer Holt and Richardson discussion of competing paradigms in comparative politics, using a framework suggested by the work of Thomas Kuhn, is a stimulating critique of some general approaches to macro-theory. Kuhn's work leads the authors to examine various paradigms in terms of their conceptual richness and unity, the logic of their theoretical propositions, the rules of interpretation, and the set of implied relevant puzzles. Although one might disagree with some specific evaluations, the treatments of the work of Almond, Deutsch, Easton, Pye, and Riker, as well as the objections to abuses of factor analysis (and other forms of data-handling uncontrolled by theory), are basically fair and helpful. They will be useful in orienting graduate students to some important questions in the discipline, although the survey of possible paradigms is far from complete. I would note only that the authors underestimate the growing influence of coalition and bargaining models in comparative politics, and that in several areas works are beginning to appear which merge theory and data more successfully than implied by the examples

discussed. In the long run I suspect that exposure to successful solutions to methodological problems, even partial and provisional solutions, will have more impact than criticism of limitations.

Moving to a rather different level of analysis, the essays by Frey and Hymes are excellent introductions to cross-cultural survey research. Hymes's discussion of "Linguistic Aspects of Comparative Political Research" is particularly powerful, and should be required reading for political scientists moving outside their own region. Frederick Frey's long essay is frustrating in its unsystematic coverage of an enormous range of topics, but filled with useful insights and experiences from Frey's extensive field experience. Here the student can be exposed to problems and possible solutions in a more concrete realm. There are many sections which will interest and inform the student preparing to go into the field—or to use the field work of others. Among the best are Frey's discussion of validation difficulties, sponsorship and access problems, problems of equivalence, and the need for prior knowledge of the research site. In the course of his essay Frey touches on many of the most important general problems in comparative research. It is unfortunate that the editors did not attempt to build a more systematic bridge between the informed and tangible analysis at this level and the broader methodological concerns voiced by them earlier.

The book, like most collections of essays, is frustrating in its incompleteness and its disjointed approach. But it is a useful effort to encourage analysis of some of the fundamentals on which comparative research is built.

G. BINGHAM POWELL, JR.

The University of Rochester

Los Que Mandan. By Jose Luis de Imaz. (New York: State University of New York Press. 1970. Pp. 279. \$7.50.)

Very much like Thomas F. McGann, who translated the third edition of José Luis Romero's *Las ideas políticas en Argentina*, Carlos A. Astiz, a political scientist, with the help of Mary F. McCarthy, has performed an equally important service for the social science community interested in Argentina by editing and translating José Luis de Imaz's *Los que mandan*. Professor Astiz is eminently qualified to perform this task not only as a social scientist with noted contributions on Latin American topics but as a native of Argentina.

Los que mandan (those who rule), which probably should have been given a subtitle for its English edition like "A Study of Argentine

Political Leadership," was originally published in Buenos Aires in 1964. It was an immediate best-seller which was discussed in universities, public forums, cafes, and in the street as well as in Congress and the media. I suppose only a William H. Whyte's *The Organization Man* or C. Wright Mills' *The Power Elite* might even approach the impact which Imaz's book had on Argentines in general and *portenós* in particular. *Los que mandan* was already in its seventh edition (*edición*) by 1968.

The translation is excellent as is the occasional editing and we lose nothing that is substantive in this English edition. Most changes in the body of the text, in fact, are simply organizational and stylistic. The translator's knowledge of the Argentine political landscape is amply shown by his helpful explanatory footnotes scattered throughout the text. However, perhaps in the desire to make the book palatable to a North American political science clientele or because of publishing exigencies, the decision was made to eliminate Imaz's interesting and forthright Spanish introduction and to replace it with Astiz's more prosaic historical and political outline of Argentine institutions. Thus, minus the introduction, the English version of *Los que mandan* is a faithful rendition of Imaz's book. An additional last chapter has been appended though its findings are not integrated with the original data presented in the previous twelve chapters.

Imaz chooses to analyze Argentine political elites in five year intervals from 1936 to 1961 and then partially updates this data for the post-1966 period of military control. He deals with various elites: governmental-administrative, political, military, religious, economic, and labor. His thesis is that there is no ruling elite in Argentina but many elites who participate in ruling the country. The analysis focuses on the formal hierarchical office holders in each of these elite sectors. It discusses such leadership determinants as socio-economic and educational backgrounds, careers, and certain life styles (cultural orientation, travels, etc.) of presidents, ministers, governors, generals and colonels, archbishops and bishops, company and association boards of directors, largest landowners, political party and labor union leaders. By reading Imaz's Spanish edition we are told why he ignored legislators (impotent), the judiciary (lack of autonomy), intellectuals (inept), and agricultural cooperatives (regional as opposed to national influence).

Thus by this methodology, despite the fact that there is no measurement of comparative elite influence by determining major issue in-

volvement and/or by assessing elite effectiveness in decision-making, the reader is offered a very good socio-political and historical account of formal leadership changes over a twenty-five year period.

We are given a great deal of data and information about the evolution of types of leaders during the Conservative Era (pre-1943), the Perón Era (1943-1955), and the post-Perón Era (1956-1963). The last chapter brings into focus leadership changes from 1964 to 1968. We find, for example: Perón broke the monopoly of political notables and upper class lawyers to high governmental office. Labor, the military, and national entrepreneurial types began to make inroads into positions of power. Leadership in the post-Perón period became less traditional and charismatic (e.g. Eva Perón) and more rational. Military officer recruitment markedly shifted to the interior provinces and away from Buenos Aires under Perón. The *Sociedad Rural* represents solely and exclusively the largest Buenos Aires landowners. Diplomacy is the career for those in the upper class with no land, no law degree and no extensive financial interests. For the entrepreneurial class, economic influence has not been translated into social status. Their economic interest articulation is not cohesive since they are divided between representatives of internationally-based and native industries. The church elite differs from other Argentine elites in that they are invested with dual authority in both the religious and governmental spheres. Most indicators demonstrate that party politicians are poorly informed in public administration, social sciences, and rudimentary problem-solving techniques. The missionary, ascetic labor leader has become practically extinct since Perón introduced the trade unions to governmental bureaucratic status.

There is a plethora of this type of interesting information that can be gleaned from each chapter of *Los que mandan*. However, the significance of the Imaz book goes beyond the data to the interspersed insights that abound in it. Though his intellectual debts to Weber, Merton, Dahl, Germani and Almond are significant, one cannot fail to see that many of his propositions, first written in 1964, have been substantiated or verified since. Some examples are in order. Imaz discusses the "modern" as against the "developed" nation problem (p. 54 ff.) which was later expounded upon by Samuel Huntington in his "Political Development and Political Decay" article. There is also a discussion of the tacit civilian approval given military intervention in Argentina (p. 88 ff.) which

was later substantiated by José Nun's article on "The Middle-Class Military Coup" which has achieved cross-national implications. The author speaks of the lack of cohesion and the absence of a frame of reference among the Argentine middle-class which forces them often to adopt the ideologies, prestige symbols, and value system of the upper class (p. 167 ff.). This very notion was perhaps the principal thesis of the Lipset and Solari edited study of *Elites in Latin America*.

Imaz wrote of Argentine nationalists without a nation (p. 250 ff.) later spelled out for all Latin America by Victor Alba. The author doubts that major structural changes are likely or that any of the major dissenting groups in Argentina could impose their point of view on others, "at least not on a long term basis and in a substantial manner." (p. 253 ff.) This view of the complexity of existing social interests has been substantiated by Eldon Kenworthy's thesis in an article on the "Politics of Late Industrialization" in which he discusses the Argentine case and by Helio Jaguaribe in his book on *Economic and Political Development* which deals with Brazil. Lastly, Imaz discusses change in society as lacking total synchronization thereby allowing the ascendancy of modern groups without the destruction of all that is traditional (pp. 127 ff.). This was meaningfully verified by Charles Anderson's strongly argued thesis that Latin American societies legitimize multiple power groups with multiple power capabilities.

Though the book lacks a major theoretical explanatory underpinning and a scientifically-drawn and exhaustively developed sample of the various elite groups, its strength unquestionably lies in the author's talent for imaginatively interpreting the data he does come up with.

PETER RANIS

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Change in Communist Systems. Edited by Chalmers Johnson. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970, Pp. 368, \$8.95.)

This volume grew out of a two month Workshop on the Comparative Study of Communism, held in the summer of 1968, under the sponsorship of the American Council of Learned Societies. The Workshop addressed itself to two large, basic questions: How do Communist systems change and why? Judging by the present selection of papers, most of the participants (with the notable exception of Richard Lowenthal) rejected the concept of totalitarianism as altogether inadequate for their

purposes and many seem also to have inclined toward treating change in Communist political systems from the broader perspectives offered by comparative and/or modernization theory. At the same time, all shared the conviction that there are certain common characteristics that differentiate Communist from non-Communist political systems, even though it may be difficult, as Chalmers Johnson puts it, "to capture the core of commonality shared by the fourteen nations calling themselves Communist."

This volume does not purport to have captured that "core." Neither does it offer a single, blanket answer to the "how" and the "why" of Communist change nor subscribe to any particular methodological mode or analytical scheme. Rather, each contributor examines Communist change (or aspects of it) from a vantage point of his own choosing. With regard to the construction of a more general theory, there is little beyond certain elements of "convergence" between some of the individual contributors plus Dankwart Rustow's extremely apt summation of the problems and pit-falls of theory building in the comparative study of Communism. Yet, the diversity which characterizes the volume is not at all a defect; indeed, it must rather be accounted a virtue, making for both a wide range of valuable insights and a sense of intellectual excitement throughout.

Among several especially thought-provoking contributions, none is more stimulating than Richard Lowenthal's brilliant analysis of "Development vs. Utopia in Communist Policy." Focusing on the experience of the Soviet Union, China, and Yugoslavia, he skillfully charts the practical consequences of the tension between utopian and developmental aspects of Communist ideology in terms of three sets of conflicts: over the dualism of elites, over the use of different types of economic incentives, and over the continuation of the revolution from above. The basic dualism between development and utopia has led to quite different outcomes in each country and Lowenthal excels both in the precision and incisiveness of his dissection of the intervening variables and in the scope and power of his conclusions concerning the consequences. Lowenthal is frank to admit that the totalitarian model of Communist party dictatorship serves as the basis of his analysis throughout. But his is a totalitarian model with a difference, for Lowenthal stresses the dynamic aspects of the party dictatorship as an instrument of social change and also argues that this very process of social change contributes to unplanned, spontaneous evolution from below that may transform totalitarian rule itself. Thus Lowenthal effectively links the totali-

tarian model to development theory to describe "two interconnected and conflicting aspects of one and the same process" and further suggests that to the extent to which this process creates a modern industrial society "the totalitarian model begins to lose its relevance." Post-totalitarian Communism, then, confronts a host of novel dilemmas reflecting a basic change in the regime's own role as a result of the alteration of its functional relation to society.

Lowenthal's contribution, like all the others, avoids any deterministic interpretation of political change and rejects the twin fallacies of unilinearism, i.e., the assumption that Communist systems must inevitably develop along a single foreordained line, and economism, i.e., the supposition that political change is a function of stages of economic development. Concerning the latter supposition, the essays by Montias and Burks are particularly illuminating. Montias identifies four main types of socialist economic systems: "mobilization," "centralized-administered," "decentralized-administered," and "market socialist" and briefly examines each in terms of three main coordinates, the degree of party mobilization of society, the degree of reliance on hierarchically transmitted commands, and the relative importance of markets. Although his "taxonomic exercise" is somewhat sketchy, it makes one quite crucial point by calling attention to the enormous gap between a decentralized-administered system and market socialism. To attain the latter would seem to require a major act of creative political will, uprooting vested bureaucratic interests and simultaneously adjusting ideological perspectives. In other words, the political basis of Communist economic development is every bit as crucial and, one might add, just as problematic as the socio-political consequences that may flow from economic change. Much the same point comes out of Richard Burks' valuable discussion of "Technology and Political Change in Eastern Europe," a slightly altered version of an already much cited Burks' paper which appeared earlier as a RAND Memorandum. Distinguishing between two types of economic reform (type "B" corresponding to Montias' decentralized-administered system and type "A" to market socialism), he stresses the political risks of the latter which have so far proved unacceptable everywhere save in Yugoslavia. The fate of the Czechoslovak reform program strengthens the point and Burks concludes by posing the conundrum of whether the Soviet Union should its own somewhat hesitant introduction of type "B" reforms fail to overcome economic stagnation.

The problem of purpose, as Rustow has done

well to emphasize in his concluding remarks, must occupy a central place in the analysis of Communism and purpose is, of course, inseparable from the role of the major political actors. Jeremy Azrael discusses the varieties of de-Stalinization in these terms and stresses that "a great many measures of de-Stalinization were the result of deliberate decisions made by incumbent leaders and elites under conditions that permitted real choice, not only the choice of sponsoring more limited reforms or different reforms from those that were actually introduced but even the choice of maintaining Stalinism more or less intact." He also notes that although most leading apparatchiki initially favored de-Stalinization with a view to regaining lost prerogatives, once that objective had been achieved, most came to oppose further reform. Given this shift of political attitude, Azrael wonders if strong, single man leadership may not be a functional prerequisite for successful systemic reform.

While not necessarily disagreeing with Azrael's emphasis on subjective considerations, the treatment of political terror by Alexander Dalin and George Breslauer strikes a somewhat different note. (Their joint paper in the present volume is based upon a chapter of their larger study, *Political Terror in Communist Systems*, which also grew out of the same Workshop.) As they see it, despite the possibility of recurrent "fits of terror," there is a "secular trend away from terror, owing to growing pluralism and awareness of the costs of terror." They argue that certain functions earlier performed by terror either no longer exist or else are now better fulfilled by other means. Whether the combination of normative, material, and coercive power which now seems to have replaced brute terror constitutes a stable mix for the future must remain a moot question. Here, again, the problem of purpose becomes quite crucial.

Precisely because the purpose of so many present day Communist leaderships appears tailored to little more than the preservation of their own power perquisites, any classification of Communist political systems in terms of the political role of social groups seems destined to run into serious difficulties. This is the case with the scheme presented by Gordon Skilling's essay on "Group Conflict and Political Change." Offered as "a stimulus and guide to further research," Skilling's classification of Communist states includes five types of regime-"isms." They are "totalitarianism" (or, as he prefers, "quasi-totalitarianism" since in his view, "the exercise of power is always affected to some extent by the existence of political groups"), "consultative authoritarianism,"

"quasi-pluralistic authoritarianism," "democratizing and pluralistic authoritarianism" and "anarchic authoritarianism." Leaving aside the semantic awkwardness of the last three categories, the more important question is the extent to which any of them can claim *fully* to comprehend entire Communist political systems. This, in turn, hinges on a sociologically more discriminating approach to the concept of "political group" under Communism than Skilling's notion of "the opportunity to express interests and opinions" as the defining characteristic. Much more empirical research will be needed to get at certain relational aspects involving social groups and their memberships, social forces to one another and, above all else, "political groups" to political power. At the present time, the group basis of Communist politics seems far too insecurely anchored to serve any genuinely helpful classificatory purposes.

The remaining contributions to the present volume include Zvi Gitelman's somewhat diffuse discussion of power and authority in Eastern Europe, Paul Cocks' carefully documented case study of the evolution of Soviet party control mechanisms, and Alfred Meyer's tantalizing review of three theories of "convergence," the democratic socialist vision, the bureaucratization à la large American corporation model, and the backlash, fascist-national socialist perspective. Meyer suggests that each of these "dreams and nightmares" of Soviet-American convergence has some plausibility but he also underscores areas of "residual difference" between the two societies and, in the end, he is reluctant to choose among the various theories. Even so, he argues that choice is inescapable in order to cope with "a question posed by reality."

The intellectual choices that must be made by students of comparative Communism are even more demanding. In order to keep from a mindless pursuit of so many will-o-the-wisps, however momentarily modish, they should pay the utmost heed to Rustow's concluding plea to take the "long road to theory." *Change in Communist Systems* provides a number of promising points of departure and it is mercifully free of any serious false starts.

MELVIN CROAN

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Understanding Modern China. Edited with an Introduction by Joseph M. Kitagawa. (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969. Pp. 284, \$7.95.)

This book consists of papers given at a conference on China held in March 1968 under the sponsorship of the Council on Religion and

International Affairs. The essays, written by specialists in Chinese studies, including three political scientists, are aimed at the educated layman. The book is thus not designed either for political scientists generally or for political scientists specializing on China, but some of the themes raised and several of the essays are likely to be of interest to readers of this journal. Also, the volume could be used as a supplement in undergraduate courses on comparative politics or international relations, in which China or Sino-Western relations are covered.

Rather than inundating the reader with a mass of alien fact, the book seeks to raise the reader's understanding of the culture, attitudes, and perceptions that underlie Chinese behavior. Thus, several authors deal with broad cultural and historical themes, as in the case of Kitagawa's introduction on "Western Understanding of the East," of E. G. Pulleybank's "The Unity of China," or of Vincent Shih's "On Being Chinese: A Philosophical Reflection." Melvin Gurtov addresses himself to "The Style of Politics and Foreign Policy in Communist China," while Mark Mancall and Seth Tillman each write on Sino-American relations and especially on perceptions of one another. Norton Ginsburg contributes an essay on China's geography, Stephen Uhalley one on Taiwan, and Claude Buss writes on the overseas Chinese. Two essays in addition to the one by Gurtov deal with Communist China, including one by Henry G. Schwarz on leadership and modernization, and one by Yuan-li Wu on economics and ideology.

The interpretive and informative value of many of the essays is quite high. Uhalley's essay on the native Taiwanese, for instance, provides a well-documented historical survey of a problem of great contemporary relevance. The essay by Schwarz contains a reexamination of the structure of power in Communist China in the light of cleavages among top leaders that were exposed during the Cultural Revolution. Schwarz suggests that these cleavages can be traced back to the Yenan period, when the exigencies of waging guerrilla war caused the emergence of a form of coalition leadership rather than of a monolithic and strictly hierarchical structure which is what many scholars had assumed to be the case. While this problem is not fully pursued here, the essay is a useful example of reassessments of Chinese Communist politics now being undertaken by western scholars.

Gurtov's essay distinguishes political culture and the leaders' operational code from style, which "concentrates on the underlying princi-

ples that account for a leadership's political action and conduct of foreign policy." This definition imposes rather a heavy burden on the concept of style, but all the same, Gurtov has some interesting things to say about the kinds of approaches that have guided China's policy-makers. He suggests that both domestic and foreign policies can at least to some extent be explained by looking at the concerns of the leaders for authority and unanimity, or by their historically-conditioned concern with self-reliance. Gurtov shows that Mao's theory of contradictions—the assumption that change takes place as a result of the struggle between opposites and that the unity produced by the resolution of a particular struggle is soon replaced by a new struggle between opposite forces—helps explain both the recurring patterns of stability and instability within China as well as China's view of the world, although in the case of foreign policy, Gurtov carefully notes that the emphasis on struggle has not led to reckless or wholly unrealistic foreign policies. The authors' interest in the way that elites perceive reality is carried further in Mark Mancall's brilliantly polemical essay "Two Realities." Mancall attacks systems theorists for allegedly assuming that all participants in the "international system" share the same perceptions, and in examining Chinese and American outlooks, he finds that indeed each side is likely to view the same set of "facts" in a completely different light.

Perhaps because they were writing for non-specialists, some of the authors overstate their case. Yuan-li Wu finds it hard to conceal his distaste for Communist China's economic policies and especially those of the Maoists; his essay contains such unhelpful comments as "virtually at any cost," "total failure," or, "dictated by ideology." Claude Buss seems to feel that the Maoists' foreign policy is one of "total revolution and total support for all wars of liberation," in contrast, incidentally, to Gurtov's balanced approach to the matter. In relating China's past to her present conduct, the essays gloss over the problem of determining which aspect of a long and complex history is relevant to the present. While Ginsburg feels that the Chinese regard their lost territories as "terrae irredentae . . . to be regained at some future date," Pulleybank concludes that if "China's traditional view of her position in the world has any bearing on her present attitudes, it seems that it is in this direction, encouraging withdrawal and self-absorption, not in the direction of self-assertive expansion." Each author selects a different aspect of China's history; consequently, each author's predictive projection

conflicts with the other's and the reader is left puzzled. Perhaps all that one can expect from a volume of this kind is that it raise important questions, and in this, the book has succeeded.

THOMAS P. BERNSTEIN

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The Roots of Russian Communism, A Social and Historical Study of Russian Social-Democracy 1898-1907. By David Lane. (Assen, The Netherlands: Van Gorcum, and New York: Humanities Press, 1969. Pp. xv, 240. \$11.50.)

After similar titles by Berdiaev, Dan, Martov, Haimson, Keep, Shapiro and Venturi, and many other books dealing with the same period, can another be justified? The answer is yes, since it is neither a recounting of events nor a probing of the development of political theory.

David Lane is a sociologist at the University of Essex (trained at Oxford), and his book is an empirical study of the social composition of both the leadership and the membership of the Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party—social origin, class, occupation, education, age, nationality, etc., and of the structure, activities and finances of the party. Part One (48 pp.) covers the party in general, including its electoral support for the Second Duma. The more valuable Part Two (146 pp.) presents detailed studies of the local organizations in St. Petersburg, Moscow, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Tver, Ekaterinoslav, Baku, and Omsk. There are 39 tables, 6 charts, 6 maps, and a 12-page bibliography.

The sources used are primarily party publications, memoirs, and police records. Except for the newspapers, most were published in Russia in the Soviet period, which makes for less complete coverage of Mensheviks—a bias of which the author is aware. He also repeatedly cautions against possible distortions of fact through partisan enthusiasm, failing memory, and police prejudice.

In Part One it is convincingly estimated that over 12,000 persons were active in the party between 1898 and 1905. Even before the revolution of 1905, therefore, Russian Social-Democracy was not primarily a matter of émigré intellectuals; it was a substantial and widespread underground movement which expanded greatly during and after the revolution. To explore the social composition of this movement the author used a cluster sampling of biographies of S-D's who were active between 1898 and 1907 and whose surnames began with the first four Russian letters. This yielded usa-

ble data on 986 persons, about a third of those listed. The A's and B's were not checked against the V's and G's, and some of the chi-squares are not significant, but some interesting findings emerge.

The RSDLP was quite broadly based, both socially and geographically, with a bias toward the upper social and educational levels. The official census categories of gentry and townsmen included only 1.7% and 10.7% of the total population respectively, but they accounted for 10% and 57% of the S-D's whose estate is known. Peasants were 33%, but this included persons who had migrated from the farm to town. The party was stronger in the south of Russia and in the Caucasus, yet it touched all regions including Siberia. Over 49% of the activists whose education is known had some higher education, and only 20% had not reached the secondary level. They were also young: of 830 whose age in 1905 is known, 557 were under 30 and only 18 over 44. The breadth of the party's social support was shown in the complicated Second Duma elections in 1907. Fifty-four S-D deputies were sent to an assembly of 478; three were sent by the landowners' curia, seven by the peasants, 21 by the townsmen, and 23 by the workers. Of these, only 7 townsmen and 11 workers' deputies were Bolsheviks, showing the greater strength and more general appeal of the Mensheviks.

Lane raises the difficult question as to whether or not there was a social basis for the split of the party into Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. Considering first a top leadership group of nine for each faction (mostly émigrés), he finds no major differences of status—"both factions being drawn from the upper social status groups" (p. 32). However, there was a striking difference of nationality: the Bolsheviks were nearly all Great Russians while four of the Mensheviks were Jewish and two more were Georgian. There were also age differences. The Mensheviks were substantially older, had begun revolutionary activity much earlier, and had personal ties with the old populist movement. Menshevik leadership was more stable and was separated by a much wider age differential from their followers. Considering next the general membership, Lane finds that nearly two thirds of his sample cannot be identified by faction, which leaves a very narrow basis for statistical comparisons. With 232 Bolsheviks and 141 Mensheviks to work with, nevertheless, he sees the Bolsheviks as being younger, more likely to be working class or peasants recently come to town, less skilled, and "overwhelmingly" Great Russians. The Mensheviks were

mostly of minority nationalities, more likely to be of petty-bourgeois origin, and more likely to have some higher education.

The local case studies of Part Two are not so easy to describe. There are no tables of comparable data for the several cities, and even when separate city tables look comparable (as in the content analyses of slogans at Moscow and St. Petersburg) variations of categories restrict the making of comparisons. There is, however, a wealth of information about the chosen cities and their regions.

Great variety appears in different places in the structure of industry, in the characteristics of the factory workers, and in the relations between labor and management. Where older depressed industries predominated and the work force was homogeneous and the factories Russian-owned, as in Moscow, Ivanovo and Tver, labor strife was more severe and the Bolsheviks were dominant. Where foreign managements were more responsive to union demands and there were different nationalities of workers, as in the newer, more capital-intensive factories of St. Petersburg, Ekaterinoslave and Baku, unions tended to divide the workers' support with the parties, and the Mensheviks had the advantage. Factional differences were far less sharp in the local groups, however, than among the émigrés. Separate factional organizations appeared early in the south, but at Moscow only in May 1905, and at Ivanovo, Tver and Omsk not at all. The only analysis of slogans by faction (St. Petersburg) reveals little difference between the two. The Mensheviks spent money as freely on arms, and supported insurrections although they were less inclined than the Bolsheviks to lead them.

Lane frequently juxtaposes his findings with current sociological hypotheses and with the work of other interpreters of Russia. He also advances interesting hypotheses of his own: on the circumstances in which leadership can attract a mass following for insurrection (p. 132); on the relationships of urbanization, industrial structure, agricultural hinterland, and party recruitment (146); on rates of industrial growth and the Marxian theory of increasing misery (211); and on age and nationality groups in the development of radical parties (215).

On the other hand, the book has weaknesses more damaging than the faulty proofreading. To illustrate, Lane gives almost no attention to the powerful faction of the "Economists," nor to their later relations to the unions and to the Mensheviks. In fact, the deep cleavage among Russian radicals over political versus economic

and social activity is not a significant part of his theoretical model, and the party's problems with the unions are not carefully explored. Again, no attention is given to sex or marital status or the relations of the radicals to their parents. And the possible implication, in the nationality difference between the factions, of anti-Semitism among Bolsheviks is left without explicit examination. But even so, we must welcome the light thrown on early and little understood stages of a successful revolutionary movement by Lane's empirical studies. Let us hope that he will continue.

THORNTON ANDERSON

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Karl Radek: *The Last Internationalist*. By Warren Lerner. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970. Pp. 240. \$7.95.)

In the fate that has befallen the November 1917 revolution, in what turned out to be the bloody business of nation-building and creating Soviet power and empire, the awareness of the international vision that dominated the lives of many of those who saw that revolution through has all but disappeared.

For decades political scientists and historians alike have correctly stressed the dominant role of V. I. Lenin in that revolution and his Russian centeredness. But Lenin did not make that revolution alone; among his ablest cohorts were the "internationalists," those who were moved not by attitudes that reflected strong Russian identification but by a largely unpolluted vision of universality.

It was to be expected that the "internationalists" would be among the first to fall victim to the "Socialism in a single county" concept—and they were. But they lost out not only because they were motivated by a grander vision than that of the creation of a greater Russian state, but also because they were predominantly resolute individualists. They tended to be "loners"; they were often brash; they were mercurial; they were at best difficult; they were adult *wunderkinder*; they definitely were not, though some of them tried hard to be so, organization men, certainly not in the style of Stalin's apparatus. They were the stuff of which revolutions are made; they could not and did not survive Thermidor.

A case in point is Karl Radek. There he is relieving the tedium of the "sealed-train" trip through Germany by opening the train window at stations along the route and heckling the German soldiers; loping across Red square, carrying a load of newspapers, two huge pistols strapped around his waist; barhopping with

Feodor Chaliapin, singing cossack songs as they move from one Moscow cafe to another. Radek was no man to gracefully slip into a bureaucratic mold.

Radek argued violently with and was alienated from almost every revolutionary leader with whom he came in contact, including Lenin. But when the news of the February revolution reached Switzerland, Lenin telegraphed Radek to come to Zurich at once. He recognized Radek as having the best German contacts likely to be available to the Bolsheviks, as being the outstanding journalist in the Bolshevik camp, and as a shrewd and dedicated revolutionary.

Armed with the authority of the revolution, Radek returned to Germany in 1919, a respected and feared emissary to those socialists who had earlier driven him from their parties. He was appointed number two man in the Comintern bureaucracy and a member of the Central Committee of the Russian party, before he became the scapegoat for an unsuccessful German revolution that he had advised against and tried to prevent.

From 1923, everything was downhill for Radek, though by his wits he managed to partially revive his fortunes from time to time. He even succeeded in avoiding the firing squad at the time of the Great purges. But he could not escape the consequences of his argumentative nature and he was evidently done in in a brawl with another prisoner in a Siberian camp in 1939.

Warren Lerner has written a precise, learned and extremely readable biography of Karl Radek. If I have any major criticism to make about the book, it is its brevity. Working in the tradition of his distinguished mentor Geroid T. Robinson, Lerner has written extremely economically. He knows a great deal more, particularly about the milieu in which Radek operated. Far too little has been written about the internationalist aspects of that period and I wish that Lerner had here included much more of the Comintern material that he has collected.

At times, Lerner claims too much for Radek. For example, I question Lerner's statement that the united front tactic was devised by Radek, and that Lenin "allowed Radek to persuade him of its validity." The evidence is that Lenin was consistently a conservative in foreign policy. The 1920 excursion into Poland was a disastrous aberration. Lenin did not have to be "persuaded" to return to a more conservative tack.

And it does seem strange there is not even a single mention of "*Left-Wing Communism, an*

Infantile Disorder, which is one of the Leninist classics and dealt largely with the problem of revolutionary strategy in Germany during the period when Radek was heavily engaged there.

But these are quibbles. This is a strong book that throws much light on the Comintern, one of the most important and least studied phenomena of twentieth century politics. Many more works like it are needed.

DAN N. JACOBS

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Party Leadership and Revolutionary Power in China. Edited by John Wilson Lewis. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1970. Pp. 422. \$9.50.)

This book consists of eleven essays of uneven quality, which were originally written for a conference in July 1968. With the exception of two, all the contributors are political scientists, and most of them belong to the second generation of post-1949 scholars who have never been on mainland China. In spite of this limitation of their training, and the "objective condition" of research problems, the book provides impressive topical, though not comprehensive, insight into the working of politics in Communist China. It has a much less "bookish air" and it betrays less of a "cultural gap" than one might have anticipated.

Part I of the book begins with C. Martin Wilbur's careful, statistical account of the early Chinese Communist leaders and his analysis of the influence of the first few years of the CCP upon them. Professor Wilbur correctly holds that the Party's gradual emancipation from Soviet Russia and its adaptation to the Chinese environment after 1928 made it possible for the Party to survive the crisis resulted from the KMT-CCP split. Furthermore, five years of collaboration with the KMT taught the Communist leaders a lesson: geographical bases and armies controlled by the Party were essential for revolution. They were never negotiable.

William F. Dorrell examines two events of the Kiangsi Soviet in order to refute the official Party history that a new "Left" opportunist line had come to dominate the Party with the rise of the Returned Students at the Fourth Plenum in January 1931, and that Mao had advocated cooperation with the non-Communist generals in the Fukien revolt in November 1933. The Maoists hold that one of the principal causes for the Kiangsi defeat was the failure to ally with the Fukien revolt forces against Chiang Kai-shek, and that if Mao's correct leadership had prevailed, failure would have been avoided. Dorrell suggests a number of reasons for the

Maoist revision of history. He might have added that the Communist attempts to establish the myth of infallible leadership and *ex post facto* reconstruction of revolutionary history are not unique. Sun Yat-sen, for example, always identified himself with success while blaming others for failures. According to the KMT historians, he was always correct.

The two articles that actually deal with leader-party relationship are classified under different categories of the book. A comparative study by Leonard Schapiro and John W. Lewis of four totalitarian systems and their leaders—Hitler, Mussolini, Stalin, and Mao—challenges the view that a uniform pattern under totalitarian parties is discernible. Benjamin Schwartz in discussing leader-party relationship in the Cultural Revolution makes some good points: 1) Mao is the source of legitimacy and he can legitimize any structure; 2) the Party's charisma will not easily be restored; and 3) Mao's retreat to the "second line" after 1959 was essentially voluntary. Schwartz argues that the intellectual origins of the issue of leader versus institution may be found in Rousseau, and that Mao, "standing high above all laws and institutions," may owe more to certain Chinese cultural perspectives than to any Western source of inspiration.

In his paper on the Party in Chinese Communist ideology, Stuart Schram traces the divergent views of Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-ch'i on the Party. He suggests that relations between Mao and the Party deteriorated after the Eighth Party Congress in September 1956 when the newly adopted Party constitution deleted reference to Mao Tse-tung's Thought as the guiding principle for Party work, and upheld the principle of collective leadership. It should be noted, however, that the CCP was actually following the line laid down by the CPSU after Stalin's death. As Schram relates in a footnote, when K'ang Sheng denounced in 1966 Liu and Secretary-General Teng for their heresy in the Eighth Party Congress, Mao reportedly interrupted him to say: "We all read the report, and it was adopted by the Congress. One cannot hold only the two of them responsible." (p. 188)

Factionalism in the Central Committee is the theme of Philip Bridgham's paper, which deals with the Kao-Jao case, the P'eng Te-huai affair, and the Cultural Revolution. While I agree with the author that policy issues were at the heart of the P'eng affair, I am inclined to stress personal factor and political intrigue rather than policy differences on the Kao-Jao case.

Three essays in Part III describe the Party in Chinese society after 1949. Thomas Bernstein's

article deals with the obstacles when the CCP sought to make use of village level leaders to implement the new goals and tasks of socialist transformation. Merle Goldman focuses her attention on Party's policies toward the intellectuals in 1961–62. Michael Oksenberg, who has the talent of grasping a good idea and exploring it in a paper, examines the "ladder of success on the eve of the Cultural Revolution." Although his inquiry is based on an extremely meager data, his essay suggests a number of significant points that merit further studies of this interesting subject.

The two articles in the final section of the book deal with the State Council and the People's Liberation Army by Donald W. Klein and John Gittings respectively. Klein's data on the impact of the Cultural Revolution on the personnel in the State Council are extremely useful. It is also much less vulnerable than other theoretical and interpretative articles. Unfortunately, the cut-off date for his study is February 1968, apparently for the July conference. It is unlikely, however, that even if he had brought the data to September 1968 or April 1969 the picture would have been substantially different.

Gittings examines the army-party relations with special attention to the discordant rather than to the unifying features of the traditional view. He reminds us that the Chinese Communist leaders are human beings like anyone else, and that their behavior may be motivated by purely personal factors as well as high-minded considerations, an assumption that has in the past been too often ignored by "theorists."

Before the Cultural Revolution, China-watchers tended to minimize tensions among the Party leaders. Since then the tendency has gone to the other extreme by over emphasizing their disagreements in the past. The contributors of this book are fully aware of the pitfall of reading back into the past the sharp differences in the leadership. In the introduction that integrates the rather diverse topics covered by the book, Lewis also rightly cautions against exaggeration the philosophical bases underlying different attitudes toward the organization of power. Nevertheless, the influence of Red Guard distortion is apparent in some of the articles.

Most of the articles in the volume were written in the light of the Cultural Revolution, which has invalidated so many interpretations of the leading scholars in the past. The validity of some of the arguments in these articles will probably not be known until years later, if it will ever be known at all. Meanwhile, the book represents a valuable contribution to the present stage of Western scholarship, and it should

be welcome among the increasing publications of mature Chinese studies.

CHÜN-TU HSÜEH

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Ethnicity, Party, and National Integration: An Indonesian Case Study. By R. William Liddle (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1970. Pp. 238. \$8.75.)

Case studies of local political change in new states are extraordinarily valuable things, given adequate preparation and sympathetic familiarity by the researcher. Their value is lasting because the data they offer may stand alone, if done well, useful apart from the generalizations an author wants to draw from them.

Professor Liddle's careful work on the Simalungun Batak area of North Sumatra is significant on this score alone, though he aims at more than a local study. The area where he did his research is economically and socially complex, made up, along with the now outnumbered Simalungan Batak themselves, of several ethnically and religiously diverse groups of immigrants from the adjacent Batak areas of North and South Tapanuli and from Java. Like other areas of Indonesia, particularly outside of Java, little was known about post-revolutionary developments in the region other than in an impressionistic way.

Liddle has now changed this condition by bringing Simalungun under intensive examination related to the obvious questions presented by social and cultural diversity in a very large new state. That is, how do the variety of peoples who live there govern themselves and how do they deal with and comprehend the state into which they have now been incorporated. For Liddle this is a problem of integration—one of several possible perspectives—and the book is a study of what Liddle, influenced by the writings of the anthropologist Clifford Geertz, understands as an 'integrative revolution' in Simalungun. While local affinities of kinship and religion and custom were by no means eliminated, new political loyalties to party and state arose which have made the people of the area Indonesians. Liddle argues that the party system was critically important in cutting across horizontal and vertical dimensions of cleavage, making participation in the state possible and meaningful in both local and national terms. Only the original Simalungun Batak themselves failed to obtain fuller expression of their interests, largely because of an over-reliance on personal links with political power and a strong ethnic identification.

According to Liddle, integrative success depends, however, on determinate institutional

and ideological factors which may or may not obtain influentially in public policy. Soekarno's Guided Democracy, by this analysis, inhibited integration precisely by rendering the parties less authoritative and by pursuing symbols of unity which discouraged realistic recognition of ethnic and religious diversity. It follows, Liddle concludes, that integration in new states depends upon giving an institutional and ideological place in the state to primordial interests and loyalties which need not be exclusive.

There are two troubling problems in the study. One is that the fascinating detail of local party operations and conflict tend to exclude anything but a hazy picture of the national level politics into which the locality is presumably being integrated. The interaction between national politics and local social environment is not always clear. Some discussion of changing patterns of resource distribution, for example, might be enlightening; apart from what the parties did in the region, what did they do for it, and how?

Second, though Liddle's generalizations about integrative process in new states deserve consideration, one is left wondering—as is true of other studies of integration—integration for what? Integration as a concept can tell us something about whether a state hangs together, about levels of participation and symbol sharing, but as yet not much about the quality of the more or less integrated whole, even as it affects the locality.

But while these conceptual points can be argued, the book is nevertheless a significant one for our understanding of politics in North Sumatra and Indonesia, and it has a good deal to say about local level political parties in new states.

DANIEL LEV

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Parteielite Im Wandel. By Peter Christian Ludz. (Köln und Opladen: West-deutscher Verlag, 1968. Pp. 438. Approx. \$10.00.)

Peter Christian Ludz's *Parteielite Im Wandel* is a study of intraelite conflict in East German politics. Focusing upon the impact of ideological, elitist, and organizational differences within the Politburo-Central Committee elite over a thirteen year period, 1954-1967, Ludz attempts to trace the important arenas of conflict which he believes exist between the older Politburo membership and the recently recruited technological-scientific elite on the Central Committee. Different socialization experiences have resulted in alternative definitions of leadership role and ideological reality within the Politburo-Central Committee elite. The re-

sult, Ludz argues, is an on-going debate between the two groups over the correct method of realizing the performance goals of the New Economic System (introduced in 1963), while, simultaneously, guaranteeing the supremacy of the party bureaucracy within the political system. The range and intensity of intra-elite conflict is focused upon the "means" of achieving optimal economic-political goals, rather than the goals of the system itself. The technological elite represents a more rational and empirical approach toward economic problem-solving than the party bureaucracy which has relied upon a more-doctrinaire, and therefore less empirical, emphasis on achieving the development of Socialism in the German Democratic Republic. Within the agreed-upon division of labor existing between technical experts on the Central Committee, and its Secretariat, and political-ideological leadership on the Politburo, there does exist a conflict potential between two groups, but this potential does not move beyond certain stated boundaries laid down by the party bureaucracy.

An analysis of intra-elite conflict in East German or GDR politics is long-overdue, especially in light of the inordinate amount of effort devoted to the study of elite behavior in West Germany over the past fifteen years. The value of Ludz's analysis, however, does not solely lie in the insights he supplies into the sources of conflict between the two elites. Perhaps more significantly, at least in the long-run, is the light he throws on the operation of the political system and social structure during an important period of economic innovation and political consolidation. From this perspective, his analysis of intra-elite conflict represents one aspect of a more-general process of social and political evolution in the GDR. Fundamental toward gaining an understanding of these broader processes is Ludz's rejection of the nondynamic concept of "totalitarianism," as the concept was used in the early and middle 1950's, and his development of the idea of "consultative-authoritarianism." The essence of this new construct is its developmental nature. What Ludz essentially argues is the fact that political consolidation and economic success has brought about the evolution of an altered political order in which direct coercion and intimidation have been dispensed with in favor of a more sophisticated network of social and economic pressures, incentives, and controls. The elevation of a technological elite onto the Central Committee and the simultaneous delegation of economic management to them by the Politburo represents one aspect of this new political development. The party bureaucracy has loosened the more-

obvious political controls in the service of economic performance and has, in turn, gained a degree of political stability and legitimacy. The analysis of political system-social structural change fits neatly into the "consultative authoritarianism" concept. At the same time, "consultative authoritarianism" also puts the intra-elite conflict dimension into clearer perspective by providing insight into how the party bureaucracy has been forced to surrender a certain amount of its power in the cause of gaining an important degree of legitimacy and stability. The recruitment of a technological elite onto the Central Committee was a necessary step toward economic-political consolidation, but the existence of a new elite, so Ludz argues, tends to put the old guard on the defensive. Shared leadership functions tend, within the operating social-political realities of GDR development, to introduce dimensions of intra-elite conflict between economic and political overseers. In a socialist, as in a capitalist, society the boundaries between political and economic direction and control are not always clear. For a leadership group which believes in the primacy of the economic over the political-ideological superstructure, such conflicts are clearly important.

Two specific problems emerge from Ludz's analysis, both of which need to be briefly covered. One, the future impact of the technological elite on the political system is not adequately covered by the author. Can "means" and "goals" be divorced from each other in a highly centralized political-economic order such as the GDR? Do procedural disagreements between the economic and the party bureaucracy about "how best to complete the Socialist revolution" in the GDR point solely to within-system conflict or are larger areas of disagreement hidden within supposedly consensual conflict? Secondly, underlying Ludz's key organizational, ideological, and leadership (clitist perspectives) variables is an implicit position on the evolution of the recruitment process at work in the GDR. Clearly he is not to be faulted in his analysis of how the recruitment of a technological elite has introduced a dimension of conflict within the political system. What does deserve comment, however, is that Ludz fails to emphasize the fact that a relatively young group of political cadres are also being recruited simultaneously. What needs to be emphasized, in light of another recruitment group, by the author is that the "direction" and "impact" of his three central variables represent different outcomes according to the viewpoint and composition of different upwardly mobile groups. In other words, recruitment cannot be divorced from the variables of social structure,

ideological perspective, and elite viewpoint toward the political and economic system.

Having mentioned two problems in Ludz's analysis should not obscure its importance to students of GDR politics, economics, and society. As an initial step in the direction of political system-social structure analysis in the "other Germany," few works deserve higher praise.

JOHN M. STARRELS

University of California, Santa Barbara

Custom and Government in the Lower Congo.

By Wyatt MacGaffey (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970. Pp. xv, 322. \$12.50.)

Since the first contacts between the ancient kingdom of Kongo and the Portuguese in the late 15th century, the Kongo have basked under the looking glass of generations of missionaries, travelers, historians, and anthropologists. Few African peoples find themselves so extensively embalmed on the library shelves. Indeed, as their latest chronicler, Wyatt MacGaffey, convincingly demonstrates, embedded in the amber of anthropological inquest is a model of Kongo society, matriarchal and matrilineal, royalist and hierarchical, which radically differs from the actual social structure and practices of those who now inhabit northern Angola, Congo/Kinshasa from Kinshasa to the sea, and Congo/Brazzaville from the capital westwards.

One of the many intriguing points documented in this excellent book is the powerful impact of recorded "knowledge" on empirical reality. The theoretical construct of Kongo society contained in the annals of anthropology provided the scientific basis for the *politique indigène* of the colonial regime. More important, the new generation of urban elites learn of themselves through the texts of the anthropologist; MacGaffey argues that those removed from the village womb of traditional society have no independent check of the reliability of the description, nor any inclination to doubt it. The anthropologist, seeking to peer into the inner processes of Kongo society, is frequently startled to see himself.

MacGaffey has based his study on the village of Mbanza Manteke, just south of the Congo River, in Songolo territory. This falls in the Ndibu sub-group of the Kongo, by conventional breakdown—although not the least of MacGaffey's contributions is the demonstration of the ambiguity of the classificatory labels used to differentiate Kongo subgroups. His field inquiry was carried out between 1964 and 1966, a time of rebellion and insecurity in the eastern part of the country, but of peace and

tranquility in the Kongo zone. But even in tranquil circumstances rural field work for expatriates is no longer as simple as it was under the colonial flag. MacGaffey's evident success in the data collection deserves high praise.

The author has set for himself the task of identifying the organizing principles of Kongo social life, the mechanisms for adjustment of social conflict, and the nature of political hierarchy and power. Unlike many of his predecessors in the Lower Congo, he questions all received knowledge—and persuasively demonstrates that much of it is probably wrong. It is easy to be intimidated by the pantheon of Kongo scholars: Van Wing, Cuvelier, De Cleene, Bittremieux, Domont, Laman, Anderson, Mertens, Soret, and others. Not so MacGaffey; with a refreshing candor, and combative spirit, he challenges the most cherished established myths concerning Kongo social organization. The similarity of many of his findings to those of Albert Doutreloux in another important recent study of the Kongo (in Mayombe), *L'ombre des Fetiches*, lends added weight to his conclusions.

Just possibly, here and there, MacGaffey may fall victim to the same tendency of his predecessors—to generalize to all of Kongo society social reality observed in one very small sector of it. There is no easy remedy for this problem, which bedevils much of ethnographic anthropology. What is of interest is not simply Mbanza Manteke, but the much larger universe of Kongo society. The powerful research instrument of the anthropologist is the painstaking accumulation of detail in a microcosm of society. Yet it does not follow that the microcosm is representative of the broader universe; indeed, what would appear beyond dispute is that the Kongo cultural area is a quite diverse social domain. Thus there is no reason to doubt the skill of MacGaffey both as observer and analyst; his data and conclusions are uniformly convincing. But some of the divergences of findings from Van Wing and others may simply reflect the different unit of observation.

The large sections of the volume that present that data are frequently difficult reading. The cast of actors—clans, villages, "houses," lineages, and individuals—is numerous; a blackboard to diagram their roles and relationships is an indispensable accompaniment. But relieving the detail, and assuring the posterity of the book, are succinct and telling theoretical passages, which offer brilliant insights into this sector of Kongo society.

MacGaffey offers a framework for deciphering one of the major puzzles of Kongo society: the tenacity and duration of land disputes,

which frequently simmer on for generations, with apparent resolutions proving to be only interludes in the conflict. MacGaffey postulates a tension between the folk model of local origins, which stresses a single continuous migration into a previously empty land, and the historical reality of continual grouping and regrouping of small units, with priority of occupation (and hence land rights) a relative matter at best. The misleading nature of the matriarchal-matrilin-eal classification commonly accorded to Kongo society is ably argued. Intrusions of bilateral descent practices were explained away by proponents of the matrilineal model as contaminations through European contact; MacGaffey is persuasive in showing this explanation is inadequate.

The author makes a fascinating contribution to the understanding of the role of social communications. Claude Meillassoux has argued that monopoly of information concerning social practices by elders is a prime political resource in traditional society. MacGaffey suggests instead that it is less the monopoly of content than the source of communication that is important; social information from young men can be discredited by elders on the grounds that it could not possibly be true coming from such an inadequate source. He demonstrates the almost total lack of communication of economic information, deriving from a pervasive fear of theft and a conviction that information on one's economic standing could only be used to one's disadvantage. Thus villagers would be highly secretive among each other about prices obtained for their produce (to the great advantage of the traders). Here one goes beyond the conventional assertion that "tradition" impedes change to offer concrete insight on how this may occur.

Two excellent chapters focus explicitly on political structure as it has evolved through successive fluctuations in colonial policy, and into the post-independence period. The European rulers, assuming a hierarchical and royalist model of Kongo society, were never able to identify real power in rural society, although the Belgian pattern of administration altered it in important respects. The MacGaffey model suggests a much more fluid reality, with substantial scope for the ambitious/charismatic individual. The elders went into temporary eclipse when the Abako party offered young men an alternative principle of legitimacy through which to compete for power in 1959-1960. But the rural roots of the party quickly shriveled after independence, and a depressing picture is painted of the limited abili-

ties of the modern state effectively to serve its rural hinterland.

Both for its rich detail and theoretical insight, *Custom and Government in the Lower Congo* is an impressive and important book.

M. CRAWFORD YOUNG

University of Wisconsin, Madison

Romania; A Profile. By Ian M. Matley. (New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1970. Pp. 292. \$8.50.)

This volume is one of a series of introductions to the countries of the world—the Praeger Country Profiles. The editor of the European series, George Hoffman, notes in a foreword that these country profiles are meant to be useful to those seeking basic information as well as a critical assessment of problems faced by various countries. As such, this book is a highly readable and reasonably comprehensive and fair survey, presenting a useful shortcut to the history and geographical features of Romania. The book is divided into seven chapters dealing with the geography, history, government, economy, the people, education, and culture. It will appeal to foreign travelers or those who seek to acquire a cursory knowledge of that country more than to scholars of the area.

Certain factual errors can be detected, such as the inclusion of the Prahova river among those rivers crossing the Carpathian Mountains range (p. 11). In writing about the interwar period, Mr. Matley notes that France had been an ally of Romania since 1926 (p. 117) when in fact, Romania belonged together with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia to the Little Entente, and it was the Little Entente that was allied to France. Also, in the first chapter, the author states that two major parts of Romania—Wallachia and Moldavia—were long a part of the Ottoman Empire (p. 10), when in fact they were merely vassals paying a yearly tribute for the better part of nearly four centuries, as acknowledged by the author later on (p. 94).

Mr. Matley's analysis does not take into account the special situation of Wallachia and Moldavia from the 16th century through 1879, as compared with the parallel history of other Balkan countries (Serbia, Bulgaria, Albania). The two principalities that later joined with Transylvania to form Greater Romania in 1918, had in some ways a rather similar position toward the Ottoman Empire as the countries of East-Central Europe had toward the Soviet Union after World War II. Their ruling princes, supposedly chosen by the local ruling classes, were in most cases imposed by the Turks, just as the leaders of postwar East Eu-

rope were imposed by the Soviets. The special status of the two principalities is evidenced by the fact that the Turks were not allowed to build mosques on their territories, while mosques could be found for instance in the Serbian and Hungarian Banat, areas once annexed by the Ottoman Empire. This special vassalage situation, not unlike that of present-day satellites, needs to be stressed if the reader is to acquire a better understanding of the reasons that Romania was able to maintain an intact social and political elite; this elite enabled the country, after independence came in 1879, to have the rich political and cultural life as well as the comprehensive state organization, that the author acknowledges throughout his book.

Some reservations can be made about certain data and statements regarding contemporary Romania following the installation of the Communist regime. It is understandable that Mr. Matley, visiting Romania recently for an extended stay in 1968 has assembled references and facts offered by the present regime that tend to present a rosy picture of the present and a dark picture of the past. The reader is left with the impression that the situation of the people is satisfactory and even good these past few years, which is hardly the case. The economy is no longer booming, and according to some estimates, the floods of 1970 have reversed all the progress of the last five years. But even before this disaster, the economy was under stress, with food—particularly meat—far from abundant.

According to a recent report by a British observer, Anthony Stuart, published in *SURVEY* # 76 (Summer 1970) after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, "there was an agreed attitude of controlled, rational defiance of Soviet pressures; the prospect of more money and more food as credits and goods came in from the West; the prospect of more passports for more people . . . this mood has now disappeared. And the floods have deepened this pessimism." Mr. Stuart continues (p. 177):

On the political side, the realization that Communism cannot, or is not allowed to, have a human face and that Soviet conservatism is a reality that shows no sign of change or development, all this has produced a feeling of despair. . . . Three years ago, although meat was not plentiful, a meat shop without meat would have excited angry comment. Now a meat shop with meat is a rarity indeed. At the same time, the number of people visiting the West has been reduced to a trickle by new rules and regulations. . . . Today in Romania I get the overwhelming impression that everyone is, quite simply, tired. Fatigue of course soon leads to apathy, which is what the Government dreads. Romanian

independence from Soviet control was only possible because of the economic progress made under the socialist system. . . . Now, in a difficult political period, the steam seems to have gone out of the economy. The State has no money in its coffers to increase wages and so is left with political pressure. But on a disillusioned population, even the excellent organized secret police can have little positive effect."

The reader would thus be well advised to take Mr. Matley's optimistic views on economic progress (pp. 178–80) with a grain of salt.

A. G. CARANFIL

Hudson Institute

The Governmental System in Southern Rhodesia. By D. J. Murray. (London: Clarendon Press-Oxford University Press, 1970. Pp. 393. \$13.00.)

This book can be assessed from either of two strikingly different points of view. On the one hand it can be viewed as a detailed political history of the Europeans in Southern Rhodesia from the granting of responsible government in 1923 to the creation of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1953. On the other hand it can be viewed as primarily a theoretical work, emphasizing the concept political sector, and attempting to deal with the vexing problem of identifying change from one system or system state to another.

If the orientation of a book is determined by the subject to which by far the greatest number of pages are devoted, the first of the above interpretations of Murray's book is the correct one. An extremely well documented history of the Rhodesian government and of the organized associations and unorganized social forces which influenced and were influenced by it during this period is presented. Because it brings together a wealth of detail never before assembled in one place, this presentation alone represents a significant contribution.

Murray himself asks that the book be viewed in terms of the second interpretation presented above, however. He tells us that his focus is on amending the interpretation made by Colin Leys in his *European Politics in Southern Rhodesia* (Oxford University Press, 1959) in two fundamental respects. First, Murray contends that Leys overemphasizes the unity of the Europeans in the face of the threat posed by Africans and under-emphasizes the intense competition within European society. He further contends that Leys's prediction of a tendency toward illiberalism within the existing party system of the pre 1962 period has been proven invalid by subsequent developments.

It is difficult to assess the extent of real divergence between Murray's and Leys' analyses, and even more difficult to judge which is more valid, because the two authors employ different definitions of system. Leys focuses on the party system in a traditional sense—the number of parties and their relative strength and bases of support. When he correctly predicted a trend toward illiberalism and a significant and continuous increase in the power of the then opposition party if it should come to power, he saw these changes as by definition within the existing system—that is, party system.

Murray, on the other hand, analyzes what he designates as the governmental system, defined as the pattern of relationships focusing on the power of government. This system is in turn a part of the larger political and administrative system (including all relationships involved in policy making) and is divided into a number of sectors—economic sectors in their relation to government, including both governmental units and nongovernmental associations or pressure groups. For Murray the governmental system prior to 1962 was one in which the most significant structures were associations and government, especially the bureaucracy, with parties playing a minor role. After 1962 a new system emerged in which the ruling party, well organized as no Rhodesian party had previously been, controls government, and the influence of groups is drastically reduced. Leys recognized the strong organization of the Dominion Party (Later Rhodesia Front) as a new factor, but by his definition it did not result in a new party system. Thus, much of the disagreement between the two authors over the question of fundamental system change turns out to rest on differing definitions of system rather than on questions of fact.

A further difficulty on this point is that Murray's original research concerns the 1923–1953 period, while the question of whether a new system has emerged requires a comparison of the whole period 1923–1962 with the post 1962 Rhodesia Front/U.D.I. era. Observers who have studied this recent period have claimed that many of the associations which supported the pre 1962 system and its governing party have now switched their support to the Rhodesia Front. To the extent that this has happened, the argument that one can most fruitfully speak of a new system is weakened, even though the power of associations has unquestionably decreased relative to that of the governing party.

Differing definitions of system are not involved in Murray's other major criticism of

Leys—that the latter exaggerates the significance of European-African conflict and ignores the significance of intra-European conflict prior to about 1948. In this case the difference is probably due in part to the fact that Murray's analysis is more microscopic. He discusses the governmental system rather than the political-administrative system as a whole, and thus, through a more detailed examination, observes a higher level of conflict within the former. In addition, however, Murray's approach illustrates the difficulty of drawing systemic conclusions from selected historical material. Since Africans played a very insignificant role in the governmental system prior to 1953, they naturally receive little treatment in this book. (The African affairs sector is populated primarily by missionaries and the Native Affairs Department.) Yet Murray makes numerous references to European desires to put Africans at a competitive disadvantage, and thus to some extent documents the point he claims to disprove (pp. 89–90, 160–61, 210, 218–20 for example). What is needed to resolve the issue of the relative significance of European-African and intra-European conflict is a systematic collection of the relevant data, both aggregate and attitudinal. This is something that neither Leys or Murray attempt.

We have focused on the theoretical issues raised in the book under review because the author indicated that this is what he considers most significant. Although we have expressed some criticisms in this regard, it should be added that the concept of political sector is potentially a significant theoretical contribution. Furthermore, as previously stated, the descriptive material presented is extremely worthwhile.

JAMES R. SCARRITT

University of Colorado

National Communication and Language Policy in India. By Baldev Raj Nayar. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969. 230 Pp. \$12.50.)

In the words of its author, "the study seeks to evaluate the impact of government policy on the capacity for communication. . . ." Our expectations then are, first, of an exposition of India's problems of national communication, second, an account of national governmental efforts to ameliorate these problems, and, finally, an evaluation of these efforts. Our first two expectations are amply fulfilled. Our third, however, is not.

Second only to the fecundity of its population, India's linguistic diversity has been perhaps the major cause of despairing prognoses

of the nation's future. Computations vary, but more than a dozen "major" languages are spoken by about ninety per cent of the Indian population. Within these languages there are any number of mutually unintelligible dialects, and outside them, somewhere between more than a hundred to more than a thousand "minor" languages.

Beginning in 1953, the Government of India was compelled by popular agitation to honor the Congress party's pre-independence promise to reorganize the states of the Indian Union so that their borders would be coterminous with the borders of the "major" languages. In 1966, the process, having been attended by no small measure of civil disruption, was completed. However, paralleling these developments, the Government of India has been relatively unsuccessful in fulfilling its constitutional obligation to establish Hindi, the largest of the regional languages, as the "official" language of the Union, the "link" language for its "politically relevant strata." Under the Indian constitution, education (and therefore, language policy) is primarily a state responsibility. The Union government has been unable to overcome and unwilling to override the objections of some states to the teaching of Hindi and its use in government affairs.

To many students of development who are less familiar with India than Beldev Raj Nayar this outline of the problem looks like the blueprint of the Tower of Babel. Political scientists are in Professor Nayar's debt for making clear that the actual and potential capacities of Indians for inter-regional communications are considerably greater than they would appear on the surface.

Nayar tells us that Hindi, at least in its pidgin varieties, is widely understood in urban bazaars outside the Hindi-speaking area, and that among concentrations of Indians from different regions—as among the workers at the Rourkela steel plant in Orissa or on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands—Hindi has emerged as the *lingua franca*. Some states outside the Hindi-speaking area, notably Gujarat and Maharashtra and to a lesser extent Kerala, have established the serious study of Hindi as an important part of their school curricula. Voluntary agencies, Hindi-language films, and the seemingly incessant broadcasting of their songs over the radio have also increased the exposure of non-Hindi speakers to Hindi.

Within the Hindi-speaking area, the rapidly increasing use of Hindi as the language of both governmental and nongovernmental communications and the fast growing number of stu-

dents at all levels who use Hindi as a medium of learning and expression have aided considerably in developing and standardizing the language. The expansion of a pan-Indian economy enhances the economic importance of the huge Hindi-speaking market for goods and services—approximately two out of every five Indians live in it—and thus increases the attractiveness of knowing its language.

Given the will, Nayar assures us, the way toward learning Hindi is not difficult for speakers of other Indian languages. He subscribes to the view of the linguist Murray Emeneau that within and between the languages of the two major linguistic families, Indo-Aryan and Dravidian, such affinities have developed over the centuries as to make India a "single linguistic area." Indian children, we are told, "learn Hindi almost twice as fast as they do English."

The hard core of opposition to Hindi is only in Tamilnadu and West Bengal, and only in the former is there a major political movement that has organized anti-Hindi sentiments. These sentiments are perhaps on the rise in other parts of the South, largely in response to the zeal of Hindi enthusiasts in the North. But as long as Kerala, for example, keeps exporting its "white collar" proletariat, the study of Hindi in its schools can hardly be ignored.

Finally, Hindi is not the only "link" language. The social and scientific prestige of English, its apparently unshakable position in *haut bourgeois* circles and rapidly expanding opportunities for higher education and *embourgeoisement* have given some credence to Ram Manohar Lohia's prediction of some years ago that "Incorrect English" can certainly become the official language of the country."

How much has governmental effort had to do with the forging of these language links? Nayar tells us in considerable detail of the national Congress party's and government's largely unsuccessful efforts to establish politically acceptable formulae for the introduction of Hindi into education and government service. But he draws short of evaluating the impact of these efforts on the communications situation. Having presented his evidence, Nayar leaves most of the task of evaluation to his readers.

To this reader, the inescapable conclusion is not only that government efforts have failed to create a substantial "updraft" in favor of Hindi, but that the "updraft" that does exist has either not been created by government or been created by governmental efforts in areas other than language policy, e.g. in economic development. It seems fairly certain that Indians who have in-

terregional business to transact will be able to continue in some fashion, albeit an abhorrent one to the ideologues and the purists, to speak each other's language. On the other hand, governmental efforts to establish official language formulae have served largely to indicate rallying points for opposition from both Hindi zealots and their enemies: and because of its limited capabilities, the government has not been able to move beyond these points to a more decisive confrontation of the issue.

ROBERT W. STERN

Wells College

Eastern Europe. By Norman J. G. Pounds. (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1969. Pp. xx, 912. \$12.75.)

Any American student who plans to visit the Communist countries of Europe but knows very little or nothing about the people, geography and history of those countries is well advised to read this extensive book illustrated with 60 photographs and 130 maps and diagrams written by Norman J. G. Pounds, University Professor of Geography and History at Indiana University. This book will equip the reader with intelligent conversation material about the resources and development, population and settlement of eight Eastern European countries. However, it will tell him practically nothing about the politics, culture and social life in Eastern Europe. It is basically a reference book which in parts reads like a travelogue and is saturated with geographic, economic and demographic data extracted from statistical yearbooks before 1966. There is no perceptible thesis or theme uniting all the material except perhaps for the definition of Eastern Europe (the sphere of Soviet domination—only temporary in the case of Yugoslavia—with a state-controlled economic system).

In this bulky volume of 15 chapters, Pounds' primary concern is Eastern Europe from the end of the war to 1967, however, he has also four chapters devoted to the history of this area from Palaeozoic to Modern times. Briefly, but informatively, Pounds covers the history of the Slavs as well as the non-Slav peoples from the time of the Principate of Augustus (27 B.C.) to the present. The geographic part of this study is excellent; the historical section is good, however, the economic and political analyses are deficient. For example, there is twice as much space devoted to "drainage" than the government of an Eastern European country. There are aggregate data dealing with agricultural and industrial output, but there is no analysis which would explain economic efficiency;

problems of modernization; reform movements; labor policies and so on. Although the author makes it clear (see p. 1) that the scope of this book is the European territory under Soviet domination, there is no special treatment of this subject anywhere in the book. Whether Soviet domination is strong, weak or mild is not explained in this book. Furthermore, the absence of footnotes makes it difficult for anyone not willing to accept on faith the author's personal judgments. For example, on p. 148, Pound writes: "In Poland and Yugoslavia collectivisation is declared to be the ultimate goal of the governments, but fear of alienating the peasantry has caused them to postpone—apparently indefinitely—its attainment." It is not clear at all whether "them" means the different members of the Polish and Yugoslav party or government elite, whether the peasantry in Poland has the same influence on policy making as it does in Yugoslavia, or whether there were other reasons for abandoning collectivization of agriculture in these two countries.

As it is, Norman J. G. Pounds has written a valuable geographic study about Eastern Europe but he failed to explain how different is this geographic area in Europe under the sphere of Soviet domination.

PETER A. TOMA

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The USSR Arms the Third World: Case Studies in Soviet Foreign Policy. By Uri Ra'an'an. (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1969. Pp. 256.)

When Soviet arms have flooded a host of Near Eastern countries and many thousands of Soviet personnel stand in Egypt and other Arab lands, it is salutary to think back to the day, a mere sixteen years ago, when Western influence was practically unchallenged in the region and the youthful military leader in Cairo felt that he had to scheme craftily to obtain Soviet military aid without provoking active intervention by the United States. Uri Ra'an'an, Professor of International Politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, has analyzed the process by which the Soviet Union in 1955 undertook to supply Egypt with large quantities of arms and so gained the entree which has led to the present predominant Soviet influence in much of the Arab world.

It is Prof. Ra'an'an's stated intention to show the implausibility of accepted versions, to the effect that Nasser turned to the Soviet Union only as a last resort when the United States refused his pleas. He sees American shortsightedness as much less determinant than the ambi-

tions of Soviet and Arab leaders and their goals, which were opposite to the stability desired by the West. The arms deal which shocked the world when announced in September, 1955, was being incubated from the last days of 1954 by the clandestine agencies, the author shows; in February, 1955, a credit was agreed, with details to be filled in. The matter was caught up in Kremlin infighting; Molotov wanted a Europe-centered, stand-pat policy to permit digestion of postwar gains and was fearful of complications in the Near East, while Khrushchev was eager to press forward. Molotov, our author believes, was slated to succeed Malenkov as chairman of the council of ministers and was replaced at the last moment by Bulganin because of his foreign policy views. Both Egypt and the Soviet Union were at once suspicious of each other and apprehensive of a possible American reaction, partly because of action taken in 1954 to prevent Guatemala from receiving communist arms. They did not finally decide to go ahead until the Geneva summit conference in July and the euphoria emanating from it convinced them that there was no danger. Nasser's negotiations for American arms were thus only a ploy, partly to improve his bargaining position with the Russians but mostly to cover the deal being prepared, reduce the likelihood of counteraction, and give appearances of acting from injured innocence.

Although Prof. Ra'anani hardly considers that the United States may have been somewhat imperious even while lacking the will to act effectively, his analysis raises serious questions about policy toward both the Soviet Union and ambitious states of the Third World. If the Soviet Union, at a time as promising for detente as any in the past generation, regarded a pacific American mood as a license for fishing in waters which they helped trouble, if deviousness and falsification are as much the rule in Soviet foreign policy as appears in this book, and if the Soviet Union is impelled forward by a dialectical feeling that to stand still is to fall behind (as Ra'anani states), one must have some sympathy for the knights of the cold war. It is likewise difficult to see how the United States could have satisfied the wishes of Third World leaders who could not undertake to use arms only for defensive purposes and who would not pay cash for weapons which the Soviet Union was prepared to deliver in huge quantities on easiest terms. The West clearly has no adequate policy for handling the tensions and ambitions of the emerging nations. Prof. Ra'anani offers as consolation the thesis that the Russians gained very little return for

their substantial expenditure. He points out that givers of foreign aid can expect little gratitude and obtain little leverage. Results in fact remained far below Khrushchev's optimistic expectations for many years. But by now the Soviet Union can congratulate itself on having largely expunged Western influence in an extremely strategic corner of the world; this may be of no great benefit to the Soviet people, but it must be a satisfaction to the Politburo.

Somewhat regrettably, the author drops his study of the Soviet arming of Egypt rather abruptly in the summer of 1955 before deliveries actually began and turns to the furnishing of weaponry to Indonesia, 1956-1960. This account, encumbered by many trivia although less than half as long as the preceding one, sheds more light on Indonesian than Soviet politics. The story is similar: an expansionist-minded charismatic leader carried on undercover negotiations for Soviet arms while requesting, more or less *pro forma*, arms from the United States. In contrast to the Egyptian case, however, American munitions were actually procured for the ground forces, while the airforce was provided by the Soviet bloc. Much more clearly than in the case of Egypt, the large Soviet expenditure was wasted, as Indonesia turned first pro-Chinese and then pro-Western. But Prof. Ra'anani fails to note that it was the American-supplied army which turned against Sukarno and the communists; the airforce was more leftist. The Russians might also have taken the lesson, as they seem to have done, that aid is more usefully dispensed in nearby lands.

It is easy to find fault. It would be more satisfying if the book developed further and limited itself to the study of Soviet policy in the Near East. It sheds little light upon Soviet purposes and interests in the Third World, beyond obvious strategic considerations. There is little general discussion even of Soviet military aid policy. The material being limited, the writing is prolix and repetitive; points are even repeated more or less verbatim (as on pp. 68 and 77); all the essentials might well have been condensed into an excellent article. Much is speculative or guesswork: "Nasser may have said . . .," "He presumably wanted . . .," etc. A good deal is made of Chinese influence, but it is nowhere demonstrated that Russian leaders greatly valued Chinese support or were much moved to oblige their Asian comrades; more convincing is the point made by Ra'anani that China and the Soviet Union were already rivals in Asia in 1957. It is odd to state that an agreement facilitating Czech use of the port of Ri-

jeka gave the Yugoslavs a "stranglehold" on Czech shipments to the Near East (p. 89), and it is unlikely that Khrushchev had by February, 1955, three months before the pilgrimage to Belgrade, converted Tito into a reliable friend. The enmity for Israel which Egypt and the Soviet Union shared is strangely neglected as a factor in their relations.

Nonetheless, this is a book which has much more to say than most essays in political science. By a careful and thorough case study, it tells much about the conduct of Soviet foreign policy. This is depicted as cunning, secretive, and unscrupulous, verbally coated with ideology. Bluster and bravado were checked by respect for danger and readiness to pull back if risks grew, but Soviet purposes appear basically contrary to those of the Western world. Students of Soviet foreign policy, even though they may not care for Ra'anán's analysis, should take it into account.

ROBERT G. WESSON

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Antologia di Scienza Politica. Ed. by Giovanni Sartori. (Bologna: Società Editrice Il Mulino, 1970. Pp. 492. L. 5,000.)

Giovanni Sartori has mustered the cooperation of six young Italian scholars to assemble a reader on American political science. I say "American" political science because almost all thirty-six contributions reproduced in the reader are either by American scholars teaching in American universities or by European émigrés. The contributions are all well known and accurately represent the diversity of approaches and concerns with which American political scientists operate. Similarly, the selection of the topics covered by the reader—theory and methodology, power and elites, political culture and behavior, parties and pressure groups, public administration, political development—is characteristic of readers published in the United States. What recommends the book to the attention of the American scholar is Sartori's general introduction, as well as his associates' lengthy introductions to the single topics. Sartori's introduction is a lucid and relentless analysis of the underdevelopment of Italian political science, the cultural and intellectual reasons behind it, and its negative effects on the operation of political elites and institutions.

Sartori includes, for example, a persuasive analysis of the illiteracy of Italian opinion leaders on matters of scientific political analysis, and their provincial belief that politics is

merely art or ideology; he shows how these weaknesses contribute to the incompetence of Italian political elites. Of particular interest to the foreign reader is Sartori's discussion of the predominance of neo-Hegelianism in Italian scholarship and of the reasons that philosophical theories of Hegelian derivation—which are not empirical theories—are not designed for political and social engineering.

But—no surprise to anyone who knows Sartori or his writings—the prime, if indirect, target of his critique is not Italian political scholarship but American political science, or at least much of what American political scientists have done on the frontiers of the discipline. And the critique is explicitly and successfully developed in the introductory essays by Sartori's associates, especially those by Fisichella and Pasquino.

They maintain that the main affliction visited upon contemporary political science is "pansociologism," or the hegemony of sociology in the scientific study of human and political behavior. Its effects are particularly deleterious for Italian political science, a late-born whose growth it severely retards. But, if I read correctly the minds of the authors, the damage can still be remedied. For one thing, as a late comer, Italian political science can start fresh and learn from the mistakes others have made. While its growth may be slow, it may be steady and appropriate. For another thing, the faddish mindlessness that characterized Italy's sudden discovery of sociology in the 50's and 60's may have limited the damage. The rapid growth of the discipline, the chaotic and acritical way in which ideas and approaches were received and disseminated by scholars and by publishers, and the dubious uses to which those were put by opinion leaders longing for packaged diagnoses of the ills of Italian society—all of this may have made the damage extensive but by the same token superficial. The tool was not sharp enough to hit vital parts.

By comparison, it seems to me, the situation in the United States is in some respects more serious. The difference between the two countries is that in the United States "pansociologism," instead of stunting the growth of political science, has undermined the discipline from within and pervasively affected its orientations, to the point that a reputable sociologist like Neil Smelser can claim that there is no difference today between political science and political sociology. Moreover, disciplinary boundaries have been blurred in the search for a master social science that has a long history, intel-

lectual credibility, and scientific appeal in its favor. No matter how removed its achievement and how wavering its pursuit, the claim that such master science is to be found in sociology and that political science is only a field for its application remains understandably attractive to many political scientists. The negative effects of such an attitude on contemporary political science are double.

First of all, while operational knowledge of politics has been sacrificed, the search for "higher-level" interdisciplinary concepts has so far yielded only an ordering language conceptually dubious and therefore empirically inapplicable. When, in turn, sociological concepts of a middle-range have been used in empirical political research, the reductionist fashion in which they have been employed has considerably hampered their utility. The study of political development, for which sociological concepts seemed most appropriate, has suffered as a consequence. But equal damage has been done to the study of industrial societies. In both cases we have often been overtaken by political events. Change has not been predicted or has taken directions that only few anticipated. Explanations are now lagging and, most serious, we are incapable of the political engineering that should distinguish us from other social scientists.

Second, many political scientists, frustrated by our failures and concerned if not obsessed by the need for relevance, have decided to forego the pursuit of operational knowledge. Instead they have opted entirely for what Sartori calls "sociologizing philosophies"—a blend of sweeping analyses of the ills of society and of ultimate-end prescriptions, often of Hegelian or young-Marx derivation.

It is not without significance that both extremes should find room in the discipline. For if we have failed to develop our discipline adequately, it may be psychologically more rewarding and intellectually easier to balance the sterile neo-scholasticism of one extreme and the synthetic analysis of the other, rather than to undertake serious reassessment. Which is another way of saying that, for all their apparent conflict, the two approaches to politics are intellectually cognate in deriving from the same culture of political illiteracy and scientific poverty. In particular, the scientific emptiness of "sociologizing philosophies" is made perceptively clear by Sartori, who suggests that, at least in the case of many Italian scholars, the discovery of such philosophies is a return to their youthful sins, when neo-Hegelianism

dominated Italian scholarship and "social science" was a contradiction in terms. That is, for all their veneer of relevance and social analysis, such philosophies share with philosophical theories a substantial unconcern for systematic observation and operational prescriptions.

The plea by Sartori and his associates, of course, is a restatement of the proper concerns of the science of politics and of the operational knowledge of which it is capable. For the chief mistake many of us have made, especially on the frontiers of the discipline, is not so much that we have adopted wrong sociological models, as that we have chosen sociological models at all. More precisely, the mistake is a reductionist use of such models. Hence, the remedy is not a better set of sociological models; it is a more attentive and purposeful search for politico-institutional models capable of greater explanatory power. Indeed, with all due respect for some sociological models, it is politics that is the strategically located variable for processing conflict, directing change, and controlling development. And it is political analysis that can best provide us with operational prescriptions. Good citizen of Florence that he is, Sartori is reminding us that politics is how to make virtue out of necessity.

GIUSEPPE DI PALMA

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Georges Mandel and The Third Republic. By John M. Sherwood. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970. Pp. 393. \$12.95.)

He was an extraordinary man: Jewish, but a conservative nationalist; a politician, but imperious and supercilious toward his fellow legislators; thoroughly ambitious, but often isolated in the Chamber of Deputies defending his principles. This was Georges Mandel whose biography by Professor John M. Sherwood of Queen's University, Ontario is a meticulous and fascinating work of scholarship. Although Mandel's personal papers were stolen by the Germans during the Occupation and then apparently lost, Professor Sherwood has tirelessly combed local and national newspapers, interviewed Mandel's friends and associates and analyzed his speeches and public writings in order to draw this excellent portrait of one of the consummate political actors in, although not necessarily of, the Third Republic.

In the Third Republic because from his very entry onto the political stage as a personal assistant to Georges Clemenceau, Mandel soon became one of the most feared, hated, yet respected men in French politics. Albert Sarraut

said of him, "He has read everything, the philosophers, the moralists, the politicians and particularly, the historians. He knew the history of France, especially that of the Third Republic better than anyone else." And after he became a deputy a speech by Mandel was sufficient to undermine a Government or ruin a Prime Minister. Yet, he was never of the Third Republic because his views on politics, especially on party politics were quite at odds with the style of the time. Tirelessly but fruitlessly Mandel spent his career trying to move France toward a stable two party system. He argued that a strong Prime Minister should take clear-cut positions on issues, forcing the parties to align either for or against the leader. And Mandel occasionally caught glimpses of such a system amid the fogs and vapours of French politics. "If we look at our political history since 1870, we will see that people voted for or against Thiers, for or against Gambetta, or Marshal MacMahon, for or against the policy symbolized by Jules Ferry, for or against General Boulanger, for or against Waldeck Rousseau. . . I want to see conflicts of idea, but they cannot take place without men; an idea not represented by a person is a myth." As well, Mandel was an early advocate of a form of regionalism and a proponent of the one ballot, single-member plurality election system. (Professor Sherwood is quite correct in calling attention to the similarity in Mandel's ideas and those of General De Gaulle and the Fifth Republic. But it would have been interesting to know if Mandel had been influenced by reading English and North American critics who also thought a two party system would be to France what Lourdes was to the sick). Early in his career Mandel hoped that Clemenceau's dominating personality would force a clarification of party lines. But when Clemenceau refused to battle for the Presidency at the end of his career, Mandel's last hope vanished.

Indifferent to and generally conservative in domestic affairs Mandel was an intransigent nationalist in foreign affairs. Never deviating from his faith in the Republic and his belief in an active foreign policy, Mandel was frequently allied with some of the most notorious nationalist anti-Semites in France. But when defeatism and anti-Semitism joined an unholy alliance after the Popular Front era, Mandel was forsaken by many of his friends on the Right.

First as Minister of Posts, Telephone and Telegraph, and then later as Minister of the Interior during the waning days of the Third Republic, Mandel impressed everyone with his un-

canny self-control, administrative ability and political acumen. When the budget for Mandel's Ministry of the PTT came before the Chamber of Deputies in 1934, it was passed with almost no debate, according to Sherwood an almost "unprecedented event" (p. 152). As Minister of the Interior in 1940 "journalists, statesmen, diplomats and scholars" all shared the opinions of the former foreign minister, and the Ambassador of the Spanish Republic both of whom agreed that if Mandel instead of Reynaud had been Prime Minister the destiny of France would have changed (Sherwood, p. 243). A staunch opponent of Germany from the very beginning, Mandel fought to have the French resist the Germans and when France was invaded he advocated carrying on the war from North Africa. After Pétain came to power, however, Mandel went to North Africa, hoping to organize a resistance government. Imprisoned there under the orders of the Vichy government his fate was sealed. Churchill wrote "Thus perished the hope of setting up a strong representative French Government either in Africa or in London." After years of imprisonment in North Africa, France and Germany, Mandel was finally murdered in July 7, 1944 by a member of the French fascist Milice.

Professor Sherwood's biography dispels once and for all the mystery and confusion that has surrounded the political career of this unique French politician, and his book is a valuable addition to the literature on the politics of the Third Republic.

HARVEY G. SIMMONS

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Man's Power: A Biased Guide to Political Thought and Action. Kalman H. Silvert. (New York: The Viking Press, 1970. Pp. 163. \$4.95.)

Colleagues who have followed Kalman Silvert's work in development theory and Latin American politics have long appreciated that he is a very rare and very special kind of academic author. This view is amply supported by this new essay presenting a theoretical frame for the analysis of social change. The importance of the theme, the tightness of the argument, and the easy elegance of the presentation make this a remarkable work. The reader will find in it a most serious concern for relevance and an attempt to confront directly the problems of how political behavior should be studied and what criteria make sense in the judgment of political action.

This volume defies easy summary, but if a sketch of the main points is to be presented—and the reader is always entitled to one in a review—it seems accurate to suggest that the core of this work is an attempt to develop an analytical model that will permit examination of the process of political change. The book begins with a discussion of the kinds of questions to be posed and the kind of data to be collected if we are to improve our diagnostic and predictive posture as far as political behavior is concerned. Mr. Silvert gives some interesting views of what it is that we should look for, and also suggests why he finds other approaches less useful.

The discussion then turns, and the building blocs of politics just examined are reexamined as a source of change. The author chooses to approach the problem by an examination of how conflicts as well as attempts at synthesis generate change and how in turn conflict and reconciliation are shaped by the differences and cleavages in institutions, ideologies, class structure, power, personalities, values, that constitute the form and substance of political behavior.

The essay then focuses on the pattern of change we call modernization and development. Silvert weaves a tight connection between freedom and modernity. “. . . *modernizing* social change [he writes at one point] occurs when the area of effective and rational choice is widened at the same time that the number and types of persons and groups who can participate in making significant decisions increase. . . . (110) Developmental change increases the level of specialization and institutional differentiation. . . . (110) Developed societies need not be modern ones. Modern ones must be developed” (111).

The final portion of *Man's Power* builds on what has been developed earlier and elaborates the view that—“‘Good politics,’ a politics that widens the area of effective choice is desirable in itself. . . .” (xxiv) It is in this last portion that the author seeks to make clear the linkages that can be established between theory and action, and discusses with some fervor what he considers to be the major pollutants damaging the health of a political system: (a) mendacity, (b) denial of participation, (c) corruption and (c₁) incompetence.

We can explore here only one or two of a large number of possible questions raised in this book and deserving comment. Let us begin with one from the set of ideas that deal with modernization. In over two decades of research

Silvert has been concerned with what he perceives as two fundamentally different responses to development: a developmental pattern which seeks to further development and minimize modernization which he perceives as very frequent in the Mediterranean basin, and the Northwestern European pattern of development permitting a good deal more modernization. Silvert's own empirical research in Latin America has been largely concerned with the Mediterranean type and so have his theoretical preoccupations. In Silvert's view an extreme case of development combined with minimization of modernization is the Falangist and fascist state (135 ff).

A word of explanation is in order. To Kalman Silvert a crucial feature of the fascist system is the compartmentalization of the whole society into a number of self-contained sub systems or pillars—the bureaucracy, the church, industry, agriculture, the army, etc.—with both the masses and most elite members in each subsystem fairly isolated from most others. In such a society masses and elites are connected by vertical communication networks almost entirely contained within each sub-system. Lateral communications and the whole process of adjustment among sub-systems essential for the functioning of national life is essentially reserved to the highest stratum of elites. To Silvert such a system provides no real unity; the interaction which would permit the creation of consensual perceptions essential for the development and maintenance of community is largely absent at most levels. In such a system the political subsystem is only *primus inter pares*, and its primacy claim is largely symbolic.

It should become understandable why Silvert defined nationalism “as the acceptance of the state as the impersonal and ultimate arbiter of human affairs,” for real integration does not begin until the control of primary loyalties is broken. Second, it should be noted that Silvert's conception of fascism would be applicable—even though differing in important respects—to some of the empirical descriptions of present-day political structure and process in some of the developed political systems of Western Europe, systems that have been defended by a number of distinguished researchers as democratic. Clearly such different evaluations of very similar empirical patterns are somewhat startling and provide food for thought.

Noteworthy in the discussion of development is the clear preoccupation of this author with man's choice and the manner and the reasons for his decisions. This orientation obviously ex-

cludes approaches where individuals are held entirely as the dependent variable in the human story. Silvert's own explanation why he feels his to be a preferable approach to the study of change is worth quoting in full:

It is true that our minds have been poisoned by determinisms that make man the dependent variable in society. We think that technological innovation will not be denied, that urbanization produces urbanity, that science is a *deus ex machina*, that economic organization determines all other social relations, that factories manufacture industrial man. Still, some social thinkers know that human beings are in truth the independent variable, and that it is precisely the degree to which their independence can be expressed that is the only solid measure of social and personal growth. They know that, *empirically*, technological innovation is constantly denied its full application, that villagers often live in cities, that science is canalized by politics, that marketplaces are the site of genuine power struggles, and that bricklayers, masons, engineers, and bankers build factories that in turn can be run by slave labor, unionized workers, or white-collar employees obeying magnetic tapes (148-149).

One final point. Precisely because the author is concerned with relevance and with closing the gap between theory and action, his judgment as to the proper role of political science and the political scientist should be of interest. Silvert's strong convictions are implicit in the writing of his volume, but one or two statements in his introduction are quite explicit: "The time has passed, in which moral pleading could pass for political theory. . . . (xxiii) The first condition of a useful political science is that it permit significant diagnosis and verifiable prediction, both based on procedures based on replication. A dangerous political science, by my criteria, is one whose formulators try to apply their learning to the making of policy in the government—as distinct from persons who make professional and technical advice available without themselves attempting to suggest or set policy. In short, I automatically trust the political instincts of my colleagues no more than anybody else's." (xvii) In the light of recent turmoil and debate here and abroad among those who study politics as to its proper direction, these statements should be carefully considered.

Works showing their authors engagé are not as rare as they used to be,—yet treatises combining explicit preoccupation with values and an equally serious and well-defined concern for theory and data and rigor are quite rare. It is this combination that makes the book exciting reading. This reviewer will not advance an opinion whether he considers this book with its

concerns a book for all seasons, but there can be no doubt that it is a book for this season and it should be read.

A. F. K. ORGANSKI

The University of Michigan

Inside the Third Reich. Memoirs by Albert Speer. Translated from the German by Richard and Clara Winston. Introduction by Eugene Davidson. (New York: Macmillan. 1970. Pp. xviii, 596. Illustr. \$12.50.)

Albert Speer was Hitler's "only friend." He might, he now writes, "in view of his kindred feelings" have become Hitler's successor. He helped to prolong the war, although he considered it lost, for perhaps two years, through utilization of millions of foreign slave laborers. At Nurnberg he received only a 20-year prison sentence, mainly for two technical legal reasons: the Tribunal found that Sauckel—who on Speer's behalf organized the deportations and was hanged—was not under Speer's formal jurisdiction; and it rejected the conspiracy doctrine urged by the U.S. prosecution which would have held the accused leaders jointly responsible. These memoirs give many glimpses by a top insider of Hitler and Hitler's intimates, of Germany's war economy, military and weapons strategy and, above all, personal intrigues that accompanied basic decisions. The praise bestowed on the work, not only in Mr. Davidson's almost lyrical introduction but by many reviewers, has gradually given over to more sober evaluations.*

The book claims to be a personal confession. Yet, the author's genuine philosophical acceptance of "responsibility for the entire regime" is so loaded with distortions, evasions and omissions as to become an apologia; so spiced with anecdotes (including extramarital complications) and trivia ("servants in livery served French cognac") as to be more *True Confessions* than true confession; and so drenched with the hauteur of the well-bred onlooker about the vulgarity of others that Speer always comes out on top. Speer seduces the reader by presenting himself simultaneously as repentant sinner and, despite all, lovable rascal. Thus, he reveals, his famous searchlight effects for Hitler's pre-war rallies at the gigantic Speer-built Nurnberg stadium were to obscure the "sizable

* See, esp. Geoffrey Barraclough's dissection in *The New York Review*, Jan. 9, 1971, pp. 6-14; John K. Galbraith, in *N. Y. Times Book Review*, Jan. 10, 1971, pp. 2 ff; Adrian Fisher and James Rowe, "Was Speer a Humanitarian?" in *N.Y. Times*, Jan. 25, 1971, p. 43; also previously, e.g., William H. Harlan, in *Saturday Review*, Aug. 29, 1970, pp. 19 ff.

paunches" the "small prebends" of the marching nazi officials had become (58). This levity obscures the ominous contents of those rallies (e.g., Hitler announced his first race laws there) and Speer's essential co-responsibility for their fruition. Speer reduces to sarcasms even the horrors of the concentration camp stone quarries where prisoners were tortured to death hewing and transporting granite for his monumental buildings: That funny Himmler with his "futuristic ideas" (even more ironic in the original: "*der unentwegt Zukunftsprojekten nachlaufende Himmler*") wanted to help out but delivered blocks that cracked, which prompted Hitler's joke that the SS better produce felt slippers! (144). The implication that the "project" was of short duration is also untrue, and his own inspection of the notorious Mauthausen camp (16 IMT 444/5) is not mentioned.

Speer admits to the political significance of his aesthetics, but this granite story alone should destroy the Speer legend, to which the book devotes scores of pages, of the idealistic artist misguided by Hitler's megalomania. Furthermore, during his years as Hitler's architect, he also held numerous high party positions, such as leader of the Union of Nationalsocialist Technicians, senator of the Reich Chamber of Culture, member of the presidency of the Academy of Arts (16 IMT 564)—organizations deeply involved in the elimination of Jews, leftists and "cultural Bolsheviks." We are only informed that in January 1941 he "resigned all [his] party offices." (177).

Speer became Minister of armament and war production early in 1942 when the hopes for a fast victory had vanished. More and new weapons were urgently needed. He became the No. 2 man during the period of the expansion of the concentration camp system and the interconnected expansion of the slave labor system. In turn, policies such as the mass killing of Soviet prisoners of war had to be modified, and slave workers had to be somewhat better fed. Speer ruthlessly demanded performance obtained by whatever methods—which made him the opposite of a technocrat. He no longer argues as his counsel did at Nurnberg that Germany's "extreme emergency" justified the compulsion of foreigners just as of Germans (19, IMT, esp. 191). But neither does he really concede the legal and moral wrong of forcing enemy civilians and prisoners of war, *even if not mistreated*, to make weapons for war against or subjugation of their own countries. He cryptically chides the Judgment for "purely numerical" standards—perhaps an oblique hedge

against the Judgment's illustrations of the enormity of his demands, such as, in August 1942, "a further million Russians" to be recruited with *11 weeks*, and in January 1944, "at least 4 million new workers from [various] occupied territories." (I, IMT, 331/2). Such demands engendered ever vaster atrocities, *especially* if they could not be fully met. He cannot be blamed for avoiding gory aspects. But he fails to inform the reader that such aspects constituted the essence of the regime.

For this reason, his further silence about the character of his fellow-protagonists amounts to falsification. Thus, he reports in detail his trips to Italy and Bayreuth with his close friend, Hitler's physician Karl Brandt. No faintest hint that Brandt participated prominently in the monstrous medical experiments on concentration camp victims, and in the euthanasia program that exterminated at least 275,000 "useless eaters" including an unascertainable number of "foreign laborers no longer able to work" (Judgment of Nurnberg 4-Power Tribunal, I IMT 247). Oswald Pohl, head of all SS concentration camp "economic activities," who like Brandt was hanged on sentence by a U.S. Nurnberg Tribunal, is parenthetically mentioned as "moderately good-natured." Speer says nothing about the role of German industry in labor and production matters, although he is a top expert on the subject.* Eerily, but for reasons, he is completely silent about the "final solution of the Jewish problem"—which, incidentally, destroyed millions of potential workers. There are horrible implications in his lapidary statement, "Hitler's hatred against the Jews seemed to me so much a matter of course that I gave it no serious thought." (112)

His reliance on the reader's gullibility, to which even Mr. Davidson succumbs (xvii) reaches bottom in his self-pitying story (375/6) about Auschwitz. In summer 1944(!) a friend alluded to something unspeakable going on in Silesia: it "must have been" Auschwitz; he still feels guilty for not having found out afterwards. Documentary evidence proves Speer's and his Ministry's involvement in Auschwitz. For example, on 9/15/42, Speer approved building material worth 13.7 million RM to construct 300 barracks for 132,000 Auschwitz inmates (NI-15392); in November 1942,

* See, e.g., his interrogation as defense witness, conducted by this reviewer, in the U.S. Nurnberg, "Flick concern" case (VI *Trials of War Criminals before the Nurnberg Military Tribunals*, pp. 789 ff.), and the records of the U.S. Nurnberg "Krupp" and "I. G. Farben" cases.

Speer's Oberinspektor Koelpin inspected an I. G. Farben-Auschwitz construction site to decide whether they had received too many inmates (NI-15256); on 7/27/43, Geheimrat Carl Krauch advised Himmler of having "also written to Minister Speer" about "expansion of another [I. G. Farben] synthetic factory . . . as was done at Auschwitz by . . . inmates of your camps" (NI-10040); in May 1944, upon his urging the 100,000 Hungarian Jews promised him by Hitler for the tenfold expansion of the notorious subterranean factories, he was routinely advised that two trainloads of Hungarian Jews (which always included women and children) had arrived at Auschwitz. (NOKW-336; R-124, introduced by U. S. Trial Counsel Thomas J. Dodd, 3 IMT, 467).

The most disturbing aspect of this result of 20 years meditation by Nazism's best mind is his ultimate warning and conclusion: The whole curse and madness resulted from human depravity and modern technology. The message turns Nurnberg's lesson—crucial in an era of nuclear Caesarism—into its opposite. The evil resulted not from metaphysically ordained fatality but from specific abuse of power by specifically depraved individuals.

The translation is on the whole skillful. Yet, some telling nuances are lost. Speer rebukes Hitler for contemplating the destruction of Paris and, what is worse, "without cause" (173). The translation omits to mention that Speer saw "*eigentlich*"—"actually" or, as the French say, "*au fond*" no cause for the destruction of Paris! This "*au fond*" is the man, and the book.

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The Commander of the Faithful: The Moroccan Political Elite—A Study of Segmented Politics. By John Waterbury. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970. pp. 368. \$10.00.)

Political culture defined in terms of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and "values" and properly operationalized in elaborate questionnaires may help in modest measure explain the workings of a given political system. Waterbury prefers a quicker and less expensive route. Drawing upon the work of anthropologists who have studied segmentary tribal societies, he has extracted from the culture a distinctive pattern of political behavior that persists, as a sort of "behavioral lag," in contemporary Morocco, in the Europeanized cities and among the French-educated elites as well as among the decomposing tribes of the hinterlands. Thus defined, political culture illuminates, even if it does not explain, Moroccan political processes. Armed

with his working hypothesis of behavioral lag and a congruent sense of humor, Waterbury does a superb job of analyzing Moroccan politics. Despite his disclaimer that "it is more important to understand what Moroccans really do and why they do it than to understand what they think they are doing" (p. 5) his book expresses a *verstehen* of Moroccan politics that has evaded less acculturated observers.

The pattern in question is that of defensive political actors maximizing their possible alliances, avoiding choices between rival groups or factions wherever possible ("bet-hedging"), and constantly conspiring for marginal gains in a zero-sum power game from which no one (with the exception of an occasional Ben Barka) is permanently excluded. Groups and factions are held together by their mutual rivalries, so that constant tension maintains the groups in a more or less stagnant equilibrium. In traditional Morocco the units were tribes or tribal segments, potential alliance systems that conflict could activate. Today the units range from primordial groups to "mixed" and "interest-oriented" factions like political parties and labor unions. Waterbury compares these segmental-factions to those of tribal society. Their mutual alliances and oppositions and internal schisms resemble those of traditional tribal segments. The individual political actors display the political reflexes of their tribal (and urban) forefathers.

But why the behavioral lag, despite the tremendous changes in Morocco's political and social structure since French established their protectorate in 1912? On one level of analysis, which may be too general to be useful, Waterbury suggests that the same factional tension and stalemate characterizes the politics of most, if not all, Arab Middle Eastern countries, and thus can hardly be surprising though it has not been studied sufficiently. But the behavioral lag of Morocco's national political elite has a more specific and satisfactory explanation. Those who inherited the spoils of independence in 1956 came from essentially the same families, and in some cases were even the same individuals, as Morocco's leaders before 1912. The major (though not exclusive) key to elite status was French higher education, and the few who obtained it came mostly from traditional elite families. Thus French education did not significantly restratify Moroccan society during the colonial period. Perhaps behavioral lag in Moroccan national politics simply reflects a freezing of Moroccan social structure. But then political stalemate and immobilism may be explained not so much by behavioral lag as by dominant elite interests.

The behavioral lag hypothesis contains within it a certain ambiguity. If the "normal" state of political affairs is one of evanescent groups segmenting and realigning in quest of marginal spoils, the zaim (leader) who atomizes all other solidarities in the name of Islam (or some more contemporary ideology) is an equally recurrent phenomenon in the Arabo-Islamic world. Waterbury admits this (pp. 88-90, 155) but never really explains why King Hassan "has rejected the role of national leader and has never exploited the immense demagogic potential that he retains . . . (but rather) has been obliged to devote most of his energies and thought to the manipulation of elite units" in order to retain "the more familiar role" of arbiter. (p. 155) Perhaps, given the interests of the present political elite and attitudes of potential counter-elites, he has no alternative.

This study does not rigorously distinguish elite from non-elite members, much less analyze the interests or strategies of its component parts. We are told that the political elite consists of the "strategic minorities" who "have an actual or potential influence on decision-making and the distribution of spoils and patronage, and who articulate, occasionally or persistently, their demands." (p. 82) It is small (perhaps a thousand members in various top political, military, administrative, commercial, and religious positions) and introverted; access is by co-optation. Most members come from traditionally prominent families; they inter-marry and have been busily acquiring or consolidating commercial privileges and former colonial estates since independence. Perhaps a modern bourgeoisie is in the making, but Waterbury leaves open the question as to whether class is superceding family, religious, and tribal ties. His focus upon patterns of behavior naturally limits his discussion to one of political tactics rather than class interests and strategies.

Still, a rigorous analysis of the political elite and its economic interests would scarcely have furthered our understanding of Morocco's improvised, day-to-day political spectacle if, like a light show, it represents nothing but inchoate shapes in flashing display. The actors think tactically; they do not have long-term projects. As Waterbury concludes, "The monarchy is a marvelous excuse for the Moroccan elite to benefit from a system that it refuses to espouse and for whose shortcomings it shirks all responsibility. The king realizes that the perfunctory grumbings of his clientele will most probably never take the form of an overt challenge to his regime upon whose rewards the elite has come to depend. Inescapably, new elites, with little or no stake in the present but great hopes in the

future, will take up the responsibilities their elders have refused to assume." (p. 315) Waterbury's negative conclusions about the absorptive capacities of the elite should stifle the characteristic Marxist criticism that analyses of political culture mask a conservative bias.

CLEMENT HENRY MOORE

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History of West Africa. By J. B. Webster and A. A. Boahen with H. O. Idowu (New York, Praeger Publishers, 1970. Pp. 333. \$9.00.)

This survey of the history of West Africa, originally published by Longmans Green & Company Ltd. under the title *The Revolutionary Years: West Africa Since 1800* is one of the volumes of the Praeger Library of African Affairs. The book is well written and organized in a manner that makes for easy reading. The previous connection of J. B. Webster with secondary education, the style of writing and the complete lack of footnoting leads one to believe that his book was written for the secondary school student. However, for the college student taking a first course in African history or African political systems, the work provides a very useful background from the period 1815 to independence. Some knowledge of this period is a prerequisite for an understanding of both African history and African political systems.

The work is organized around the four major movements in West African history; 1) the introduction and spread of Islam; 2) the abolition of slavery; 3) the partition of Africa by the European powers; 4) the rise of modern nationalism. The book is divided into five parts. Part one deals with the rise and spread of Islam and the Abolition of slavery. The jihads of Uthman dan Fodio, Hamed Bari and al Hajj Umar together with the activities of the Islamic brotherhoods of the Sanusiyya and the Tijaniyya were the instrumentalities of the Islamic movement of the nineteenth century in the Western Sudan.

Part Two is devoted to a description of the Coastal Kingdoms of the Nineteenth Century. The rise and fall of the Oyo Empire is described in some detail as are the Dahomey and the Ashanti Empires. There is also a description of the Ibo as a segmentary political system. The latter is of special interest to political scientists studying African political systems. There are also chapters on the settlement of Sierra Leone and Liberia by freed slaves.

Part Three describes the relationships between West Africa and Europe in the period 1800 to 1900. Part Three begins with the rise and fall of the city states of the Niger Delta

followed by a description of the fall of southern Ghana. The remaining two chapters describe the partition of West Africa by the European powers and the collapse of the African states in the face of the European military and economic power.

The four chapters of Part Four are devoted to the response of the Africans to foreign rule. The first two chapters describe the colonial policy of indirect rule, which dominated the British colonial policy, and the French policy of assimilation. A chapter on colonial economy and the efforts of African to reform the colonial policies completes part four. The twenty-four pages of the chapter on Efforts to Reform Colonialism provides an interesting, but brief, survey of the efforts of the African to cope with colonialism within the system.

Part Five consists of one chapter and attempts to deal with the changes which resulted from World War II to independence. This chapter of only thirteen pages attempts to deal with post World War II independence movements in Ghana, Nigeria and French Africa. This chapter is much too brief even for a survey history.

The authors have attempted a very ambitious task which on the whole is satisfactorily completed. One major criticism is the complete lack of documentation. If, as may well be the case, this is intended as a textbook for secondary education it may be excused. However, as a scholarly work it is fatally deficient in substantiation of fact and conclusion. The absence of footnotes is not mitigated by a bibliography. There is a section titled Further Reading whose eight pages are somewhat padded by the numerous citation of individual selections from books of readings, many from the same work.

There are some minor problems such as the use of Asante for the more frequently used Ashanti, and the occasional failure to adequately identify a person or place at its first introduction in the text. Proper identification is usually available for those who are willing to search for it. For example, "a Christian preacher by the name of Harris" is identified as being responsible for "... greatest Christian mass movement in West African History." It is only when the illustrations are examined that we learn that the Christian preacher is Prophet William Wade Harris. This happens only occasionally but often enough for the reader to be disturbed.

On the whole the book is well written, interesting to read and with the above reservations worth the time. It is not the needed scholarly survey of West African History.

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The Mexican Revolution: Federal Expenditure and Social Change Since 1910. By James W. Wilkie. (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1967, 1970. Pp. 337. \$9.00.)

This book was first published in 1967. It received the Bolton Prize for the best work in Latin American history in that year. It has been widely noted and discussed and was the subject of a full scale review article (by Thomas Skidmore and Peter Smith, *Latin American Research Review*, Spring, 1970). The APSR chose not to review the initial version, but has commissioned this review of the slightly revised 1970 edition. The book is by now well known to students of Latin America. Under the circumstances, it would seem that my most useful function would be to evaluate it as a contribution to the general field of comparative politics. Do we now know something about Mexico we didn't know before that bears on a general problem of political analysis?

A study of budgetary policy in Mexico would seem to be of interest to students of comparative decision-making and policy-making, and to those concerned with the comparative evaluation of the performance of nations and regimes. For students of political development, the Mexican policy-making experience would seem to raise all the interesting questions of how one governs a nation after it has had its revolution, when the party of change has some mandate, and the more obvious constraints of the old power structure have been swept away.

As it turns out, Wilkie is interested in a quite limited problem. He wants to use his data on public expenditures as a test of the "ideologies" of the Mexican Revolution. Basically, he is concerned with correlating public spending with presidential rhetoric and style. In general he finds that the policy-makers put their money where their mouths are. He also reconfirms that the hoary characterizations of the stages of the Mexican Revolution—a first cautious, consolidatory stage, the Cardenas period of social reform, the stage of emphasis on capitalist revolution since 1940—are not as absolute as they appear in some forms of Mexican political dogma. Wilkie prefers to contrast the post-1930 "active state" with the pre-1930 "passive state." The second half of the book is devoted to an assessment of the overall impact of the Mexican Revolution on the social welfare of the least well-off part of the population, again a quantitative test of the revolutionary ideology of interest in mass welfare.

While several notable straw-men are apparent in this undertaking, there is much to admire in Wilkie's effort and in his handling of his materials. Anyone who has ever tried to assemble

an historic time series for anything not quite standard in a Latin American country can only be impressed by Wilkie's diligence, persistence and cunning. Somehow Wilkie pried loose the record of actual rather than projected budget expenditures from out of the bowels of the Mexican bureaucracy. (Since I went in quest of this very material, unsuccessfully, in 1961, I stand in proper awe of the achievement.) In order to get an index of social welfare, or better, of potential mass benefit from the Revolution, Wilkie combined seven indices, ranging from literacy and sanitary facilities to the number of people eating tortillas rather than bread and wearing sandals instead of shoes or going barefoot.

Wilkie is very much aware of the limits of his data and only occasionally draws inferences that seem far-fetched. And, in a way that might set a good example for cross-national researchers in political science, he does not let his quantitative data dominate his interpretation. Rather, he blends his budget and social welfare studies with conventional historical documentation and oral history interviews (a technique he also pioneered in Mexico).

But when all of this has been said, the book will be substantively disappointing to the student of comparative politics. Skidmore and Smith in their review article have done a comprehensive methodological critique and I will not recover this ground. First, let me note some topics of interest to political scientists, perhaps suggested by Wilkie's title and overall theme, that the book does not analyze. Wilkie does not assess the relationship of public policy and public performance. He does not attempt to relate expenditure to output, and as Sharkansky and others have indicated, that relationship is far from self-evident. Furthermore, Wilkie's approach does not enable us to examine the problem of public choice and development strategy, to evaluate the approaches of any Mexican administration in terms of the options open to it and the mix of policy instruments it deployed. Wilkie deals only with the public budget. He does not consider revenue, monetary, or foreign exchange measures, or the regulative and coercive powers of the state. Furthermore, he excludes the budgets of autonomous agencies and state enterprises from his calculations. These have represented a very large share of public investment—about half of the total in recent years—since the early 1930's.

Such limitations affect the book's prime intent, which is to speak to the relationship between ideology and policy-making. Wilkie suggests that the pattern of formal and direct state expenditures is an appropriate index of the in-

tent of policy makers. My feeling is that Wilkie's approach systematically understates the intent to develop industrially in the period since Cardenas when autonomous agencies became a preferred instrument for stimulating economic growth, and that to consider social expenditures outside of the total context of fiscal and monetary policy may drastically mistake both the redistributive effect and the intent of governments.

Finally, the classification of government expenditures into simple "economic," "social," and "administrative" categories seems inadequate and diminishes the usefulness of the study for comparative purposes. It seems to me that this trichotomy imposes an evaluatory scheme that affects Wilkie's entire interpretation. In the logic of development planning and policy-making, various types of investment may be politically justified on quite different ideological grounds. Investment in certain forms of education may be strongly urged in the name of economic growth. Extended police protection might be a most immediate response to real mass needs and desires for public services. And to count agrarian credit in Mexico entirely as an economic expenditure designed to advance real productivity growth, in the light of the well known story of the *Banco Ejidal* simply makes one skeptical of the utility of the whole scheme.

My views on this book reflect a minor irony. Ten years ago, when our discipline was at the height of methodological self-consciousness, a predictable response by an historian when a political scientist had breathlessly unfolded his latest achievement in technique would be to ask, "Yes, but does it tell us anything of importance?" Wilkie belongs to a group of contemporary historians who have tried to bring social science technique and methodological rigor to the study of history. From this point of view a good share of its significance to historians must have to do with its pioneering use of new forms of historical documentation, and its rigorously quantitative approach. It is somehow fitting that it fall to the political scientist of the post-behavioral age to reflect on the book, oblivious to its methodological consequence, and inquire about its relevance.

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Czechoslovakia: Intervention and Impact. I. William Zartman, ed. (New York: New York University Press, 1970. pp. XIV, 127.)

In December 1968 the Center for International Studies of New York University organized a conference on "The Impact of the Czechoslovak Events on Current International Re-

lations." The present volume, published, by a twist of irony, in the New York University's "Studies in Peaceful Change," is a revised version of the papers read at the symposium.

In the first paper, entitled "Political Change in Czechoslovakia," Jan F. Triska views the economic failure caused by the "Stalinist mobilization system" as the primary cause of the changes that occurred in Czechoslovakia in 1968. This failure created "irresistible pressures for changes in basic patterns of production, distribution, consumption and control" which in their turn produced "new social structures" and led to the emergence of "various competing social and institutional groups within as well as without the Party." Once these new social structures were established, they tended to "press for corresponding changes in the structure of authority" and "push for change in political decision-making." However, when the changes reached a level that the Soviet leadership, "the validator of East European Party elites," perceived as "dangerous decrease in the degree of Czechoslovak solidarity with the USSR," the intervention followed.

Although labeled "The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: The Aftermath of the Czechoslovak Invasion," the second paper, presented by Vernon V. Aspaturian, concerns itself more with the developments that preceded the invasion than with its actual "aftermath." It lists the geographic, historical, political, ethnic and other variables that have shaped East European attitudes toward the Soviet Union. It reviews the East European developments preceding the "Czechoslovak spring" of 1968. It speculates briefly about the factors that have induced Soviet Russia to intervene and explores the differences and similarities in the Soviet behavior in the cases of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Rumania.

The third paper, written by William E. Griffith under the heading "U.S. Policy and the Invasion of Czechoslovakia," is sharply critical of the U.S. behavior during the Czechoslovak crisis. Griffith feels that the least President Johnson should have done was to warn the Soviet Union that a Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia would cause a postponement of the ratification of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty as well as the strategic weapons negotiations. Such a step, the author believes, might have helped, mainly because the Soviet Union, fearful lest West Germany gain access to nuclear weapons, was more vitally interested in the non-proliferation treaty than the United States.

In the fourth paper, entitled "NATO after

Czechoslovakia," Andrew Pierre concentrates mainly on the impact and the implications that the invasion of Czechoslovakia has had or was likely to have for Western Europe and the NATO Alliance. He finds that the Soviet action has dealt a serious, though perhaps only temporary, setback both to the French efforts at an East-West rapprochement in Europe and West Germany's *Ostpolitik* designed to improve relations with the communist countries of Eastern Europe. He contends that it has caused the NATO alliance to "take on increased importance and relevance." He speculates, among other things, that the invasion of Czechoslovakia "could give new life to some old ideas about European unity" and perhaps even induce the West Europeans to attempt to develop a common policy toward the Soviet Union.

Finally, in the fifth paper of the symposium devoted to "Military Intervention by the Great Powers: The Rules of the Game," Andrew M. Scott addresses himself to the question of interventions in general. He divides them into three types: "intra-bloc interventions" which comprise interventions by a great power in its own sphere of influence; "inter-bloc interventions" that involve actions by one of the great powers in the sphere of influence of another power; and "extra-bloc interventions" when intervention occurs in an area not located within the sphere of influence of any power. Using as examples the Soviet and U.S. interventions since World War II, such as the U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic, the Soviet interventions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and the attempted Soviet intervention in Cuba, he explores "the rules" followed or likely to be followed by the intervening powers.

Summarizing, in the concluding chapter of the symposium under the heading "The Norms of Intervention," the exchanges of ideas that took place at the conference, I. William Zartman singles out the Soviet conviction that the Communist party was about to lose control as the "decisive element" in the Soviet intervention both in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Hungary in 1956. That is where the cases of Czechoslovakia and Hungary differ from those of Poland in 1956 and Rumania in the sixties, for in the last two instances the dominant role of the Communist party did not appear to be in jeopardy. Among the "external elements" that have contributed to the Soviet decision to intervene in Czechoslovakia he assigns the highest priority to Moscow's fear lest West Germany's "bridge-building" might weaken the Soviet influence in Eastern Europe.

Taken together, the five papers and the con-

cluding chapter amount to a well-rounded, though somewhat repetitious, description and analysis of the pertinent aspects of the Czechoslovak crisis of 1968. In spite of some variation in emphasis, the contributors to the symposium are generally in agreement about the main factors that have prompted the Soviet leaders to resort to military intervention in Czechoslovakia as well as about the consequences that the intervention was bound to produce for Czechoslovakia, Eastern and Western Europe, and the world communist movement. In particular, they agree on two important points, namely 1) that the Soviet intervention was an assertion of Soviet imperialism and Russia's great-power interests rather than "proletarian internationalism, and 2) that it did not permanently reverse the trend toward liberalization in Eastern Europe.

While most of the conclusions reached in the symposium are backed by solid argumentation, there are a few statements that are lacking in substantiation and seem to this reviewer to be of doubtful validity. Does the invasion of Czechoslovakia really indicate, as held by Griffith, that "the influence of East Germany and Poland on deterring liberalization is greater than had previously been assumed"? Can the East European countries be considered, as Triska puts it, to be "the external validators" of "the legitimacy" of Soviet leadership and did they "push" the Soviet Union to intervention? And is it not somewhat exaggerated to say, as does Aspaturian, that the Comecon was converted in 1957-1961 into a vehicle for "draining economic resources from the Soviet Union to the East European countries"?

EDWARD TABORSKY

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The European Challenge. A Detailed Blueprint on How Europe Can Use the Tools of the New Technology to Keep Pace with the 1970s. By Louis Armand and Michel Drancourt [tr. Patrick Evans] (New York: Atheneum, 1970. Pp. vii, 256. \$5.95.)

Despite the central intent of its authors, *The European Challenge* is much more an impassioned plea for political change than a reasoned plan for accomplishing it. The volume suffers analytically because emotional exuberance rather than reason too often guided the authors' pens. Yet, by the same token, the attractiveness of the book is in its intensity. Armand and Drancourt's "federalist" panacea for the woes of Europe and the world is unconvincing. But their forceful advocacy of federal structures is so provocative that *The European Challenge*

will make its greatest impact as a stimulant to debate.

The main theme of *The European Challenge* is the familiar lament that present-day political structures are outmoded and thoroughly ill-suited to handling, channeling, and controlling modern technology and its impacts. According to Armand and Drancourt, the most disjointed and archaic feature of our international system is that the world remains politically subdivided into states and attitudinally compartmentalized into nations in a new age when states, nations, and the boundaries separating them have become economically, technologically and communicationally irrelevant. In fact, political compartmentalization has become dysfunctional to human evolution. The authors of *The European Challenge* depict the world in the 1970s in the early phases of a new "planetary" age characterized by global and continuous interaction among men (man-to-man, rather than government-to-government) over an ever-expanding range of economic, technological and basic human concerns. Structures and processes typical of the planetary age include huge transnational corporations, production facilities at the nodes of global supply and distribution networks, cybernetically guided multilateral trade and payments, world-wide television transmission and burgeoning international tourism. The "European challenge," or perhaps more accurately, the "challenge facing Europe" is to create and vitalize a political framework to order the impending technological anarchy of the planetary age so that innovation can be transformed into uplifted human well-being. European imagination must fashion the political philosophy of the future, Armand and Drancourt insist, and European organization must become the new era's political-structural prototype.

But why should the task of politically organizing the transnational, "planetary age" fall to Europeans? First, Armand and Drancourt explain, if Europe is going to have any role, any influence, or any stature at all in future world affairs, these must follow from political leadership because other positions of ascendancy are by now either filled by the super-powers or contested by them at levels beyond European reach or desire. The United States created, and comfortably rides, the technological and economic wave of the future. In the military realm both superpowers contest elusive supremacy at levels of nuclear sophistication that are utterly irrelevant to the exercise of political influence. Europeans hardly wish to enter this nuclear arms race. But, in the political realm, in the area of new organization to handle new trans-

national problems created by new technologies, Europeans may be riding an inside track to world leadership. Armand and Drancourt point out that ushering, guiding and shaping the world political future involve, at a minimum, attending to problems of the third world, supporting existing international organizations, and establishing new "federal" structures that can become models of institutionalized transnationality. Europeans with their twenty years of supranational experience (for better and for worse), their ebbing nationalism, and their post-colonial, post-Cold War visions are most admirably suited to politically innovative roles. Moreover, Armand and Drancourt add, what has Europe to lose by experimenting in political transnationality?

Though one might like to quibble about specific points and passages scattered through early chapters of *The European Challenge*, it is nonetheless difficult to find major fault with the authors' insightful diagnosis of economic and technological dynamics now driving the world haphazardly in both promising and ominous directions. Beyond noting that "the future" is unlikely to arrive as quickly as Armand and Drancourt suspect since they systematically ignore capital costs in large-scale innovation which tend to postpone technically possible undertakings until these become economically feasible, I must say nevertheless that I agree that technology is indeed foisting transnationality upon us. I certainly further agree that a world of jealous sovereignties steeped in "power politics" tradition is ill-structured to cope with new transnational forces in other than regressive ways. Finally, I agree, too, that Europeans could contribute to a newly structured political future. In fact, despite Armand and Drancourt's general belittlement of the European Communities, I would judge that Europeans have already demonstrated remarkable political imagination in transnational organization.

Serious problems in Armand and Drancourt's work arise at the point where the authors shift from diagnosis to prescription. In fact the contrast between the careful analyses and persuasive conclusions of the first chapters of *The European Challenge* and the loosely-reasoned, polemically-toned utopianism of the last chapters is rather disturbing. Armand and Drancourt build their political-structural design and their hopes for the transnational future about a single theme—"federalism." *Federalism* working and succeeding is what Europe must demonstrate to the world in the dawning planetary age. To be sure, the federalism they

propose (a structure of transnational committees, diffuse lines of authority and decision-making via vertical and horizontal dialogue) is innovative, and, frankly, fascinating for the political scientist to visualize. Still, as with most utopian schemes, the Armand and Drancourt design contains no instructions for getting "from here to there." To say that it is *imperative* that federal structures be established is insufficient. And similarly, to say that European research foundations *must* be created, that transnational youth committees *must* be formed, that monetary union *must* emerge, and that a "political thought chamber" *must* guide federal development again is not to say enough. Such prescriptions tend to leave all of the real-world, here-and-now, difficult-to-contend-with, nakedly political loose-ends dangling. What we really must know is *who* is going to establish what new structures *how* and *when*? Furthermore, what opposition (in politics there is always opposition) is going to be encountered, and how, when and why is it going to be overcome? Replacing old structures with new ones implies a political process. Armand and Drancourt tell us a good deal about the old structures, and a good deal about the new ones. But they tell us so little about the politics that transform the old into the new that we must remain somewhat skeptical about probable outcomes from responses to the "European challenge."

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The Politics of Struggle: The Communist Front and Political Warfare, by James D. Atkinson. (Chicago, Henry Regnery Company, 1966, Pp. 192, \$6.50)

In the author's words, the book is an attempt to "spell out some of the doctrine, the history, the organization, the operations and the techniques of the international Communist fronts" (p. viii). This is done mainly through a detailed case study of one front, the World Federation of Teacher's Unions (or FISE).

The book is in three parts. Part I presents a succinct summary of Marxist-Leninist doctrine for waging unconventional warfare, the origins and evolution of the Comintern and fronts, and their transformation into a tool of Soviet foreign policy. Part II is a case study of FISE. By way of surveying the origins and activities of FISE and identifying the persons associated with or playing leading roles in FISE, Professor Atkinson shows that FISE has been essentially a Soviet creature, financed and deployed by the Soviet secret service as an unconventional instrument for pursuing Soviet foreign policy

goals. Part III discusses the tactics and techniques of "psycho-political warfare" employed by the Communists and their fronts. In the author's view, the fronts are proxy forces in the Cold War utilized by the Soviet Union for the purposes of waging political warfare against the non-Communist world—i.e., exploiting the anticolonial and nationalist sentiments of the Third World, inflaming tensions and protest movements of all sorts in the West in an attempt to produce widespread civil disorder, fostering pacifism and defeatism in the West thereby eroding the latter's will to resist the Soviet design on the "free world." The fronts also serve as covert agents recruiting cadres in Africa, Asia, and Latin America on behalf of the Soviet secret service. In short, the *raison d'être* of the fronts consists in their ability to "operate in areas and situations in which overt Soviet representatives cannot function at all, or can function only with limited effectiveness." (p. 158)

Professor Atkinson's work is a painstaking documentation, drawing upon the available documentary materials in English, French and German. He has admirably succeeded in demonstrating that the fronts are indeed nothing more than a "key weapon in the armory of Soviet political warfare." (p. vii) His success is however marred by a number of dubious observations and highly debatable arguments made in the course of his narration.

The argument that Soviet foreign policy goals have remained virtually unchanged in the half century following the Bolshevik seizure of power, notwithstanding frequent tactical shifts and leadership successions (p. 109–17); the assertion that the Communist fronts (and through them the Soviet secret service) have been behind most, if not all, of the student demonstrations and riots, peace marches, and other protest movements in the non-Communist world (p. 184); the assumption that mass media in the West are easily susceptible to the propaganda manipulation of the Communist fronts and that some eminent and respectable persons in the non-Communist world who work on behalf of peace and other worthy causes are essentially docile and unwittingly become the willing tool of the Communists (p. 118, 121); the unstated assumption that the interests of the national Communist parties and those of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union have been identical and that conflicts of interest among them are most improbable; the caution against exaggerating the nature, scope and consequences of the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute and the subsequent open rupture of the mono-

lithic solidarity of the Communist bloc (p. 174); the projection that the Sino-Soviet conflict and the associated trend toward polycentrism have been and will remain inconsequential for the world Communist movement and the efficacy of the front's activities (p. 159, 182);—all these are either highly debatable or outright false, or run counter to the opinion of informed specialists. Indeed, even some of his analysis, it would seem, tends to lead to contrary conclusions.

To sum up, the book reads like an intelligence report, replete with quotations from whatever sources that tend to support the author's views and peppered with acrimonious indictments of the conduct of Soviet Union and the Communist fronts. It is brilliantly unsophisticated and innocent—unsophisticated in that it takes Communist rhetoric at face value, innocent in that it conveys, unconsciously perhaps, the impression that the Communists alone are guilty of practicing unconventional political warfare. While it has proved the main thesis it sets out to prove, much of commentary and portrayal of Soviet conduct and the front's activities is at best a caricature and at worst exaggeration. The hysteria of the Cold War has led the author to confuse rhetoric with practice, and fantasy with reality.

PI-CHAO CHEN

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The Case for Reappraisal of U.S. Overseas Information Policies and Programs. Ed. by Edward L. Bernays and Burnet Hershey. (Praeger Publishers, 1970. 328 pp. \$15.00.)

This is an unfortunate book on an important issue: the efficacy of the nation's overseas information activities. It is unfortunate because it adds little more than sheer mass of opinion to a perennial—and quite warranted—controversy on the subject.

The book is condemned by its format. Much of it consists of transcripts of hearings before Rep. Dante Facell's House Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements. The remainder is a variety of brief essays, most about two pages long. What can possibly be accomplished, one wonders, by reprinting hearings that anyone can buy from the Government Printing Office and by organizing a series of essays that are generally so brief that no author, no matter how brilliant, could use them as a vehicle to add much to a debate on a complex subject.

The book, as a consequence, serves much the same function as a testimonial dinner. To the extent that people who go to testimonials are

convinced that the honored guest is a great man because a number of his friends get up and say so, this book convinces the reader that the American information effort needs reappraising by bombarding him with assertions that it ought to be.

As in testimonial dinners, moreover, the opposition gets little opportunity to have its say. The dialogue in the book is lopsided. The professional information people, journalists, and pollsters are there in force. Men concerned with foreign policy per se, and specialists who have examined the significance to policies and events of opinion shifts, are just not present in noticeable strength. In fairness, this omission reflects accurately the nature of much of the debate on the information question.

The results, as far as this book is concerned, should surprise no one. Various superficial surveys are marshaled to show, *inter alia*, that the number of people abroad who consider the United States their "best friend" is declining and that the overall image of the U.S. is getting worse. Most of the commentators in the book feel that the root of the problem is the nature of the information program itself, or at least that—whatever the cause of this unfortunate state of the American image—the solution lies in a restructured information effort. A number of those who take the latter tack agree that the trouble is due to the changes in the product that USIS is selling. They note the impact overseas of America's domestic race problems, of the assassinations of Senator Kennedy and Rev. King, and of our Indo-China policies.

A very small minority—too small in my view—goes still further and doubts that improving USIS is much of an answer to this, or to any other serious foreign policy problem. One writer suggests abolishing USIS. Others stay back from that brink.

No attempt is made to look at the issues systematically, or to define them rigorously. Does it matter that the citizens of minor powers have jaundiced views about the intentions and values of a super power? If so, how does it matter; what kind of image is optimal? What are the limits of efficacy or a major power's institutionalized information effort? And so on.

Once again, though, it should be said that the book has a more limited aim—to make, as the title states, a case for reappraising the existing information operation. The question is: Was a whole book necessary to do this? If the result is to be this kind of testimonial, then I would say no.

EUGENE B. MIHALY

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Towards a Better Use of the Ocean. By William T. Burke (SIPRI Monographs). (New York: Humanities Press. 1969. \$9.50.)

This is one of the monographs published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, and it is appropriately devoted to a problem that is critical for the future of mankind. Since the historic speech made by Ambassador Pardo of Malta at the United Nations on November 1, 1967, a flood of conferences, symposia and monographs has been devoted to the future of the oceans. Dr. Pardo's speech dramatically underlines the danger of the growing partition of the oceanbed—with inevitable consequences for the freedom of fishing and navigation and other common uses of the oceans—caused by the constantly expanding claims of coastal states to exclusive rights over the resources of the adjacent oceanbed. The competitive expansion of national claims was drastically accelerated by a disastrous clause in the Continental Shelf Convention of 1958, which granted exclusive rights over the continental shelf resources to coastal states—previously confined to a depth of 200 metres, "beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas. . . ." This, coupled with the dramatically rapid progress in the technology of oceanbed exploration, submersible vessels, oceanbed laboratories, and transportation facilities along the oceanbed, has led the major coastal and technologically developed states to grant exploratory as well as exploitation licenses at ever-increasing depth and distances from the coast. Depressingly—though not surprisingly—international lawyers of repute have justified such expansion of national claims, by virtually dismantling the concept of the "continental shelf," eliminating the adjacency test and pleading for exclusive coastal jurisdictional claims to the edge of the continental margin, i.e., down to a depth of from 4,000 to 5,000 metres. This would comprise the bulk of exploitable biological as well as mineral resources.

The major part of the monograph consists of a lucid survey and analysis by Professor Burke, a disciple and collaborator of Professor McDougal, and one of the foremost authorities on the law of the oceans in the United States. Professor Burke's survey covers not only the crucial problem of the continental shelf but also deals with the problems of fisheries and the military and scientific uses of the oceans. It is an incisive criticism on scientific as well as policy grounds of the trend towards exclusive appropriation of growing portions of the oceans.

The gist of Professor Burke's analysis—which was followed by a debate by a small and distinguished panel consisting of lawyers as well as oceanographers—is reflected in the principal recommendations made by the symposium:

1. A clarification of the definition of the continental shelf should be undertaken. The present situation is not satisfactory, its vagueness allowing a variety of interpretation. Different methods of delimitation might be contemplated, as well as different means of arriving at the delimitation: the use of a mileage or depth criterion or the geological concept; a revision of the Geneva Convention, a resolution adopted by the United Nations.

2. Without prejudice to the present rules of general international law, no government should claim a territorial sea beyond 12 miles from the baseline. A moratorium or "freeze" on claims of exclusive rights regarding the ocean floor, as well as on extension of the shelf limits, should be established. Future negotiations would be of little value if in the meantime the states concerned rushed to establish sovereign rights so as to hold a more favourable position when such negotiations begin.

3. A better international structure for managing the use of the ocean and its resources, including a more equitable sharing of the benefits of such uses, should be established.

4. The governments of the member states of the United Nations and the various United Nations agencies should give early and thorough consideration to the advisability and feasibility of establishing an intergovernmental ocean organization to deal with all aspects of ocean investigation and the uses of the seas.

The principal drawback of the symposium is that it was held in June, 1968, published sometime in 1969, and distributed, it appears, in 1970. (It reached the present reviewer in October, 1970). In the interval, there have been further important scientific and technological developments, while dozens of symposia, conferences and monographs, with more up-to-date information, have been published. Among the monographs are Professor Henkin's *Law for the Sea's Mineral Resources* (1968) and Professor Andrassy's *International Law and the Resources of the Sea* (1970). Among the most significant international conferences—which have assembled a wealth of scientific data and appraisals as well as legal analyses—are the symposium held in Rome under the auspices of the Academia di Lincei, the proceedings of which were published in the summer of 1970, and the project "Pacem in Maribus" of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, the results of which have been published in part. Above all, the United States has submitted to the U. N. Seabed Committee an ex-

tensive and detailed draft convention, which is far and away the most important single official contribution to the crucial problem of the delimitation between national and international jurisdiction, and the form and functions of the proposed international seabed authority. The gist of the U.S. proposal is that the continental shelf proper should be redefined—in the sense of the original Truman Proclamation—so as to have a strict depth limit of 200 metres, instead of the open-ended limit of the Continental Shelf Convention, and that an international authority should have full control over the resources of the deep seabed beyond the continental margin. The intermediate zone, between the limits of the continental shelf and those of the continental margin, is to be under the trusteeship administration of the coastal state, which is to be subject to regulatory standards set by the international authority (e.g., in matters of pollution, preservation of living resources and technological competence) and to allot a major part of the revenue derived from the licenses to international development purposes.

The first meeting of the U.N. Seabed Committee, to which the U.S. proposal was submitted, ended in complete deadlock, and the prospects for a meaningful international convention in the foreseeable future are slim, while with every day that passes coastal states extend their de facto jurisdiction by the granting of licenses. The end result may be one more triumph of a narrowminded nationalism, which would go far to destroy the most important achievement of the last few centuries, the freedom of the seas.

The publication under review remains a valuable contribution to this vital problem. Not in its principles, but in the relevant legal, scientific and technological data, it has inevitably been overtaken by the lapse of time.

WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN

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The Atlantic Fantasy: The U.S., NATO, and Europe. By David Calleo. (The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970. Pp. 182. \$5.95.)

Revisionist views of the Cold War are being given new impetus and direction by the pervasive search for principles to guide U.S. foreign policy after the Vietnam recession. However we judge the merits of the numerous analyses and re-analyses of the Soviet-American conflict that are paraded before us, there is a pervasive feeling that the dominant formulations of U.S. security and national interest which have sustained post-war policies no longer

are serviceable without significant alteration. They seem inadequate either to explain the contemporary world situation or to offer guideposts for American objectives and strategies. What is less clear is whether alternative formulations will prove more compelling and useful. Fortunately, the increasing specificity of revisionist advocacy is beginning to offer some firmer bases for assessment.

Most of the soul-searching, along government corridors and in university seminar rooms (not to mention a much talked-about Washington basement), has foremost in mind the questions of commitment to the defense against Communism in the third world, and the great power stake in the contest for political advantage in those areas of the globe. The tragedy of Vietnam is the self-evident reason for that preoccupation. Increasingly though, the radical critique of the conventional wisdom embodied in established policy is being extended to other, less obviously troubled domains. Western Europe, where the manifold issues of alliance defense and the continent's continued political division have surfaced intermittently for years, is becoming the object of a more critical attention as the wave of revisionist analysis flows from the recent post to the present, and as the rethinking of U.S. policy spreads outward from the Southeast Asian epicenter.

David Calleo's book is a call for the termination of the U.S. 'protectorate' over Western Europe that he sees as the expression of "undisciplined imperialist pretensions" (pp. 20) spurred by the vision of duopolistic competition between ourselves and the Soviets for the political domination of Europe. In line with revisionist analysis, Calleo argues that the Soviet threat was at the onset of the Cold War overstated and today, certainly, is insufficient reason for the commanding U.S. presence in W. Europe. For the sake of our illusions of liberal mission, and in continuing pursuit of the will o wisp of a European Federation under American patronage, we are said to be perpetuating a dangerous condition of dependence among our European allies. The present arrangements of power are dangerous because they nurture our inordinate ambitions and give warrant to our unneeded interference in European problems; because they prevent our allies from assuming proper responsibility for their own affairs; and because a swift and thorough devolution of military obligations and leadership prerogatives onto the Western Europeans is a precondition for ending the antagonistic great power confrontation that keeps Europe unnaturally divided and politically anxious.

Calleo's case for a drastic scaling-down of our physical and moral presence links the issue of European independence to the broader currents of U.S. foreign policy. Devolution is seen as dictated by the mounting domestic pressures in the U.S. for disengagement, and W. Europe is deemed to provide the appropriate location for beginning the global process of military retrenchment and enlightened self-restraint in exercising our formidable power. Circumstance seems ripe for reappraisal: "by the late 1960s a sizable portion of the American political elite, as well as the general public, appears to have decided that the country's international role was demanding a dangerously excessive proportion of its resources. (page. 8) The need is urgent: "Unless drastic measures are taken to restore a sane proportion to national priorities, . . . America will become a nightmare at home and a menace abroad" (page 9). Europe is the test of our intellectual adaptability and our will for change. "If we cannot at least turn away from the pretensions to hegemony in Europe, where they are not needed, the prospect for a rational devolution of our swollen international responsibilities is unlikely anywhere" (page 23).

Why does Europe offer such a splendid prospect? Calleo understands the present situation as a unique mix of stable and unstable elements. He believes that the existing constellation of forces, and political boundaries, are taken as a given by all parties concerned. The Soviet Union in particular harbors no aggressive ambitions. Threats to the status quo derive from other sources: the gradual deterioration of Atlantic institutions *as they fail to adjust to the growing economic strength and self-reliance of the Western Europeans*; the thwarting of European integration by the dominant U.S. role; and the uncertain status of the German Federal Republic. The 'natural' condition for Europe today is seen as one in which an end to America's big brother paternalism spurs our allies to do for themselves collectively what our presence and attempted direction tries to do for them. Once out from under the protective America wing, no longer constricted by the web of Atlantic institutions that now serve as instruments of American hegemony (NATO, the dollar-dependent international monetary system, etc.), and faced with the task of securing their own well-being, the West Europeans will assert themselves so as to realize the potential for unified effort. The salutary international consequences of a new-found European unity will be to moderate the Great Power confrontation, make more amenable Russia's attitude toward

Germany and East-West exchanges, and, by implication, set the U.S. down the road toward a properly more restricted vision of its international role.

No assessment of Calleo's analysis can be all-embracing. It is a book of many parts. His assessment of how America dominates Western Europe is more persuasive than his broad-stroke sketches of the U.S. supposed imperialist compulsions; the impulses of domestic life bulk excessively large compared to the constraints of the international environment in explaining U.S. policy; and, most strikingly, his optimism for a Europe largely free of American influence is out of proportion to his explication of the myriad of intricate problems that face any policy innovator. Revisionism does offer a new perspective from which to view the competing formulae for understanding, and acting upon the thicket of European puzzles. If, to date, it fails to provide a new world view with which to reprogram the foreign policy establishment, and contains no panaceas for some of our more durable international problems, revisionism does open up a fresh angle of vision.

MICHAEL J. BRENNER

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Soviet Relations with Latin America 1918-1968: A Documentary Survey. Edited by Stephen Clissold. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970. Pp. xx, 313. \$12.00.)

Latin America is interesting as an object of Soviet attention for a variety of reasons. For short periods Soviet activities and the U.S. response to them have brought the politics of the area to the center of the world stage. Events in Guatemala in 1954, in Cuba from 1959 to 1962, in the Dominican Republic in 1965, and Chile in 1970 have claimed space on the front pages of the world press not so much because of the strategic or economic importance of these areas but because of the U.S. confrontation with the Soviet Union or with a party or movement presumed, sometimes incorrectly, to be acting as an agent of the Soviet Union. But for most of the fifty years covered by this documentary survey the Soviet Union has played only a minor role in the area, and interest centers on the role of the CPSU in the affairs of Latin American communist parties.

Mr. Clissold has selected his documents to illustrate these two kinds of Soviet involvement in Latin America and has thereby provided the student of Soviet policies with a good deal of very interesting material. Documentation on the activities of Latin American communist

parties, especially for the interwar period, is very hard to come by even in the largest world libraries, and the book under review provides a fascinating picture of Soviet rigidity in its approach to Latin American communist parties before World War II. Moscow was continually lecturing these parties on how to conduct their affairs and insisted over and over that the Russian Revolution of 1917 was the model for revolution everywhere. It is an index of the unimportance of Latin America for the Soviet Union that the Comintern was permitted to emit this useless and often harmful advice for so long.

In the postwar period Moscow was to change its estimate of the opportunities for weakening the position of the United States in an area where it was generally considered to possess unchallengeable dominance. The documentary survey is not completely satisfactory in illustrating Moscow's changed appreciation of the situation. From 1954 forward Moscow alternated between conservatism and optimism in its approach. Some key Soviet materials on this point have been omitted. For example, a book review in *Kommunist* in 1954¹ argued that the Xth InterAmerican Conference in Caracas had shown the weakness of the United States in the area and that successful Latin American opposition to the United States could be expected. Since one of the authors of his new departure was Sivolobov, identified (p. 64) as an important Soviet party official charged with the monitoring of Latin American parties, the significance of the article was beyond question. Later in *Pravda*, in a very prominent article, Kuusinen made the same points.² The CPSU had obviously reached the conclusion that the United States was now vulnerable in Latin America and decided to sell arms to the reformist Arbenz government of Guatemala.

By restricting the collection to documents, much illuminating material has been excluded. For example, a book review in the official journal of the CPSU and an article by the official who had been in charge of the Comintern for some twenty years are technically not documents, but they constitute rather persuasive evidence of a shift in Soviet policy. Similarly the few Soviet books and articles on Latin America in the late fifties revealed that the Soviet Union felt that the United States would intervene in Cuba as it had in Guatemala and therefore of-

¹ V. Ermolaev, S. Semenov, A. Sivolobov, "Serious Mistakes in a Book about the Workers' Movement in Latin America," *Kommunist*, May 1954, pp. 120-127.

² O. Kuusinen, "On the Slogan of Freedom and American Conduct," *Pravda*, May 10, 1954.

ferred Castro less help than Arbenz had received. Again an article in the most important Soviet academic journal on foreign policy argued, before Guevara's presence in Bolivia was publicized, that a revolutionary situation in Bolivia did not exist.³ This suggests that the Soviet Union knew or guessed what the Cubans were up to in Bolivia and were registering a warning. The controlled nature of the Soviet press makes such deductions defensible.

This valuable and interesting collection of documents could have been more useful if the editor had not been guided by a narrow definition of the term document in the selection of materials.

HERBERT S. DINERSTEIN

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The Dynamics of China's Foreign Relations.

Edited by Jerome Alan Cohen. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard East Asian Monographs, 1970. Pp. 129.)

The Dynamics of China's Foreign Relations consists of half a dozen essays concerning Chinese foreign policy in different areas of the world. Most of these are largely historical-descriptive in nature, and each of the scholars represented has approached his area in his own way, so that no general hypotheses concerning the nature or conduct of recent Chinese foreign policy are put forward or tested by the collection as a whole. As a result, each of the essays must be considered on its own terms.

George Ginsburgs offers a closely-reasoned interpretation of possible Chinese and Soviet strategies in their boundary dispute over the Amur/Ussuri river islands. Unlike some journalistic commentators, Ginsburgs does not see this dispute as likely to develop into large-scale hostilities between the contending parties. To the contrary, he views it as a carefully controlled *symbolic* manifestation of a larger controversy over the Peking Government's claims that "unequal" treaties made by its predecessors must be renegotiated. The lack of intrinsic importance of the disputed islands can be seen in this context as an aid to keeping the hostilities over them limited to the verbal level.

Arthur Stahnke reviews Chinese policies toward India and Pakistan from "the 1962 war between India and China" to mid-1969. By successfully wooing Pakistan and promising it support in its longstanding quarrels with India after 1962, Stahnke points out, China seemed to have gained the upper hand in its regional ri-

valry with India. But when war between Pakistan and India came in 1965, China's consistent support for her new ally was more than neutralized by the support provided India by great powers from outside the region—the Soviet Union and the United States. As a result, Peking now fears India as an outpost of Soviet-American power on its southern border.

Gene Hsiao focusses on the rivalry between Peking and Taipei over relations with Japan. Each of these rival Chinese governments has sought to manipulate Japan's desire to trade to serve its own political purposes; nevertheless, by 1970, Japan had become Peking's largest single trading partner, and Taipei's second largest. In large part, Japan's ability to enjoy this "best of both worlds" trading position has been due to the increasing dependence of both "Chinas"—and particularly of Taipei—on this trade.

The paper provided by editor Cohen deals with Peking's attitude toward trade with the United States. From the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949 straight through the 1950s, Peking carefully left open the door to trade with the United States, and showed every indication of being quite eager for such trade to develop. By the end of the decade, however, repeated rebuffs from the Eisenhower Administration appear to have convinced the Chinese Communist leadership that "it was a 'waste of time' to try to settle minor questions before settling fundamental issues" (p. 62). During the 1960's, therefore, a reversal of roles took place, with John Foster Dulles' successors moving to open up the possibility of Sino-American trade, and China rebuffing these U.S. initiatives repeatedly pending some settlement of the "Taiwan problem."

China's diplomatic and aid competition with the U.S. and the Soviet Union in Africa is described by George Yu, who concludes, not surprisingly, that China's limited economic resources have put her at a great disadvantage vis à vis the Soviet Union and the United States. Nevertheless Peking has viewed Africa as an important proving ground for its revolutionary theories and has benefitted from being more willing than its rivals to support revolutionary changes in the African status quo.

Political scientists may find Daniel Tretiak's essay on China's relations with Latin America to be the most stimulating in this uneven collection. Tretiak advances a number of hypotheses about the rhetoric and behavior of modern revolutionary states (France, Russia, China), and about the responses of non-revolutionary states to them. He then analyzes Peking's policies to-

³ E. Kovalev, "Agrarian Reform in Bolivia: Its Class Essence and Significance," *Mirovaia Ekonomika i Mezh-dunarodnye Otnosheniia*, June 1966, 56-64.

ward Latin America, and Washington's responses, in terms of these hypotheses. Thus even cautious Chinese foreign policy actions are interpreted as threatening by the United States because of the revolutionary rhetoric in which they are couched, leading to "a vicious circle of mutual hostility" (p. 90). On the other hand, this same contrast between militant rhetoric and cautious action creates difficulties in the relationship between the elite of the new revolutionary regime and out-of-power revolutionary partisans in other states. And these problems are compounded by the victorious revolutionary elite's tendency to universalize the validity of their own revolutionary model. Note the difficulties Peking's leaders have encountered in their relations with Fidel Castro and with other Latin American revolutionary leaders.

"The dominant theme common to these essays," the editor concludes, "is largely implicit. . . . [A]t least with respect to the particular areas studied, the long-range effects of the Cultural Revolution are likely to be relatively inconsequential." Moreover, despite "the image of an elite gone mad" projected by "both the American and Soviet propaganda machines. . . . [N]owhere in this collection is there evidence that they [Chinese statesmen] are irrational, and perhaps the clearest impression is that, rhetoric to the contrary, they are a very cautious lot" (p. x).

SHELDON APPLETON

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International Law in an Organizing World. By William L. Tung. (New York: Thomas P. Crowell Company, 1968. Pp. 604. \$8.75.)

International Law in a Changing World: Cases, Documents and Readings. Edited by Edward Collins, Jr. (New York: Random House, 1970. Pp. 493. \$9.95.)

International law is possibly the most misunderstood field in the study of political science today. Many non-specialists still cling to notions that international law is irrelevant or at best is of academic or historical interest. It would be convenient to blame the misguided perceptions about international law entirely on power-national interest interpretations of the global system. The realists provide ample ammunition for the scoffers and cynics by defining international law as little more than a diplomatic facade or, worse yet, as a moralistic universalistic camouflage used to conceal crass and self-serving power maneuvers by states. Extreme realism has distorted the image of law. How-

ever, international law suffers perhaps as much from the ministrations of its friends, the rule-oriented legalists (primarily lawyers but including political scientists), as from its foes, the power-oriented realists. So much of international law has been written in a political vacuum that many have been led to believe that it has little connection with the realities of political life.

Although many scholars, such as Richard Falk, Morton Kaplan, Wesley Gould and Urban Whitaker, have contributed to the political understanding of international law, the major emphasis still is on state-devised formal rules. This is especially true of valuable but politically sterile materials used in classroom teaching. Most of the basic sources are either prepared by lawyers or by political scientists who are enamored by the legal approach. For example, the book most often required in political science courses in international law (according to a recent tabulation in Peter Rohn, *et. al.*, *Basic Courses in International Law*), is Bishop's *International Law* which is specifically designed for an "introductory course in international law offered to law students." It leans more toward the courtroom than toward the political battlefield.

The need then is for more politically-oriented texts which present law and politics within the context of a multi-actor total system. The two books under review—both by political scientists—at least address themselves to this problem. The titles are revealing. Professor Tung emphasizes an "organizing world." He still clings to much of the traditional legal materials and does not really grapple with political interactions. However, he does establish himself in the forefront of publicists concerned with explaining law as a product of organizational as well as state action. Professor Collins stresses a "changing world." He emphasizes political change and provides a mix of classical legal materials and modern political readings.

International Law in an Organizing World is essentially a text on international law (three fourths) and a text on the United Nations (one fourth). Thus it is of most value in one-semester or one-quarter courses which combine the two topics. It would not be unfair to claim that Tung's title is deceptive if law in an organizing world means the placing of law and organization within a conceptual framework of an integrated international system. He does not do this. His chapters on international organization are reasonably traditional in scope and self contained. He discusses the background of international organization, the structure of the

United Nations, international conferences and administration, and the United Nations and enforcement of the peace. However in the "law" sections of his book, he integrates the substantive contribution of the United Nations via treaties, resolutions, etc., to a much greater extent than do most of his text-writing colleagues. He captures the flavor of the transition of Nineteenth Century law to law in the modern era where the United Nations is playing a vital role, both in conflict areas and in the development of exciting new rules designed for a working system of world order.

By combining the fields of law and organization, Professor Tung of necessity is forced to condense some of the topics. For example, he devoted only six pages to the high seas despite its growing importance (in as well as out of the United Nations) because of pollution problems, seabed development, etc. In contrast, he allocates 30 pages to diplomatic techniques, practices and procedures—a topic normally found in books on diplomacy rather than on international law. His condensation also forces him into some risky oversimplifications such as not drawing clear distinctions between states and governments in recognition and between diplomats and consuls in privileges and immunities.

Nonetheless, as a survey effort, Tung has provided an excellent overview of the usual categories of international law. His opening chapter on developments and fundamentals is especially worthy. He is refreshingly and unabashedly a believer in international law as "true law"—not in the utopian or courtroom tradition, but as a process-rule system based on consent and reciprocity and balanced between legal order and national interest. The author is a professor of international law at Queen's College and a former government official in China. His book reflects this background. The writing is precise and spartan at times; the documentation is excellent and most comprehensive. In fact, the more serious student of international law can strike some of the richest lodes in the footnotes. They are bulging with both cases and political action illustrations. Tung is also generous in his Oriental and Communist illustrations and legal interpretations, a welcome change from the usual Occidental-oriented offerings to undergraduates. His book is a significant addition and a meaningful contribution to the better understanding of modern international law.

Professor Collins is playing in a different ball game. Although he provides thumbnail introductory essays, he basically has brought together the kind of readings which he believes

an undergraduate political science student should read in an international law course. Although no two specialists would pick and paste the same selections, most probably would clip a number of the political offerings found in *International Law in a Changing World*. The rival arguments on the Viet Nam war is an example. There might be more disagreement over the case selections.

Collins also follows the traditional format but excludes nationality, which is unusual but defensible. He combines the classical cases with more politically relevant materials and thus has undertaken a rather Herculean task. The approximate 150 selections range from snippets (one paragraph on the S.S. Lotus Case) to lengthy texts (17 pages on the law of treaties.) Some sections (e.g., territorial acquisition) are traditional; others (e.g., legal regulation and the use of force) are more innovative. Some sections are sketchy (e.g., diplomatic immunities and space law); others (e.g., treaties) are comprehensive. The book is designed as a supplementary reader. Much of the material can be found elsewhere. However, a considerable number of items, such as the Cuban quarantine, the Gulf of Aquaba dispute and the Pueblo incident, have never made their way into more hide-bound publications. They are the types of readings which no political scientist could ignore and still claim that he understood the implications of international law in an ongoing political system.

Both Professor Tung and Collins contribute to the understanding that international law is far more than a mere system of rules found in court decisions, state proclamations, etc. International law also channels conflict, facilitates communications, establishes parameters, and serves as a policy tool. It is universalistic in conception, not state-bound or Western, and is an integral part of what we commonly call the political process. It is a vital element in the creation and maintenance of a system of world order. Neither of the two books are directed specifically at these issues. However, both, in their own way, have helped to loosen the stranglehold of the traditional legalists and are somewhat representative of a growing group of political scientists who believe that international law is too important to be left in the hands of state-oriented, rule and case bound lawyers and political scientists.

CLIFTON E. WILSON

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**The Future of the International Legal Order,
Vol. II: Wealth and Resources.** Edited by

Richard A. Falk and Cyril E. Black. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970. pp. 343. \$11.00.)

The massive undertaking, of which this volume is the second installment, launched by the Princeton Center of International Studies is living testimony to the continuing renaissance of international law. The editors have set themselves the imaginative task of exploring the future of world order, in all its ramifications, in terms of the adequacy of past and evolving legal practice and principles. Their task is descriptive, projective, synthetic, and eminently normative. It aims at nothing less than a comprehensive legal-political-economic policy science for exploring the possibilities of attaining a more orderly world. In the words of the editors, "This volume focuses upon the capacity of the international legal order to cope with the course of international economic development in a setting that will be heavily influenced by rapid and dramatic technological progress." (p. vi). It also deals with non-violent means to reconcile upcoming differences in objectives between rich and poor countries, the powerful and the weak. The volume contains four separate contributions. Wolfgang Friedmann briefly examines some broad themes in the evolution of international law in relation to economic and social development. Burns H. Weston contributes a long essay, subtitled "A Framework for Future Inquiry," on the status in international law of expropriation of foreign property. William T. Burke reviews law and practice with reference to the technology of exploiting ocean resources. Ivan A. Vlasic does the same with respect to the exploration of outer space. It should come as no great surprise that the contributors vary quite considerably, in terms of clarity of focus and comprehensiveness of demonstration, in really attaining the objectives set by the editors. Vlasic comes closest. Burke shies away from crowning his excellent analysis with a set of comprehensive recommendations for actual policy. Friedmann's "keynote" essay is simply a summary of his magisterial and deservedly well-known recent volumes on the same subject. Weston's contribution rarely gets beyond a very complete digest of cases and opinions dealing with the expropriation of foreign-owned property; his real analysis seems destined for future inquiry.

Quite apart from the unifying topical emphasis which the editors sought to provide, three of the contributions also share commitment to a well-developed methodological approach. All except Friedman couch their analyses in the configurational style made famous by the "New

Haven School." Moreover, the manner in which this style is applied to the treatment of expropriation, the ocean, and outer space has a great deal to do with the substantive materials analyzed and also with the inferences drawn from the analysis. The quality of the substantive argument cannot, therefore, be separated from a review of the method. In fact, the intent of the editors can be approximated only when the strictures of the method are obeyed flexibly. Weston's essay, which seeks to remain true to the canons of configurational jurisprudence most faithfully, is also the least persuasive piece in the book, in part because it fails to rank-order and contrast the "values" posited by Lasswell and McDougal. The substantive themes in each essay cannot be reviewed, then, without a discussion of the role of the configurational approach in the essays.

The intent of the configurational approach is defined by Burke in crisp terms; it is "to attempt to clarify goals, to observe trends in decisions, to identify factors affecting decisions, to appraise the impact of decisions in terms of the fulfilment of goals, and to offer recommendations to maximize the chances of achieving goals." (p. 244). The most obvious question which arises is: *whose goals?*—those of all the actors, some of the actors, of the international public interest, of the observer, or the critic? Moreover, our contributors all tend to give different answers to the question, with Weston opting for the actors concerned in a given controversy, Burke for all actors potentially interested in the oceans, and Vlasic for a future egalitarian, non-violent, and welfare-oriented world order. A standardized list of topics is used in configurational jurisprudence to deal with a given policy question. It includes identification of the participants, their objectives, the situation in which they act, the strategies they follow, and the outcomes produced. Further, longer-range effects of the immediate outcomes are then to be identified in terms of the same list of topics. Special attention attaches to objectives because these include the *values* to be attained by action, values which in turn ought to be safeguarded in an ensuing legal confrontation and in efforts to reconcile differences. The list of values is familiar: wealth, well-being, skills, enlightenment, power, respect, rectitude, and affection. Are they of equal importance to the participants or to a world public interest? How should they be ranked if they are not of equal importance? What principles ought to govern a ranking? The configurational approach has the enormous merit of being systematic and of seeking to analyze legal prob-

lems in a broad political context. It is clearly right in placing emphasis on the goals of the participants and in seeking to relate these to standard values. However, the approach remains essentially a checklist of important topics unless it addresses two additional matters: hypotheses ought to be provided which link modal participants, situations, objectives, strategies, and outcomes *in the context* of effects identified hypothetically and ranked in terms of value preferences. And such an effort presupposes a method for ranking the values themselves. Once this is achieved a true policy science of international law can emerge.

The relative shortcomings of configurational jurisprudence thus predict the success of our essays. Vlasic ranks wealth, well-being, rectitude, and respect above power, skills, enlightenment and affection. He has no trouble in identifying a future world order in which space research would be conducted and regulated to maximize the attainment of these values. He can then trace desired effects "backward," so to speak, and arrive at a specification of what kind of strategies participants should adopt, what objectives they should follow—and what sort of space law we should work for. Burke stops short of this. He identifies wealth, power, and enlightenment as the main values which underlie the objectives of participants and then seeks to identify a legal policy toward the oceans which would enable participants to maximize these values in terms of mining for manganese, ranching, fish, or establishing underwater cities. The result, while involving him in very interesting descriptions of evolving ocean bottom technologies and their possible political and economic implications, is a statement short of a clear recommendation as to what ocean law ought to be if one were to rank wealth above power or enlightenment (or vice versa). Weston, finally, includes in his analysis all of the values, and opts between none of them. Consequently, his discussion is erudite and instructive with respect to telling us much about participants in expropriation litigation, their objectives and strategies and of the situations which get them into trouble. He is equally helpful in giving us the longest list of instances of expropriation this reviewer has encountered (as well as every opinion ever expressed by anybody on the subject) and in reviewing the immediate outcomes of expropriations and attempted legal remedies. However, he offers next to nothing on longer-range effects—in terms of power, wealth, rectitude, or anything else.

Substantively, what can we glean from these

essays about the future role of the law relating to foreign investment, ocean exploitation, and space exploration in helping redistribute the world's wealth and solve conflicts over redistribution by peaceful means? Vlasic makes clear that space law—to the extent that it exists—is made by the superpowers in their own interest; sharing knowledge for the sake of economic development is not an important part of their objectives or strategies. He suggests how space communications can aid in improved meteorology (and hence agriculture) as well as in education. Appropriate measures upgrading the powers of the UN and of COSPAR are worked out by him. Areas of outer space military experimentation with potentially disastrous consequences are described and appropriate revisions of the Outer Space Treaty suggested. If binding third-party settlement is not suggested as a realistic means of settling disputes, a more egalitarian as well as expert-dominated approach to conflict-resolution nevertheless emerges. Burke notes that while the territorial jurisdiction of the coastal state has crept inexorably further into the water since 1945, the open sea and its bottom remain available by common consent for the exploitation of all. But nations with the most advanced technology of ocean crawlers are likely to reap disproportionate benefits—and the rich will be getting richer. Burke, after sketching the technology, then proceeds to imagine the kinds of claims rival exploiting countries may be formulating against each other. And he summarizes the actual modes of resolving incipient conflicts devised so far (mostly by delegations for study to such specialized UN agencies as UNESCO's Intergovernmental Oceanic Commission and FAO's Committee on Fisheries) without addressing the question of whether this suffices for the future. Weston really fails to address the matter of redistribution altogether and he skirts the question of resolving conflicts over expropriation by noting that, depending on the situation, unilateral intervention may be justified and lawful, while turning the other cheek might be the appropriate response on other occasions.

The balance of contributions and shortcomings, however, is still heavily on the side of a healthy emphasis in international legal studies on a focussed interdisciplinary attack on policy problems rapidly emerging on the horizon of technological evolution. If I take this occasion to mention a few further issues requiring exploration within this new emphasis, I do so in admiration of the progress now being made. One issue has already been mentioned: listing values is not enough. We must, in addition, examine

the compatibility of values and ask whether—if all are desirable—they ought to be ranked in a hierarchy of priorities. On the other hand, all may not be desirable in all circumstances attending the evolution of technology. While a balance may have to be found between wealth and power when we deal with the oceans, the same equation need not be adopted when we deal with space or weather modification. If several values of equal importance remain implanted in a given choice, efforts must be made to calculate the trade-offs if one or the other is to be sacrificed. And this can be done only if we are reasonably clear and agreed on the effect to be achieved. A kindred issue is raised by the rival suggestions that national, regional, or international agencies be given key regulatory powers. Again, depending on the values to be maximized, there may be different costs and benefits associated with each option, and these must be assessed before recommendations are made, in knee-jerk fashion, in favor of the UN. Finally, we must know more about the links between known actor objectives and the outcome to be specified as normatively desirable quite apart from present actor thinking. This, in turn, requires that we know how actors change their conceptions of what is desirable, how a negotiating posture evolves and changes, and how multilateral negotiation may hasten the process of change. There is much in the new approach to international law which promises success in addressing these issues.

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National Interest. By Joseph Frankel (New York; Praeger Publishers, 1970. Pp. 172. \$5.00.)

Few concepts of international politics have been attacked with greater vehemence by academics and used as tenderly by statesmen as "national interest." The reason for this discrepancy is, of course, that the concept escapes meaningful definition for analytical purposes in which the academic is interested; and that the unpredictability of its concrete meaning makes it highly serviceable for diplomatic purposes. Mr. Frankel's treatise underpins the despair of the academics by many relevant and some apparently not so relevant theoretical musings. He neglects examination of the stubborn life the concept enjoys in the international politics of nations. In the last chapter, modestly and cautiously entitled "Toward an Assessment," he justifies his non-conclusions by asserting that "it would be impracticable to attempt a summary and conclusion of the book in the customary

way." This result is the near-inevitable outcome of the inherent nature of the concept, but also of the author's approach to dealing with it. For he chooses to handle his assignment of "enabling students and others concerned with politics to understand and use those concepts that are the working tools of modern political science" on a largely abstract level, with relatively little attention paid to empirical formulations and employment of the concept by practicing politicians (though he provides numerous historical examples). It is at least debatable whether such an Olympian 'academic' posture is justifiable in the name of political science. On the author's level one can heartily agree with him that "national interest" is a "singularly vague concept." It might nevertheless have rounded out his investigation of the concept had he examined how much the very vagueness enhances the value of the concept as a "working tool" for the statesman whom it helps in justifying or rationalizing his policies and for the national publics who find it is a cherished symbol of their nationalist emotions.

Following contemporary practice, the author delves into methodological considerations and alternatives in order to discover the most suitable for his purposes. He decides to be scientific rather than intuitive, fully realizing and detailing the limitations inherent in this method. His perspective, he says, is behavioral, but his method only marginally so—mainly because his subject does not yet lend itself to a full-fledged behavioral method. Therefore in this initial stage of analysis "the approach is largely a matter of trained intuition" (p. 28). After his original decision, one is slightly taken aback. There is an apparent inconsistency here that obscures the meaning of the author's choices. Unfortunately, such obscurities can be found in many parts of the book. Once it deals with substance, it starts out clearly enough: the uses of the term "national interest" are classified, for purposes of analysis, as aspirational, operational, and explanatory and polemical. But this neat-sounding distinction gets largely lost in the body of the book. It also becomes uncertain early whether "national interest" is understood as a goal of foreign policy; the value aspect or some other part of foreign policy; or a synonym for foreign policy. One of the reasons for this uncertainty is that the author goes rather far afield in discussing the meaning of the concept, drawing in major theories of foreign policy, general theories of politics, and—under the heading of dimensions of national interest—strategy, economics, geography, and the time factor. There is greater clarity and better orga-

nization in the section devoted to the formulation of the national interest, whose major message is that everything depends pretty much upon the will of decision makers. Which could explain the uselessness of the concept of "national interest" as a scientific instrument.

The book is a strange mix of interesting points, good insights, and useful analytical passages with obscure assertions and well-worn observations. It brings confusion into chaos by showing how much greater the complexity of the concept is than is commonly accepted. This may be a contribution of therapeutic value for those who use the concept glibly—except statesmen for whom greater complexity only heightens the value. Those who look for clarification of the concept will not find it in this book—mostly because, as the author conveys fairly convincingly, it cannot be found anywhere.

WERNER LEVI

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The Consolidated Treaty Series, 1648–1918.

Edited and annotated by Clive Parry, LL.D.

To be completed in approximately 140 volumes in the course of 10 years. (Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, Inc., volumes 1–10, 1969–1970. Pages lv, 468; x, 518; vii, 514; viii, 520; viii, 507, viii, 501, viii, 503; vii, 518; vii, 509; vii, 505. \$40 per volume.)

As treaties form an invaluable documentary source for the diplomatic historian and international lawyer, efforts have long been made to provide accurate and comprehensive collections of them. Most of the great states have published official collections of those to which they are party, but these have been incomplete and of uneven quality, so that even those students who have access to the largest libraries find themselves sometimes defeated in trying to use such official publications. Many of the smaller states have no published collections. Even the United States has not issued a complete collected edition of its treaties, although it has always printed them currently, for many years with the *Statutes at Large* and since 1950 in a separate treaty series. The Congress has authorized compilation of four volumes of treaties and international agreements, generally referred to as *Malloy's Treaties* after the editor of the first two volumes, but these extend only to 1937. Perhaps the fate of Hunter Miller's superbly edited collection, *Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America* (8 volumes, 1931–1948) illustrates the difficulty which even the wealthiest governments experience in achieving an optimum program

of treaty publication, for that series reached only the year 1863 before Congress left it stranded without financial support.

Students who cannot find an instrument they need in an official collection, or who do not have such collections available, have turned to comprehensive privately issued treaty collections. For two centuries the combination most widely used has been Jean Dumont's *Corps universel diplomatique du droit des gens*, 8 volumes covering the years 800–1718 (1726–1731), followed by the "Martens" series (i.e., Georg Friedrich von Martens and Baron Charles de Martens, *Recueil des principaux traités d'alliance, de paix, de trêve*, etc., 2d ed., 8 vols., 1761–1808 [1817–1835]; *Nouveau recueil*, etc., 16 vols., 1808–1839 [1817–1842]; *Nouveaux suppléments*, etc. [ed. F. Murhard], 3 vols., 1839–1842; *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, etc. [ed. Murhard], 20 vols. in 22, 1840–1874 [1843–1875], 2me série, 35 vols., 1853–1897 [1876–1908], 3e série [ed. H. Triepel], 37 vols., 1894–1939 [1908–1942]). The final series of the Martens collection overlapped the comprehensive *League of Nations Treaty Series* (204 vols., 1920–1944), which had distinct advantages in availability of official texts from member states, which were required to register them with the Secretariat, and in translating and publishing facilities. The Martens series was not continued after World War II. Since then the *United Nations Treaty Series* (already more than 600 volumes) has occupied the field.

The treaty series of the League of Nations and the United Nations have been comprehensive, although not wholly complete. They have provided texts in the official languages and in both English and French translations where these languages were not official. The editing has been accurate, but without annotations. Index volumes are issued, but only at considerable intervals. For the period since 1918, therefore, the situation has been pretty satisfactory. For earlier years, where Martens continued to be the principal reliance, it was less so. As must be expected in an unofficial series, Martens was incomplete; it was especially so for non-European treaties. It did not always utilize official texts. Further, it made heavy demands upon the linguistic skills of readers, and required some patience in locating the desired instrument. For the period from 1700 to 1760 it provided (in a supplement) only a selection of treaties supplementary to those in Dumont. Consequently that work must still be used in order to push back to the beginning of the modern period of history, and apart from its own special editorial and linguistic difficulties,

it is now unobtainable. We must therefore applaud Dr. Parry's undertaking to provide a *Consolidated Treaty Series*, as complete as may be, covering the period 1648–1918. Taken with the League and United Nations series, such a collection will provide a complete run for the modern period. Dr. Parry also recognizes the need for editorial annotation to provide the reader with bibliographical information about sources, as well as with essential facts about ratification, termination, and the diplomatic events affecting and affected by the treaties.

Apart from Dr. Parry's own outstanding editorial talents and great experience (he is also the editor of the series of *British International Law Cases* and the *British Digest of International Law*), there is the added assurance provided by the sponsorship of the Council of Europe, which has recommended to member states that they place at his disposal texts of treaties not otherwise available and translations they may possess into English or French. He has also the cooperation of the American Society of International Law and the British Institute of International and Comparative Law.

The first ten volumes, now in hand, certainly make it clear that this compilation will supplant Dumont and Martens for the period covered, providing more complete coverage, the best available texts, with some French and English translations, clearer typography, and useful editorial notes. Index volumes at intervals are promised, although none has yet appeared. These may also carry supplementary texts to repair any omissions which may be discovered. The treaties have not been reset but are photographically reproduced from earlier publications. This work has been meticulously executed: the originals have been enlarged or reduced to page size (resulting of course in some disparity of type size), and the negatives have been treated where necessary to improve clarity. All are very legible, and indeed superior to the original publications which were used.

Given so many commendable improvements it may appear captious to express a few reservations. These reflect the feeling that such an undertaking under such sponsorship should produce a truly definitive treaty collection. In some respects the *Consolidated Treaty Series* falls a little short of that goal. As it is nevertheless so good that no one is likely to think it worthwhile again to undertake so heavy a labor, it is likely that the good will defeat the best.

Would it not have been far better to follow the practice of the League and the United Na-

tions of printing the official language texts and then in all cases giving English and French translations on facing pages when these were not official languages? Instead the *Consolidated Treaty Series* gives such a translation of some of the more important treaties when a published one is available for reproduction, but in many cases only the official language text. A rapid count of the 339 instruments in Volumes 1 through 10, covering the years 1648–1668, indicates that 178 do not appear in either French or English. Of these 91 are in German alone (and in old German types), 54 in Latin alone, 1 in German and Latin, 13 in Spanish, 2 in Latin and Spanish, 1 in Italian, 3 in Italian and Spanish, 1 in Portuguese, 2 in Latin and Portuguese, 3 in Dutch, 2 in Swedish, 1 in Danish, 1 in Swedish and Danish, 3 in Russian. This makes considerable demands upon the linguistic competency of readers. To follow the League-United Nations plan would be expensive, for it would require fresh translations of many treaties and largely increase the number of volumes. Clearly a heavy subsidy would be required. Yet it might be cheaper to do this once than to force generations of scholars who lack one or another language to find translators.

Again, has not the editor adopted a too restricted policy of annotation? His prospectus indeed indicates an ambitious plan, but the notes in the volumes here reviewed center upon bibliographical information concerning sources of published texts, versions, and translations, occasional information about ratification and termination, and sometimes brief summaries of the content of a treaty. Perhaps we are given all that Dr. Parry can discover, but this is not evident from the notes. He sometimes tells us that the original exists in a particular archive, especially when this is the British Foreign Office, but we are left uncertain in other cases whether the original exists and in all cases whether the published texts from which photocopies were made have been compared with the originals to assure accuracy. Frequently there is no information about ratification. Even more frequently there is none about termination. As a minimum it would seem such facts should be given. How much further the editor can be expected to go depends upon the resources available to him. Some indication of the copious historical-diplomatic and legal literature concerning the negotiation and subsequent application and interpretation of important treaties would have been welcome. We find nothing of this sort even for such politically significant treaties as Münster-Osnabrück (Westphalia) or Breda,

or such legally interesting items as the several treaties which contributed strongly to the modern concepts of neutrality, contraband, and blockade (e.g., Spain-Netherlands, 1650; France-Hanseatic Towns, 1655; England-Spain, 1667; England-Netherlands, 1667).

As we have long appreciated that the half-loaf of Dumont and Martens was much better than none, we must welcome gladly the three-quarter loaf of Parry, well baked. Perhaps it is just an idle counsel of perfection to wish that the United Nations might have undertaken a treaty series for this period which would combine the authenticity and linguistic convenience of its current treaty series with annotations of the comprehensive type provided by Hunter Miller. If Dr. Parry has not gone so far, he at least has added greatly to our resources.

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In Defense of Sovereignty. Edited by W. J. Stankiewicz. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969. Pp. 305. \$2.50, paper.)

This book consists of contributions on the subject of sovereignty from twelve well-known writers, political scientists, lawyers, and philosophers. It comes most opportune at a time when U.S.-Soviet diplomacy stresses the prerogatives of major powers in solving the world's problems while smaller countries jealously guard their sovereign rights.

In the introductory chapter the editor, Professor Mankiewicz, postulates the classical theory that "the sovereign tends to be an unlimited, supreme, coercive power which has a will and expresses itself through legislation." Bodin and Hobbes are cited as originators of this concept. The editor lists semantic, empirical, and moral criticisms of the concept: he refers to Maritain's opposition to claims of absolute sovereignty, Stanley Benn's discussion on the need for a supreme norm, Kenneth Cole's criticism of a static juristic conception as opposed to a dynamic political view of the state, Karl Deutsch's treatment of cybernetics and analogy of the state to the human brain, Hans Kelsen's treatment of sovereignty in relation to international law, K. W. B. Middleton's interpretation of sovereignty as political authority, Georg Schwarzenberger's theory of sovereignty as an abstraction from reality, Ivor Wilks's concept of the legal sovereign, W. J. Rees's answer to certain behaviorist objections to the concept, Yves R. Simon's transmission theory of consent, and F. H. Hinsley's historical approach—that the concept was known to the Romans but not the Greeks, who were more philosophically

minded, known in Europe but not Asia or Africa, known to the Renaissance, but not medieval Europe.

The introduction is followed by more detailed analyses by these authors. The editor's summary and evaluation in the first chapter tends to anticipate their points of view and to a certain extent to refute them before they have had a chance to be heard. Methodologically, it might have been preferable to have this chapter at the end rather than the beginning. The reader tends to evaluate contributions in the light of Mr. Stankiewicz's thought. His treatment in the introduction is interspersed with personal comment, such as in relation to Maritain's analysis, "to (the classical theorists) power was unintelligible unless related to a willingness to submit to that power. What cannot be ignored is the *function* of sovereignty in maintaining social order: it is this function which creates the obedience that makes sovereign power and its exercise possible."

In criticizing Benn's treatment, the editor suggests that "the supreme norm is not omniscient. It is capable of deciding not all issues, but only one: a conflict between subordinate members of the orders; that is, the supreme norm is limited by its position as a supreme norm. If we suppose that the concept of sovereignty excludes any kind of limitations, we have to conclude that not even a supreme norm can be called sovereign."

In commenting on Cole, he states that "one of the flaws in Cole's paper stems from his very success in exposing the weakness of what he attacks: he does not really explain why jurists use the concept of sovereignty, despite the appalling difficulties it creates."

After quoting what he regards as the essence of Deutsch's view "if all important decisions are concentrated at one point, and if decisions made at that point tend to govern or override all decisions made elsewhere in the system, the performance of the system may resemble the situation of concentrated sovereignty, familiar from the absolute monarchies of seventeenth and eighteenth-century Europe," Stankiewicz comments that "the difficulty here is that none of the key terms—'important decisions,' 'concentrated,' 'govern or override'—are explained or explicable in terms of the neural analogy."

Dealing with Kelsen's analysis, Stankiewicz asks "how important is Kelsen's paper . . . to an analysis of political sovereignty? Why, in fact, should a paper dealing with something that the concept of political sovereignty says does not exist—international law be important?" And he concludes that "some jurists de-

nounce the classical concept of sovereignty as a hindrance to international morality—and the rule of law—but beneath the moral outrage lies the necessity for proving that a legal order can itself be sovereign, and the only area where this can be proved is the one in which a political sovereign does not exist.”

In a more general vein, Stankiewicz comments that “where the natural scientist and philosopher must eventually arrive at certain irreducible assumptions, the social scientist must accept the fundamental proposition of all science, namely that all things are related. If he supposes . . . that propositions about the nature of the state, law, order, and obedience are irreducible, he detaches his discipline from the rest of science.” He argues that sovereignty is both authority and power, and he holds that “it is not possible to be one’s own government or to have supreme power over one’s self, nor can a constitution be a government.” In his conclusion at the end of the book he states that “the most significant developments that are likely to come out of the sovereignty concept in the future will be related to its ability to make classifications of political behavior meaningful. Too much effort in the past has been spent on proving or disproving the concept and not enough on studying its potentialities as a tool of analysis.”

Reading through the various contributions one cannot help getting the impression that the editor has been debating “strawmen” in the form of selected quotations. Maritain, for example, makes an impressive case proving that the state is accountable and subject to supervision. He concludes by asking, “what can possibly be the concept of a sovereignty liable to supervision, and accountable? Clearly, the state is not sovereign.” Similarly, it is clear that sovereignty in the international sphere is limited by agreements, custom etc. Despite the fact that certain writers require “transformation” of international into national law in order to be binding, others believe that international law is the supreme legal standard. As far as democratic theory is concerned, the powers of government are clearly limited in a democracy and other norms than sovereignty, such as popular will or consensus, might be stipulated as the basis for authority and power.

The contributors to this volume speak from the vantage point of their respective disciplines. The editor seems to have applied his own perspective rather than interrelating the various points of view in the light of the background disciplines. An expansion of the first chapter taking into account the full richness of the

following contributions and relating them to each other in terms of criticisms and defenses of the concept of sovereignty as well as the editor’s own view, would have supplied a more powerful dissertation. As a compilation the individual contributions are carefully selected and the editor’s comment fully deserving of attention. It is to be hoped that further treatments of the subject of sovereignty in a world where international organization co-exists with sovereign states will be forthcoming.

The work is capped by a detailed index.

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United States Policy Toward Latin America: A Study in Domestic and International Politics.

By E. Harrison Wagner, (Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1970. 246 p. \$7.95.)

There are various policies on availability of dissertations written at U.S. universities. A policy of requiring publication at the author’s expense was given up by Columbia and other universities in the 1940’s as being too burdensome; the rationale was that faculty would be careful to maintain high standards if the texts were certain to be exposed to an alien and critical audience. A policy of filing a copy in the library of each university is too restrictive of access by scholars and the public. Beginning in 1938, universities have nearly universally adopted the practice of depositing a copy of each dissertation with University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan. Lists of titles are available and copies of texts can be purchased. This is a useful arrangement, especially in bringing data and bibliographies quickly to hand. To categorize it, we shall call it Ann Arborization, a process of bringing young scholars minimally into the intellectual world.

Some authors, however, not content with this status, desire to De-annarborize their dissertations, and they think that by updating and re-writing, presentation to a wider audience would be justified. This is a risky procedure, for not all rookies are, like Mel Ott, ready for big league exposure in their first season. The temptation to De-annarborize is understandably strong, but often it should be resisted, and, in any case, given the most serious consideration. Usually, when the temptation has been coolly assessed, nonpublication, i.e., the Re-annarborization of dissertations is the best course.

Mr. Wagner has chosen to De-annarborize his dissertation, with appreciative references to professors at Brandeis and Harvard universities for improvements that have been made over

the original text. The title of the book is misleading; this is not a text to replace that of Samuel F. Bemis. Its time span is primarily 1945-68. Its aims are diverse. "The inter-American economic game, which is the subject of this book, is thus related to other regional, functional, and global games." (p. 4) However, "The main concern of this book, then, is with domestic and international politics, and not economics." (p. 7) Again, "The subject of Chapters 3 through 7 is the effect of domestic politics in the United States on the economic policies that the United States Government has applied to Latin America." (p. 4) And, "In Chapter 8 I have tried to describe international politics in such a way as to take into account the effect of the workings of domestic politics in the participating countries, and to apply my conclusions to a discussion of international politics in the Western Hemisphere." (p. 7).

So far as the United States is concerned, the author has some interesting things to say in Chs. 3, 7 and 8 about the influences of domestic politics and institutions on foreign policy. These, brought together with care and precision, might have made an impressive journal article, entitled, e.g., "U.S. Foreign Policy and the Fragmentation of Power." As it is, however these suggestions are nearly lost in the course of a review of economic policy toward Latin America in the past two decades, based entirely on published sources, and adding little to our knowledge.

So far as Latin America is concerned, despite the author's statement (above) that he has taken into account "the effect of the workings of domestic politics in the participating coun-

tries" (p. 7), there is almost nothing here about domestic affairs of individual Latin American economies or politics. For example, there are five references to Chile in the index; one is an error—there is no reference to Chile on p. 76—three do no more than include Chile in lists of Latin American countries, e.g., visited by President Eisenhower (p. 147) and one refers briefly to Chilean protests against United States efforts to keep copper prices down during the Korean War. (p. 52) None of these deals with Chilean "domestic politics," and neither on Chile nor any other Latin American country is any document, book, article or any other local, Latin American source cited as a basis for influencing a policy judgment, or for any other reason. Mexico is treated even more cavalierly. As for ECLA, that fount of economic doctrine for Latin Americans, it is quoted once and mentioned briefly twice.

This is a book about domestic aspects of United States policy toward an artificial entity—Latin America—of which the author apparently knows very little. He refers to "most of Latin America" (p. 45) and "many Latin Americans" (p. 49), but at no point does he reveal anything approaching a serious acquaintance with any one of the 20 individual countries with whose policies that of the United States must contend. What is out there? What are their strengths and possible *ripistes*? The time should have passed when a book claiming to deal with international and domestic politics in the Americas is in fact so parochial as this one. This manuscript should have been Re-ann-arborized.

BRYCE WOOD

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